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ABSTRACT 
Since 2003, Iraq has been experiencing an unprecedented series of disasters; both human made 
and natural, and this has given rise to increased attention by policymakers to the country's 
arrangements for disaster management. Disaster response, which refers to actions “taken 
immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency occurs, to save lives [and] minimise 
damage to property” is one of the critical phases in the Disaster Management life cycle. The 
focus of this study is on disaster response management associated with the events caused by 
terrorism activities in Iraq.  
The study analyses and evaluates the basic functions of disaster management operations 
(planning, organising, directing, controlling); these are presented as weaknesses, strengths and 
recommendations, which are identified for effective disaster response management. This 
research adopts a single holistic case study approach, where the Iraqi General Directorate of 
Civil Defence is the case study and disaster response management is the unit of analysis. The 
Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence is considered as the critical case for this study as 
they are the main administrative body responsible for responding to disasters stemming from 
terrorism in Iraq. A mixed methods approach is used to improve the validity and reliability of 
the research. As such, the findings are based on semi-structured interviews and questionnaire 
surveys with executives responsible for disaster response in the Iraqi General Directorate of 
Civil Defence. In addition, a documentary review of all major documents related to disaster 
response management in this directorate is undertaken. Conceptual content analysis is used to 
articulate the primary data and this is then analysed in the context of the secondary data, by 
conducting cross analysis between the four different stages of disaster response management.  
The findings show that disaster response management is a significantly important stage in the 
disaster management cycle, as an efficient and effective response will ultimately minimise the 
loss of life and damage to property. Whilst there are some weaknesses and limited 
implementation of several elements of good practice in disaster response management in the 
current disaster response practices, there are some strengths which should be built upon. The 
final recommendations are made up of eleven sets of different themes, based on findings from 
both the secondary and primary data. 
This study contributes to the scarce literature currently published on the subject of disaster 
response management in developing countries, such as Iraq. The uniqueness of such studies 
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could be attributed to the very limited attempts that have been made in the past to explore 
disaster response management, possibly due to the difficulty in collecting data around terrorism 
activities. The practical contribution of this study is the potential improvement of the current 
disaster response practices and the systems of disaster response management, which will 
ultimately minimise the loss of life and damage to property. The recommendations proposed 
in this study could potentially improve the immediate response system to serve Iraq’s disaster 
management in the future. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
Disasters are as old as human history but the dramatic increase and the damage caused by them 
in the recent past have become a cause of national and international concern (Dey & Singh, 
2006). ‘Disasters’ have become a common word to people all over the world. The whole world 
is prone to natural disasters as well as to abrupt human-made ones, which have been occurring 
repeatedly in recent history (Palliyaguru, Amaratunga, & Haigh, 2013). 
Lynn (2016) define disaster as a “natural or human-made hazard resulting in significant 
physical damage or destruction, loss of life, or drastic change to the environment”. A disaster 
is classified as such and noted on the EM-DAT database when at least one of the following 
criteria are present (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, & Below, 2016) 
• 10 or more people are reported killed; 
• 100 or more people are reported affected; 
• There is a declaration of a state of emergency; 
• There is a call for international assistance. 
 
The occurrence of a major disaster threatens the possible breakdown of the interconnected 
sociotechnical system that provides technical, economic, social, and cultural services to a 
particular area or community. The disaster menaces not only the destruction of technical 
infrastructures such as power lines, communication lines, and roads but also the organisational, 
social, and economic structures that support the daily actions of the community (Comfort, Ko, 
& Zagorecki, 2004). Disasters sometimes occur without any warning, particularly natural 
disasters. Human-made disasters can be caused by technological and industrial developments; 
with political and socioeconomic change or stagnation come dissatisfaction, terrorism, and war 
(Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). Disasters are often large intractable problems that test the 
ability of communities and nations to effectively protect their populations and infrastructure, to 
reduce both human and property loss, and to rapidly recover (Altay & Green III, 2006). Thus, 
Desforges & Waeckerle (1991), at that time, argued that natural and human-made disasters, 
such as earthquakes, floods, plane crashes, high-rise building collapses, or major nuclear facility 
malfunctions, posed increasing challenges to disaster management response. Statistics 
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indicated, in the first decade of the 21st century, that the number of natural and human-made 
disasters had climbed inexorably, since from 1994 to 1998, the reported disasters average was 
428 per year but from 1999 to 2003, this increased to an average of 707 disaster events per year; 
an increase of about 60 percent over the previous years. The biggest rise was in countries of 
low human development, which suffered an increase of 142 percent (Dey & Singh, 2006). 
Even in the 1990s, it was recognised that disasters, especially human-made ones, were an ever-
present threat and were happening at an increasing rate worldwide (Desforges & Waeckerle, 
1991). Over the course of the past century, according to Coppola (2015), human-made disasters 
grew at a rate much greater than natural disasters. Aitken and Leggat (2012) and Bevere, 
Sharan, and K S (2016) agree with this view presenting the significant rise in human-made 
disaster compared to natural disaster, as explained in Section 2.3 Figure 1.1 also shows a rise 
in human-made disaster numbers.  
 
 Figure 1.1 Total number of technological disasters reported in the world between 1900 
and 2012 (Coppola, 2015, p. 32). Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database. 
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It can be seen in Figure 1.1, that the average number of reported technological disasters 
occurring worldwide grew significantly between 1900 and 2012, spiking from around the start 
of the 1990s and peaking at the start of the new century. The number was less than 50 per year 
in 1980 and this grew to almost 350 per year in 2000, representing a more than sevenfold 
increase in just 20 years (Coppola, 2015). 
The post-cold war era brought many changes in international relations, some new allies were 
formed and organisations such as the UN have attempted to help with the challenges to the 
global community, an effort which remains in 2017. One of the main challenges has been the 
response to both natural and human-made disasters in situations of armed conflict. At the end 
of the 20th century, there were more than 35 armed conflicts worldwide that inflicted over 1,000 
civilian or military deaths (Jenson, 1997). Since then, the number of disasters has increased 
dramatically, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
In addition to this, there have been various terrorist attacks that have occurred throughout the 
world, causing destruction to lives and property. Different countries have faced major attacks, 
such as Germany, Russia, Spain, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Kenya, and Afghanistan. Suicide 
bombings, for instance, are becoming even more common in the Middle East (McEntire, 2015).  
According to Paffenholz (2005), two-thirds of the countries of the world are either suffering 
from political tensions and violent conflict or find themselves in the aftermath of a destructive 
conflict or war. Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, and Davis (2004) agree with this view and added that 
a much greater proportion of the world’s population find their lives shortened by events that 
often go without being noticed: violent conflict, illnesses, and hunger. Such events have often 
been passed as normal existence in many parts of the world, especially (but not only) in 
developing countries. Not only the lives of people are at stake, based on Bush and Duggan 
(2015) the domestic knowledge infrastructure of societies can be frequently targeted directly 
and indirectly if conflicts multiply, interact and escalate. Therefore, damage resulting from 
armed conflict, depending on the nature of the weapons used and the possibilities of secondary 
damage linked to the conflict (for example, fires or floods) may resemble the impact of natural 
disasters (Teijgeler, 2006).  
As a result, timely interaction and coordination of disaster management services are required 
by disaster response and recovery efforts in order to save lives and property (Meissner, 
Luckenbach, Risse, Kirste, & Kirchner, 2002).   
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1.2 Research Problem 
The concept of disaster management has been identified by the research community as: “the 
body of policy and administrative decisions, the operational activities, the actors and 
technologies that pertain to the various stages of a disaster at all levels” (Lettieri, Masella, & 
Radaelli, 2009, p. 117). It is widely acknowledged that disaster management is a very complex, 
difficult, and dangerous activity (Madry, 2015). Accordingly, disaster management aim to be 
proactive (Handmer & Parker, 1991). To conduct proper disaster management, the sequence of 
activities that are logical, integrated and progressive should be acted as a cycle called Disaster 
Management Cycle (Iyer & Mastorakis, 2006, p. 3). There are different phases of this cycle, 
such as response, reconstruction, mitigation, and preparedness (Gospodinov & Burnham, 2008, 
p. 28). Different scholars use the same concepts for these phases but in different terms. 
Although appropriate actions at all stages of the disaster management cycle lead to greater 
preparedness, better warnings, reduced vulnerability or the prevention of disasters (Vasilescu 
et al., 2008), the response phase is considered as one of the critical phases of the Disaster 
Management life cycle (Baharin, Shibghatullah, & Othman, 2009; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). 
The complexity of the disaster response mission, in some cases, will be increased due to the 
high volume of potential casualties as well as the urgency of a fast response (Muaafa, Concho, 
& Ramirez-Marquez, 2014). It is widely acknowledged that in the world of disaster response, 
minutes of delay can cost lives and loss of property, so effectiveness and efficiency are 
essential. In order to avoid actions that are impulsive and possibly counterproductive, the speed 
of response should be balanced with intelligent assessment and good planning (Lindell, Prater, 
Perry, & Nicholson, 2006). Moreover, according to Madry (2015), the disaster response process 
has made progress in incorporating space and other advanced technologies, but there is still 
much work that needs to be done. Many disaster incidents still do not effectively incorporate 
these powerful capabilities, particularly in less developed parts of the world. Such a problem is 
due to the nature of the professional disaster management and response community. In 
agreement, Uhr, Johansson, and Fredholm (2008) argue that to improve the analysis of a 
response system and its data collection process, future research in this area is needed to further 
advance understanding of this phenomena. Not only that, this need is required to develop greater 
precision and better routines in the process of analysis and mapping of data to better understand 
the reality of disaster response. Such understanding enables normative strategies in disaster 
response to be adequately developed. Further, to obtain a better understanding of the 
capabilities of a disaster response system, greater insight into the dynamic processes involved 
when such a system responds is required (Uhr et al., 2008). 
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According to Haigh and Amaratunga (2010) disasters of human origin affected many people in 
the first decade of this century. Wars often resulted from the conflict in regions, for example, 
in Somalia, Afghanistan and Darfur. Losses from such wars exceeded the losses from “natural” 
disaster. Moreover, conflict causes disasters related to terrorist actions such as those in New 
York and Washington (2001), Madrid (2004), Bali (2005), London (2005) and Sri Lanka. 
Consequently, Haigh and Amaratunga (2010) emphasised that military conflict or actions 
carried out by terrorists should be placed within the context of wide-ranging disaster planning. 
There has been some discussion among researchers regarding the behavioural response to the 
disaster as applicable to large-scale destruction and acts of terrorism (Fischer, 1998, 2005, 2008; 
Furedi, 2007). It is widely believed that the world changed forever after the events of 11 
September 2001. It became a more dangerous and uncertain place, where no-one is safe or 
immune from the threat of terror. Terrorism is the most salient hazard due to a remarkable 
upsurge in terrorist acts in the recent past (Coppola, 2015; Fischer, 1998, 2005, 2008). 
Continuing terrorist attacks worldwide are likely to sustain attention to disaster planning, 
especially in Middle Eastern countries (Perry & Lindell, 2003). 
With regard to Iraq, the situation is not an exception, as shown in Table 1.1. Iraq was ranked 
number 1, out of the top 10 countries most at risk of terrorism (due to their vulnerability to 
global risks). It is generally believed that Iraq contains many terrorists and terrorist 
organisations (Fischer, 2005). 
Table 1.1 Top 10 Countries Ranked by Terrorism Risk, 2010 (Coppola, 2011, p. 118) 
Rank Country 
1 Iraq 
2 Afghanistan 
3 Pakistan 
4 Somalia 
5 Lebanon 
6 India 
7 Algeria 
8 Colombia 
9 Thailand 
10 Philippines 
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Violence in Iraq has also become normalised, ranging from the Iraqi and US military assaults 
and sectarian militias, the threat of suicide bombings, to violent street crime (Wong, al-Saiedi, 
& Silva, 2005). According to Hafez (2006), shown in Figure 1.2, 443 suicide attacks took place 
in Iraq between 22 March 2003 to 20 February 2006. 
 
Moreover, due to the development of insurgency after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, the 
lethality of suicide attacks increased, as shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.2 Number of Suicide Attacks in Iraq by Quarter, 2003–2006 (Hafez, 2006, p. 601) 
Figure 1.3 Number of Persons Killed and Injured in Suicide Attacks by Quater, 
2003–2006 (Hafez, 2006, p. 606) 
7 
 
As Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) emphasise, multiple gaps and serious shortcomings have 
been revealed in the disaster risk reduction relating legal and institutional arrangements in Iraq. 
At governorate tier, the disaster management is traditionally operated based upon their 
conventional experience. Moreover, the institutional setups, as well as the laws, are poorly 
equipped to respond to diverse types of disasters.  
War and post-war conflicts have crippled many essential services needed to reduce risks, 
manage hazards and respond to disasters (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). Due to a lower 
frequency of disasters associated with natural hazards in recent years, there has been no rigorous 
effort to institute a comprehensive multi-risk disaster risk management framework. The 
transition from war and internal conflict to functional governance has a direct bearing on the 
DRR architecture in Iraq. Further, there is no coordinating body or focal agency to ensure an 
integrated response by the multiple agencies working on Disaster Risk Reduction in Iraq 
(Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
It further emphasises that the lack of standards and criteria for assessing cases of disasters is 
considered one of the most significant weaknesses in Iraq’s existing disaster legislation. In 
particular, existing legal and institutional systems are ill-equipped to assess and respond to 
multi-hazard risks (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014, N.D.).  
Goodyear (2009) shows that comprehensive and coordinated disaster management is lacking in 
Iraq which includes a risk analysis based on an examination of hazards, vulnerabilities, 
capacities of populations local community, and the first responders charged to assist in times 
of emergencies. Further, with an extensive list of human-made hazards to address, Iraq is ill 
equipped at this time to encounter all these challenges without external support. As a result, the 
need for stronger infrastructural and technical capabilities within the Government of Iraq and 
other disaster risk reduction stakeholders is an imperative to plan for effectively respond to 
future disasters in Iraq. 
Historically, in Iraq, the response to the disasters have largely remained ad-hoc and reactive in 
nature (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). As humanitarian crises become more complex, with 
new and varied actors on the ground, strong partnerships and collaboration between experts, 
organisations, and disciplines are necessary to build capacity especially for the disaster response 
stage in Iraq. 
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There is a dearth of literature on the particular topic of disaster response management in Iraq. 
Indeed, Ren, Kiesler, and Fussell (2008) said that little is known about the challenges and 
obstacles when it comes to sharing and coordinating information effectively, and the lack of 
understanding can be attributed to sparse empirical studies in this area. This is compounded 
when researching the country of Iraq. This is supported by Oloruntoba (2005) and Steigenberger 
(2016), who argued that there is a focus on developed countries, while disasters that occur in 
developing countries have received scarce coverage. 
In addition, while previous studies often involve a post-disaster evaluation, few have examined 
what is happening during the disaster response. Another gap in the literature is that the topic 
has usually been investigated from a single stakeholder’s perspective (Ren et al., 2008) rather 
than looking at multiple stakeholders. 
This study will attempt to gather a wealth of information about Iraq which does not receive 
adequate coverage in the disaster literature. This will provide useful insight into the role of 
disaster response management in Iraq. 
 
1.3 Aim, Objectives and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Aim 
This study aims to evaluate and make recommendations to disaster response management in 
Iraq with particular reference to terrorism to enhance the current disaster response practices. 
This exploration focuses on the achievement of the basic functions of the management 
operation (planning, organising, directing, controlling).  
1.3.2 Objectives 
In order to achieve the aforementioned aim, the following objectives have been defined: 
1) To critically review the significance and the challenges of disaster management in 
general and the disaster response management stage in particular. 
2) To evaluate and synthesise the current status of disaster response management 
stemming from terrorism in Iraq.  
3) To critically evaluate the weaknesses in the disaster response management stage with 
particular reference to Iraq.  
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4) To critically evaluate the strengths in the disaster response management stage with 
particular reference to Iraq.  
5) To make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of disaster response 
management stemming from terrorism in Iraq. 
 
1.3.3 Research Questions 
The following research questions were formulated: 
1) What is the status of disaster response management in Iraq? 
2) Why is the response phase considered as one of the critical phases of the Disaster 
Management life cycle? 
3) What are the weaknesses during disaster response management in Iraq? 
4) What are the good practices to critically evaluate the disaster response management stage? 
5) Why is the evaluation of disaster response management critical to future response 
improvements?  
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
This study is scoped to include Disaster Response Management of human-made disasters, such 
as terrorism activities, which occur in Iraq. The General Directorate of Civil Defence is a main 
administrative body that is responsible for the disaster response activity in Iraq. As such, this 
research focuses on the General Directorate of Civil Defence to investigate the current disaster 
response practices.  
  
1.5 Research Methodology 
Based on the nature of the research objectives and research questions, this research is 
philosophically placed more towards subjectivism and interpretivism because the research deals 
with issues that are more subjective in nature, rather than objective. Further, from the 
understanding of axiology, the position of this research is closer to the value-laden stance (see 
Section 3.3 in Chapter 3). This research adopts case study as the research approach (see Section 
3.5 for justifications). A single holistic case study design is taken with the unit of analysis being 
disaster response management (see Section 3.5.1.2). In addition, the General Directorate of 
Civil Defence was identified in the scope of the study because it is the main administrative body 
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that is responsible for disaster response activity in Iraq. Therefore, primary data was collected 
from experts who are involved in disaster response in the General Directorate of Civil Defence. 
To gather expert opinions regarding the phenomenon under consideration, semi-structured 
interviews and a questionnaire survey were used in this study in addition to documents that 
were reviewed as a supplement to the aforementioned data collection techniques. 
For the analysis of the semi-structured interviews and document analysis, content analysis was 
used, whilst for the analysis of the questionnaire survey, descriptive statistics were used. By 
using the computer aided software programmes NVivo (version 10) and MS Excel, the data 
analysis process was supported. To increase the acceptability of the findings and to make the 
study more robust, the findings were corroborated by triangulating the sources of data. The 
primary and secondary data findings were validated by conducting expert interviews, in order 
to increase the robustness of the final sets of recommendations. 
 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
Though several studies have been conducted on disaster management, there is a focus on 
developed countries, while very limited attempts have been made to explore disaster 
management in developing countries. Further, due to the fact that Iraq and the Middle Eastern 
region of the world do not receive adequate coverage in the disaster literature, this study has an 
important contribution to the literature in terms of its primary and secondary data which do not 
likely exist anywhere else in the world. Moreover, there is a dearth of research on the impact 
the current disaster response status in Iraq has in addressing the problems in disaster response 
management in Iraq, as very little empirical data is available in this field. This study will provide 
useful insight into the role of disaster response management in Iraq. 
The original contribution to knowledge, therefore, is the identification of the challenges and 
obstacles facing disaster response management throughout the world in general and facing 
disaster response management during terrorist operations in Iraq in particular.  
The identification of the good practice disaster response management factors, which help to 
identify the overall gaps during disaster response management in Iraq also contributes to 
knowledge. Furthermore, weaknesses and strengths of the current disaster response practices 
are identified, in order to make recommendations to improve the immediate response process 
in its four stages (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling) which will ultimately 
11 
 
minimise the loss of life and damage to property, and will raise awareness and possibly address 
these weaknesses and enhance disaster response practices. The proposed recommendations, 
therefore, contribute to the sparse literature based in Iraq, thereby further enriching the 
knowledge of disaster response management in general. 
To conclude, this study contributes to both the knowledge and the practices as follows:  
1) Drawing up the challenges facing disaster response management throughout the world in 
general, and those facing the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence in particular. 
2) Identifying the factors of good practice in disaster response management. 
3) Identifying the overall gaps during disaster response management in Iraq. 
4) Identifying points of weakness and strengths in the current disaster response practices in 
Iraq. 
5) Proposing sets of recommendations for the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence. 
 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The chapters of the thesis are organised as follows: 
1.7.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
An overall view of the thesis was provided in Chapter 1 by presenting the key issues which led 
to the initiation of this study, its aims and objectives, a brief introduction to the research 
methodology and contribution to knowledge. 
1.7.2 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review. From the literature, key issues were identified related 
to the disaster, disaster management, disaster response management, and the challenges faced 
in the response management stage. In addition to that, specific literature related to disaster 
response management in Iraq and countries surrounding Iraq is presented and synthesised. 
1.7.3 Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
The research methodological design is provided in Chapter 3 in addition to the research process 
that was followed during the study. The chapter delivers the details of the research philosophy, 
approach and data collection and analysing techniques used for the study.    
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1.7.4 Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
Chapter 4 shows the description and analysis of the single case study. To provide a general idea 
about the General Directorate of Civil Defence, the case study background is provided. Further, 
the analysis of the semi-structured interview transcripts is presented by categorising each stage 
as being either a weakness, strength, or recommendation for disaster response management. 
Subsequently, the implementation of good practice disaster response management factors is 
checked by conducting a questionnaire survey. The gaps between levels of importance and 
implementation are presented. The final section in this chapter examines different kinds of 
documents, such as unpublished internal statistics, reports and studies, and different laws 
related to the current disaster response management and response practices within the Iraqi 
General Directorate of Civil Defence.  
1.7.5 Chapter 5: Research Findings 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the key research findings of the single case study based on the 
disaster response expert interviews, questionnaire survey, document analysis, and literature 
review. It also presents the final sets of recommendations, after a validation process, suggested 
to enhance the overall process to effectively respond to a disaster. 
1.7.6 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 6 draws up conclusions by linking the objectives of the study with the overall research 
findings from the primary and secondary data. Moreover, theoretical and practical implications 
are also provided followed by the limitations of the study and future research areas. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided the overall view on the subject area under consideration in this thesis in 
terms of its background, problem, aim, objectives, a summary of the research methodology, 
contribution to knowledge, and the structure of the thesis. The next chapter reviews and 
synthesises the literature review of this study.  
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is important with respect to this research as it provides the initial information for 
disaster management in general and disaster response management in particular, to further 
advance the understanding of this phenomenon. To understand the concept of disaster, 
especially human-made disaster and its management, it is necessary to review the existing 
literature in several domains as listed below: 
 The first domain will explain the definition of disaster.  
 The second domain of this section will focus on types of disasters.  
 The third domain will include the explanation of terrorism in Iraq.  
 The fourth domain will describe the disaster management cycle in general and 
the disaster response management phase in particular. 
 The fifth domain will present the four stages of disaster response management 
(Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling). 
 The sixth domain will illustrate the challenges during the four stages of 
disaster response management. 
 Finally, in the seventh domain, disaster and disaster management in Iraq and 
countries surrounding Iraq will be investigated. 
 
2.2 Defining Disaster   
In order to better understand the concept of disaster, it is first important to provide a definition 
of the term disaster. Many researchers have defined disaster in their research. Madry (2015) 
defined disaster as an “emergency that cannot be effectively managed using existing, local 
resources and implies a broad-scale incident that covers many people and affected 
infrastructure. Anytime a community is overwhelmed by an incident, and it cannot effectively 
manage the situation using its existing resources, requiring a call for outside assistance, that is 
considered to be a disaster”. While one of the famous researchers in the field of disasters, 
Fischer (2008, pp. 2-3) identifies the concept of disaster as “actual or threatened accidental or 
uncontrollable events that are concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a relatively 
self-sufficient subdivision of a society undergoes severe danger, and incurs such losses to its 
members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of 
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all or some of the essential functions of the society, or its subdivision, is prevented”. In a similar 
way, Lindell (2013, p. 797) states that a disaster is “an event concentrated in time and space, in 
which a society or one of its subdivisions undergoes physical harm and social disruption, such 
that all or some essential functions of the society or subdivision are impaired”. Gospodinov and 
Burnham (2008, p. 26) agree with this view, stating that “the word disaster implies a sudden 
overwhelming and unforeseen event. At the household level, a disaster could result in a major 
illness, death, a substantial economic or social misfortune. At the community level, it could be 
a flood, a fire, a collapse of buildings in an earthquake, the destruction of livelihoods, an 
epidemic or displacement through conflict. When occurring at district or provincial level, a 
large number of people can be affected. Most disasters result in the inability of those affected 
to cope with outside assistance”.  
In yet a further definition, Coles and Buckle (2004, p. 3) defined disaster as “a serious disruption 
to community life which threatens or causes death or injury in that community and/or damage 
to property which is beyond the day-to-day capacity of the prescribed statutory authorities and 
which requires special mobilisation and organisation of resources other than those normally 
available to those authorities”. Similarly, disasters are defined as “deadly, destructive, and 
disruptive events that occur when a hazard interacts with human vulnerability. Disasters are 
significant societal events that injure and kill people, damage infrastructure and personal 
property, and complicate the routine activities people undertake on a daily basis (e.g., bathing, 
cooking, travelling, going to school, working, etc.)” (McEntire, 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, 
according to Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 2), disaster is “a dynamic mechanism that begins 
with the activation of a hazard and flows through the system as a series of events, in a logical 
sequence to produce a loss”. Using a narrower concept, Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 2) define 
disaster as “an unintentional and unplanned event, for which a significant comprehensive 
emergency management plan should be included and developed”.  
In general, there are two common points in all definitions. Firstly, events that are concentrated 
in time and space. Lindell (2013) emphasises that the difficulty in identifying the time of the 
disaster impact is a common feature of disaster, in addition to the problem of identifying disaster 
impact zones because they are not neat circles. Lindell (2013) stated that an earthquake that 
might cause 50 deaths in a few minutes can be distinguished from automobile accidents that 
cause approximately 34,000 per year in the US. Secondly, physical harm and social disruption 
may occur due to the normal protections' exceedance during a disaster event (Lindell, 2013). 
From these definitions, it is apparent that disasters have different characteristics and impact but 
15 
 
have a common element, which is their severity. Thus, no definition of disaster is universally 
accepted (Shaluf, 2007). By evaluating the above definitions, it can now be concluded that 
disaster is a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a 
national or international level for external assistance. The aforementioned definition will be 
taken in this study.  
2.3 Statistics about Disasters 
Figure 2.1 clearly shows a rise in disaster numbers each decade from the 1950s to the end of 
the 20th century (Aitken & Leggat, 2012). It also shows a significant rise in human-made 
disaster compared to natural disaster, although both rose in the last half of the 20th century. In 
fact, human-made disasters doubled in number between 1980 and the end of the century (Aitken 
& Leggat, 2012). Statistics indicate that the number of natural and human-made disasters 
climbed inexorably in the first part of the 21st century (Dey & Singh, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Frequency of Disasters Each Decade (Aitken & Leggat, 2012, p. 146) 
 
An event is classified as a catastrophe and included in the sigma database when insured claims 
and total economic losses exceed 97.7 million, or the number of casualties exceed 20 dead or 
missing, 50 injured, 2000 homeless. According to such criteria, there were 353 catastrophic 
events across the world in 2015, up from 339 in 2014. Of the total, 198 were natural 
catastrophes, the highest ever recorded in one year, and up from 191 in 2014. The remaining 
155 events were human-made disasters, also more than the 148 that occurred in 2014 (Bevere 
et al., 2016).  
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Figure 2.2 Number of Catastrophic Events, 1970–2015 (Bevere et al., 2016, p. 2) 
 
It can be seen from Figure 2.2 above that there were a greater number of human-made disasters 
than natural catastrophes between 1970 and 2010, at which point, natural catastrophes increased 
above the number of human-made disasters. 
2.4 Types of Disasters 
Disaster phenomena have been studied by research centres all over the world. Sometimes 
different terminology may be used to classify disasters by different researchers. The views of 
academics on disaster types are summarised below. 
 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Types of disasters (Biswas & Choudhuri, 2012, p. 13) 
 
Disasters are mainly classified by many researchers into two groups: natural disaster and 
human-made (Biswas & Choudhuri, 2012; Carrillo et al., n.d.; Fischer, 2008; Iyer & 
Mastorakis, 2006; Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006; Zimmerman, 1985). Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
different types of disaster. However, certain research such as Moe and Pathranarakul (2006) 
call human-made disaster by a different name; that of “technological disaster”.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Types of disasters (Shaluf, 2007, p. 705) 
 
On the other hand, Shaluf (2007) classified it into three groups: natural, human-made and hybrid 
disasters as shown in Figure 2.4. Similarly, Hood and Jackson (1992, p. 112) categorised it into 
purely natural disasters, hybrid disasters and purely social disasters. What follows is a 
description of these types. 
Disaster 
Human-made 
Sociological 
Natural 
Geological 
Hydrological 
Climatic & atmospheric 
Wildfire 
Technological 
Disaster 
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2.4.1 Natural Disaster 
Broadly, a natural disaster has been defined as a consequence when humans are affected by a 
natural hazard (e.g., volcanic eruption or earthquake). Human vulnerability, caused by the lack 
of appropriate emergency management, leads to environmental, financial, or human impact 
(Biswas & Choudhuri, 2012, p. 14). In a similar way, Pelling et al. (2004, p. 98) defined it as 
“a serious disruption triggered by a natural hazard causing human, material, economic or 
environmental losses, which exceed the ability of those affected to cope”. Carrillo et al. (n.d., 
p. 28) state that these types of disaster occur naturally in proximity to, and pose a threat to, 
people, structures or economic assets. Biological, geological, seismic, hydrologic, or 
meteorological conditions or processes in the natural environment caused these types of disaster 
(e.g., cyclones, earthquakes, tsunami, floods, landslides, and volcanic eruptions). It is widely 
known that “Acts of God” are often termed as natural disasters (Shaluf, 2007). Natural disasters 
are classified by Biswas and Choudhuri (2012) into four types (geological, hydrological, 
climatic & atmospheric, and wildfire) as shown in Figure 2.3. However, Turner and Pidgeon 
(1997) cited in Shaluf (2007, p. 707) classified it in a different way, namely, natural phenomena 
beneath the earth’s surface, natural phenomena of complex physical origin on the earth’s 
surface, metrological/hydrological phenomena and biological phenomena. Finally, it is 
important to mention that natural disasters are considered catastrophic events, over which man 
has no control, resulting from natural causes such as volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, earthquakes, 
etc. (Shaluf, 2007). 
2.4.2 Human-Made Disaster 
A major term of interest for this study is that of human-made disaster which is often referred to 
as human-made disaster. Human-made disaster has been defined as human action, error, 
negligence, or involving the failure of a system which caused disasters (Biswas & Choudhuri, 
2012, p. 14). Similarly, Carrillo et al. (n.d., p. 25) define it as “emergency situations of which 
the principal, direct causes are identifiable human actions, deliberate or otherwise. Situations 
in which civilian populations suffer casualties, losses of property, basic services and means of 
livelihood as a result of war, civil strife or other conflicts, or policy implementation are mainly 
involved in it. People are forced to leave their homes, in many cases, giving rise to 
congregations of refugees or externally and/or internally displaced persons as a result of civil 
strife, an airplane crash, a major fire, oil spill, epidemic, terrorism, etc.” Iyer and Mastorakis 
(2006, p. 3), in a similar way, define it as the result of various untoward incidents. Shaluf (2007), 
on the other hand, defined it as those catastrophic events that result from human decisions. 
19 
 
Whereas the frequency and severity of natural disasters should be acknowledged, Harding 
(2007) states that human-made disasters are broader in scope and consequences. Furthermore, 
human-made disasters provoke a serious disruption of the agriculture, economy and health-care 
sectors of a society, typically producing long-lasting effects that perpetuate underdevelopment. 
To sum up, disaster management has traditionally emphasised natural hazards rather than 
human-made technological hazards (Zimmerman, 1985). This study will shed light on human-
made disasters stemming from terrorism in Iraq. 
2.4.2.1 Types of Human-Made Disasters 
Biswas and Choudhuri (2012) categorised human-made disasters into two types: technological 
and sociological. Technological disasters are the results of the failure of technology, such as 
transport disasters, engineering failures, or environmental disasters. Sociological disasters have 
a strong human motive, such as war, riots, criminal acts and stampedes (Biswas & Choudhuri, 
2012, p. 14). However, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(2003) classified it by its occurrences, that can be sudden or long-term. Sudden human-made 
disasters include mine, structural and building collapses when this occurs independently 
without any outside force. Moreover, land, sea, and air disasters are all human-made disasters. 
Long-term human-made disasters tend to refer to international and national conflicts. 
Nevertheless, Turner and Pidgeon (1997) cited in Shaluf (2007, p. 707) categorised it due to its 
causes: (see Figure 2.5)  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Types of Human-Made Disasters (Shaluf, 2007, p. 705) 
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 Caused by warfare: 
1. Conventional warfare, including blockades and sieges; and 
2. Non-conventional warfare (biological, chemical and nuclear). 
 
 Caused by accidents: 
1. Vehicular (ships, cars, planes, trains); 
2. Drowning; 
3. Collapse of buildings and other structures; 
4. Explosions; 
5. Fires; 
6. Biological; and 
7. Chemical, including poisoning by pesticides and pollution. 
 
2.4.3 Hybrid Disasters 
According to Shaluf (2007), hybrid disasters are a result of both human error and natural forces. 
The extensive clearing of jungles causing soil erosion, and subsequently heavy rain causing 
landslides is considered one of many examples of hybrid disasters. In a similar way, Hood and 
Jackson (1992) cited in Shaluf (2007, p. 710) defined it as a compound of human decisions and 
volatile natural forces (e.g. floods ravage communities built on a known flood plain).  
As shown in Table 2.1, Shaluf (2007, p. 706) summarised natural, human-made and hybrid 
disasters, and disastrous events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Table 2.1 Types of Disasters (Shaluf, 2007) 
Disaster 
Type 
Sub-disaster  Name of Disaster 
Natural Natural phenomena beneath the Earth’s surface Earthquakes 
Tsunamis 
Volcanic eruptions 
 
 Topographical phenomena Landslides 
Avalanches 
 
 Meteorological/Hydrological phenomena Windstorms (cyclones, typhoons, 
hurricanes) 
Tornadoes 
Hailstorms 
Floods 
Drought 
Heat waves/cold waves 
 
 Biological phenomena Infestations (locust swarms, mealy bug) 
Epidemics (cholera, dengue, ebola, 
malaria, measles, meningitis, yellow 
fever, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis) 
 
Man-made Socio-technical     Technological disasters Fire 
Explosions (munitions explosions, 
chemical explosions, nuclear 
explosions, mine explosions) 
Leakage 
Toxic release 
Pollutions (Pollution, acid rain, 
chemical Pollution, atmospheric 
pollution) 
Structural collapse of physical assets 
 
                                Transportation disasters Air disasters 
Land disasters 
Sea disasters 
 
                                Stadia or other public places failures Fire 
Structural collapse 
Crowd stampede 
  Production failure Computer system breakdown 
Distribution of defective products 
 Warfare National Civil war between armed groups from 
the same country 
Civil strikes 
Civil disorder 
Bomb threats/terrorist attack 
 
  International   Conventional war War between two armies from different 
countries 
Sieges 
Blockades 
 
                         Non-conventional war Nuclear 
Chemical 
Biological 
 
Hybrid Natural and man-made events Flood ravage community built on 
known floodplain 
Location of residential premises, 
factories, etc., at the foot of an active 
volcano, or in an avalanche area 
Landslides 
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To sum up, sometimes natural and/or human-made disasters trigger subsequent disasters such 
as displaced people (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2003). 
The subsequent disasters have social and economic impacts. Furthermore, the disruption of 
normal community functions through human-made disaster must be recognised for its broad-
based, long-term impact (Harding, 2007). For this reason, human-made disaster with particular 
reference to terrorism in Iraq has been highlighted in this research (see Figure 2.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Type of Human-made Disasters Highlighted in this Research 
 
2.5 Terrorism 
Terrorism is considered the most salient hazard due to a remarkable upsurge in terrorist acts 
during the past decade particularly in Iraq (see Table 1.1). McEntire (2015) considered 
terrorism as one of the most deadly civil/conflict risks throughout history, and has unfortunately 
become even more pronounced in the past few years. Helbing, Ammoser, and Kühnert (2006) 
stated that terrorist attacks have become an increasingly serious concern. In many cases, 
terrorists try to gain public awareness for certain political or religious interests or a disregarded 
problem, for instance, a suppressed minority. The terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 in 
New York and on 11th March 2004 in Madrid are the best illustration of such attacks.  
After the events of 11 September 2001, the world changed, becoming a more dangerous and 
uncertain place, and no-one can consider themselves safe or immune from the threat of terror. 
According to Davies (2005), the threat of suicide bombers and the events of 9/11 have brought 
a completely new meaning to terrorist activity. As there is a willingness among terrorists to use 
almost any means to make chaos and wreak death and destruction, leading to an environment 
of fear caused by the threat alone. In agreement, Helbing et al. (2006) noted that in many cases, 
the ultimate goal of terrorists is maximum damage. Not only damage, Lemyre et al. (2005) 
indicated terrorism events, such as radiological, chemical, biological, and nuclear have 
Disaster 
Human-made disaster Hybrid disaster Natural disaster 
Terrorism 
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psychosocial consequences both at the emotional levels and normal behavioural and the clinical 
level. Arora and Arora (2013) noted that it is important to briefly mention the threat of a 
radiological or chemical attack being integrated into a suicide bombing. Though these have not 
yet been used with success, it has been attempted in bombings in Iraq using chlorine tankers. 
Arora and Arora (2013) added that first responders must have a basic knowledge of what to 
expect during suicide attack events along with their specific security, safety and management 
considerations. An understanding of the threat posed by explosive devices specifically targeting 
first responders is considered a key to such awareness. While the most important aspects of 
responder knowledge are awareness of the threat of secondary devices. In addition to that the 
most important initial steps in suicide attack responses are ensuring that the threats on scene 
have been neutralised (Arora & Arora, 2013). 
Terrorism is defined in many ways by many scholars and institutions. According to Frykberg 
and Tepas 3rd (1988, p. 569), terrorism is the unlawful exercise of random and ruthless violence 
against property or individuals, usually innocent civilians, in order to intimidate governments 
or societies for political or ideological purposes. In a similar way Panzer, Butler, and Goldfrank 
(2003, p. 2) defined terrorism as the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence to instil 
fear in populations, and an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their 
populations. While Miron and Cernuşca (2008, p. 65) and Romanian Law (535/2005) defined 
terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives”. Similarly, McEntire (2015) defined terrorism as “the threat or use of 
violence to intimidate someone or a government. The perpetrators usually have ideological 
motives and a political objective to reach”. Perry and Lindell (2003) argue that whilst it is 
possible to use the general basic structures of disaster response management, in terms of using 
the planning knowledge, terrorist incidents are very different to other types of disaster, having 
unique aspects which need to be considered in the response plans. 
There are various terrorist attacks that have occurred throughout the world. Different countries 
have faced major attacks, such as Germany, Russia, Spain, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Kenya, 
and Afghanistan. Suicide bombings, for instance, are become common in the Middle East 
(McEntire, 2015). In the case of Iraq, it is widely agreed that terrorists did not have a hold on 
any part of Iraq before the US invasion. However, it is also generally believed that Iraq contains 
many terrorists and terrorist organisations. Therefore a step back will be suggested rather than 
forward (Fischer, 2005). As a result, violence in Iraq has become normalised, ranging from the 
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Iraqi and US military assaults and sectarian militias, threat of suicide bombings, to violent street 
crime (Wong et al., 2005).  
As discussed above, terrorist threats are a reality in Middle Eastern countries, particularly in 
Iraq. Accordingly, terrorist operations are the main reason leading to the increased number of 
disasters in Iraq. Thus, evaluation needs to be conducted to the system of disaster management 
in Iraq due to these operations. 
2.6 Disaster and Conflict 
Conflicts can be violent and militarised. As conflicts multiply, interact and escalate, the 
domestic knowledge infrastructure of societies is frequently targeted directly and indirectly 
(Bush & Duggan, 2015). Basically, conflicts can be prolonged or shortened by disasters 
(Keefer, 2009). Further, long-term disasters tend to refer to national and international conflicts 
(Shaluf & Ahmadun, 2006). Keefer (2009) believes that disaster recovery efforts can be 
improved or undermined by conflicts. In addition, disaster relief is often disrupted by conflict. 
Damage resulting from armed conflict, depending on the nature of the armaments employed 
and the possibilities of secondary damage linked to the conflict (e.g. fire, flood), may resemble 
the impact of natural disasters (Teijgeler, 2006). Based on Wisner et al. (2004), conflicts have 
continued to exacerbate natural extreme events such as drought in Afghanistan and the volcanic 
eruption in eastern Congo (2002). According to Keefer (2009), the reason behind the cause or 
exacerbation of conflict is that the underlying political conditions that weaken government 
response to natural hazards also make governments more vulnerable to insurgency. An 
association between conflict and disaster can be promoted by the political and strategic factors 
and causes distortions in the allocation of disaster relief (Keefer, 2009). Goodyear (2009) stated 
that the central link between hazards, disaster, conflict and economic development is 
vulnerability. In agreement, Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) noted that the vulnerability of the 
Iraqi people has been exacerbated by different kinds of hazards such as acute poverty, 
displacement and the continuing effects of conflict. According to Paffenholz (2005), two-thirds 
of the countries of the world are either suffering from political tensions and violent conflict or 
find themselves in the aftermath of a destructive conflict or war. 
Disasters have an impact on the economic development and human development of a country 
(Wisner et al., 2004) causing devastation at the household / family level (when livestock, crops, 
homes and tools are repeatedly destroyed). The impact is also felt at national level, when roads, 
bridges, hospitals, schools and other facilities are damaged. The pattern of such frequent 
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devastation from natural disaster can be exacerbated and complicated by human action – both 
by ineffective efforts to deal with the disaster and by the increased vulnerability that ensues 
from potential conflict (Wisner et al., 2004). 
Human-made disasters (at the outset) often have a greater impact than natural disasters in the 
detrimental effects on people. Theft, war, civil disorder, terrorism, neglect and vandalism are 
human factors in the wilful destruction of the world (Teijgeler, 2001). Armed conflict and acts 
of terrorism remain particularly disturbing, since they have such a devastating effect on society 
and the heritage of countries (Teijgeler, 2006). 
2.7 Disaster Management 
Disaster management is a very difficult, complex, and dangerous activity (Madry, 2015). The 
aim of disaster management, taking this broad approach, is to be proactive and reduce the major 
incident occurring or the likelihood of a disaster, and to reduce the consequences should one 
occur (Handmer & Parker, 1991). The following is a brief review of disaster management 
definitions. The term, disaster management can be defined as “the organisation and 
management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of 
emergencies, in particular, preparedness, response and recovery in order to lessen the impact of 
disasters” (IFRC, 2017). Disaster management can also be defined as “an integrated process of 
planning, organising, coordinating and implementing measures that are needed for effectively 
dealing with its impact on people. This includes prevention, mitigation, capacity building, 
preparedness, response, assessment, rescue and rehabilitation” (Deshmukh, Rodrigues, & 
Krishnamurthy, 2008). Lettieri et al. (2009, p. 117) defined disaster management as 
administrative decisions and the body of policy, the actors, the operational activities and 
technologies that relate to the several phases of a disaster at all levels. (Dey & Singh, 2006; 
Vasilescu et al., 2008) agree with this view, stating that it includes all the activities which help 
to avoid, reduce the impact or recover from disaster loss, and these can be implemented before, 
during or after a disaster. However, according to Carrillo et al. (n.d., p. 27), disaster 
management is a massive task which is not limited to any specific location. They disappear as 
quickly as they appear. Thus, proper management is imperative to optimise the ability of 
planning and response. Due to restricted resources, it is essential to co-operate efforts at the 
governmental, community and private fields. This scale of collaboration needs an organised 
and coordinated effort to prepare for, mitigate against, recover from, and respond to 
emergencies and their effects in the shortest possible time. In yet a further definition, Iyer and 
Mastorakis (2006, p. 2) defined disaster management as multiple institutional approaches which 
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are required at all phases of a disaster. Industry is one of the institutions interested in developed 
planning to address a disaster. Resource assessment, diagnosis and feedback in order to satisfy 
the goal of disaster reduction are a requirement of perfect planning. Dedicated commitments 
are required for disaster management by central, state and district levels. An effective disaster 
plan could be maintained by a structure with obviously defined authority and adequate budget. 
In general, it can now be concluded that better elaboration, planning, strategic mobilisation, 
training for relief project workers and techniques to push aid through unresponsive governments 
should be stressed by a disaster management system. Indeed, obvious procedures for systematic 
behaviour by different relief organisations will lead to more effective and efficient relief tasks 
(Lai, He, Tan, & Phua, 2009).  
2.7.1 Disaster Management Cycle 
In order to better understand the importance of the disaster response phase in the disaster 
management cycle, it is first important to provide a definition of what the disaster management 
cycle is. According to Warfield (2008) cited in Vasilescu et al. (2008), the disaster management 
cycle represents the ongoing procedure by which governments, civil society, and businesses 
plan for and decrease the influence of disasters, react during and immediately following a 
disaster, and take steps to recover after a disaster has occurred. Suitable actions at all cycle 
phases cause better warnings, greater preparedness, reduced vulnerability or the forbidding of 
disasters during the following repetition of the cycle. He also added that the whole disaster 
management cycle contains the modelling of public policies and plans that either modify the 
causes of disasters or mitigate their effects on people, property, and infrastructure. Using a 
narrower concept, Carrillo et al. (n.d., p. 27) define the disaster management cycle as “a cycle 
with phases that reduce or prevent disasters”. Whereas Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 3) define 
it as a logical, integrated and progressive sequence of activities as a cycle of preparedness and 
action followed by disaster management.  
 
Figure 2.7 Disaster Cycle (Gospodinov & Burnham, 2008, p. 28) 
27 
 
 
Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 3) identify the stages of disaster management cycle as, risk 
reduction, readiness, response, and recovery. Gospodinov and Burnham (2008, p. 28) divided 
the disaster cycle into four phases, namely, response, reconstruction, mitigation, and 
preparedness see Figure 2.7. Similarly, Muaafa et al. (2014) classify disaster management 
stages to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In a similar way, Vasilescu et al. 
(2008, p. 49) presented the phases of the disaster management cycle but in a different style (see 
Figure 2.8). It can be seen that Vasilescu et al. (2008, p. 49) classification have more stages 
than Gospodinov and Burnham (2008, p. 28) one but it already includes the four stages of 
Gospodinov and Burnham (2008, p. 28). These divisions use the same concepts but in different 
terms. 
 
 
Even though all disaster management phases are interrelated (Muaafa et al., 2014), the focus of 
this study is on the response stage of terrorism in Iraq (see Figure 2.9). This is because the 
response phase is identified as the most critical phase of the disaster management life cycle 
(Baharin et al., 2009) since delays of minutes can cost lives and property (Lindell et al., 2006). 
 
Figure 2.8 Disaster Management Cycle (Vasilescu, Khan, & Khan, 2008, p. 49) 
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Figure 2.9 Response Stage Highlighted in this Research 
 
2.8 Disaster Response Management  
Having defined what is meant by the disaster management cycle, disaster response management 
definitions will be reviewed. Disaster response can be defined as action “taken immediately 
before, during, or directly after an emergency occurs, to save lives [and] minimise damage to 
property” (Godschalk, 1991, p. 136) cited in (McEntire, 2015). In the same way, response can 
be defined as “activities taken immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency that 
saves lives, minimize property damage, or improve recovery; e.g., emergency plan activation, 
activation of emergency systems, emergency instructions to the public, emergency medical 
assistance, manning emergency operations centres, reception and care, shelter and evacuation, 
and search and rescue” (McLoughlin, 1985). Or it is “the provision of emergency services and 
public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health 
impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected” 
(UNISDR, 2009). While Vasilescu et al. (2008, p. 47) defined response activity as initiatives 
taken in response to a disaster with the purpose to achieve early recovery and rehabilitation of 
affected communities, immediately after disaster strikes. Likewise, Madry (2015) defined 
response as “the immediate set of actions taken to save lives and property in a disaster, including 
search and rescue, sheltering, emergency medical assistance, and more”. In the same way, 
response is defined as “the set of actions conducted during the initial impact of these emergency 
situations, including those to save lives and prevent further property damage providing 
Disaster 
Human-made disaster Hybrid disaster Natural disaster 
Mitigation 
Terrorism 
Response Preparedness Reconstruction 
Disaster management cycle 
29 
 
emergency relief to victims of natural or human-made disasters” (Barbarosoğlu & Arda, 2004). 
Carrillo et al. (n.d., p. 50) agree with this view, stating that disaster response is “the sum total 
of actions taken by people and institutions in the face of disaster. These actions commence with 
the warning of an oncoming threatening event or with the event itself if it occurs without 
warning”. On the other hand, Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 3) define it as “the core of the initial 
response to a disaster provided by the emergency services and thereafter, depending on its 
nature and scale by the local authorities and voluntary and utility services”. While Nazarov 
(2011) defined response as “the actions taken to save lives and prevent further damage in a 
disaster or emergency situation. Response is putting preparedness plans into action. Response 
activities may include damage assessment, search and rescue, firefighting, and sheltering 
victims. Response activities take place during an emergency” (Nazarov, 2011). Using a 
narrower concept, the World Health Organization (2002, p. 22) defined it as a set of activities 
implemented after the impact of a disaster. Coppola (2015, p. 305) stated that the beginning of 
the response process is as soon as the hazard event has become imminent and lasts until the 
emergency is declared to be over. 
Having evaluated the views on disaster response management, the following has been 
established as the working definition for disaster response management: “actions taken 
immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency occurs, to save lives, minimize 
property damage, to achieve early recovery and rehabilitation of affected communities, 
immediately after disaster strikes”. 
According to Madry (2015) professional disaster management is a very serious business due to 
both the difficulty and scope of a disaster response, and also due to the fact that lives and 
property are at stake. In agreement, Hofmann, Betke, and Sackmann (2015) stress that an 
efficient, effective, and flexible process execution in disaster response management is crucial 
to the safety or even the survival of systems, people, and/or properties. Responding to disaster 
is a serious challenge because disaster requires serious decisions that must be made in critical 
situations (Platt, 2015), in addition to that different types of management skills and information 
are also required in different phases of disaster response (Comfort et al., 2004). In agreement, 
Uhr et al. (2008) indicated that the response operation is complex. Muaafa et al. (2014) agree 
with this view and added, in some cases, the complexity of the disaster response mission will 
be increased because of the urgency of a fast response and the high volume of potential 
casualties. In agreement, based on Ogasawara, Tanimoto, Imaichi, and Yoshimoto (2014), 
during a disaster, response activities must operate in a constantly changing environment. If the 
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disaster has produced large amounts of damage over a wide area with numerous unexpected 
events, mounting an accurate and rapid response will be difficult. Recent disasters have 
presented that it is difficult for policy makers to respond to citizen reactions to disasters 
(Pennings & Grossman, 2008). Further, Baharin et al. (2009) and Hale et al. (2005) stated that 
the response phase is one of the critical phases in the Disaster Management System life cycle. 
As a result, developing an efficient and effective disaster response strategy is crucial (Muaafa 
et al., 2014). Moreover, Sakurai, Watson, and Kokuryo (2016) stress that developing 
government or community capacity to mobilise responses to a future disaster is important. Not 
only that important, Hale et al. (2005) encourage a distinct research effort, due to the unique 
environment present during disaster response, such as stress, time pressure, and immediate risk 
of significant loss. Thus, in the USA, since 9/11, there have been considerable efforts to propose 
improvements in the ability to respond to emergencies (Turoff, Chumer, de Walle, & Yao, 
2004). In Australia, however, responses normally occur in three stages, within the structure of 
the Australian Federal Government. Firstly, assessing the problem is required to develop 
possible responses, based on this assessment, by department or inter-government committee 
that is responsible for policy administration in the area. Secondly, the level of response will be 
decided on cabinet depending on recommendations developed either at the departmental level 
or as the result of interdepartmental consultations. Thirdly, the implementation of cabinet 
decisions will be described by the department or departments involved. Accordingly, existing 
legislation might be used or new legislation might be passed in such decisions (Prideaux, 2004). 
The key problem with this phase is it is widely believed by the public that the behavioural 
response to disaster is deviant and chaotic (Fischer, 1998, 2008). Previously, Fischer (2005) 
noted that the behavioural response is actually very altruistic. While Comfort (2002) mentioned 
that the effective mobilisation of response to extreme events on a large scale is considered one 
of the least understood problems in public management. Comfort et al. (2004) gave a reason 
for this problem, stating that the ratio of demand for assistance to capacity to provide resources, 
in disaster response and recovery operations, varies over time. Such immediate demands, in the 
initial stages of disaster, involve actions to protect lives and provide assistance to injured 
persons. As a result, the organisations that are responsible for first-response seek to meet urgent 
demands of disaster victims under tight time constraints. Arora and Arora (2013) added that 
first responders must have a basic knowledge of what to expect during suicide attack events 
along with their specific security, safety and management considerations. An understanding of 
the threat posed by explosive devices specifically targeting first responders is considered a key 
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to such awareness. While the most important aspect of responder knowledge is awareness of 
the threat of secondary devices. In addition to that the most important initial steps in suicide 
attack responses are ensuring that the threats on scene have been neutralised (Arora & Arora, 
2013). Comfort (2002) further stated that the knowledge base to support response operations in 
such an event needs to be scalable. In addition to this, Eyre (2006) states that the ability to cope 
is related to a range of risk factors that happened before, during and after the disaster. Making 
the situation as normal as possible can help survivors to cope better, therefore to protect social 
resources and signpost further sources of support are fundamental to good psycho-social 
response. 
Disasters occur all over the world, and the response is clearly influenced by the level of 
development, historical context, local culture, and the national readiness to respond (Madry, 
2015). The efficient response to a disaster plays an important role in reducing its impact on 
affected victims (Muaafa et al., 2014). An effective response to disaster includes the ability to 
improvise in the face of unexpected situations as well as the ability to harness benefits from 
preparedness activities (Handmer & Parker, 1991). Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki (2003) and 
Comfort et al. (2004) show that the efficiency of disaster response is affected by the initial 
magnitude of the disaster, the number of jurisdictions engaged, the type and amount of 
resources available, and the type of response strategies used. Madry (2015) considered that the 
structure of the disaster response officials is the key to the response, while Miller (2007) noted 
that time is another element to consider when examining disaster response. Miller (2007) added 
that community response is formed by pre-existing social organisation (Miller, 2007). 
Regarding the effectiveness of the organisational response, Fischer (2005) presented three 
factors which affected the organisational response, namely: the extent to which emergency 
plans are rehearsed; the degree of prior disaster experience; and the level of prior planning. 
Whilst Comfort (2002) listed three different factors, namely: pre-disaster planning among 
organisations to identify what information will be required; how this information may be 
accessed and rapidly searched, exchanged; and absorption of valid information regarding 
sudden, damaging events transmitted through a network of organisations that crosses 
disciplinary, organisational, and jurisdictional boundaries required for this process. 
On the other hand, Cardona (2005) believed that in order to reduce vulnerability, all types of 
risk management capabilities need to be strengthened. Furthermore, existing risks and likely 
future risks should also be identified. This cannot be achieved without an adequate measure of 
risk and monitoring to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of corrective or prospective 
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intervention measures to mitigate or prevent disasters. Similarly, Ugwu and Ihejirika (2013) 
emphasised that when disaster occurs the needed assessment process has become an initial 
process to follow up; it is a problematic or daunting task to understand the required need to 
administer more accurately and swiftly in such situations. Cardona (2005) also mentions that 
the lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework of disaster risk to facilitate a 
multidisciplinary evaluation and intervention resulted from the difficulty in achieving effective 
disaster risk management. Most existing indices and evaluation techniques have not adequately 
expressed risk and are not based on a holistic approach that invites intervention. To sum up, 
Cardona (2005) stated that evaluation and follow-up should be undertaken using methods that 
facilitate an understanding of the problem and that can help guide the decision-making process.  
So for all these reasons, research and evaluation provide disaster practitioners with the 
knowledge needed for preparedness and response. They also provide good platforms to 
exchange knowledge. As humanitarian crises become more complex, with new and varied 
actors on the ground, strong partnerships and collaboration between experts, organisations, and 
disciplines is vital to build capacity.   
In summary, the majority of the aforementioned definitions and views agree that disaster 
response management is an action taken immediately after disaster strikes. The salience of this 
stage is due to its deviant and chaotic nature. Various scholars in disaster management literature 
presented factors which affected the response stage. Accordingly, this stage needs to be 
scalable. Furthermore, due to the salience of the disaster research model of behavioural 
response to disaster as applicable to terrorism events (Fischer, 1998, 2005, 2008), the focus of 
this study is at the response stage of human-made disasters in Iraq. 
2.8.1 Aims of Disaster Response Management 
Turning now to the aims of disaster response management, much research has listed it in order 
to explain the importance of this phase. According to Carrillo et al. (n.d., p. 52) the overall aims 
of disaster response are:  
1) To ensure the survival of the maximum possible number of victims, keeping them in the 
best possible health in the circumstances. 
2) To repair or replace damaged infrastructure and regenerate viable economic activities. 
To do this in a manner that contributes to long-term development goals and reduces 
vulnerability to any future recurrence of potentially damaging hazards. 
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3) To re-establish self-sufficiency and essential services as quickly as possible for all 
population groups, with special attention to those whose needs are greatest: the most 
vulnerable and underprivileged. 
4) In cases involving population displacements (due to any type of disaster) the aim is to 
find durable solutions as quickly as possible while ensuring protection and assistance as 
necessary in the meantime.  
5) In situations of civil or international conflict, the aim is to protect and assist the civilian 
population, in close collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and in compliance with international conventions. 
 
While the World Health Organization (2002, p. 22) listed it in a different way: 
a) Assess the needs. 
b) Reduce the suffering. 
c) Limit the spread and the consequences of the disaster. 
d) Open the way to rehabilitation. 
 
Several other authors have mentioned the aims of disaster response management. Coppola 
(2015, p. 305) stated that aims of response management are limiting injuries, loss of life, and 
damage to property and the environment that are taken before, during, and immediately after a 
hazard event. Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 3) points out that the common purpose of disaster 
response management is to save life and relieve suffering.  
2.8.2 Disaster Response Activities 
In addition to the aims of disaster response management, various researchers have identified 
the activities of disaster response management. For instance, Carrillo et al. (n.d., pp. 52-55) 
identified typical activities of emergency response as: 
 
1) Warning. 
2) Evacuation and migration. 
3) Search and rescue (SAR). 
4) Post-disaster assessment. 
5) Response and relief. 
6) Logistics and supply. 
7) Communication and information management. 
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8) Survivor response and coping. 
9) Security. 
10) Emergency operations management. 
11) Rehabilitation. 
12) Reconstruction. 
 
Whereas Iyer and Mastorakis (2006, p. 3) identified the common elements of response as: 
a) Identify the disaster and raise alarm. 
b) Notify the emergency services 
c) Save life and treat causalities. 
d) Activate the emergency plans. 
e) Confirm communications are working. 
f) Establish control. 
g) Manage the developing situation. 
 
The disaster response stage is crucial due to the deviant and chaotic behaviour during 
responding to disaster (Fischer III, 1998a, 1998b). Moreover, the behavioural response is 
actually very altruistic (Fischer, 2005). To manage response activities, this research will focus 
on the four stages of the disaster response stage, namely, Planning, Organising, Directing, and 
Controlling. These four stages will be followed to represent response activities in an appropriate 
way (see Figure 2.10). The next section moves on to describe these four stages. 
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Figure 2.10 The Four Stages of Disaster Response Management 
 
2.8.3 The Stages of Disaster Response Management 
It is widely considered that management is an important operational process in this world. 
According to Cole and Kelly (2011) Management is a “coordinated activities (forecasting, 
planning, deciding, organising, commanding) to direct and control an organisation”. The main 
intention of management is to establish the essence of proactive performance in our chaotic 
world as well as to assist an organisation to make the best use of its resources to achieve its 
objectives. To accomplish these goals, four major managerial functions, namely, planning, 
organising, leading, and controlling (see Figure 2.11) should be performed. (Jones & George, 
2003). Moreover, according to Comfort and Haase (2006) point of view, the various elements 
of the system in question and the interactions between them should be taken into account to 
understand a phenomenon. Accordingly, in order to understand best the importance of these 
four functions and the interactions between them, a definition of every stage will be provided 
in the sections below.  
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Figure 2.11  Four Functions of Management (Jones & George, 2003, p. 8) 
 
2.8.3.1 Planning Stage 
To gain better comprehension of the significance of planning in disaster response events, it is 
first important to provide a definition of what planning is. Planning is “the formalisation of 
what is intended to happen at some time in the future; concerns actions taken prior to an event, 
typically formulating goals and objectives and then arranging for resources to be provided in 
order to achieve a desired outcome” (Cole & Kelly, 2011, p. 17). In a similar way, Ahuja, Dozzi, 
and Abourizk (1994, p. 10) stated that planning is “selecting objectives and then establishing 
programs and procedures for achieving the objectives”. Naylor (2004, p. 234) agrees with this 
view, stating that “planning is the process of setting the objectives of an organisation and the 
means for their achievement”. Cole and Kelly (2011) summarise the planning definition as “an 
activity which involves decisions about ends (organisational aims/ objectives), means (plans), 
conduct (policies), and results”. However, Koontz and O'donnell (1955, p. 111) contend that 
good planning must consider the nature of the future environment in which planning decisions 
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and actions are intended to operate. Koontz and O'donnell (1955, p. 111) and Weihrich and 
Koontz (2005, p. 98) assert on the importance of planning as it bridges the gap from where we 
are to where we want to go. Three steps in the planning procedure have been displayed by Jones 
and George (2003, p. 8): 
1. Determining which objectives the organisation will follow. 
2. Determining what courses of action to adopt to achieve those objectives. 
3. Determining how to assign organisational resources to achieve those objectives. 
 
Within the context of disaster response management, based on Chen, Wu, and Lai (2006) the 
planning process is critical. In addition, planning and collaboration are important to disaster 
response (LeClerc, 2015), but at the same time disaster planning is an enormous undertaking 
(Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). Kovel (2000) agrees with this view and describes disaster 
response planning as an incomplete puzzle. Although the pieces of this puzzle were present, 
there were no guidelines on how to place them together. According to Barbarosoğlu and Arda 
(2004), the development of a fast response and efficient disaster relief plan poses itself as a 
complex stochastic decision problem because the decision-makers generally have imprecise 
and random information about the resource, timing and scope requirements of the disaster prior 
to the incident. Moreover, disaster planning and crises management have become an important 
part of the strategic planning process for many organisations (Money & Harrald, 1995). As it 
is difficult and complex process since no one knows where or when the next disaster may strike 
(Madry, 2015). Moreover, disaster plans provide effective preparation and training for response 
measures even they not generally accepted as a final solution (Money & Harrald, 1995). 
Further, to minimise the cost and effects of emergencies, an effective disaster plan should be 
taken after all reasonable risk reduction measures. Moreover, to meet the disaster demands, 
identifying the resources (facilities, personnel, materials and equipment) that are required by 
disaster response organisations and the demands that a disaster would impose upon those 
organisations is required for planning process (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Therefore, the planning 
process is considered the key to effective disaster management from which all related strategies, 
arrangements, and programs should flow (Emergency Management Australia, 2004). In 
agreement, May, Colbert, Rea, Wood, and Nara-Venkata (2015) stated that effective disaster 
response is preceded by effective disaster planning. Further, the overall aim of disaster planning 
may seem obvious: to save lives and property (Handmer & Parker, 1991). Larson, Metzger, and 
Cahn (2006) added a well-thought-out and rehearsed response plan saved lives. This view was 
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also supported by Desforges and Waeckerle (1991), stating that an obvious disaster plan 
coordinated by experienced and knowledgeable leaders will not only lessen superfluous 
problems but protect more lives. In agreement, Emergency Management Australia (2004) found 
that plans and programs preparation for response actions taken, during and immediately after a 
hazard impact has a significant influence on community's ability to cope with the impact of 
disasters. Such actions are undertaken to ensure that hazard effects are minimised. Further, 
building resilient communities is the cornerstone of planning for disaster risk reduction 
(Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). Within the field of urban management, disaster planning 
responses to human-made disasters is a growing area of critical debate due to the increasing 
terrorist attacks on urban areas (Batho, Williams, & Russell, 1999). As such, continuing terrorist 
attacks not only on urban areas but throughout the world are likely to sustain attention to 
emergency planning, but particularly in the Middle East (Perry & Lindell, 2003). 
To sum up, logically, the response planners should have generic and robust decision models 
and tools to enhance their disaster response and relief capability and should be proactively 
prepared for an effective response (Barbarosoğlu & Arda, 2004). Further, realities of the setting 
in which disaster operations take place should be recognised by planners by concentrating on 
the essential principles of response, clearly specifying priorities, and minimising the amount of 
operational detail that restricts flexibility (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Accordingly, proper 
preparation and planning enable the community to deal better with devastation and death in the 
wake of disasters (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991) as well as lives can be saved by conducting 
a well-thought-out and rehearsed response planning (Larson et al., 2006).  
2.8.3.2 Organising Stage 
A second management function is organising. Broadly, organising has been defined as “the 
grouping of activities necessary to attain objectives, the assignment of each grouping to a 
manager with authority necessary to supervise it, and the provision for coordination 
horizontally and vertically in the enterprise structure” (Koontz & O'donnell, 1955, p. 240). 
Further, Cole and Kelly (2011, p. 17) defined organising as “determining activities and 
allocating responsibilities for the achievement of plans; coordinating activities and 
responsibilities into an appropriate structure”. However, Naylor (2004) defined it as “an 
arrangement of all element of an organisation to achieve its strategic objectives”. Similarly, 
Jones and George (2003) defined organising as a “process to establish a structure of working 
relationships that allow organisational members interact and cooperate to achieve organisation 
goals”. Whereas Dixon (2003, p. 27) defined it in another way, stating that, organising is 
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“coordinating and directing the company’s resources in such a way that the company can carry 
out its objectives”. 
Regarding the organisational response, according to Chen, Sharman, Rao, and Upadhyaya 
(2008), coordination is an important problem, because it impacts on life and property in the 
affected area. Despite this fact, it is an understudied research issue (Chen, Sharman, 
Chakravarti, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008). In the area of disaster response, Chen, Sharman, Rao, 
et al. (2008) stated that coordination has thus far received relatively little scientific attention, 
despite its obvious significance. Ren et al. (2008) gave reasons for this scarcity in studies as 
few previous studies have examined what is happening during a disaster, while they often 
involve a post-disaster evaluation. As a result, little is known about the obstacles and challenges 
facing the coordinating process, particularly sharing and coordinating information effectively. 
Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008) noted that the essential ingredient for disaster response 
management is effective coordination. As any disaster situation requires a response under 
temporal and resource constraints and high uncertainty and necessity for rapid decision making, 
the coordination of the emergency response is demanding. Further, Ren et al. (2008) mentioned 
that previous studies of organisational coordination in disaster response teams have identified 
failures resulting from breakdowns in information flow and materials supply across 
organisational boundaries. In addition to that, Lettieri et al. (2009) stressed that wrong 
coordination would cause time wasting due to conflicts of resources and ultimately, human and 
property losses. Lettieri et al. (2009) also noted that efficient labour division and delegation, as 
well as important technological implementations such as the internet and GIS, are crucial to 
achieve good coordination. Lettieri et al. (2009) agree with this view and added that 
professionalisation might lead to a relevant workforce rationalisation and it is currently leading 
to its demilitarisation. Not only that, Madry (2015) stressed that the key to the response is the 
structure of the disaster response officials. 
According to Ren et al. (2008), organisations operating in high-risk work environments are 
complex and dynamic, notably because they rely on collaboration among multiple groups of 
professionals to be successful and reliable. LeClerc (2015) noted that response will not be 
successful if the communication and organisation structures set up prior to the disaster are not 
able to accommodate a variety of factors when coordinating response between multiple 
agencies. Therefore, successful disaster response might be achieved by conducting good 
collaboration between all levels of government and non-profit agencies. Based on Comfort and 
Haase (2006) when an organisational response to the needs of the communities failed 
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catastrophically, the sociotechnical nature of disaster response appears vividly. Consequently, 
the organisational system is required to preserve the technical system and cope with the bias, 
human error, and vulnerabilities that sneak into the management of disaster occasions. In 
agreement, Comfort and Kapucu (2006) stressed that a coordinated action for extreme events 
is required among multiple actors across many jurisdictions under conditions of heavy demand, 
urgent stress, and tight time constraints (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). UNISDR and UNOCHA 
(2008) support this view stating that to facilitate an effective response and to avoid confusion, 
skilful coordination among the wide range of potential stakeholders is critical. An Emergency 
Operations Centre is also essential to ensure a location for coordination and provide a clear 
central focal point. According to LeClerc (2015), it is very difficult to coordinate a response 
between multiple agencies. This is because the initial response is often lacking interagency 
communication and disjointed. The response will not be successful if the organisation structures 
and communications are not able to accommodate a variety of factors.  
Throughout any disaster response, although collaboration  in  dynamic  and  complex  
environments  such  as  disaster  response  teams  is  challenging (Ren et al., 2008), working 
partnerships are necessary to the immediate response and subsequent recovery (Batho et al., 
1999) as well as collaboration between all levels of government and non-profit agencies is also 
crucial for a successful response (LeClerc, 2015). Ren et al. (2008) stressed that smooth 
coordination across multiple groups whose cultures, routines, and incentives can conflict, are 
required to achieve high performance. Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008) point out that to enable 
better disaster response coordination, a number of new technologies have emerged in recent 
years. Further, due to the rising threat of terrorism, a significant reorganisation of the U.S. 
Government have been encouraged through establishing the Department of Homeland Security. 
First responders training and public health preparedness measure have a good share from 
billions of dollars allocated for such measures (McEntire, 2015). 
2.8.3.3 Directing Stage 
Different scholars deal with this function in different terms, such as leading, directing, etc. In 
this research, the term directing will be used to identify the third stage of management.  
Directing can be defined as “the interpersonal aspect of managing by which subordinates are 
led to understand and contribute effectively and efficiently to the attainment of enterprise 
objectives” (Koontz & O'donnell, 1955, p. 499). However, Jones and George (2003, p. 11) 
defined leading as an “Articulating a clear vision and energise and enable organisational 
members so that they understand the part they play in achieving organisational goals. 
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Leadership depends on the use of power, influence, vision, persuasion, and communication 
skills to coordinate the behaviours of individuals and groups so that their activities and efforts 
are in harmony”. In a different way, Dixon (2003, p. 95) defined it as “directing and guiding of 
employees and subordinates to help them to attain the organisation’s objectives with the 
maximum application of their abilities”. Using a narrower concept, Weihrich and Koontz (2005, 
p. 366) define leading as “the process of influencing people so that they will contribute to 
organisational and group goals”. 
In terms of response coordination, Comfort (2002) considered that coordinating response 
operations to extreme events is an extraordinarily complicated duty for public managers. Shen 
and Shaw (2004) agree with Comfort’s (2002)  view stating that is not easy to coordinate the 
activities in such a complicated system for an effective response. Further, Steigenberger (2016) 
concluded from empirical studies focusing on decision-makers with a political background that 
the respective disaster response activity suffered from suboptimal leadership. Therefore, 
various types of management skills, information, and equipment are required in various stages 
of disaster response (Comfort et al., 2004). In agreement, Steigenberger (2016) stress that 
decision-makers in operational disaster response activities must have comprehensive expertise. 
Moreover, the accomplishment of effective inter-organisational coordination among 
responding organisations has a substantial effect on the success of disaster response processes 
(Perry & Lindell, 2003). 
2.8.3.4 Controlling Stage 
The final stage for management is controlling. Control can be defined as “a regulatory process 
by which the elements of a system are made more predictable through the establishment of 
standards in the pursuit of some desired objective or state” (Leifer & Mills, 1996, p. 117). 
However, Jones and George (2003, p. 11) defined it as an “evaluating how well an organisation 
is achieving its goals and take action to maintain or improve performance”. Whereas Dixon 
(2003, p. 141) stated that controlling “is the measurement and correction of subordinates’ 
activities and the production processes, to ensure that the enterprise’s objectives and plans are 
being carried out”. Koontz and O'donnell (1955, p. 582) and Weihrich and Koontz (2005) agree 
with this view, stating that, “controlling is the measurement and correction of performance in 
order to make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised to attain them are being 
accomplished”. 
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Controlling activities are concerned essentially with measuring progress and amending 
perversions (Cole, 2004). The basic control process involves three steps (Carpenter, Bauer, & 
Erdogan, 2010; Cole, 2004; Dixon, 2003, p. 141; Koontz & O'donnell, 1955, p. 583):  
 To establish standards of performance. 
 To measure actual performance against standards. 
 To take corrective actions where appropriate. 
 
                                      
Figure 2.12 The Control Process (Dixon, 2003, p. 141) 
 
In addition to this, Dixon (2003) illustrated the control process in a diagram as shown in 
Figure 2.12. However, Weihrich and Koontz (2005) point out to the close relationship of 
planning and controlling as they are like ‘Siamese twins’ of management, being inseparable 
(see Figure 2.13).  
 
Figure 2.13 Close Relationship of Planning and Controlling (Weihrich & Koontz, 2005, p. 98) 
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To respond instantly during a disaster, a suitable needs assessment process is required. 
Accordingly, achieving a suitable evaluation must be performed quickly after the disaster 
incidence (Ugwu & Ihejirika, 2013). This study intends to provide recommendations to improve 
the disaster response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq. Therefore, the weaknesses 
and strengths for further improvement for four stages of disaster response management will be 
analysed. Having defined the four management stages, different challenges during the disaster 
response stage have been revealed by exploring the literature as detailed below. 
2.9 Challenges during Disaster Response Management 
Much research has dealt with disaster response management, however, some of it reveals many 
challenges facing disaster response management in different aspects and in various countries. 
In this section, such challenges in different aspects will be discussed. 
2.9.1 Planning Stage Challenges 
2.9.1.1 Planning Process 
The key to effective disaster management is the planning process, from which all related 
strategies, programs, and arrangements should flow (Emergency Management Australia, 2004). 
Chen et al. (2006) stated that the planning process is critical. Further, planning and training 
play a crucial role for successful disaster response (Steigenberger, 2016). Additionally, 
planning is essential to being able to take effective and prompt action (McLoughlin, 1985). 
Current disaster can evolve into a prolonged disaster because of a fragmented and multi-
objective nature of disaster planning. Lack of resources, and in some cases of expertise as well 
as inadequate scenario planning probably hamper the process of disaster planning (Trim, 2004). 
Moreover, Saeed (2012) noted that the plans of the organisations can be challenged by the 
unexpected events and dimensions of the disaster. Further, Perry and Lindell (2003) pointed 
out that continuing terrorist attacks worldwide are likely to enhance attention to disaster 
response planning, especially in Western democracies. Whilst, Schneider (1992) emphasises 
that the dependence upon the extent to which post-disaster human behaviour corresponds to 
prior governmental expectations and planning is the key to a successful governmental response. 
Therefore, Goodyear (2009) stresses the need to establish a disaster management system within 
the Government of Iraq for appropriate response and preparedness planning to human-made 
disasters and natural disasters. 
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There is a critical debate about the usefulness of plans for disaster response management and 
organisational preparedness more generally (Steigenberger, 2016). According to Uhr et al. 
(2008), both the literature and empirical findings indicate that sometimes response operations 
diverge from existing plans when adapting to an event and its consequences. Likewise, the 
response to the attack in Sweden collapsed in 2005 as it did not follow fixed plans or procedures 
which are criticised by an officer who participated in the response operation. While in Britain, 
one of the problems of disaster planning is that goals set by central government may not appeal 
to those responsible for their implementation (Handmer & Parker, 1991). In the same context, 
although hundreds of hours were put into planning development, many organisations fall prey 
to numerous unexpected problem areas along the way. Often, the plan is ineffective or worse 
yet, improperly executed (Barenbaum, N.D.). In agreement, one of the disaster response 
practitioners criticised the fact that the response did not follow fixed procedures or plans (Uhr 
et al., 2008). This might because of poor understanding of the response plan, which is one of 
the different recurring problems that are plague response to disasters (Desforges & Waeckerle, 
1991). However, Saeed (2012, pp. 3-4) attributed that to the dynamic situation in a disaster. As 
a result, new activities (which have not occurred before) may be required apart from those 
already planned. So the system should allow for ad-hoc creation of activities and 
dependencies by the command centre or the field teams. Saeed (2012) added that new plans 
have to be made and incorporated with old plans and plans of other organisations. Based on the 
magnitude of the disaster, one organisation might establish more than one command centre. 
There can be one or more field teams controlled by a command centre. Within the same context, 
Banipal (2006) noted that dependence on the central dispatch centre was considered one of 
the major operational problems experienced during hurricane Katrina. Banipal (2006) explained 
that due to being highly dependent on the central dispatch centre to coordinate emergency 
response, it is not only prone to human error but also to the events that can influence the 
command centre including disruption of power, floodwater damage to the building and wind 
damage to communication antennas, leaving the field officers on their own as it happened in 
New Orleans. 
In the context of creating plans for terrorist incidents, an inter-organisational testing process is 
complex because it includes varieties of organisations that might not normally deal with one 
another (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Uhr et al. (2008) added that despite the fact that a complex 
and dynamic environment might need certain flexibility in organisation plans and procedures, 
too little attention appears in planning processes and in bureaucratic structures. 
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In the US, two problems have arisen. Firstly, the assertion on the existence of a plan as a 
document rather than an assertion on the planning procedure brings positive outcomes for 
the threat. Secondly, the literature on planning for technological and natural disasters has a 
general lack of awareness in terms of policy actors, elected officials and law-enforcement 
officials who guide much of the terrorism plan creation (Jenkins, 2001; Smithson & Levy, 2000) 
cited in (Perry & Lindell, 2003, p. 336). Whereas, an important issue in disaster response in 
Australia is competition and conflict over responsibilities (Handmer & Parker, 1991). However 
in Taiwan, Chen et al. (2006) found a phenomenon that is very analogous to the findings of 
Lindell, Whitney, Futch, and Clause (1996) and Lindell and Perry (2001) that lacking full-time 
staff support had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the Local Emergency 
Planning committees in the US. Moreover, the planning process doesn’t include other 
organisations, let alone community contribution. Many supporting organisations don’t even 
know what their jobs in the disaster management technique are. Lindell et al. (1996) and Lindell 
and Perry (2001) had analogous findings on this matter in the US. In Iraq, Goodyear (2009) 
stated that there is absence of the paradigm shift in disaster management thinking in Iraq. 
Goodyear (2009), within this context, criticised the reactive disaster response operational 
mechanisms. In agreement, (Money & Harrald, 1995) highlighted the problems of ‘create-
review-revise planning’ since plans are not reality, they are like models when the disaster 
occurs, there may not be an exact match to that of the plan. Money and Harrald (1995) also 
state that it is difficult to build consensus among experts about what the plan should look like.  
2.9.1.2 Financial Resources 
Disaster response planning comprises the allocation of resources, especially budget and 
personnel. Budget allocation should be commensurate with the role of every department within 
its jurisdiction. According to Rudman, Clarke, and Metzl (2003, pp. 1-3), America’s emergency 
preparedness efforts are hampered by some obstacles. Funding for emergency responders that 
was stalled and side-tracked is considered a major obstacle due to: 
a) The slow distribution of funds by federal agencies. 
b) A politicised appropriations process. 
c) Bureaucratic red tape at all levels of government. 
Equally, in Taiwan, local government did not have enough budgets to perform all four phases 
of disaster management (Chen et al., 2006). While in Turkey, strong financial resources are 
needed to agencies responsible for DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) activities. Such resources 
become inadequate when distributed among several units (Baris, 2009).Whilst in Europe, 
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funding is fragmented because fragmentation phenomenon appeared, in the prevention of risk 
caused by natural hazards, between spatial planning and civil protection (Greiving, 
Fleischhauer, & Wanczura, 2006) cited in (Greiving  et al., 2012). Despite the fact that many 
vulnerable countries have created permanent funds for robust disaster response activities, Iraq’s 
draft National Disaster Risk Reduction Law does not assign specific funding for disaster risk 
reduction at national and sub-national levels. Such activities are as an alternative financed using 
estimated allocations in the national budgets, in addition to donations and grants. Nor does it 
create any permanent fund for supporting disaster risk reduction at national and regional 
governorate level (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
2.9.1.3 Management Framework, Program and Factors, and Supporting 
Ordinances  
Power allocation is considered one of the important components of disaster planning. To ensure 
an integrated response, every organisation within the jurisdiction needs to recognise its role 
when the disaster occurs to avoid conflicts. Beginning with disaster response management 
framework and factors, according to Baker and Refsgaard (2007), an adoption of new 
frameworks was required to make institutional development in disaster response. Whilst, 
Baris (2009) explained that weak awareness and lack of action of population and institutions 
results from a lack of knowledge of modern disaster risk factors. Similar to Rudman et al. 
(2003) who stated that due to the lack of preparedness standards, it is impossible to recognise 
exactly what is required and how much it will cost. Pelling et al. (2004) added that devising 
the tools required for policy makers are considered one of the challenges for integration to 
make transparent justifications for development policy and the better operations for disaster. 
Regarding disaster response program integration, Unlu, Kapucu, and Sahin (2010) claim that 
the success of multi-task response actions relies on the disaster and crisis management 
integration of programs prepared in diverse disciplines and organisation of a generated 
cooperation. Chen et al. (2006), on the other hand, shed light on the development of 
supporting ordinances and regulations at different government levels that are needed for 
the operation of the disaster management system in Taiwan. Whereas in Iraq, according to 
Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014), the current institutional and legislative system is excessively 
complex. Institutions and laws have overlapping jurisdictions and DRR-related functions are 
located in different ministries. Such overlapping and conflicting mandates can contribute to a 
fragmented response capacity. Despite the fact that an efficient and effective response to 
disasters needs a national perspective, there is no institution which can accomplish a 
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coordination role to ensure an integrated response from government departments and agencies 
working under multiple DRR related resolutions, regulations and laws. As a result, there is a 
need to better integrate responsibilities. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) also noted that Iraq 
has traditionally followed a relief and response-oriented approach to disaster risk management, 
as is evident from the review of legislation, and makes only partial reference to preparedness. 
Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) further criticise the restrictive scope of the existing 
institutional arrangements at national, regional, governorate and district levels, which is focused 
mainly on post-disaster conditions. Furthermore, the capacity of line agencies to be involved in 
disaster response is narrowly concentrated on disasters related to natural hazards and does not 
cover the whole spectrum of disaster situations. 
2.9.1.4 Education on Disaster Risk 
In disaster situations, education is an integral part of the planning and provision of the 
humanitarian response, as lives can be sustained and saved by providing quality education. Such 
education can give physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection to learners. Further, 
education and training are accepted as cornerstones of an effective disaster response, (May et 
al., 2015). According to Baris (2009), despite the education about disaster risk is offered in 
primary and high schools in Turkey, there is no organised educational program for the 
general public. There was no consideration for developing standards for community 
organisations and public education, reaching the public at active, large participation, producing 
training materials and training the trainers. Goodyear (2009) stresses that capacity 
development is the main ingredient of strengthening public-level preparedness. All levels of the 
preparedness and response system need skilled people in disaster management with an obvious 
understanding of their role within that system. Such capacity development should not only 
comprise public members but should produce learning and dialogue between all actors that 
form part of the disaster management system. However, Harding (2007) concluded that social 
development strategies and human rights principles should be promoted by professionals 
through political practice and within social work education to face human-made disasters. As a 
result, social work would be given a central role in avoiding human-made disaster and in 
reconstruction and development following disaster.  
48 
 
2.9.2 Organising Stage Challenges 
2.9.2.1 Coordination Problems 
Effective coordination is an essential element for disaster response management. Thus far, the 
available literature related to coordination of disaster response considered this area is important 
because typical requirements are demanding during an emergency situation, for instance, the 
risk of possible mass casualty, high necessity and uncertainty for rapid decision making, sudden 
and unexpected events, large-scale impact and damage,  response under resource and temporal 
constraints and the disruption of infrastructure support necessary for coordination like 
telecommunications, electricity, and transportation. Therefore, this area is challenging and 
needs to be studied in greater detail (Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al., 2008). A large and growing 
body of literature has investigated challenges during the coordination stage. One of these 
studies is from Meissner et al. (2002) which revealed that in order to save lives and property, 
disaster response and recovery efforts require coordination and timely interaction of 
public emergency services. Based on Lettieri et al. (2009) wrong coordination might cause 
conflicts to result and waste time. Ultimately, it might cause human and property losses. This 
coordination includes efficient labour delegation and division (Lettieri et al., 2009). In addition, 
According to Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008), the issue of coordination in the context of 
emergency response is an understudied topic. It is considered an important problem, as it 
impacts on life and property in the affected area. In a similar way, Unlu et al. (2010) describe 
coordination and management of first-response operations during crises as problematic and 
ineffective. Particularly, the Turkish system is not designed for different types of crises such as 
terrorist attacks. While also in Turkey, organisational and institutional problems were found 
in organising a suitable disaster management and response system (Baris, 2009). Yet, a lack of 
direct coordination among first responders is considered one of the major operational problems 
experienced during hurricane Katrina (Banipal, 2006). In the Philippines, systemic breakdowns 
in communication, damaged infrastructure and limited coordination have occurred in disaster 
management performance by the Philippine government response agencies when implementing 
response and relief activities. Such breakdowns caused failures in disaster management 
performance (Saban, 2014). However in the United States, it is widely believed that the 
organisational response was typically deviant and chaotic and is unproductive in defeating the 
long-term goals of the terrorists, though, in Turkey, the institutional organisation for disaster 
management and planning has a chaotic nature, namely the responsibilities and duties of some 
of the institutions often cause confusion (Baris, 2009). Uhr, Johansson, and Fredholm (2008) 
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indicated that the complexity of the response operation likely resulted from the unclear and 
confused distribution of authority in the disaster response. In agreement, Chen, Sharman, Rao, 
et al. (2008) indicated that coordination of disaster response is complicated by factors such as 
multi-authority and massive personal involvement; infrastructure interdependencies; high 
demand for timely information; and the conflict of interest. Whereas, George et al. (2010) 
attributed such complexity to the disconnected nature of disaster response activities and 
manpower-intensive problems. In the United States, a recent study of disaster managers 
supports the desirability of the “coordination” rather than the “control” approach. The disaster 
manager, in many cases, acts as a facilitator rather than a commander. Therefore, the absence 
of a coordinator with sufficient authority to coordinate powerful federal agencies appears as a 
problem in the United States (Handmer & Parker, 1991). Furthermore, the International Risk 
Governance Council (2009) cited in Greiving  et al. (2012) pointed out problems related to 
organisational capacities for responding to or monitoring risk as major deficits of current 
risk governance. Hills (1994) summarised that in the disaster response, ideas concerning 
coordination are confused, partially because coordination by planning is not clearly 
distinguished from coordination by feedback. As the latter is in accord with past practice, in the 
UK’s emergency response, coordination by feedback will continue to be an important issue.   
2.9.2.2 Coordination between Organisations 
Disasters often occur without warning and surprisingly, therefore there is no time for long 
negotiations or prearrangements for different actors such as public and non-profit organisations. 
Since such organisations might have little experience in doing disaster management activities 
under extreme circumstances, different problems can emerge from such fragmented 
performance such as lack of coordination, information exchange, and trust (Comfort, 2007; 
Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). In addition to that, because national governments’ capacities to 
respond are highly overwhelmed during extreme events, the coordination and joint response 
resources mobilisation of the global disaster management community is demanded by 
governments. Such coordination is outside their hierarchical control (Saban, 2014). 
Accordingly, the inter-organisational collaboration remains one of the main challenges in 
disaster management literature (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). Achieving coordinated action 
among a different group of actors depends basically on their access to timely, valid information 
and their ability to participate in information search, absorption, exchange, and adaptation 
(Comfort, 2002). As pre-existing strains between organisations may be exacerbated in disaster 
response situation (Koehler, Kress, & Miller, 2014), disaster operations are affected by the 
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degree of coordination developed among agents involved in disaster response (Comfort et al., 
2004). According to Saeed (2012) the main problem in disaster response management which 
lies at the coordination and collaboration of activities of different organisations involved 
both at the inter- and intra-organisation level. Baris (2009) argues that the impacts of disasters 
are dramatically exacerbated due to the absence of a single organisational structure 
focused on disaster management. Within the same context, Greiving  et al. (2012) stated that 
due to a lack of coordination between involved actors; current management of disaster risks 
is often fragmented. Such fragmentation of responsibilities should be regarded during any 
coordination of activities. Greiving  et al. (2012) called this phenomenon as the “problem of 
interplay” which is defined as a result of the presence of a multitude of actors. Steigenberger 
(2016) gave a reason for such complex coordination problems as these agencies seldom interact 
in their daily operations. Helbing et al. (2006) added that it is hard to coordinate different 
organisations and many people that have not collaborated before and do not know each others’ 
command structures. So cooperation of this agencies is required at disaster response operations 
(Steigenberger, 2016). The UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) added that assistance during 
disaster is provided from the wide range of potential stakeholders, such as the military, NGOs, 
utility companies and private sector entities and skilful coordination among them is critical to 
avoid confusion and to facilitate an effective response. The Emergency Operations Centre, for 
instance, is also essential to ensure a clear central focal point and location for coordination. In 
Iraq, based on Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) there is no coordinating body or focal agency 
to ensure an integrated response by the multiple agencies working on Disaster Risk Reduction. 
LeClerc (2015) stressed that response will not be successful if the communication and 
organisation structures set up prior to the disaster are not able to accommodate a variety of 
factors when coordinating response between multiple agencies. Therefore, to achieve an 
effective response to disaster, cooperation among all levels of government is required (Kamel 
& Wachs, 1996). Interestingly, Comfort et al. (2004) find that the relation between the 
efficiency of disaster response operations and the number of jurisdictions involved is positive. 
Such a finding is contradictory to the general observation from practice that when the number 
of jurisdictions involved in response operations increases, the efficiency will drop.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
2.9.2.3 Coordination between the Donor Countries and the End Beneficiaries 
In Pakistan, as regards the coordination between the donor countries and the end beneficiaries, 
coordination problems existed during Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake (Ugwu & Ihejirika, 2013), 
While in the South-east Asian region,  disaster relief agencies face a number of key challenges 
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that limit their capacity to respond effectively to disasters. Poor coordination between 
relief agencies and the local government has resulted (Lai et al., 2009) from the lack of 
support from the government of the country struck by disaster. Such lack of support is 
considered the main stumbling block that hampers disaster relief operations (Rowlands, 
Tan, & Yuen, 2007). On the other hand, Fisher (2007) stated that the right to deny relief 
agencies access to disaster-struck country territories has been retained by the government 
of the disaster-struck country through the primary phase of a disaster relief operation, 
particularly if the influenced areas are replete with conflict. Relief agencies, in such a situation, 
have little recourse to international legal preparations to obtain primacy entrance to disaster 
areas or oblige the government to accept help.  
2.9.2.4 Bureaucracies and Cronyism 
It is often argued that the prototypical bureaucratic response of delegated authority and use of 
formal routines have a dampening effect upon policymakers’ demands while also slowing 
organisational responses (May, Workman, & Jones, 2008). In the case of the United States, a 
"gap" happens between the emergent norms that direct social interactions and the 
bureaucratic norms that dominate governmental activity. It is widely believed that there is a 
failure in the relief effort when this gap is large, but when the gap is small the relief effort 
progresses smoothly, and governmental operations are perceived to be successful (Schneider, 
1992). For example, in the case of hurricane Katrina, it was claimed (Boin, Hart, McConnell, 
& Preston, 2010) that because of cronyism in the White House (in Bush’s administration) there 
were appointments that were made (such as FEMA director Brown and Homeland Security 
Secretary Chertoff) which were given due to loyalty rather than expertise (appointees were not 
qualified for the roles), and ultimately this affected the efficiency of the disaster response. In 
agreement, Handmer and Parker (1991) stress that the initiative of operational sections can be 
constrained because of the tendency for bureaucracies to exert strong central control. 
2.9.2.5 Hierarchy and Centralisation Problems 
One of the important tasks for organising is assigning groups of essential activities (to achieve 
response objectives) to a competent manager with authority necessary to supervise it. Within 
the context of hierarchy problems, Baris (2009) believed that the abundance of too many units 
may cause sometimes hierarchy problems when responding. However, Meissner et al. (2002) 
noted that there is a need for both intra and inter organisation coordination at several hierarchy 
levels in order to react not only individually and efficiently, but also in a coordinated manner. 
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Based on Perrow (1984, p. 334) cited in Handmer and Parker (1991) since the 1960s, 
organisational theorists have “recognised that centralisation is appropriate for organisations 
with routine tasks, and decentralisation for those with non-routine tasks”. Different scholars 
stressed the importance of decentralisation during disaster. For instance, Kapucu and Garayev 
(2011) put emphasis on non-traditional approaches and tools characterised by non-hierarchical 
structures and flexibility in decision-making. Kapucu and Garayev (2011) stated that because 
of the ineffectiveness of the traditional disaster management tools, the traditional approaches 
characterised by hierarchy and centralisation have been replaced by decentralised emergency 
management systems. Nazarov (2011) and UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) confirm this view, 
while Withanaarachchi and Setunge (2014) stressed that decision-making must be flexible 
during unexpected incidents. Whereas, Steigenberger (2016) stress that an effective disaster 
response plan outlines roles and responsibilities and prescribes a command structure that is as 
decentralised as necessary and as centralised as possible.  
Baris (2009) noted that the disaster risk reduction system of Turkey is still mainly centralised. 
However, Unlu et al. (2010) point out that centralised and decentralised systems have various 
tasks in various conditions. Despite the centralised organisation of the Turkish Crisis 
Management System that provides the government more coordination and control over 
resource distribution, involvement responsibility with various ministries and national 
organisations generates a coordination problem (Unlu et al., 2010). Manoj and Baker (2007) 
added that in disaster response, organisational challenges are prevalent, particularly when 
groups that are accustomed to hierarchy and hierarchical (centralised) decision making must 
rapidly work in a more dynamic, flatter, ad-hoc organisation that appears during post-disaster 
relief efforts. Nevertheless, Smirnov, Levashova, Pashkin, Shilov, and Komarova (2007) 
emphasise the decision that had been made about future research to concentrate on 
decentralisation of the decision support system evolution. Smirnov et al. (2007) added that 
such choice can be accomplished through presenting of self-organising networks. Goodyear 
(2009) supports this view stating that “systems that are community-based can sometimes be 
more effective than top-down centralised systems because they can be more directly integrated 
into local response and risk reduction strategies”.  
2.9.2.6 Trust 
It is widely acknowledged that cooperation without initial trust is very difficult to implement 
because trust boosts cooperation. Once trust has been violated, cooperation is diminished 
significantly (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Steigenberger (2016) describes trust as a precondition 
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for effective coordination. It is also an important issue in the field of coordination and control. 
According to Trim (2004), to facilitate cooperation and communication between different 
actors involved, it is necessary to establish trustworthy and respectful relationships between 
such actors. In agreement, Emanuele, Cristina, and Giovanni (2009) stressed that in a stressful 
and potentially harmful environment, there is little chance for a participatory approach between 
employees and their superiors. Accordingly, trust is the best way to diminish the chance that 
responders would disobey superiors’ orders and compromise operations outcomes. 
2.9.3 Directing Stage Challenges 
2.9.3.1 Scale or size of the disaster 
Different scholars such as George et al. (2010), Kamel and Wachs (1996), and Koehler et al. 
(2014) agreed that there are specific circumstances surrounding the particular disaster, which 
influence the effectiveness of disaster response, namely, magnitude, location, and time of 
occurrence that are unpredictable. According to Baker and Refsgaard (2007), one of the most 
challenging aspects facing the disaster response institutions is the lack of knowledge of the 
scale of the disaster until after the damaging incident has happened. Therefore, the scale or size 
of the disaster should be determined and a response strategy should be developed and 
implemented to the plan by institutions operating in the emergency response arena. George et 
al. (2010) agree with the aforementioned view and noted that scale and standardisation of 
disaster are often one of the major factors that challenge disaster response management and 
make it complex. Likewise, the magnitude of the incident, the duration or time-scale of the 
event is also a critical component in assessing the extent of a disaster. Accordingly, a number 
of actions can be taken to reduce damage if the scale of the disaster is accurately estimated prior 
to its impact (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). Moreover, there are different factors used to measure 
the initial magnitude of disaster such as geographic location, physical severity, and 
preparedness for disaster. In uncertain conditions, a preliminary effort to assess the initial 
magnitude of disaster is necessary. Such assessment might be revised repeatedly as more 
precise information becomes obtainable (Comfort et al., 2004). Comfort et al. (2004) stress that 
the demand and capacity flow is influenced by the spatial size of the disaster area. Therefore, 
more time for recovery will be required if the disaster affects an extensive geographical area 
(Comfort et al., 2004). According to Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014), to launch an appropriate 
and timely response to disaster situations, the development of a classification system of 
disasters and procedures for announcing a state of emergency are of vital importance. Since the 
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classification system assists to identify the level and nature of response required for a specific 
situation. 
2.9.3.2 Communication 
According to Jones and George (2003, p. 11), “Leadership depends on the use of power, 
influence, vision, persuasion, and communication skills to coordinate the behaviours of 
individuals and groups so that their activities and efforts are in harmony”. In larger disasters, 
disaster responders face a huge challenge which is a lack of communications infrastructure. Not 
only that, degraded communications also have a large impact on response in addition to 
escalating demands of victims which exhausts the remaining capacity (George et al., 2010). 
Comfort et al. (2004) stress that if the telephone lines are damaged, communication fails. 
Comfort et al. (2004) clarify that the system will be overloaded by an unexpected increase in 
the number of connections resulting from many people simultaneously switching their 
communication means from land telephone lines to wireless or cellular, which in turn make 
mobile phones not work. During the 2005 Katrina flood, failures in communication are 
considered one of the shortcomings in the federal emergency response (Baker & Refsgaard, 
2007). However, Banipal (2006) found that the inter-operability issue was a major operational 
problem experienced during hurricane Katrina. Because the existing system was not scalable 
enough to support hundreds of additional users, the out of state volunteers were unable to 
use it. Further, Comfort (2007) stress that the capacity for coordination, among multiple actors, 
depends on effective communication. Comfort (2007) stated that “if the communication 
processes do not elicit sufficient shared understanding among the parties to align their priorities 
for action, the likelihood of achieving a common action framework among multiple actors will 
be seriously diminished”. Manoj and Baker (2007) noted that the lack of radio interoperability 
is a primary challenge in responding to both natural and human-made disasters. As different 
response actors communicate with radios set to orthogonal frequencies. This makes inter-
agency communications very difficult. Consequently, when more local, state, and federal 
agencies become involved, the problem is compounded. Therefore, Smith (2011) found that 
communication is needed to establish a collaborative organisation, particularly within network-
type organisations. Smith (2011) also found that communicating with the community affected 
by the disaster is important in terms of transparency regarding response operations. Further, 
according to GSMA (2012), in countries that have highly centralised or authoritarian regimes, 
coordination between mobile network operators and governments can be difficult in times of 
disasters. Consequently, to manage the disaster response processes effectively and efficiently 
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the support of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) is considered a desirable 
feature (Saeed, 2012). In addition to that, integration of early warning systems with public 
alerts, evacuation and disaster response systems across sectors is vital for disaster management 
(Goodyear, 2009). 
2.9.3.3 Information  
Effective directing of resources, when responding to terrorist incidents, requires assessing 
information prior to, during, and after such events. According to Ren et al. (2008), due to sparse 
empirical studies in the area of sharing and coordinating information, little is known about the 
challenges and obstacles when it comes to sharing and coordinating information effectively. It 
is widely believed that effective response to both natural and human-made disasters requires 
assessing information prior to, during, and after potentially catastrophic events as well as 
initiating activities that will lessen their impact upon society (Belardo, Karwan, & Wallace, 
1984). Moreover, to create and orchestrate an effective disaster response and recovery effort, 
obtaining accurate information about the extent, impact, and scope of the disaster is critical 
(Madry, 2015). Goodyear (2009) supports this view stating that information plays an extremely 
important role in effective disaster reduction and response. Because the information quality and 
quantity is highly unpredictable, it is considered one of the challenges facing institutional 
systems that are in charge to manage disaster response (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). According 
to Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, and Paton (2012), concerning disaster management decision 
making, due to the fact that poor decisions lead to poor disaster management, more information 
and practice are desired and needed by local government organisations. George et al. (2010) 
noted that to respond effectively to disaster, situational awareness in a disaster is critical. As 
timely delivery of high volumes of accurate data is required by disaster responders to make 
correct decisions. Accordingly, Ogasawara et al. (2014) stress that, in the case of large, wide-
area disasters, gaps in available information probably lead to the problem of delayed decision 
making. Such an information vacuum in the immediate aftermath of a disaster can cause fatal 
delays in decisions for the most urgent lifesaving response activities. Sinclair et al. (2012) added 
another challenge to this context, which is a lack of awareness of the existence of information 
about decision making or lack of understanding of its relevance to disaster management from 
some disaster managers. Therefore, according to Goodyear (2009) due to the importance of an 
efficient disaster risk management information systems, such systems should be effectively 
linked to local authorities, local early warning systems, and the media to ensure effective use 
of disaster risk information for public awareness and education, among others. In Iraq, although 
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the draft National Disaster Risk Reduction Law acknowledges the importance of information 
and knowledge management, it fails to provide a framework for establishing a dedicated 
information system (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
Further, because the complex, dynamic and unpredictable nature of the environment in which 
many groups of professionals need to collaborate, sharing and coordinating information is very 
difficult for such groups, and due to collective decision-making, actions are negatively 
influenced by poor information sharing and coordination during inter-agency disaster response. 
Therefore, lack of coordination might lead to a number of possible failures, for example, 
counter-productive ordering of sequential relief processes, delayed evacuations, and 
inappropriate allocations of first responder resources which often result in disaster growth and 
even higher numbers of causalities (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). Ferdinand, O’Brien, 
O’Keefe, and Jayawickrama (2012) support this view stating that poor information sharing 
meant there were cases of duplication of activities leading to community division and conflict 
of interests. Moreover, Bharosa et al. (2010) noted that although the people are aware of the 
need for information sharing and coordination, they find themselves challenged by a lack of 
information and system quality. Comfort et al. (2003, 2004) stated that different phases of 
disaster response require different types of information and management skills. They also 
presented the common assumption in disaster management, which is “lack of information is the 
basic factor in limiting the efficiency of response among organisations”. Further, the efficiency 
of response actions can be enhanced by accessing core information as well as coordination 
throughout the network of responding organisations can be increased because cooperation 
without information is not adequate to raise response effectiveness (Comfort et al., 2004). 
Handmer and Parker (1991) added that effective information flow can partially help to 
overcome a high degree of fragmentation in disaster and hazard management, despite the 
limited exchange of information in some cases (Handmer & Parker, 1991). Not only that, 
Comfort (2002) argued that to achieve coordinated action among a different group of actors, 
timely, valid information should be accessed. In addition, they should be able to involve 
information absorption search, exchange, search, and adaptation. Accordingly, Madry (2015) 
stress that the heart of the disaster response effort is represented by the key information that is 
accurately updated in a timely way. 
2.9.3.4 Providing the Relief Supplies 
It is often argued that management of resources in disaster situations is difficult (George et al., 
2010) because accurate targeting of aid is considered one of the challenges facing institutional 
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systems that are in charge of managing disaster response (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). With 
respect to providing the right relief supplies for people in need at the right time, it is 
considered one of the most difficult steps in responding to disasters and emergency situations, 
as shown in practice. In agreement, Madry (2015) stressed that getting the right resources and 
people to the right place at the right time is the greatest challenge. It is also the essence of the 
control and command stages of the disaster response. Fiedrich, Gehbauer, and Rickers (2000) 
agree with this view stating that finding the best assignment of available resources to affected 
areas is a hard problem to solve due to the difficulty in processing and assessing all incoming 
information in an adequate manner. Based on Comfort and Haase (2006) actual performance 
failure might happen under stress of disaster if the current knowledge of resources and risks is 
lacking. At the same time sending wrong or too many supplies means losing resources and time 
(Smirnov et al., 2007). Moreover, a time lag will happen to return response organisations 
resources to the normal level if they use all of their resources in the beginning stages of a 
disaster and do not conserve them (Comfort et al., 2004). In addition, the effective mobilisation 
of response to extreme events on a large scale is considered one of the least understood 
problems in public management. So the knowledge base to support response operations in such 
an event needs to be scalable (Comfort, 2002). Larson et al. (2006) also state that local first-
responder resources are often overwhelmed by large-scale emergency incidents, such as acts 
of terrorism, human-caused accidents, and acts of nature. While the delays in deployment and 
mistargeting of aid concerned are considered one of the shortcomings in federal emergency 
response, precisely by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, during the 2005 
Katrina flood (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). Thus, if the nation does not take immediate steps to 
better identify and address the urgent needs of disaster responders, further terrorist 
incidents could have an even more devastating impact than the September 11 attacks (Rudman 
et al., 2003). Moreover, to meet the disaster demands, identifying the resources (facilities, 
personnel, materials and equipment) that are required by disaster response organisations and 
the demands that a disaster would impose upon those organisations is required for the planning 
process (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Distribution of resources, on the other hand, also has a problem 
of coordination. Although organisations might have resources, they may not be distributed 
efficiently to people who need help (Comfort et al., 2003, 2004). Despite having the 
contribution of several studies in terms of improving disaster response plans, especially the 
disaster resources scheduling problem, techniques for supplying optimal strategies for disaster 
resources to respond efficiently and effectively to disasters is still lacking (Muaafa et al., 2014). 
According to Fiedrich et al. (2000) time, quantity and quality of the resources are three limiting 
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factors affecting resource allocation processes. Based on Comfort et al. (2004) the ratio of 
demand for assistance to capacity to supply resources varies over time in disaster response and 
recovery operations. Comfort et al. (2004) assume that the demand flowing disaster response 
activities relies on the initial size of disaster, the degree of cascade effect or interdependence 
among actual or potential damaged parts, and the capacity flow among the participating 
organisations based on their initial conditions of knowledge, resources, equipment, and skills. 
2.9.3.5 Speed of Response 
When examining disaster response, time is one of the essential elements that should be noted 
and considered (Miller, 2007). To limit damage to people, property and environment, dire 
consequences, that are typically delivered from complex disaster problems, must be solved in 
a very short amount of time (Torma-Krajewski & Powers, 2010). Because in the domain of 
disaster response, minutes of delay can cost lives and property, so speed is typically essential. 
Not only that, the need for quick action is considered one of the challenges facing institutional 
systems that are in charge of managing disaster response (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). 
Nevertheless, speed of response must be balanced with good planning and smart assessment 
to avoid actions that are precipitate and probably counterproductive (Lindell et al., 2006). In 
agreement, Madry (2015) stressed that time is the real enemy when responding to a major 
disaster. Perry and Lindell (2003) agree with this view by pointing out two important points. 
Firstly, quick reactions based upon wrong hypotheses or inadequate information can lead to 
insufficient protective measures. Secondly, threat assessment is critical and must be 
performed constantly, even during stages of disaster effect. Moreover, Banipal (2006) noted 
that quick response to disaster has the potential to significantly reduce total loss. Nonetheless, 
Quarantelli (1977) has argued that appropriateness of response is much more crucial than 
speed. Perry and Lindell (2003) upheld this view and added quicker response can be achieved 
by careful planning.   
2.9.4 Controlling Stage Challenges 
2.9.4.1 Decision Making at the Controlling Stage  
It is widely acknowledged that poor decisions lead to poor disaster management (Sinclair et al., 
2012). Further, the right decisions at the right time save lives and property (Madry, 2015).Thus 
efficient and effective decision-making needs to be researched and understood, practised, 
learned, and effectively implemented during response (Sinclair et al., 2012). Because a disaster 
requires critical decisions that must be made in difficult circumstances, responding to disaster 
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is a serious challenge (Platt, 2015). In agreement, Torma-Krajewski and Powers (2010) stress 
that making decisions is a critical factor of any disaster response and the success of that response 
is dependent upon effective decisions being made in a timely manner (Torma-Krajewski & 
Powers, 2010). Decisions can be as complex as responding to a major disaster. Decision making 
in a disaster is made additional difficult due to stress (Withanaarachchi & Setunge, 2014). 
Experienced and knowledgeable leaders make right decisions when faced with difficult or 
unexpected problems (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). They reported that one of the repeated 
problems that hinder response to disasters is errors in judgment, particularly those committed 
early, will be exaggerated quickly as the response proceeds. Decision-makers usually have 
inaccurate and random information about the resource requirements, scope and timing of the 
disaster prior to the incident, the development of fast response and efficient disaster relief plans 
poses itself as a difficult stochastic decision problem (Barbarosoğlu & Arda, 2004). 
Withanaarachchi and Setunge (2014) stated that the highest ranking officer to the lowest 
ranking officer who participate in decision making can fail to perform the most significant 
aspect of decision making during disasters, saving lives. There can be breakdowns in the chain 
of command in all areas from evacuation planning to communication and sheltering, to 
transport. 
Leadership challenges in disaster management were discussed by Boin and Hart (2003, p. 545). 
They argued that inaccurate information, media pressure, stress, and organisational chaos, are 
some of the factors that make it challenging for disaster leaders to make right decisions. There 
are wide and diverse factors that are influencing the decision-making process and the decision 
maker. At the group or organisation level some of these factors are cooperation, 
communication, coordination, and constraints such as information sharing and intelligence, 
clashes over organisational domains or jurisdictional differences, teamwork and shared mental 
models, uncertainty, policy ideology, and political and economic priorities. These factors might 
overlap onto the individual decision maker and can also comprise the knowledge, individual’s 
experience, trust, skills, time pressure, stress risk, overwork, leadership ability, personal 
priorities, conflict over responsibility, deviance, political goals, and control (Boin & Hart, 2003; 
Handmer, 2008; Quarantelli, 1997b). Uhr et al. (2008) stated another challenge, which is 
officers on the incident scene who take directing decisions and initiatives not negotiating or 
anchoring with other officials, in addition to unclear roles of the various decision makers and 
organisations participating, along with their responsibilities. Withanaarachchi and Setunge 
(2014) stressed that a responsible decision maker should have the knowledge about the situation 
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and be able to carry out a situational analysis; implementation and other related requirements, 
available resources to carry out the whole process of decision making; able to understand the 
constraints and available time; team capabilities; and the level of collaboration, experienced 
staff, and available technology. Withanaarachchi and Setunge (2014) also noted that decision 
maker at responsible places must get the required guidance and training since it is not easy to 
find solutions to every disaster. Further, Boin and Hart (2003, p. 545) stated that successful 
disaster leaders avoid routine policy-making procedures to accelerate decision making in 
dynamic, complex environments in which the decision maker must remain flexible. Thus, 
decision-makers in operational disaster response activities must have extensive expertise 
(Steigenberger, 2016). It is important that people involved in disaster responses have a 
comprehensive understanding of how decisions should be made, and the factors existing during 
disasters that can influence the effectiveness of the decisions (Torma-Krajewski & Powers, 
2010). In the case of large, wide-area disasters, since circumstances are continually changing, 
real-time and ongoing decision making is a particular challenge. Fatal delays in decisions for 
the most urgent lifesaving response activities can happen due to gaps in available information 
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (Ogasawara et al., 2014). Steigenberger (2016) 
concluded that the respective disaster response activity suffers from suboptimal leadership, 
particularly by decision-makers with a political background. 
2.9.4.2 Risk Assessments, Control and Evaluation 
In general, to undertake risk assessments in urban areas, different challenges should be taken 
into account, including: specialised technical skills, financial allocation for risk assessments, 
data collection and interpretation, the extent to which assessment methodologies represent the 
actual situation, gaining and maintaining political support (Dickson, Baker, Hoornweg, & 
Tiwari, 2012). It is often argued that actual performance under stress of disaster is almost certain 
to fail if current knowledge of risks and resources is lacking (Comfort & Haase, 2006). 
Similarly, Schipper and Pelling (2006) stress that lack of data on risk, hazard, vulnerability, and 
disaster losses are barriers in front of disaster response and initiatives are needed to overturn 
such barriers. In agreement, the UNISDR (2016) noted that risk assessment methods often cite 
instant challenges in obtaining the necessary data. In Iraq, according to Goodyear (2009), a 
comprehensive and coordinated disaster management system of risk management was lacking. 
Such a system includes a risk analysis based on an examination of the first responders charged 
to assist in times of disasters, capacities of resident populations, vulnerabilities, and hazards.  
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In terms of control, it is claimed that sometimes the exercise of power is misused by a small 
number of privileged managers (Comfort, 2007), although in very uncertain situations such 
as an immediate disaster response, the shared goals of protecting lives and property can be 
maintained through shared knowledge and expertise. Comfort (2007) also states that the focus 
on the critical points is crucial so as to contain the scale of the disaster; a situation that is 
articulated in military environments, whereby the soldiers are trained to frame strategies yet use 
their own judgement to analyse a particular situation. 
In addition to assessing the risks before the disaster and controlling operations professionally, 
it is crucial to evaluate the disaster response so that lessons can be learned. As controlling 
activities are concerned essentially with measuring progress and amending perversions (Cole, 
2004). According to McLoughlin (1985), there are opportunities to improve future responses 
invariably once a government responds. Evaluations are critical to such improvements and 
should be conducted shortly after the incident while memories are still fresh. In the aftermath 
of disasters, organisational managers are sometimes perceived to have not controlled their 
resources that are supposedly “initiated, managed and controlled” by organisations. All 
evaluations and conclusions, whether positive or negative, should be fed back into the 
planning process (Al-Dahash & Kulatunga, 2015). Hofmann et al. (2015) support this view 
stating that disaster response management has to include performance analysis; so that the 
fulfilment of objectives and goals can be analysed and previous plans from pre-disaster for 
preparedness can be adjusted so that disaster response can be improved. 
By considering the above discussion, the challenges during the disaster response management 
stage have been categorised into planning, organising, directing, and controlling phases. 
Figure 2.14 below illustrates the summary of these challenges during the disaster response 
management stage. 
62 
 
 
Figure 2.14 Summary of the Challenges during Disaster Response Management stage 
 
2.10 Disaster Response Management Good Practice 
To conduct a proper evaluation of the current disaster response practices, a comprehensive 
literature review was conducted. By reviewing a large amount of global literature, as discussed 
in the above sections, a number of good practices for disaster response management were 
identified (see Appendix B). To evaluate each stage of the four Disaster Response Management 
stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling), the identified elements were 
categorised by these management stages (see Appendix C). The identification of good practice 
disaster response management factors, will help to identify the overall gaps in every stage of 
disaster response management in Iraq. Table 2.2 shows the elements of good practice that have 
been highlighted by the respective authors. This information is categorised into the stages of 
Disaster Response Management and themes. 
Directing Stage 
 Lack of knowledge of the scale of disaster. 
 Lack of communications infrastructure. 
 Failures in communication due to degraded 
communications. 
 The information quality and quantity is 
highly unpredictable. 
 Information vacuum in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster can cause fatal 
delays in decisions for the most urgent 
lifesaving response activities. 
 Providing the right relief supplies for people 
in need at the right time. 
 The effective mobilisation of response. 
 Speed is typically essential, but 
appropriateness of response is much more 
crucial than speed. 
 
Planning Stage 
 Response operations diverge from existing plans. 
 Slow distribution of funds, inadequate resources 
and not enough budget. 
 Lack of knowledge of modern disaster risk factors 
and lack of preparedness standards. 
 Devising the tools for policy makers. 
 Program integration. 
 The development of supporting ordinances and 
regulations at different government levels. 
 Fragmented response capacity due to the 
complexity of the institutional and legislative 
system 
 No organised educational program for the 
general public. 
Controlling Stage 
 Decisions is a critical factor of any disaster response. 
 Errors in judgment problem. 
 Failure to perform the most significant aspect of 
decision making during disasters. 
 Evaluations are critical to improve future responses. 
 Sometimes the exercise of power is misused by a 
small number of privileged managers. 
 Disaster response management has to include 
performance analysis. 
Organising Stage  
 Disaster response requires coordination and 
timely interaction. 
 The organisational response was typically 
deviant and chaotic. 
 Lack of coordination between involved 
actors, fragmentation of responsibilities, 
“problem of interplay”. 
 Poor coordination between relief agencies 
and the local government. 
 Bureaucracies and Cronyism 
 Hierarchy and centralisation problems. 
 Cooperation without initial trust is very 
difficult to implement. 
 
63 
 
 
Table 2.2  Element of Good Practice Disaster Response Management Categorised by 
Management Stages 
Stage Theme Good Practice Author 
Planning 
 
Planning 
process 
- The extent to which emergency 
plans are rehearsed.  
- The level of prior planning. 
- Evacuation plan. 
- Drawing up organizational 
disaster plans and integrating 
them with overall community-
mass-emergency plans; and 
continually updating obsolete 
materials/strategies. 
- Systematic disaster and loss 
inventory. 
- Housing improvement and human 
settlement relocation from prone-
areas. 
- Emergency response planning and 
implementation of warning 
systems. 
- Endowment of equipment, tools 
and infrastructure. 
- Well-planned emergency relief 
supply system 
- Applicable emergency response 
plan and regulations 
- Prior planning of logistic centres 
and shelters 
- Government unity of leadership to 
plan and coordinate as a whole 
- Pre-determined strategies 
- Updating and enforcement of 
safety standards and construction 
codes. 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007) 
(Fischer, 2005) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, & 
Russell, 1999) 
 
Financial 
resources 
- Reserve funds for institutional 
strengthening. 
- Budget allocation. 
- Budget mobilization. 
 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño, Cardona, & 
Barbat, 2005; 
Carreño, Cardona, & 
Barbat, 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
Supporting 
ordinances 
- Supportive laws and regulations. 
- What local jurisdictions may be 
involved? 
- Legal procedures for requesting 
short-term emergency state and 
federal assistance  
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
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- Applicable emergency response 
plan and regulations 
Education on 
disaster risk 
- Involvement, education and 
review. 
- Community capabilities audit. 
- Undertaking public educational 
activities. 
- Training and education on risk 
management. 
- Community preparedness and 
training. 
- Education campaign on disaster 
prevention and response 
- Specific training of professionals 
such as rescue workers and 
medical staff 
- Training 
- Educating the public and others 
involved in the planning process. 
- Holding disaster drills, rehearsals 
and simulations; 
- Developing techniques for 
training, knowledge transfer and 
assessments. 
 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, & 
Russell, 1999) 
Organising 
 
Coordination 
problems 
- Developing overall coordination. 
- Generating an appropriate 
delegation of tasks and division of 
labour. 
- Volunteer management. 
- Search and rescue. 
- Coordination and collaboration. 
- Organisation and coordination of 
emergency operations. 
- Reasonable organizational 
structure and clear awareness of 
responsibilities 
- Regular organization of simulated 
disaster exercise 
- Government unity of leadership to 
plan and coordinate as a whole 
- The involvement and support of 
army 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
“Problem of 
interplay” 
coordination 
between the 
donor countries 
and the end 
beneficiaries 
- Protocols. 
- Formulating memoranda of 
understanding and mutual aid 
agreements. 
- Correctly recognising differences 
between response and agent-
generated demands. 
- Blending emergent and 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Quarantelli, 1997a, 
1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Enrico Louis 
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established organisational 
behaviours. 
- Community emergency response 
teams. 
- Establishing informal linkages 
between involved groups. 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
Hierarchy and 
Centralization 
problems 
- Competencies of managers and 
team members. 
- The degree of prior disaster 
experience. 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Fischer, 2005) 
 - Implementation of hazard-event 
control and protection techniques. 
- Properly exercising decision-
making. 
- Effective consultation with key 
stakeholders and target 
beneficiaries. 
- Clearly defined goals and 
commitments by key 
stakeholders. 
- Flexibility of decision-making. 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007) 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
Directing 
 
Command 
centre 
- Adequately processing 
information. 
- Having a well-functioning 
emergency operations centre. 
- Effective information 
management system. 
- Disaster management command 
centre. 
- The detailed status of EOC 
mobilization. 
- Key officials need to be briefed.  
- Non-EOC organisations being 
mobilized for emergency 
response. 
- Convening meetings for the 
purpose of sharing information. 
- Hazard monitoring and 
forecasting. 
- Strong ability to send out specific 
early warning about potential 
hazards. 
- Clear procedure of reporting and 
submitting information 
- Effective emergency information 
system to ensure information 
transferring 
- The scale of the disaster 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, & 
Russell, 1999) 
Communication - Providing appropriate reports for 
the news media. 
- Emergency public information. 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
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- Effective communication 
mechanism. 
- Public information and 
community participation. 
- Intra- and inter-organisational 
behaviours between organisations. 
- From organisations to the public. 
- From the public to organisations. 
- Within systems of organisations. 
-  
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño  et al., 2007)  
(Batho, Williams, & 
Russell, 1999) 
(Quarantelli, 1988) 
Speed is 
essential 
- Very short response time to start 
the emergency plan 
- Cordon access 
- Evacuation 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, & 
Russell, 1999) 
Timely 
provision of the 
right relief 
supplies for 
people in need 
- Effectively mobilising personnel 
and resources. 
- Emergency shelter arrangements. 
- Effective logistics management. 
- Sufficient mobilization and 
disbursement of resources. 
- What are our inventories of 
emergency resources and where 
are they located? 
- What emergency evacuation 
requirements are there and where? 
- obtaining, positioning and 
maintaining relevant material 
resources 
- Timely and accurate relief needs 
assessment 
- The security of relief aids during 
distribution and transportation 
- Application of modern logistics 
technology 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Quarantelli, 1997a, 
1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
Controlling Evaluations are 
critical 
- Risk assessment. 
- Damage reporting system. 
- Hazard evaluation and mapping. 
- Vulnerability and risk assessment. 
- Testing of inter institutional 
response. 
- Statistics and feedback of loss 
information 
- Evaluation on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the management 
system 
- Continuous improvement of the 
operational system of emergency 
management 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-235; 
Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2005; 
Carreño et al., 2007) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
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2.11 Disasters in Iraq 
Iraq is exposed to various forms of natural and human-made disasters, as listed in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3  Natural and Human Induced Vulnerabilities Faced by Iraq (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 
N.D., p. 9) 
Natural Human Induced 
Earthquakes IDPs and refugees 
Floods Terrorism/civil unrest 
Land Slides Toxic environmental pollution 
Sand Storms Landmines & Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 
Drought High-risk structural collapses 
Depletion of  Natural Resources Transport and industrial accidents 
Health Epidemics  
 
The country is increasingly susceptible to natural disasters including floods, drought, 
epidemics, desertification, sandstorms, earthquakes, soil salination of fertile lands, destruction 
of marshlands, and chemical and industrial hazards (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
The effects of war in Iraq are coupled with the susceptibility to natural hazards which has 
exposed the people of Iraq to multiple human-made disasters. Such disasters have included 
sulphur dioxide release due to sulphur stockpiles, depleted uranium, industrial and military 
legacy of contamination and dangerous waste, unexploded ordnance and land mines, military 
scrap yards, land pollution and dangerous waste by the oil industry, fire, and surface water 
pollution by oil spills due to sabotage of oil pipelines (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014).  
The continuing effects of conflict, displacement and severe poverty have exacerbated the 
exposure of the Iraqi people to these disasters. Many essential services needed to manage 
hazards, reduce risks and respond to disasters have been crippled by war and post-war conflicts 
(Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
The post-war transitions in Iraq have affected the institutional capacities of the state to respond 
in an efficient manner. Furthermore, it appears that the lack of a national platform to organise 
the efforts of multiple institutions at all tiers of government have serious limitations for the 
current institutional and legislative systems for DRR (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014).  
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2.12 Statistics about Terrorist Operations in Iraq 
2.12.1 Number of Overall Incidents in Iraq Caused by Terrorists  
The internal statistics from the Statistics Department / Iraqi Ministry of Interior, shown in 
Figure 2.15 below, illustrate the number of overall incidents caused by terrorists in Iraq, 
between 2009 and the first seven months of 2016. The number of incidents was 10500 
throughout 2011, and a similar number occurred in 2012. After the fall of Mosul in June 2014 
and due to the war against the so-called Islamic State, the number of terrorist attacks increased 
dramatically to more than 77000 in 2015, and during the first seven months of 2016, this number 
has already reached more than 60000.  
 
 
Figure 2.15 Number of Overall Incidents in Iraq Caused by Terrorists, 2009-2016 (Statistic 
Department, 2016) 
 
2.12.2 Types of Incidents Caused by Terrorists 
Terrorist incidents are a key component of this research. Therefore, it is important to analyse 
the terrorist incidents data in terms of their type, frequency, and lethality. To do so, Figure 2.16 
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clearly shows the different types of incidents caused by terrorists and their frequency between 
2009 and the first seven months of 2016.  
 
Figure 2.16 Types of Terrorist Operation, 2009-2016 (Statistic Department, 2016) 
 
The most frequent type of terrorist incident is the planting of ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’, 
which accounts for more than 90000 incidents. Such incidents vary depending on the different 
type of device, some are planted in busy areas, some are adhered to vehicles, and some are 
simply acoustic devices that cause minimal damage but great fear. The next highest number, 
unsurprisingly, is the capture of terrorists, which may include either killing or injuring the 
attacker, which has more than 65000 operations. An interesting finding from this statistic is that 
after 2013 a new type of operation was observed, the ‘Bombing of a Residential House’ and 
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‘Terrorist Attacks on Security Checkpoints, Headquarters and Patrols’. The emergence of such 
types of terrorist operation was mostly caused by the preparation by the terrorists to occupy 
Mosul in June 2014. The least frequent type of terrorist operation was ‘Suicide Attacks’. From 
2009 to the end of July 2016, 1134 suicide attacks took place in Iraq. 
2.12.3 Number of Killed and Injured in Terrorist Operations 
Many Iraqi people have been affected by terrorist operations. In this section, statistics about the 
number of killed and injured will be discussed in order to show one of the challenges facing the 
employees in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence in Baghdad and the provinces, 
while responding to disasters.  
According to the statistics from the Planning and Resource Development Department/ Iraqi 
Ministry of Health, which is shown in Figure 2.17, more than 60000 people were killed and 
injured in terrorist operations throughout 2006.  
 
Figure 2.17 Number of Killed and Injured in Terrorist Operations, 2004-2016 (Planning and 
Resource Development Department, 2004-2016) 
 
The biggest rise was seen in 2006/ 2007 because of the attacks on 22 February 2006 in Samarra 
on the holy shrines of Ali Al-Hadi and Hassan Al-Askary, which are sacred to the Shia people. 
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This attack led to a significant increase in tension between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq. 
Consequently, there was a significant increase in the number of killed and injured in terrorist 
operations throughout 2006 and 2007 and thereafter. However, this number decreased to 13000 
in 2011 which is the least number of killed or injured people compared with other years. This 
number has also increased to more than 40,000 people that have been killed or injured 
throughout 2014, 2015 and the first half of 2016, due to the war against the so-called Islamic 
State, and particularly after the fall of Mosul in June 2014. 
 
Figure 2.18 Number of Males, Females, and Children Killed in Terrorist Operations, 2004-2016 
(Planning and Resource Development Department, 2004-2016) 
 
It can be seen from Figure 2.18 that significantly more males were killed than females. The 
number of children killed was lower still. Similarly, in Figure 2.19, the number of people 
injured reflected the same pattern: mostly males, then females and children with the lowest 
number. 
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Figure 2.19 Number of Males, Females, and Children Injured in Terrorist Operations, 2004-
2016 (Planning and Resource Development Department, 2004-2016) 
 
 
2.13 Disaster Management in Iraq and Countries Surrounding Iraq 
It is widely acknowledged that poor policy and institutional capacities regarding disaster 
management makes people and communities more prone to the effects of natural and human-
made disasters. As humanitarian disasters become more complex, different countries such as 
Middle Eastern countries including Iraq try to overcome such disasters by enhancing disaster 
management in this area with research. To have a general idea about these scholars in this area, 
a literature encompassed disaster management in Iraq and countries surrounding Iraq has been 
reviewed and is presented below. 
2.13.1 Disaster Management in Iraq 
It is often seen that there is focus on disasters in developed countries, whereas disasters that 
occur in developing countries have received scarce attention (Steigenberger, 2016). Further, 
although extensive research has been carried out on disaster management, no single study exists 
which adequately covers the problem of disaster response management in Iraq. Only three 
studies have focussed on disaster management in Iraq (Goodyear, 2009; Harding, 2007; 
Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). Such studies are unsatisfactory because Goodyear’s (2009)   
study aimed to enhance the understanding of the existing situation of disaster risk reduction 
(DRR)  for the GoI (Government of Iraq), non-governmental organisations, UNAMI (United 
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Nations Mission) and the wider audience of donor agencies as well as the international disaster 
risk reduction community. Three purposes have been noted by this study. Firstly, the nature and 
feature of Iraq’s hazards and their risk of becoming a complex emergency was highlighted. 
Secondly, the current disaster response capacities of key stakeholders in responding to Iraq’s 
natural and human-made hazards were reviewed. Thirdly, practical recommendations for 
stakeholders were given to be considered in the development of programmes that might 
participate to support disaster risk reduction at the central, region, governorate and community 
levels; the priority development strategy as defined in the GoI next Five-Year Plan (2010 – 
1014) was also addressed. The study reveals that the primary constraints that impede the 
disaster response capacity of civil services institutions are inadequate fiscal resources and 
manpower as well as a reservation to align themselves with government systems. However, 
limited access to professional equipment and training, individual organisational capacity, 
and the absence of a central authority entrusted to create a strategic plan among all 
stakeholders, including non- governmental organisations and civil society as well significantly 
contribute to weaken disaster management systems. In addition, there is requirement to set 
up a disaster management system within the GoI for preparedness planning and appropriate 
response to human-made and natural disasters after the security improvements in 2008 and part 
of 2009 and the decrease of the foreign disaster response capacity provided by the departure of 
the Multi-National Forces-Iraq from city centres. It also reveals that Iraq’s institutional 
disaster management ability is restricted, both on the national and subnational fields. 
Moreover, the lack of the model shift in disaster management thinking in Iraq has not 
changed concerning the adoption of an all-risk disaster reduction system to substitute their 
reactive disaster response operational techniques. The study also sheds light on the lack of 
comprehensive and coordinated disaster management system of risk management in Iraq 
that comprises a risk analysis based on an inspection of threats and the vulnerabilities and 
capabilities of inhabitant populations and the first responders charged to support in times of 
crises. Within the GoI and other disaster risk reduction stakeholders, stronger technical and 
infrastructural capabilities are needed inevitability to plan for, mitigate and respond to future 
crises in Iraq (Goodyear, 2009). However, Harding (2007) conducted a case study of a human-
made disaster examining the US-led policy towards Iraq after exploring the concept of disaster. 
The latter argued that Iraq’s economic and social development was crippled by war following 
years of economic sanctions, US military intervention in 1990–1, the Iran–Iraq war and decades 
of government repression. Due to the continuing violence and social disintegration in Iraq, 
social work was suggested as a key overall role to play in responding to strategies that create 
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such disaster. Harding (2007) concluded that social development strategies and human rights 
principles should be promoted by professionals through political practice and within social 
work education to face human-made disasters. As a result, social work would be given a central 
role in avoiding human-made disaster and in reconstruction and development following disaster 
(Harding, 2007). The study by Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) aimed to improve the Disaster 
Risk Reduction (DRR) legal and institutional arrangements in Iraq by examining the key 
strengths and gaps in the existing legal and institutional framework for disaster risk reduction. 
Furthermore, a review of the existing legal framework was provided. It concluded four 
overarching features. Firstly, human-made calamities such as conflicts, terrorism and industrial 
hazards have been focused on as a result of the longstanding conflict and wars in Iraq. Secondly, 
no rigorous effort has been made to institute a comprehensive disaster risk management 
framework due to a lower frequency of natural disasters in recent years. Thirdly, the 
establishment of any comprehensive DRM/R framework which can be operative at all the 
tiers has been inhibited due to a direct bearing for a transition from war and internal 
strife to functional governance on DRM/R architecture in Iraq. Fourthly, there are a number 
of laws which were enacted prior to 2003 and are directly related to DRM/R such as the 
Emergency Use Law 1969, Civil Defence Law 1978 and Public Health Law 1981. But these 
laws have yet to be synchronised with the emerging legal and institutional arrangements in post 
2005 Iraq. Such laws do not take account of disaster contingency planning. This means that the 
development of institutional and legislative systems for DRR has a reactive approach. To sum 
up, disaster risk reduction (DRR) in Iraq requires effective disaster preparedness and response 
mechanisms, people-centered early warning systems, responsible enforcement of policies and 
legislation, careful development planning, scientific knowledge, public understanding, and 
political and legal commitment, however, it is a complex and crosscutting development issue 
(Goodyear, 2009). Further, previous studies regarding Iraq’s disaster management have not 
dealt with the response phase in particular. So other studies for countries surrounding Iraq will 
be reviewed to complete the overall picture on disaster management in this area. 
2.13.2 Disaster Management in Countries Surrounding Iraq 
Starting with disaster management in Turkey, more recent attention has focused on the 
effectiveness and development of Turkey’s Disaster Management System as well as conducting 
a qualitative evaluation to find the shortcomings and weaknesses of the current system (Baris, 
2009; Unlu et al., 2010). Baris (2009) focuses on institutional actors and deal with issues of 
coordinating disaster management aspects considering the past experiences. The latter 
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emphasised that in order to obtain a “comprehensive disaster management” the legislations 
should be reviewed and additional points should be added to existing legislation. 
However, Unlu et al. (2010) examine what kinds of initiatives were presented and what is the 
tendency for change.  Alternative approaches and suggestions were included after analysing 
recent cases and exploring some government initiatives. Baris (2009) concluded that many 
institutional and organisational problems in organising a suitable disaster management and 
response system occurred. While the impacts of disasters are dramatically exacerbated due to 
the lack of a single organisational structure concentrated on disaster management. Whereas, 
Unlu et al. (2010) concluded that Turkey’s disaster management system has developed since 
1930, which mostly relied on experiences. A centralised structure governed the disaster and 
crisis management system. Nevertheless, the system at local level appeared extremely weak. 
Moreover, at both national and local levels, contribution of non-profit organisations is quite 
restricted. Consequently, the first-response operations had a problematic and ineffective 
coordination and management. Specially, different types of crises such as terrorist attacks are 
not considered in the design of the existing system. Unlu et al. (2010) added a more integrated 
and flexible structure to cope with current problems effectively is needed in Turkey’s crisis 
management. 
However, in Iran, Jahangiri, Izadkhah, and Tabibi (2011) claimed that community-based 
disaster management (CBDM) is one of the existing and worldwide approaches for managing 
disasters. (CBDM) implies that people’s participation in the disaster management cycle can be 
initiated from the basic phases of a procedure and finishes in the accomplishment and 
institutionalisation in the community. A descriptive-comparative study on the CBDM in 
different selected countries has been made in order to design a model for Iran. Six steps have 
included in the methodology dealing with some countries which have been chosen based on 
their participation in cases like planning, policy making, coordination, organising of disasters, 
control and their experience in accessing related information and disaster management. 
Jahangiri et al. (2011) found that the achievement of a successful disaster management needs a 
community contribution in different disaster management lifecycles. Jahangiri et al. (2011) 
admitted that the type of contribution might differ according to the features of each particular 
country. 
Whereas, in KSA, a comprehensive multi-disciplinary framework was provided for disaster 
risk management in Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior (Directorate of Civil Defence) by 
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presenting the duple paradigm of disaster management (proactive mindset and reactive 
mindset). A guideline for all government levels will be served in order to perform disaster risk 
management. Similar to Iran’s study, an analytical comparison was made for four international 
disaster risk management frameworks aligned with international good practices (Magrabi, 
2011). 
Whilst in Jordan, Sawalha, Jraisat, and Al-Qudah (2013) conducted an investigation study to 
recognise major threats that have the possibility to put Jordanian hotels in disaster or crisis 
circumstances. In addition to examining the frameworks/tools adopted by Jordanian hotels to 
manage disasters and crises. Cultural factors affecting the wider implementation of disaster and 
crisis management good practices in Jordanian hotels were also explored. A survey undertook 
“five-star” hotels in Jordan, as well as administered a questionnaire followed by semi-structured 
interviews, were conducted with three General Managers from three hotels of various cultural 
backgrounds: international; regional; and local.  The study revealed that a comprehensive and 
effective framework/ tools for managing disasters and crises are lacking in Jordanian hotels. 
Furthermore, the wider adoption of disaster and crisis management good practices within 
Jordanian hotels are affected by organisational culture. Sawalha et al. (2013) concluded that the 
relevant authorities in Jordan should demonstrate the significance of disaster and crisis 
management to address crises and disasters more efficiently. 
Because of the longstanding conflict and wars in Iraq, scholars about Iraqi disaster management 
have concentrated on human-made calamities such as conflicts, terrorism and industrial 
hazards. Moreover, Iraq’s institutional disaster management ability is restricted; both on the 
national and subnational fields as well as a comprehensive and coordinated disaster 
management system being lacking. Likewise in some neighbouring countries (see Figure 2.20), 
a community contribution in different disaster management lifecycles is needed to achieve 
successful disaster management. 
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Figure 2.20 Iraq and Countries Surrounding Iraq Highlighted in this Paragraph 
 
2.14 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has focussed on identifying the key research areas relating to this study through a 
comprehensive literature composition. The review of the literature is pulled together on the 
major knowledge domains such as disaster, types of disaster, and terrorism. Moreover, the focus 
on the study (disaster response management) was discussed in greater detail on its four 
administrative stages: planning, organising, directing, and controlling (Lettieri et al., 2009). 
Further, challenges facing the four stages of disaster response management was also presented 
in addition to disaster management in Iraq and countries surrounding Iraq. The following 
chapter will discuss the research methodological design, where the methodology adopted to 
conduct this research is argued in detail. 
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 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
To address the main research issues of the study, a comprehensive literature has been provided 
through the previous chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the rationale 
and justifications on the research methodological design of the study. Accordingly, the chapter 
is structured as below:  
 Research Methodological Design 
 Research Philosophy 
 Research Approaches 
 Research Strategy 
 Research Choices 
 Time Horizon  
 Research Techniques 
 
3.2 Research Methodological Design 
It is widely agreed that a research methodology should be prepared prior to conduct any 
research. According to Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009, p. vii) a design research methodology 
“should help identify research areas and projects, and in selecting suitable research methods 
to address the issues”. Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009, p. 9) also defined design research 
methodology as “an approach and a set of supporting methods and guidelines to be used as a 
framework for doing design research”. Despite the risk and uncertainty in the research process, 
the possibilities of any failure could be minimised through using appropriate research design 
and by forecasting and identifying pitfalls and problems that the researcher might come across. 
Further, the overall research strategy identified through examining the philosophical aspects of 
the research by using research design. Accordingly, many frameworks can be identified within 
the literature on methodological aspects of conducting research. Among those is the nested 
model which gained popularity among researchers, introduced by Kagioglou et al. (1998) and 
the research onion model which was introduced by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2007), 
(2009), (2012), and (2016). While the nested model includes three elements to establish the 
research methodology, including research philosophy, research approach and research 
techniques, the onion model involves six steps, to include: research philosophy, research 
approaches, research strategies, research choices, data collection methods and timescale. It is 
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recognised that one of the important features of the nested model is that shows a simple way to 
understand the research methodology components as shown in Figure 3.1, however the research 
onion consists more layers and provides the researcher with clear guidelines of how to design 
the research appropriately through a series of logical reasoning and decision-making steps.  
 
Figure 3.1. Nested Research Methodology Approach (Sources: Adapted from Kagioglou et al. 
(1998)) 
 
In order to explain the appropriate research methodology in this research, the ‘research onion’ 
model, as shown in Figure 3.2, was chosen due to its clear definitions and systematic order of 
processes starting from the research philosophy in the outer layer, down to the data collection 
and data analysis layer in the central point of the research onion. The following section 
describes in greater detail the research philosophy pertaining to this study. 
 
Figure 3.2 Saunders' Research Onion Model (Saunders et al., 2016, p. 164) 
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3.3 Research Philosophy 
Saunders et al. (2016) consider the philosophy of research in the outer layer of the research 
onion. They also expressed it as an overarching term that relates to the development of 
knowledge and the nature of that Knowledge. Creswell (2009) stated that in the initial stage of 
the study, examining different philosophical perspectives and assumption is vital and should be 
carried out. Likewise, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2008) noted that having an 
understanding of  philosophical issues is very important for at least three reasons and could help 
the researcher to: 
 Clarify research designs. 
 Recognise which design will work and which will not. 
 Identify, and even create, a design that may be outside the researcher’s past experience. 
Most literature classified research philosophy into three main perspectives, namely ontology 
“assumption that the researcher makes about the nature of reality”, epistemology “a general 
set of assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world or in the other 
words, an assumption  about how researchers acquire and accept knowledge about the world”  
and  axiology “assumptions about the nature of values the researcher places on the study” 
(Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2016). Whereas all are different from each other, the way in 
which a researcher thinks about the research process is influenced by each one (Creswell, 2009; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2016).   
Within the context of an ontological position, there are two aspects; objectivism and 
subjectivism. Epistemological stances, on the other hand, were distinguished by Saunders et al. 
(2016) into positivism and interpretivism. With regard to axiology, the main emphasis in this 
philosophical branch is whether research assumptions are made in a value-laden or value-free 
environment (Collins & Hussey, 2009). 
This research seeks to evaluate and explore the current disaster response management system 
in Iraq. Furthermore, due to the involvement of different experts in this process and the fact that 
their “subjective” perceptions and decisions collectively “socially construct” what is seen as 
the response to disaster “phenomena”, the research falls mainly within the ontological stance 
into the subjectivism continuum. In addition, the researcher adopted an interpretivistic 
epistemological position in order to gain an in-depth understanding of social reality through 
studying peoples’ attitudes and behaviours when responding to disaster events. Moreover, as 
this research is of an exploratory nature and the interpretation of interviewees (experts) forms 
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a major component of understanding the reality, combined with the expertise of the researcher 
in this particular field, it is value-laden, since value is added from both parties. Hence, a social 
constructionist approach is adopted. The philosophical stance pertaining to this study is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The following section will discuss research approaches pertaining to 
the study. 
 
Figure 3.3 The Philosophical Stance Pertaining to the Study 
 
3.4 Research Approach 
As reported by Saunders et al. (2016), whilst the research approach relates to theory 
development, the selected approach will enable the researcher to answer the research questions 
and meet the objectives of the study. A research approach consists of three types; deductive, 
inductive, and abductive. The researcher, in the deductive approach, develops hypothesis or 
hypotheses. The hypotheses will be expressed in operational terms to explain the relationship 
between variables. The hypotheses will be tested prior to examining the specific outcomes and, 
if necessary, the theory will be modified according to the findings. Conversely, in the inductive 
approach, there is no development of the theory prior to data collection. Researchers in 
following interpretive approach, starting with the evidence and then building up a theory based 
upon it. Within inductive approach, according to Pathirage, Amaratunga, and Haigh (2008), the 
theory would follow the data rather than vice versa as with deduction. The third approach is the 
combination of deduction and induction which was called an abductive approach by Saunders 
et al. (2016).  
Ontological assumptions 
Realism  Idealism  
Epistemological assumptions 
Positivism  Interpretivist  
Axiological assumptions 
Value free Value laden 
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In this research, the researcher used secondary data to review the significance of disaster 
management and deduce principles in building appropriate data collection tools. As such, the 
data collected are partly theory loaded. In addition, this research attempted to build a theory on 
improving effectively the disaster response management in Iraq. Therefore, this research used 
a combination of deductive and inductive approaches.      
Based on the above discussion, in this study, abductive principles which combine deductive 
and inductive approaches are employed in the process of theory building. The reason behind 
this is that the research requires an examination of complex interactions between people with 
different concepts as well as needing a more complete picture of the real situation. Having 
discussed the research approaches, the next section looks into the research strategy.  
3.5 Research Strategy 
The research strategy is the next layer of the research onion. Many strategies used in business 
and management to collect real data can be adopted by the researcher. For any study, an 
appropriate research strategy choice is based on the research questions, objectives, the amount 
of time, the extent of existing knowledge and other resources available as well as the 
philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et al., 2016). Accordingly, research strategies 
commonly employed by researchers are an experiment, survey, case study, action research and 
ethnography (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Remenyi, 1998; Saunders et al., 2016). Yin (2014), 
on the other hand, included five major ways of undertaking social science research namely, 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study of which, the selection is based on 
the type of research question posed, the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Yin (2014) did not include action research and ethnography in his division to research 
strategies. In fact, each strategy can be used for all three research purposes; exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory. However, the most important issue is whether the selected strategy 
will enable the researcher to answer the research questions and meet the objectives of the study 
(Saunders et al., 2016). 
The selection of the research strategy needs to reflect the philosophical stance of the study 
because some research strategies are likely to harmonise better with one particular research 
philosophy than the other. Accordingly, research approaches can be plotted in the research 
philosophical continuum as shown in Figure 3.4, due to their characteristics evaluation. 
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Figure 3.4 Research Strategies within the Philosophical Continuum - Adapted from (Sexton, 
2007) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.4 the positivism and objectivism positions are taken by experiments 
and surveys with respect to epistemological and ontological undertakings respectively. Because 
the philosophical stance of this research leans towards the interpretivism and subjectivism side, 
the use of experiments and surveys are unjustifiable. Experiments are mostly conducted in a 
laboratory setting under controlled environments where the context and the phenomena are 
separated (Yin, 2014). Experiments allow identification of casual relationships through 
observing the effect of the dependent variable by controlling the independent variable. 
Likewise, with experiments, surveys are also related to the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 
2016). Whilst one advantage of surveys is that a large amount of data is generated, the 
disadvantage is that the depth of information is limited compared to the rich and detailed data 
that can be obtained from in-depth interviews and participant observation (McLafferty, 2003). 
Saunders et al. (2016) agree with this argument, indicating that research using opinion surveys 
can lead to ambiguous conclusions. There is more agreement from Yin (2014), who stated that 
surveys can test phenomena, but their ability to investigate the context is extremely limited. 
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As this research falls under the interpretivism and subjectivism stance and to answer the 
research questions and meet the objectives of the study, the researcher must examine three 
different strategies: action research, ethnography, and case study approach.  
Firstly, an action research strategy. It is an iterative process involving researchers and 
practitioners acting together on a particular cycle of activities. Such strategy is unique in the 
way it associates to research and practice (Avison, Lau, Myers, & Nielsen, 1999). That forms 
a continuing action of planning, diagnosing, taking action and evaluating. Involving the 
employee (as the part of the research objects) throughout the research process is very important 
to implement changes they have helped to create (Saunders et al., 2016). Despite providing an 
in-depth understanding to a specific phenomenon, this strategy is inappropriate to achieve 
research objectives due to the lack of the required access to perform the intervention in the Iraqi 
disaster response management system. 
Secondly, ethnography strategy. Saunders et al. (2016) mention to this strategy as “a research 
strategy that is very time consuming and takes place over an extended time period as the 
researcher needs to immerse herself or himself in the social world being researched as 
completely as possible”. Since achieving the aforementioned factors is very limited as it not 
practically possible for the researcher to immerse deeply into the actual environment. Therefore, 
the ethnography strategy is not suitable for this study.   
Thirdly, a case study strategy; and because of the open-ended inquiry used in case studies, it is 
suitable for building theory and generating hypotheses (Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, & 
Newton, 2002). Further, due to the exploratory nature of the research, this research adopted a 
case study data collection strategy as the most appropriate strategy for answering the research 
questions of this study. Furthermore, it helps to verify the research findings. A case study has 
been defined by Yin (2014, p. 18)  as “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident”. Both ‘what’ type of exploratory questions and the ‘why’ 
type of explanatory research is covered by this approach. He added, in the natural setting, such 
an approach can assist researchers to investigate the phenomenon. Denscombe (2010) declared 
that by using a case study the researchers can examine the studied phenomena or the real-life 
situation. Moreover, it allows them to gain an in-depth picture of the relationships and processes 
within the phenomenon. The case study approach, as a result, is more common in qualitative 
studies when compared with quantitative studies. Miles and Huberman (1994), in contrast, 
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noted that the combinations of both quantitative (questionnaires) and qualitative (interviews 
and documents) data has been allowed in case studies to accomplish different aims and to serve 
different purposes. Yin (2014, p. 11) also supports this argument, he contends that “ the case 
study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence: documents, artefacts, 
interviews, questionnaires and observations”. Therefore, the case study research strategy is 
capable of adopting different data collection methods and is usually used when it is required to 
obtain in-depth knowledge about a particular phenomenon. 
To sum up, the research under consideration does not intend to change or influence the attitudes 
or procedures of the environment or the participants as does in action research. Nor does it 
intend to study physiology or behavioural patterns of the participants as in the case of 
ethnographical approaches. So the case study approach is suitable for this research to explore 
the current practices related to disaster response management in Iraq.  
The selection of case study has been justified in the above section by considering the nature of 
the study, the philosophical stance, and the research questions posted. More justification for 
case study selection and its benefits will be elaborated in the section that follows. 
3.5.1 Case Study Design 
Having discussed why experiment, survey, action research, and ethnography research 
approaches are not appropriate for this study (see Section 3.5 ), this section discuss the use of 
case study as a research strategy and how the quality of this study will be enhanced by using 
such strategy. According to the aim, objective, and research questions shown in Section 1.3, an 
exploration of the current practices related to disaster response management is required from 
this study. Different views of individuals were identified regarding the criteria of good practice 
disaster response management, challenges, strength, and weakness points facing disaster 
response process in its different administrative functions. Therefore, this research requires a 
strategy which helps gathering of experts’ opinions and an in-depth analysis. An in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenon under consideration is offered by case study (Gerring, 2007). 
Moreover, the views of the “actors” of the case under consideration could be incorporated by 
carrying out case study (Zonabend, 1992). Further, according to the definition of a case study 
that stated by Collis and Hussey (2013) “a methodology that is used to explore a single 
phenomenon in a natural setting using a variety of methods to obtain in-depth knowledge”, 
some of the discernible characteristics of case study strategy has been identified. It is normally 
used when obtaining in-depth knowledge is required regarding a particular phenomenon as well 
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as its capability to accommodate different research techniques. Both qualitative and quantitative 
data also can be accommodated in case study research (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2014). Although 
case study research presents many advantages to a research study as mentioned above, it 
criticised for bias, lack of rigor, use of incomplete evidence, and for being expensive and time-
consuming (Remenyi, 1998; Yin, 2014). So far it can be argued that, despite the fact that case 
study is taking too long and expensive, the time and budget could be minimised by using careful 
design. Likewise, many drawbacks can be compensated by having a number of advantages. A 
variety of evidence is embraced by case study such as interviews, observation, and document 
reviews (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). The richness of the collected data will be increased 
while creating the prospects for data triangulation.   
Accordingly, the case study approach appears to be the most suitable method for this study, 
which caters ‘What’ and ‘How’ type research questions about a contemporary set of events, 
without differentiating between phenomena and context, where the researcher tends not to 
interfere with what is being studied. 
Yin (2014) suggested four choices to design case study, namely, single case study (holistic) 
designs; single case study (embedded) designs; multiple case (holistic) designs; and multiple 
case (embedded) designs. Such choices are depending on the number of cases, single (one case) 
or multiple (more than one case) and the number of units of analysis, holistic (one unit of 
analysis) or embedded (more than one units of analysis). The next section will explain which 
choice this study has adopted. 
3.5.1.1 Single versus Multiple Case Study  
According to Yin (2014), “a single case study approach is suitable when investigating critical, 
unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal case”. A critical case is used when it challenges, 
confirms or extends a theory while the unusual case represents a rare situation. Conversely, a 
common case captures a typical or a representative project or case. Therefore, studying one case 
is adequate to get an understanding about the other cases. A revelatory case can be applied to 
study a phenomenon which was inaccessible previously. The phenomenon, as a longitudinal 
case, was studied over a long period of time. 
The research under consideration fell under the critical case because the General Directorate of 
Civil Defence is the main administrative body when responding to disaster (Humayun & Al-
Abyadh, 2014), especially when the situation is triggered by terrorism in Iraq. There are a 
number of stakeholders involved during disaster response stage, namely, General Directorate 
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of Civil Defence, Health Department, NGOs, and Iraqi Red Crescent Society. The General 
Directorate of Civil Defence working under the Federal Ministry of Interior can rightly be 
termed as the focal response agency (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014) and it is the main 
administrative directorate during disaster response stage. Consequently, based on the critical 
view of experts involved in the disaster response activity, the extracted concepts were assessed. 
As a result, a valid theory which contributes to knowledge can be developed after revising the 
extracted concepts. Hence, in accordance with Yin’s rationale for doing single case study design 
and the nature of the research objects, an opportunity to get better research outcomes might be 
acquired in this research if a single case study approach is adopted.  
Accordingly, this study used the single case study approach due to the criticality of the theory 
development and refinement of the phenomenon. Further, the General Directorate of Civil 
Defence was considered the case study boundary for this study because the General Directorate 
of Civil Defence is the main administrative body when responding to disaster (Humayun & Al-
Abyadh, 2014).  
3.5.1.2 Holistic with Unit of Analysis 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 25) stated that the unit of analysis of a study is a “phenomenon 
of some sort of occurring in a bounded context”. Based on Collis and Hussey (2013) it is the 
focal point where the research problem, phenomena and the variables refer to and about which 
the data is collected and analysed. Due to its importance, Miles and Huberman (1994) 
considered the unit of analysis as the “heart” of the research. According to Yin (2014), there is 
a relation between the chosen unit of analysis and the research objectives. The unit of analysis 
might help in shaping the scope of data collection in the later phase. In this study, the unit of 
analysis is disaster response management. 
Based on Yin (2014) opinion, a single case study has two variants, holistic design and 
embedded design. Because the General Directorate of Civil Defence has a same administrative 
system in all its branches or subunits distributed in all Iraqi provinces, the research boundary 
takes the General Directorate of Civil Defence as a case study boundary, and this research is 
focusing on a single unit of analysis which is “disaster response management”. As such, this 
study is sought to adopt single case study holistic design.  
The next layer of Saunders’ research onion concerns with the research choice, the following 
section will explain it in detail. 
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3.6 Research Choices 
There are two main categories for research choices according to Saunders et al., (2016), the 
mono method and the multiple method. The mono method points to using a single data 
collection technique and its corresponding data analysis procedures, whereas multiple methods 
are where more than one data collection technique and analysis procedure is used to answer the 
research questions of a study. In addition, multiple methods have been divided into mixed-
method and multi-method studies (see Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5  Research Choices (Saunders et al., 2016, p. 152) 
 
Mixed-method is defined as using both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques 
and analysing procedures in one research design. Meanwhile, multi-method is defined as using 
more than one method, either qualitative or quantitative, in a single study and analysing them 
in accordance with their relevant procedures (Saunders et al., 2016). Figure 3.5 shows the two 
main categories for research choices. 
In social science, Bryman (2012) and Creswell (2009) argued that a researcher can adopt either 
objectivist or constructionist ontological positions or either interpretivist or positivist 
epistemological positions. In other words, qualitative or quantitative data or both have been 
involved in research choices. Saunders et al. (2016) indicate that individual quantitative and 
qualitative techniques and procedures do not exist in isolation. According to Creswell (2009) 
and Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003), there are critical issues for both quantitative and 
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qualitative research that might cause biases, if it used in isolation. Therefore, in order to reduce 
the current gaps in each approach, the combination of both approaches in one main mixed 
approach might be beneficial. As a result, the validity of the findings can be enhanced. Bryman 
(2012) noted that in the mixed research approach positive benefits can be brought by using 
different methods to collect data since the weaknesses of any one method can be ‘offset’ by the 
strengths of another method. 
Accordingly, more than one data collection technique and analysis procedure were used in this 
study. The mixed-method research choice was most suitable for this study in order to address 
the research question. As the result of the complexity of disaster response processes and to 
understand the real situation of the phenomenon, one single technique would not have been 
adequate. A better understanding of the phenomenon was therefore obtained from mixed-
methods and thus both qualitative and quantitative approaches were applied. The findings of 
one method were used to clarify the results created by the other.  To “peel off” the next layer 
of the research onion, the time horizon of the research will be discussed in the next section. 
3.7 Time Horizon  
A ‘time horizon’ aspect of research could be understood by looking at ‘time horizon’ 
subdivisions’ features. Saunders et al. (2016) classified it to cross-sectional and longitudinal. 
In cross-sectional studies, the researcher studies one particular phenomenon at a particular time. 
Conversely, a longitudinal study focuses on a particular phenomenon and observes their 
changes and developments over time. Due to focusing on a particular phenomenon at a 
particular time, a cross-sectional aspect has been considered in this study.  
3.8 Research Techniques 
Data collection and their analysis procedures are related to research techniques. Walliman 
(2006, p. 50) defines data as “the essential raw materials of any kind of research. They are the 
means by which we can understand events and conditions in the world around as”. The type of 
data collected can fall into two categories: primary data and secondary data (Saunders et al., 
2016; Walliman, 2006). When the data collected from a researcher’s own research, it is called 
primary data, while secondary data is the data obtained from existing sources. Walliman (2006) 
argues that although data can be collected from virtually everywhere, it requires a plan of action 
that uses and identifies the most appropriate and effective methods of data collection. 
Accordingly, the next section will elaborate on data collection techniques adopted in this study. 
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3.8.1 Data Collection Techniques  
Various data collection techniques can be employed during a case study research strategy and 
that is considered one of the main advantages of it. Six sources of evidence can be obtained by 
a case study strategy, namely, documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation and physical artefact (Dooley, 2002; Yin, 2014). Using multiple sources 
of evidence has been encouraged by Yin. Thus, an investigator can be allowed to address a 
broader range of behavioural, historical and attitudinal issues which leads to the development 
of a converging line of inquiry and a more accurate and convincing conclusion (Yin, 2014). 
Using multiple sources of evidence also encourages creating a case study database as well as 
maintaining a chain of evidence. 
In agreement with the aforementioned argument, making records of all relevant evidence and 
creating a database may help the researcher to meet the study purposes. Such purposes can be 
obtained further by using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research i.e. mixed 
methods research. Moreover, by triangulating the methods, a personal understanding of the 
phenomenon will be enhanced. Accordingly, a general picture of the real situation regarding 
Iraqi disaster response management was gained by using a quantitative method. By using such 
a method, the answer to the research question “What is the status of disaster response 
management in Iraq?” and all the consequent related probing questions were obtained. Further, 
in order to get a fuller picture, an in-depth understanding of the quantitative results was obtained 
by exploring experts’ perspectives using the qualitative method of interviews. In addition, some 
significant and related documents were analysed in order to help the researcher to understand 
and further support the findings that were derived from questionnaires and interviews.  
A wealth of information was obtained from both primary and secondary data. In this study, the 
resources of secondary data were articles, books, past theses, archival records, legislations, and 
relevant websites, while primary data were collected through questionnaires, interviews, and 
documents.  
3.8.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire is a set of proforma question distributed to individuals aiming to gather 
information (Saunders et al., 2016). An intensive investigation of the literature has been 
conducted to find the elements of good practice disaster response management in order to 
formulate the questions for the first draft of the questionnaire. After the completion of literature 
investigation, permission from the selected case was obtained. This permission was sought from 
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the senior managers of The Iraqi Directorate of Civil Defence because it is a hierarchical 
organisation. In the meantime, the researcher began designing the first draft questionnaire 
which needs to undergo through the required ethical approval process (see Appendix D). The 
questionnaire which has been designed in accordance with management stages (planning, 
organising, directing, and controlling) was reviewed by supervision panel. They suggested 
reducing the number of questions by deleting repeated and unrelated questions and to group 
and separate the questions for more clarity as well as to provide a definition for every stage 
within the questionnaire. The required amendments have been made and the questionnaire was 
translated into the Arabic language (see appendix E). To facilitate an efficient translation, the 
researcher also conducted a comprehensive investigation into Arabic literature to ensure the 
accurate technical terminologies are used.  
The researcher conducted questionnaire survey within the case study. The questionnaire was 
divided into five sections (see appendix E). The first section asked about general information, 
while the rest four sections asked about the element of good practice disaster response 
management during planning, organising, directing, and controlling stages. By carrying out this 
survey, the difference between the levels of importance and implementation of various elements 
related to the different stages of disaster response management was investigated from a 
questionnaire survey.  
3.8.1.1.1 Likert Scale 
By using a Likert scale, the opinion and behavioural variables can be captured. Five scales of 
“importance” (unimportant, of little importance, moderately important, important, and very 
important) have been represented by Likert scale to capture the level of importance. Further, 
other five scales of “frequency” (never, rarely, sometimes, very often, and always) have been 
used to capture the level of implementation. In addition, a column for “no opinion N/O” has 
been added for both the scales. This addition is important as it would minimise the tendency 
for giving an inaccurate answer when the respondents lack knowledge or opinion for a specific 
question (Kulatunga, 2008). Table 3.1 represents the values designated for the Likert scale. 
Table 3.1 Values Designated for the Likert Scale 
Scale for 
importance 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Very 
important 
No opinion 
N/O 
Scale for 
implementation  
Never Rarely Sometimes Very often Always No opinion 
N/O 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 999 
 
92 
 
The questionnaires were distributed to the staff with Captain military rank and above. 53 
questionnaire surveys were conducted. All the respondents were executives responsible for 
disaster response in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence and were selected based on 
the experts’ rank, knowledge, experience, and involvement with disaster response teams. 
Section 3.8.2 will discuss in detail how the questionnaire sample was selected. The 
questionnaire was designed to identify the difference between the levels of importance and 
implementation of the elements of the good practices and any gaps in every stage of disaster 
response management in Iraq. The extent of such gaps acts as a good indicator of the 
weaknesses and the good practice highlights the strengths of the current disaster response 
management. After completing this stage, the researcher carried out the pilot study. 
3.8.1.2 Archival Records and Documents 
To enhance the reliability and triangulate the research questionnaire and interviews about the 
disaster response management in Iraq, reviewing the existing information in archival records 
and documents were conducted in addition to the processes of the questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews with the disaster response experts. According to Saunders et al. (2016) 
and Yin (2014), a collection of archival and current documents as empirical research field data 
is known as being important.  
In this study, the archival records and documents to be analysed were identified from expert 
interviews. Documents such as studies, reports, statistics, follow-up, and laws have been 
gathered from the IGDCD and other organisation related to disaster response, for example, Iraqi 
Ministry of Health (see Table 4.1 ). Such gathering has been conducted during the interviewing 
stage. The types and design of semi-structured interviews will be discussed in the forthcoming 
section. 
3.8.1.3 Interview Design 
According to Amaratunga et al. (2002), interviews are deemed to be a favourable method in 
different research areas in order to gain in-depth data. It is widely considered that one of the 
common sources of evidence for the case study is interviews. Through a series of interviews, 
the data were collected. In this study, the most critical sources of evidence are the interviews. 
This is due to the capability of this technique to probe the current practices related to disaster 
response management. Further, the researcher is allowed to clarify any unclear answers with 
experts (Kumar, 2011) and access to sensitive information might be achieved. Saunders et al. 
(2016) stated that there are three ways to conduct interviews, namely, structured; semi-
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structured or unstructured. Each kind of interview has its own disadvantages and advantages. 
Regarding the structured interview, the responses from the interviewees are limited which leads 
to less richness of the data. Conversely to that an unstructured interview, it lets the interviewees 
express freely without restriction. Consequently, the process of analysing the data might 
become more difficult due to the absence of consistencies (Myers, 2013). However, a semi-
structured interview is established to extract valuable information from real experiences, 
interviewee’s interpretations, and recommendations on the research topic.  
Due to the aforementioned argument and because this research contains an in-depth study on 
the current practices related to disaster response management, a semi-structured interview will 
let the interviewees be more flexible in giving their response from various viewpoints with the 
consistency coming from a similar set of questions. The researcher prepared a few sets of 
proforma semi-structured interview questions for the interviewees. This form of questions was 
sent to the supervisor team to get their feedback. After receiving the supervisor team’s feedback 
and making the amendments and translating it to the Arabic language, the semi-structured 
interview form (see appendix F) became ready to conduct the pilot study in April 2015.  
The interview was designed to elicit the weaknesses and the strengths of the disaster response 
management and the recommendations to enhance the current disaster response practices. The 
interviewees are referred to in this study as E followed by the number, as this was the code 
assigned to each interviewee. 28 intensive semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
Lieutenant Colonel military rank and above. The next section will discuss in detail how the 
questionnaire and interview sample were selected. 
3.8.2 Sampling of Participants and Interviewees 
According to Saunders et al. (2016), in research, sampling is needed. Such requirement resulted 
from the limitation in obtaining information from the entire population. Sample selection is 
mainly relying on the research objectives. When deciding sampling technique, the researcher 
should not ignore factors such as time limitations, financial, and accessibility to the resources. 
Two strategies can be used in sampling: random sampling/probability sampling and non-
random sampling / non-probability sampling. In random sampling, the chance of each element 
being selected from the population is usually equal, while, non-random sampling doesn’t give 
an equal chance to each element being selected. Kumar (2011) sheds light on the usage of 
sampling within a quantitative research and a qualitative research. The sampling in the 
qualitative research is not significant, whereas a sample is used to represent the study population 
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in a quantitative research. Figure 3.6 illustrates some sampling methods under each of the basic 
strategies. 
 
Figure 3.6 Sampling methods (adapted from Saunders et al. (2016)) 
 
According to the nature of the research outlined in chapter 1, the quality of the sample is 
required rather than the quantity for this study. Each person included in the sample was studied 
in more detail and greater depth and the researcher want to probe deeper with every person in 
the sample. Moreover, the researcher puts in her consideration how informative the sample is 
rather than the size of it. Therefore, to get enough information, the researcher selected a 
purposive sampling for this study. Kumar (2011) and Saunders et al. (2016) stated that 
purposive sampling is a sub-set of non-probability sampling where a specific sample is selected 
non-random way in order to obtain rich and specialised data related to a study. 
Based on the experts rank, knowledge, experience, and involvement with disaster response team 
as advised in the pilot study, the questionnaire’ responders and interviewees were deliberately 
identified with the help of the senior manager and the manager of IGDCD. 
For the questionnaire survey, 53 members of Iraqi Directorate of Civil Defence were involved 
because there is a need to understand the studied concepts as they existed currently in the 
studied case. A questionnaire was distributed to the staff with Captain military rank and above 
(53 officers) who are currently working in the selected case. The reason for distributing the 
questionnaire is to explore the current situation related to disaster response management in Iraq 
with particular reference to terrorism and identify the weaknesses and the strengths of the 
current disaster response practices.   
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In qualitative research, deciding a sample size is complex in nature. In the same time, the sample 
size in a qualitative research is not an essence unlike in a statistical research (Kumar, 2011). 
The researcher achieved an adequate size when she reached the saturation point in her data 
collection. Such point is achieved when no new themes are discovered or new information is 
received (Kumar, 2011; Saunders et al., 2016). Saunders et al. (2016) recommended non-
random minimum sample size which is illustrated in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Minimum Size for Non-Probability Sample (Saunders et al., 2016, p. 297) 
Nature of Study Minimum Sample Size 
Semi-structure/in-depth Interviews 5-25 
Ethnographic 35-36 
Grounded Theory 20-35 
Considering a homogenous population 4-12 
Considering a heterogeneous population 12-30 
 
By using a combination of purposive sampling and a snowballing method, the interviewees 
were selected from the case study. Based on Saunders et al. (2016) minimum non-probability 
sample size for semi-structured interviews which has been shown in Table 3.2, twenty-eight 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with Lieutenant Colonel military rank and above. 
3.8.3 The Pilot Study 
At the beginning of April 2015, the researcher travelled to Iraq to conduct the pilot study to get 
ready to perform the case study. To increase the reliability and validity of the research tools, 
the precision of such tools on addressing the research question was checked. The researcher 
also intended to estimate the time required for the interview exercise. Further, discussion about 
a sampling of participants and interviewees has been undertaken in order to obtain contact detail 
of such participants and interviewees and to have a feedback about selecting the sample.  
The pilot study for the questionnaire and the semi-structured interview questions started at the 
beginning of April 2015 with three voluntary experts who suggested some amendments only to 
the questionnaire questions. Those experts completely agreed with the semi-structured 
interview questions. According to voluntary experts’ comments, the questionnaire questions 
were clear in term of language except that few terminologies were not very clear especially 
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with the Iraqis context. But at the same time, it will be easy to comprehend content, if the 
responder is from medium and higher rank such as captain, major, lieutenant-Colonel, colonel, 
Brigadier-General, and above. Therefore the experts stressed on choosing the sample for each 
of the questionnaire and interview-based on the ranking. They further advised regarding 
researcher’s interview skill in order to elicit more deep and rich information from the 
interviewees because there are questions regarding their personal opinions and experience on 
the weaknesses and the strengths of the current practices related to disaster response 
management. Based on experts’ feedback, the researcher updated the questionnaire and 
interview questions. Accordingly, the data collection tools were ready by July 2015 to use 
within the case study.  
3.8.4 The Main Study 
The researcher travelled to Iraq at the beginning of July 2015 to distribute the questionnaire 
(see Appendix E). In order to receive the completed questionnaire, the researcher stayed in 
contact with the respondents. Meanwhile, face-to-face interviews had been conducted with key 
officials at the most convenient time and place for the interviewees the selected case. An 
interview guideline which includes; the interview questions, the security and management of 
the interview responses and research information have been given to each interviewee. Further, 
all interviewees’ personal information is taken as anonymous.  Each interview lasted from 50 
minutes to 90 minutes. All interviews run smoothly as planned.  
To communicate with all respondents, oral and written Arabic had been used as the respondents 
were more comfortable with their local language. During the interviews, audio recording is 
usually very helpful to make sure the accuracy of the translation. However, the researcher could 
not use the audio recording due to the sensitivity and high-security nature of the place. 
Consequently, direct paper transcription was used to document answers and any other 
comments related to the questions made by interviewees. For analysis purposes, paper 
transcription, which was in Arabic, was then translated to the English language. Document and 
archival records were obtained with the help of interviewees to further understand and evaluate 
the current practices related to disaster response management. 
This data collection journey took about six weeks. At the beginning of September 2015, the 
researcher was able to collect 53 completed questionnaires and 28 interviews when the 
saturation point has been achieved. After completing data collection stage, data analysis process 
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began. The following section presents how the objectives are addressed through the data 
collection techniques.  
3.8.5 Objectives of the Study and how they are addressed through the Data 
Collection Methods 
Table 3.3 below illustrates how the objectives are addressed through the data collection 
techniques. 
Table 3.3 Objective of the Study and Method of Investigation 
 
Method of Investigation 
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Case Study 
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To critically review the significance of disaster management in 
general and the disaster response management stage in 
particular. 
X    
To evaluate and synthesise the current status of disaster 
response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq. 
 X X X 
To critically evaluate the weaknesses in the disaster response 
management stage with particular reference to Iraq. 
X X X X 
To critically evaluate the strengths in the disaster response 
management stage with particular reference to Iraq. 
X X X X 
To make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of 
disaster response management stemming from terrorism in 
Iraq. 
X X  X 
 
After discussing the data collection techniques and completing data collection stage, data 
analysis process began. The following section discusses in detail the data analysis process. 
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3.9 Data Analysis Process 
It is widely considered that one of the main parts of any study is the data analysis because it 
helps to inspect the gathered data and to arrive at suitable conclusions according to such data. 
Data analysis procedures consist of examining, categorising, tabulating, testing or otherwise 
recombining both qualitative and quantitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a 
study (Yin, 2014). The qualitative data highlights all non- numeric data or data that has not 
been measured however quantitative data highlights all numeric data (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Yin (2014) emphasises that to reduce potential analytical difficulties, a general strategy for data 
analysis should be developed. Such strategy will lead the researcher when selecting an 
appropriate data analysis tool, ensuring that the evidence is addressed properly, thus generating 
convincing and sound analytical conclusions while discarding any alternative interpretations. 
Moreover, despite the existence of a various method of data analysis, no specific data analysis 
has been found to accommodate case study (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012; Yin, 2014).  
In this study, NVivo and MS Excel software was used to analyse the data and present it in the 
appropriate form. Using such software will establish continuity and increase both 
methodological rigour and transparency (Saunders et al., 2016). This step was conducted after 
transcribing the collected data from non-written evidence (interviews) to written accounts. 
3.9.1 Analysis of Questionnaire Surveys 
MS Excel software was used to analyse the data gathered through a questionnaire. After the 
researcher arrived back in the UK at the beginning of September 2015, the data entry process 
started immediately. The results from the questionnaire have been entered and analysed. 
By using the Likert scale in its 5 points’ grading for the degree of importance and for the degree 
of implementation as explained in Section 3.8.1.1, quantitative data was collected and such 
primary data was entered into MS Excel spreadsheet. To minimise and avoid any errors, the 
data set was further proofread.  
To handle the missing data “no opinion N/O”, Saunders et al. (2016) argue that a special code 
for missing data is often reserved by statistical analysis software. For example, 999 is used to 
distinct the missing data from other answer codes (Wilson, 2013). Therefore, subsequent 
analyses can exclude such missing data when necessary (Kulatunga, 2008; Saunders et al., 
2016; Wilson, 2013).  
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According to Saunders et al. (2016), the three most used ways of measuring the central tendency 
in business research are: mode, median, and mean (average). The median is the mid-point of 
the data whereas the mode is the most frequently occurring value. The most frequently used 
measure of central tendency is the mean value since it encapsulates all the values in the sample 
and hence it was used in this study. Accordingly, to measure the importance and the degree of 
implementation of the element of good practice disaster response management, the researcher 
calculated the mean value i.e. the average value of the data sets.  
3.9.1.1 Presentation of Questionnaire Survey Analysis  
The questionnaire survey findings were presented by using radar charts. The gap between the 
importance and implementation was presented, as shown in Figure 3.7. The extent of such gaps 
can be given a good indicator to the weaknesses and the strengths of the current practices related 
to disaster response management. 
 
Figure 3.7 Radar Chart for Every Data Set to indicate Both Importance and Implementation’s 
Value 
 
3.9.2 Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews 
Because of the use of semi-structured interviews, the free flowing text was obtained as 
qualitative data. To analyse such data within this study, content analysis has been utilised. This 
section will explain the use of it. In qualitative research, content analysis is widely used. 
Significant desired raw information such as implicit or explicit data are extracted from texts or 
images by using this method. Before making interpretation and valid inferences, such 
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information will be organised into a systematic concept (Busch et al., 1994-2012; Krippendorff, 
2012; Kulatunga, Amaratunga, & Haigh, 2007; Smith, 2000). The content analysis tool is also 
able to quantify qualitative data (Kulatunga et al., 2007; Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 
2013). Based on Kulatunga et al. (2007), in qualitative research, four approaches to content 
analysis has been presented. Firstly, word count, by counting the frequency of identified words, 
the importance of the words can be showed by using the assumptions of the most frequent word. 
Secondly, the conceptual content analysis focuses on identifying the occurrence and presence 
of an identified concept and/or themes is examined in text or sets of text (Busch et al., 1994-
2012). The predetermination of concept or themes could be through the literature review or 
appear from the information itself. Thirdly, the relational analysis considers the relation 
between concepts inside the text is analysed by this approach (Busch et al., 1994-2012). 
Fourthly, referential content analysis focus on the underlying meaning of the text is examined 
and text interpretation is based on the researcher judgement. 
In this study, the researcher sought to explore the interviewee’s thoughts about the current 
disaster response practices. Therefore, the attitudes and opinions concerning the current 
practices related to disaster response management in Iraq, weaknesses and strengths of the 
current disaster response practices were examined. The interviewee’s recommendations to 
enhance the current disaster response practices were also explored. Mere word counting, within 
this scenario, would not guide the researcher to accomplish the ultimate goals by extracting 
major concepts from the study. In addition to that, it is not anticipated to develop relationships 
among the concepts, within the range of the content analysis, nor planned to analyse the 
complexity of the language. Consequently, by considering the requirements of this study, as 
this study aim to evaluate and make recommendations to disaster response management in Iraq, 
the documents related to disaster response management and the experience of the interviewees 
were investigated by using conceptual content analysis approach. Such approach was selected 
because it presents the opportunity to inspect the interviewees’ answers in multiple methods so 
as to discover data which are important to the study. Accordingly, to provide insight on the 
disaster response management in Iraq, the conceptual content analysis has been utilised in this 
study. 
3.9.2.1 Presentation of Semi-Structured Interview Analysed Data 
As conceptual content analysis was identified as the most suitable method to achieve the aim 
and the objectives of this research, a computer software package called NVivo was used to aid 
such type of analysis. Since NVivo is a software package that supports qualitative research. It 
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has an ability to collect and organise qualitative data, such as an interview. The researcher chose 
to use NVivo 10 because such software provides great management for the interview 
transcription and supporting the execution of content analysis. Further, the numbers of 
interviews were too large to handle manually. The most importantly, in addition to it is easy to 
understand and simple, it permits a rigorous and comprehensive data analysis process. 
The researcher followed a procedure in coding to conduct the analysis using NVivo software. 
Firstly, the raw data from the interviews are transcribed into text format using Microsoft Word 
software. After that, this data is imported to NVivo. The preliminary themes and codes using 
the literature review and manual analysis on the transcripts were then initially established prior 
to developing themes in NVivo. In NVivo, the theme is known as a node. The structure of such 
nodes is based on the key theme of the semi-structured interview that reflects the objectives of 
the study. Finally, the researcher conducted further analysis to the coded texts after developing 
the nodes. These multiple stages approach that were used to code the interviews transcription 
are sometimes named open coding, axial coding, and selective coding process (Hayat & 
Amaratunga, 2014). The researcher in the open coding stage coded and named the information 
from the interviews depending on the key ideas of the emerging information. At the axial coding 
stage, the researcher categorised and gathered the nodes into relevant themes (see Figure 3.8).  
 
Figure 3.8 Example of Data Presentation Using Nvivo 10 
 
After finishing the axial coding process and in order to add more elaboration and discussions, 
the transcription codes were exported to Microsoft word software. The researcher after that 
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extracted the information from the transcription depending on its suitability and relevance to 
the themes. The researcher used direct quotations of the interviewees when presenting the 
arguments. Thus, this procedure is named selective coding. Accordingly, a series of matrices 
of themes has been presented after classifying the analysis of data. Throughout this process, in-
depth or detailed descriptions were used to give the reader a better understanding of the 
underlying conditions behind the phenomenon and the activities that had taken place. The 
credibility of the study was presented through these in-depth descriptions. 
Having designated all the elements in the methodological framework, from research philosophy 
to date collection techniques and analysis, the research methodology adopted by this study is 
summarised in the following onion model of Saunders et al. (2016) (see Figure 3.9). 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Methodology for this Research Adopted from Saunders’ Research Onion 
 
Subjectivism 
Interpretevism Value laden 
Abductive 
Interviews 
Documents 
Archival records  
Questionnaire 
Case study Mixed-method Cross-sectional 
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3.10 Validity and Reliability 
In any research, having precise data and strong results are importance to achieve quality 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000; Golafshani, 2003; Suter, 2012; Yilmaz, 2013). Yilmaz (2013) 
presented a description for both validity and reliability. Validity is an “accuracy of data”, 
however, reliability is a “consistency or the degree to which a research instrument measures a 
given variable consistently every time it is used under the same condition”. A research needs 
to satisfy specific standards in collecting and measuring data to obtain reliability and validity. 
Golafshani (2003) noted that biasness can be eliminated by achieving validity and reliability in 
a qualitative research.  
To maximise validity and reliability in social research, four tests are common used, namely, 
construct validity; internal validity; external validity; and reliability (Yin, 2014). For the 
construct validity, the researcher should consider it in data collection stage in order to create 
the accurate operational measures for the study context. Whereas to find a relationship between 
events, the internal validity is needed and it is applicable mainly in experiments and causal 
studies (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). The external validity concerns on whether the 
findings of a study can be stratified in another study. Furthermore, the reliability is the 
possibility of achieving a mirror result by repeating the same case study. 
In this research, by choosing a suitable research design and appropriate data collection tool, the 
validity of the process can be achieved. Further, by triangulating the data collection methods 
and conducting the piolet study, presented in (Section 3.8.3), the reliability can be enhanced.  
In addition to these four tests, there is also credibility. It shows that to what extent the research 
findings can be believable and acceptable. By presenting how the interpretation has been 
conducted taking into account any bias, this issue can be addressed. For this research, the 
credibility was enhanced by using in-depth or detailed descriptions. 
3.10.1 Validity of the Recommendations 
After completing the analysis process of all data, the emerged finding from primary and 
secondary data was presented as sets of recommendations that are suggested to enhance the 
disaster response management in Iraq. In order to verify and validate the recommendations, 
three executives responsible for disaster response in the main administration (purposely 
selected) from the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence were interviewed by the 
researcher (see Section 5.8). To refine the recommendations, the interviewees were questioned 
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about the appropriateness of the recommendation, and to check whether they were classified 
appropriately under the different research themes. By conducting content analysis, few 
comments, which were received from experts, were addressed to make an improvements or 
changes to the final sets of recommendations (see Section 5.9).  
3.11 Research Methodological Framework 
To achieve the aim of the research and addressing the research objectives, the selected sources 
of evidence were tailored carefully by constructing a robust research design. Both Bryman 
(2012) and Creswell (2009) argue that the research design is the framework set by the researcher 
in order to collect the data and analyse them. Further, the researcher should clearly address the 
scope of the examination. In this chapter, the research methodology adopted for this study was 
discussed and justified.  
Therefore, in order to summarise the procedures used, this section shows the research 
methodological framework of the study as a flow chart, identifying the three main stages as 
expressed in Figure 3.10, in order to articulate the logical steps taken throughout this study.  
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Figure 3.10 Research Methodological Framework  
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3.12 Ethical Approval 
Throughout the process of conducting this study, ethical issues were carefully considered in 
order to ensure integrity. As the university’s code of ethics provides a statement of principles 
and procedures for conducting research work, the conduct of this study was guided by this code. 
Before the primary data collection process began, a formal application for ethical approval, 
stating all conditions and activities for this research area, was submitted and approved by the 
Research Ethics Panel, University of Salford, in line with the requirements of the university. 
To avoid misconduct in research data analysis and interpretation, gaining appropriate ethical 
approval is critical. To maintain the University of Salford's ethical standards and guarantee 
integrity, the following conditions were met: 
 Obtaining access data permission from the selected case "The Iraqi General Directorate 
of Civil Defence" see Appendix G. 
 The participants were selected only after confirming their desire to participate in the 
research. 
 Interviews were held at times that were convenient for interviewees. 
 Interviewees were able to stop the interview at any time. 
 Interviewees were fully informed about the purpose and nature of the research. 
 The confidential treatment of personal information was guaranteed prior to the 
interviews. 
 The data collected via the questionnaire and interviews was treated (in terms of its 
storage and protection) with strict confidentiality and handled only by the researcher. 
With regard to the secondary data collection, all sources, authors and contributors of 
information were properly acknowledged and well referenced, using the approved university 
system. To ensure that the data were conducted in a successful way through collecting, 
interpreting and analysing valid and reliable data, ethical approval was fully adhered to. In 
addition to that, explicit approval to publish the name of The Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence was obtained, so that permission was granted to include their name in the thesis, this 
is shown in Appendix H. 
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3.13 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, the research methodology adopted for this study has been presented and justified 
by discussing how the research philosophy, approaches, and techniques were designed to 
address the research problem of the study. Moreover, the design of a single holistic case study 
and the measures conducted to ensure the acceptability of the research findings were also 
discussed. The chapter that follows moves on to describe in greater detail the analysis of the 
interviews, questionnaires, and documents.    
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 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
RESULT 
4.1 Introduction 
The description and analysis of the single case study will be shown in this chapter. Within the 
case study, analysis of the interview transcript, questionnaires and documents will be provided 
as well as discussion of the experts’ opinions on the current practices related to disaster response 
management and the current administrative system’s ability to respond to human-made 
disasters stemming from terrorism in Iraq. By using NVivo software, the interview data was 
analysed and a number of themes and sub-themes were revealed related to the different stages 
of disaster response management in Iraq (planning, organising, directing, and controlling). In 
addition, recommendations for the overall disaster response process and for each stage of the 
process will be given in order to enhance Iraqi disaster response management in the future. 
Before conducting this analysis and discussion, a detailed description of the background to the 
General Directorate of Civil Defence will be provided. 
4.2 Case Study Background   
The General Directorate of Civil Defence is one of the formations of the Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior. This directorate has undergone a number of changes before appearing in its present 
form. It started in Baghdad after the British occupation of Iraq in 1917 with the formation of a 
firefighting force, based at the Al-Rashid Campsite. It consisted of 25-32 men and it only had 
one fire engine, one riverboat and one horse-drawn carriage at its disposal. The situation 
continued, without progress and development, until the year 1936. After the creation of the Iraqi 
state, the firefighting force became the Directorate of Firefighting and Mechanical Matters. Its 
headquarters relocated to the secretariat of the capital building and then in 1938 moved to 
Sheikh Omar Street. The year 1942 saw the birth of the first official department for Iraqi civil 
defence and was then known as the Directorate of Passive Defence, linked to the Ministry of 
Defence. This directorate, in fact, was a superficial formulation because it was not seriously 
enriched until 1956 and the issuance of civil defence decree no. 2 in 1957. The number of its 
members was not more than 100 men, 5 cars (one fire engine and four cars to transport water), 
2 portable pumps, and one firefighting centre. After 1960, the number of its men and machines 
increased year by year. In 1975, Iraq witnessed active industrial shifts, economic developments 
and a construction boom, which created comprehensive new factors that raised the degree of 
exposure to the dangers of fire with the possible doubling of damage it could cause. This led to 
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the creation of the Industrial Security Department within the Civil Defence Directorate. In 
addition, a new cooperation was generated between the basic firefighting facilities, which were: 
the Baghdad Directorate of Firefighting, the military firefighting services, and the oil facilities 
firefighting services. After that, in the year 1979, the Baghdad Directorate of Firefighting was 
separated from the secretariat of the capital and was attached to the Ministry of Interior, then 
renamed the General Directorate of Civil Defence. It received great support and was 
modernised according to global specifications in mechanisms, facilities, equipment, and 
materials. 
At the beginning of the 1980’s, another stage began which was the start of supplying the 
Directorate of Civil Defence with diverse scientific capabilities in all areas. At that time 
cumulative practical experience, mixed with academic research and supported by theoretical 
knowledge, enhanced ambition. These were the basic building blocks for another generation to 
deal with events with knowledge and experience. Modern fire engines were imported at the 
time, but as they were only in low numbers they did not fill the need. To bridge the gap in 
information and experience in the field of firefighting, like any young institution, a limited 
number of specialists were sent to attend courses outside the country. 
In the middle of that decade, firefighting entered another stage characterised by a qualitative 
change. This was represented by making firefighting one of the internal security forces under 
Law No. 53 which came into force on 15th October 1985. Soon the civil defence was exposed 
to many cracks and setbacks, particularly from the early 1990’s, soon reaching its worst in 
capability at all levels. The implementation of this law led to firefighting suffering from a very 
severe shortage so that its capabilities declined. The reasons for this are related to the adverse 
effects of the numerous wars, the form of the hierarchical structure of the state and priorities of 
importance in it, which overlooked the role of civil defence and its importance. This decline 
continued until 9th April 2003 when the regime was in Iraq was changed (Abdel Hafez & Abdul 
Sattar, 2015). In the post-2003 era, there were fewer natural calamities, longstanding wars or 
local conflicts, there was, however, more turmoil. Accordingly, Iraq’s institutions had limited 
scope and mandate (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014, N.D.). 
Currently, the focal agency for disaster response in Iraq at all levels is the General Directorate 
of Civil Defence, which is work under the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It provides vital 
services including evacuation, rescue, fire-fighting, ambulance, medical services, emergency 
communications, and shelters in the case of disaster (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014, N.D.). 
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Apparently, almost all of the limited disaster response capacity of the GOI lies in the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence of the Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of Public 
Health and Primary Health Care. In order to respond to disasters ad-hoc support to the GoI is 
provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations, and 
national/international non-governmental agencies (Goodyear, 2009). 
Having briefly identified the background details of the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence, which leads the response process to human-made disasters stemming from terrorism 
in Iraq related in the case study.  
4.3 Interview Analysis – Planning Stage  
The data collected from the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence are presented in this 
section. The analysis of this data started by categorising each stage as being either a weakness, 
strength, or recommendation for disaster response management. Subsequently, sub-themes 
were extracted from the collected data on each main theme. The following are the interview 
responses and discussions for the planning stage of disaster response management in Iraq.  
4.3.1 Weaknesses during the Planning Stage 
Points of weakness have been extracted from interviewees’ transcriptions in order to complete 
the important elements in the evaluation of the current Disaster Response Administrative 
System. Planning weaknesses’ sub-themes as showed in Figure 4.1 below will be argued in the 
following sections.  
 
Figure 4.1 Nodes for Planning Weaknesses 
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4.3.1.1 Citizens’ Irresponsible Intervention 
Disaster response planning is only as good as the assumptions on which it is based. However, 
some of these assumptions are very difficult to imagine, particularly when it relates to citizens' 
intervention at the scene and the consequences of such an intervention.  According to 
interviewees E1, E2, E6, E8, E10-E13, E15, and E22-E24, effective disaster response planning 
has suffered from citizens’ intervention at the scene that makes the response process very 
difficult. Interviewee E11 mentioned: “It is difficult to contain the chaos during the incident 
because of the irresponsible intervention of citizens”. Some of the interviewees, E3, E4, E9, 
E13, and E20, attributed this situation to a lack of society's awareness or citizens’ knowledge 
about not interrupting the official disaster responders’ work whilst performing their duties. One 
of the interviewees, E3, captured this as follows: “There is a lack of citizen awareness of the 
necessity for non-interference by the crowd near the scene”.  
Interviewee E11 pointed out that another reason for citizens' intervention is due to local police 
not imposing a proper security cordon. While interviewees E4 and E20 agree with E11’s 
view, they believe that citizens' intervention can be exploited by suicide bombers or terrorists, 
who could cause dual or sequential bombings. Dual or sequential bombings are considered the 
most challenging problem facing the official disaster responders in Iraq. It costs a lot of disaster 
responders’ lives. The next section is another sub-theme that is related to planning weaknesses. 
4.3.1.2 Coordination between Organisations   
It is widely acknowledged that to conduct an effective planning process, inter-organisational 
coordination should be considered by disaster response planning, yet interviewees E4, E13, and 
E14 stated that this was one of the more complex difficulties inhibiting the planning process. A 
clear indication is given by interviewee E4 that there was a “lack of cooperation from the rest 
of the organisations in executing the plan”. In a similar way, interviewee E14 asserts that 
“The plans are not applied strictly by the rest of the organisations”. Moreover, interviewee E2 
stated that there is a “weakness in responding to disasters from other organisations, such as 
services and security organisations”. While interviewee E11 pointed out the “varying periods 
of time in response to a disaster from other stakeholders who relate to the response process”. 
Interviewee E14 added that there was an “overlap in responsibilities with other departments”. 
This is supported by interviewee E13, who highlights the “intersections that occurred between 
the executive authorities (civil defence) and local governments in the provinces” as a weakness 
of the planning stage. These intersections have a negative impact on the planning process and 
plan implementation when responding to any disaster. So the General Directorate of Civil 
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Defence has some weaknesses regarding coordination between organisations. The following is 
a review of another point of weakness, which is education about disaster risk.  
4.3.1.3 Education about Disaster Risk 
The third sub-theme in planning weaknesses is the education of staff and the public. In disaster 
situations, education is an integral part of the planning and provision of the humanitarian 
response, as lives can be sustained and saved by providing quality education. Such education 
can give physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection to learners. Regarding public 
education, in addition to what is maintained in Section 4.3.1.1, interviewees E3, E4, E9, E10, 
E13, E16, and E20 emphasised that lack of citizen awareness is one of the common weaknesses 
during the planning stage. E7, E16, and E17 agreed with the aforementioned interviewees that 
there is a lack of awareness of the need to give way to fire engines. Moreover, interviewee E17 
added a new reason for the lack of public awareness, as follows: “The subject of civil defence 
is not covered in the curriculum as it was in the past”. As a result, based on interviewee E4’s 
responses, citizens’ awareness has a significant effect on the planning process, particularly with 
respect to Civil Defence. Such awareness makes implementing plans very difficult in reality. 
In the case of staff education, there is a lack of internal and external courses and practices (E3, 
E10, E17, E18, E20, and E25-E28). Thus, “Knowledge about work and how to deal with orders 
and instructions is absent”, as interviewee E11 mentioned. Moreover, it might reduce the 
possibilities for staff gaining knowledge and exchanging information and experience from other 
countries. Nevertheless, E3 and E18 pointed out that those specialised courses in the field of 
planning are very rare. As a result, there is a “weakness of schematic awareness and experience 
of associate members and leaders (E3)”. Interviewee E20 has another opinion about the failure 
of exercising the national plan to respond to disasters. Interviewee E20 adds that one of the 
challenges facing the planning stage in terms of staff education is “the failure of staff being 
educated about the importance of periodic maintenance of machines and equipment”. This 
failure causes delays in the implementation of the plan, thus, education becomes an integral 
part of the planning, collaboration and coordination process, between educators and other 
disaster sectors. It is vital that there is an adequate collaboration so that delays are minimised 
and in turn, an effective response is provided. Within the same context, interviewee E12 
highlights an important point about “lack of development of junior managers” as a weakness 
of the planning stage. This subject is important for several staff, who suffered from negligence 
and marginalisation because of favouritism and influence of relations with political parties. 
These effects are among many obstacles faced by employees who wish to develop; especially 
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those who have the ambition to complete their education, to be, for example, a senior planner 
in the future. Interviewee E12 explained that “staff members are only allowed to complete their 
postgraduate studies after obtaining approval that is affected by nepotism and political 
parties”. Within the same context, interviewee E3 added another point of weaknesses: “Despite 
putting obstacles in front of the scientific development of the employees, such as the age 
requirement for them, a lot of employees have the ambition to complete their studies despite the 
lack of encouragement from the key officials”. Yet, educating learners is an essential component 
in terms of providing an effective response. 
4.3.1.4 Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure 
In order to meet the disaster response demands, resources including personnel, materials, 
equipment and facilities should be identified in the planning process. If equipment, tools and 
infrastructure are not considered in the planning stage, then the response is likely to be 
weakened. Despite this, there is a shortage in a lot of heavy rescue equipment and infrastructure 
of the Directorate of Civil Defence and its branches distributed in the country, because of a lack 
of planning. According to interviewee E7, there is a “limited capacity and supply for the civil 
defence, such as a lack of boats, aircraft, and heavy rescue equipment and limited only on light 
rescue equipment”.  
During the planning stage, “The lack of heavy rescue equipment (E6, E17, E19, E20, and E22-
E28)” is considered an important weakness for this stage. Interviewee E19 attributed this failure 
to having heavy rescue equipment during responding to disaster to “late arrival of the 
supporting rescue mechanics from relevant departments”. While E6 and E17 assert that there 
is a dearth of personal equipment and individual kit to staff members. In addition, there is no 
update to existing gears (E12) as well as there is an “absence of modern equipment and means 
such as aviation” (E1, E18). E19 has the same opinion about the absence of modern equipment 
and “equipment for risk assessments when the event occurs”. E16 agree with E1, E18, and E19 
views as follows: “there is a lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives”. 
“Deactivation of the GPS system in rapid response to the incident” is one of the planning 
weaknesses that are appeared in interviewee E19 responses. Interviewee E17 agreed with the 
latter view by stating “failure to provide the mechanisms of modern technology such as GPS 
system”. Interviewee E17 also criticised the “outdated communications devices and there is no 
regular maintenance for them”, whereas, E3 pinpointed the need of “sophisticated software in 
the field of planning”.                
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A quicker response is promoted by careful planning, particularly planning for civil defence 
infrastructures or centres, since there has been urban expansion and population growth in the 
past 15 years in Iraq. The civil defence infrastructures often do not meet the needs of many 
areas in the country. Interviewees E12, E18, and E20 have the same view about the scarcity of 
civil defence infrastructure. As interviewee E20 mentioned, “Lack of civil defence centres 
compared to population density”. Interviewee E18 added there is a “lack of infrastructure to 
some areas in the Iraqi province”. This is due to increase population density and urbanisation.      
Regarding the fire nozzles network, because of the outdated fire nozzle network maps, some of 
these nozzles are not visible – they are sometimes buried in the ground and there is a lack of 
awareness of them. It is, therefore, important to have access to an up-to-date fire nozzle 
network, and this relies on the planning being current. E4 mentions this aspect in his responses, 
as it suffered from “buried, weak water pressure, lack of fire nozzles network”. Though E12 
sheds light on an important point regarding this aspect, the “unsuitability of fire nozzles’ 
network for vehicles water hoses”. In fact, water organisation installed new networks, but 
sometimes these do not work properly due to weak water pressure or unsuitability of the 
network for vehicles’ water hoses, for example. This means that disaster response planning 
cannot rely on this network and do proper planning of activities for disaster response. Such an 
essential aspect might make the plan impracticable and this, in turn, has a negative effect on the 
response process.   
One of the fundamental principles of response that planners should recognise is minimising the 
amount of operational detail that restricts response flexibility. Periodic maintenance of the 
equipment and devices is shown by experts as the operational detail that restricts response 
flexibility. Interviewees E12 and E3 have the same opinion of “lack of periodic maintenance 
of the equipment and devices” and it “is limited to remedial maintenance only”.  Though 
interviewee E17 pointed out spare parts’ aspect and mention it in his responses: there is 
“weakness in equipping spare parts for the individual prevention equipment as well as 
mechanisms”.   
4.3.1.5 Financial Resources 
Disaster response planning comprises the allocation of resources, especially budget and 
personnel. Budget allocation should be commensurate with the role of every department within 
its jurisdiction. Interviewees E1, E15, E17, and E25-E28 have the same opinion on the size of 
the budget and the limited choices about how to allocate the budget. Interviewees E3, E4, E10, 
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E12, E17, E18, E20, and E25-E28 agree that there is a failure in budget allocation and 
mobilisation. According to interviewee E12, “The ability to financially allocate resources is 
inadequate”. In addition, interviewees E4, E17, E20, and E25-E28 shed light on items that are 
not covered in the budget allocation e.g. kerosene for generators, and printing of important 
booklets and leaflets. Interviewee E3 agreed with E18 that the “lack of financial resources and 
the power to allocate such resources effectively led to the failure to implement some of the tasks 
included in the plan, which had negative effects on the speed of completion of duties”. 
Interviewees E2 and E21 emphasised that after obtaining approval for the financial allocations 
to an emergency budget, there was also the problem of “limiting the choices made in 
emergency allocations”. Meanwhile, interviewees E6, E14, and E22-E24 cover other financial 
problems, namely, overtime, transportation, and danger allowances not being paid to staff. Due 
to this problem, staff might not fulfil their roles according to the plan.   
4.3.1.6 Lack of Schematic Specialist Staff 
It is widely acknowledged by most of the experts E3, E6, E14, and E17-E28, that the lack of 
staff is considered to be a huge problem in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence when 
compared with the annual planned staff number (E3). Interviewee E3, who is the director of the 
Planning and Follow-up department, emphasised the “lack of schematic specialist staff”. 
Interviewee E3 went on to assert that there is a “lack of specialised staff in the field of civil 
engineering and statistics” within the planning department. Similarly, interviewee E20 
confirmed that there is a “lack of specialist and ordinary staff, especially divers and 
engineering staff” in the directorate. According to interviewee E17, new civil defence centres 
have also suffered from staffing shortages. Staffing shortages are attributed by interviewee E18 
to “ill-considered decisions that adversely affect the implementation of the plan”.  
4.3.1.7 Planning Process 
To conduct a proper evaluation of the planning process for the current administrative system 
and response practices, it is necessary to identify the negative points of this process. Through 
interviewees’ responses, a number of weaknesses have been identified. Regarding the plan 
implementation, according to interviewees E1and E10, “sometimes the plans are 
unenforceable and cause confusion”, whereas interviewees E3, E8, and E14 agree that there 
was a “weak implementation of the plan by stakeholders” or, “the plans are not strictly 
implemented” due to the “lack of understanding of what has been planned” (E3). In addition, 
interviewee E8 stressed some important weaknesses in the planning process such as: “some 
plans are unrealistic”, “some of the plans lack professionalism” and “plans are affected by 
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personal views and jurisprudence of the decision makers”. Interviewee E13 also states that 
there is a “lack of prior planning”, while Interviewee E12 points out a “failure in adopting 
long-term plans”. Moreover, interviewee E8 pointed out the “ignorance of the importance of 
planning” by key officials, besides the fact that “some plans are unimplemented”. 
Interviewee E10 also shed light on the area of amendments of the plans, as he believes that the 
“authorization of amendments to the plans is limited to the General Directorate of civil 
Defence only”. However, the planning departments in all Iraqi cities do not have the 
authorisation to amend the plans. Likewise, interviewee E11 added that there is a “lack of 
seriousness in dealing with research and reports submitted by officers and staff members in 
order to develop the work, remove the obstacles, and add new things” as well as there being a 
“lack of feedback and acceptance of the officers’ and staff members’ proposals, which leads 
to despair and frustration for them”. This point was also supported by interviewee E12 who 
saw this from the operative point of view: “Adequate opportunities are not given to junior 
managers in planning”. Interviewees E13 and E14 attributed these negative points to a “lack 
of unified decision making” and a “multitude of decision-making sources”. Interviewee E13 
added other reasons such as “inefficient decision-making with respect to planning as a result 
of the unstable political situation in Iraq”, and “the central leadership of the ministry is not 
competent (Army competence)”. The latter explains this point of weakness more by stating: 
“Due to inefficiency in decision-making, most orders issued are inapplicable” also “things are 
requested outside the scope of work”. Interviewees E3 and E13 confide that “delay of 
correspondence” and “bureaucracy” lead to “deficiencies in the implementation of the 
planning procedures, such as the lack of documents on land ownership for the civil defence 
centres”. Within the same context, interviewee E13 added that “a large part of correspondence 
within the hierarchy, from the top to the lower level, is not feasible or beneficial and 
implementing it is just a waste of time and effort”. 
To obtain a flexible response to a wide range of disaster scenarios, generic plans for evacuation 
and shelter should be developed. Within this context, interviewees E2, E17, E21, and E25-E28 
brought up a new weakness point for the planning process regarding public shelters, saying that 
there was a “lack of planning for public shelters”. Interviewee E17 explained that there are 
basically no public shelters in any Iraqi cities except in the capital city Baghdad, and these 
shelters have suffered from neglect. Interviewee E17 declared that the General Directorate of 
Civil Defence and all its branches depend on private shelters in the planning process. 
Interviewee E2 and E21 added that “most public shelters in Baghdad are appropriated by only 
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a few agencies” which increased the problem in the time of war and during terrorist attacks 
because of the shortage of such shelters. 
It is widely acknowledged that an early warning system affects the success of disaster response 
operations. Therefore, disaster response planners, in Iraq, try to achieve such an important 
response function by disseminating early warnings covering all the areas of Iraqi cities. But in 
reality, interviewees E2 and E21 mention that there is a “weakness of the early warning 
systems”. In addition, interviewee E3 added that there is an “absence of a central alarm 
system” and mentioned that “the second phase of the early warning system is incomplete, 
which is very serious in the case of an emergency”. Interviewee E3 added that the first phase 
of an early warning system includes only the centres of Iraqi cities, while the second phase 
covers all the areas of Iraqi cities. Accordingly, disaster response planners plan to disseminate 
warnings in rural areas using mosque speakers and ambulance sirens. This might hinder people 
that are further away – they may not hear the warning sound and thus become more vulnerable.   
Public safety, which is the most important societal concern, can be addressed by applying 
building codes for all buildings. Protection against the threats of terrorism and natural disasters 
is enhanced by applying building codes to make societies more resilient. However, if these 
codes have not been enforced by local governments and enacted into law, they will be 
ineffective. Fire safety codes, for instance, is one of the civil defence requirements that affect 
people and disaster responders in obvious ways. Ideally, disaster response planners assume all 
buildings apply these codes, but, in reality in Iraq, the application of safety standards and 
construction codes seems to be weak. Interviewees E7, E12, E20, and E21 agreed that there is 
a “weakness in the application of building codes and occupational safety standards in public 
and private facilities” (E21). While interviewee E20 stressed the “failure in following the 
conditions of safety and security in storage”, interviewee E7 emphasised the “failure in 
applying protection and means of safety to some buildings”. Interviewee E12 has the same point 
of view, that there is a “failure in providing buildings with a fire nozzle network”. These 
weaknesses might cause confusion when implementing the response plan, and therefore it might 
negatively affect the speed of the response process. 
4.3.1.8 Road Congestion 
It is widely acknowledged that traffic jams are a common obstruction facing the planner and 
the disaster responder in any disaster event. Globally, disaster response plans have the aim of 
reaching the scene and responding within few minutes. But in Iraq, this aim is difficult to 
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achieve because of traffic jams, particularly in Bagdad. This problem of “traffic jams” appears 
within most of the interviewees’ responses (E2, E3, E6, E8, E10, E12, E15, and E22-E24). 
According to interviewee E3, this problem appeared due to the “defects in urban planning, 
especially with narrow streets”. Interviewee E20, agreed with E3’s view, stating that there is an 
“imbalance in the width of streets and alleys”. Interviewee E11 gave another reason for traffic 
difficulties: “passing through some unpaved roads in many neighbourhoods and residential 
areas is difficult”. Interviewee E19 supported this view regarding the lack of services, 
particularly road maintenance, by mentioning a “lack of passable roads to reach the scene 
because of security blocks and maintenance”. He added an important point about security 
blocks, which most of the interviewees had to contend with (E2, E3, E4, E6, E7, E8, E9, E11, 
E12, E17, E19, and E22-E28). Interviewee E17 complained about “blocking the roads without 
warning”. Interviewees E2, E4 and E9 gave a good reason for this problem: “……a lack of 
coordination with security agencies”. 
 Furthermore, interviewees E2, E7 and E9 criticised the security authorities for putting up “a 
multitude of concrete barriers and cutting off the roads for security reasons”. Similarly, 
interviewees E3, E8, E9, and E12 grumbled about security checkpoints as mentioned in their 
transcriptions. Congestion and security checkpoints cause a delay in the arrival of civil defence 
teams at the scene. As the researcher looked further into why there is a delay in the arrival of 
the disaster responders’ team at the scene, interviewees E3 and E17 gave an important reason 
for this: “weakness of public awareness which results in not making way for fire engines”. 
This main problem leads to another minor problem: legal proceedings in the case of exposure 
to traffic accidents (E7, E17, and E25-28). Consequently, the planning processes are negatively 
affected by these problems and considered a huge challenge facing the disaster response 
process. 
4.3.1.9 Supporting Ordinances 
Power allocation is considered one of the important components of disaster planning. To ensure 
an integrated response, every organisation within the jurisdiction needs to recognise its role 
when the disaster occurs to avoid conflicts. In Iraq, according to interviewee E21, the present 
legislative system is too complex. This probably leads to conflicting mandates and overlapping 
jurisdictions among multiple institutions when responding to disaster. Although the application 
of the law and regulations is essential for any work, it could be seen that the Iraqi General 
Director for Civil Defence had some shortcomings in applying some crucial legal points (E19 
and E21). According to interviewee E21, there is a “lack of clarity in the mechanisms of a 
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declaration of emergency in the disaster areas and legal implications of this announcement”. 
Interviewee E21, who has a background and experience in managing the civil defence 
directorate, added, “because of the lack of a unified national legal framework for disaster risk 
reduction and response, failures in the response happen when various types of disasters 
occur”. Moreover, “after 2003, the state’s structural changes have not been reflected in the 
laws and regulations of disaster management (powers of the governors, the development of 
the region, the new ministries such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of 
Displacement and Migration, and Ministry of Environment)”. However, interviewee E19 raises 
different weaknesses: “Absence of a special civil defence Court”. Interviewee E19 briefly 
explained that “when sending violators of the civil defence laws to a regular court, some judges 
have no knowledge of the laws of civil defence, which lead to a confusing process in the 
prosecution of defaulters”.  
Most of the interviewees praise the new Civil Defence Act No. 44 of 2013. Interviewee E13 is 
one of them, but he has an operative point of view, stating that “Act No. 44 is good in theory 
but in practice difficult to apply”. While interviewees E4, E14, and E25-28 agreed that after 
2003 the deactivation of some laws within this act might cause a lot of problems. Interviewee 
E4 gave an example on this point: “Deactivation of the law of teaching the civil defence 
curriculum and entering it as the curriculum of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Higher Education”. This might cause lack of public awareness, which is considered one of the 
huge weaknesses facing the planner and the disaster responders alike. Regarding organisations’ 
awareness of the laws, interviewee E14 touched on this point as follows: “There is a lack of 
awareness of the detail of the law by the various organisations preventing them from working 
up to their specialisations”. This leads to a fragmented response capacity. Consequently, more 
difficulties are experienced during the planning process, and thus this reduces the quality and 
the speed of response to the disaster. These weaknesses have also appeared due to the bad 
security situation. These will be explained in the next subsection. 
4.3.1.10 Security Situation 
In disaster situations, delays of minutes can cost lives and property, and this is compounded in 
a poor security situation. Therefore, response planners aim to deliver the response within a few 
minutes. Due to the poor security situation facing the state of Iraq, especially after 2003, the 
disaster responders and planners in the civil defence directorate have been challenged with a 
lot of problems. Although interviewee E7 believes that the difficulties in “the security aspect 
are particularly in the northern governorates because they are under the control of terrorist 
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groups”, there are also difficulties in the middle and southern governorates. According to 
interviewee E8, for example, “The civil defence teams are only allowed to enter some sensitive 
areas in the country after obtaining a security clearance, leading to delays in response”. In 
addition, interviewees E1, E4, E12, E14, and E16 asserted that there is a security breach 
because of the lack of modern and effective checking devices and a security camera network.   
According to disaster response plans, disaster responders cannot intervene before conducting 
security checks at the scene. In reality, since there is a lack of such devices, combined with their 
naturally altruistic nature, they respond without securing the scene, and this can potentially lead 
to more problems, which causes the response plan to be unenforceable. Interviewee E4 added, 
“Because of a security breach due to the lack of effective checking devices, dual or sequential 
bombings were increased significantly”. Dual bombings are considered the most challenging 
problem facing both the disaster responders and the planners (E4, E6, E7, E11, E12, E15, E20, 
and E22-E24). Interviewee E6 attributed this problem to “the absence of security sense”. 
While interviewee E15 said that this sheds light on the “lack of knowledge about the people 
who carry out explosions and the time and place of the explosion”. Interviewees E22-E24 
agreed with the latter view and added that using women, teenagers, the elderly, the disabled and 
animals, in addition to dead bodies, in the bombings, are another reason for causing this bad 
situation. Interviewee E11 gave another reason, “Lack of security sense and awareness of the 
security men”. Interviewees E11 and E16 added the lack of seriousness of the local police in 
excluding citizens from risk sites and emptying the arena for the civil defence team to work 
comfortably by not imposing a security cordon properly. Interviewee E20, on the other hand, 
provided a different reason: “ignorance by citizens as to the seriousness of the situation so that 
their closeness to the scene is exploited by suicide bomber terrorists”.         
With regard to roads being closed by the security authorities, interviewees E2-E4, E6, E7-E9, 
E11, E12, E16, E17, E19, and E22-E28 blatantly admitted that closing the roads because of the 
security situation impedes access to the scene as soon as possible. In addition to what is 
mentioned in Section 4.3.1.8, placing a lot of concrete barriers and checkpoints challenged the 
smooth passing of the Civil Defence vehicles. All these weaknesses might hinder the planning 
process. Disaster response planning is based on assumptions, yet assumptions that are affected 
by a security breach are difficult to predict. This will negatively affect the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the plan. 
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4.3.1.11 Unplanned Random Development 
Urban and regional planning provisions should be taken into account by planners when 
planning for a disaster response, particularly concerning the dangerousness of the place and the 
location of critical facilities. It is widely considered that random development is a major 
problem facing the planning process when responding to a disaster event (E9, E12, E11, E16- 
E20, and E25-E28). Different points of view were revealed from interviewees’ transcriptions, 
starting with “random housing, shops, and poor urban planning” (E17), which makes 
accessing the scene very difficult and takes a lot of time. Consequently, this situation will hinder 
the planning process to meet the global standard time to respond to a disaster (eight minutes). 
Interviewees E9, E11, E16, E18- E20, and E25-E28 suffered from the same problem and agreed 
with the aforementioned view, stating that there is “random misuse of the road's forbidden hard 
shoulder”, and there is also “random construction of housing and factories”. Interviewee E11 
stressed “the existence of random residential complexes that do not have a regular route 
network”. In the same way, interviewee E18 shed light on the “abuses taking place on the main 
roads and markets”, especially from street vendors. Interviewee E19 also mentioned the same 
problem in his transcription, “a lack of passable roads to reach the scene…..”, while 
interviewee E9 emphasised, “places of random street vendors, especially in the markets”. 
Interviewee E20 raised another challenge, which is the “random storage of materials”. This 
problem costs the civil defence directorate a lot of effort as well as responders’ lives.   
As far as programmed blackouts are concerned, interviewees E11, E17, E18, and E25-E28 
highlighted this complex problem by stating that the “programmed cutting off of National 
Electricity” (E17) causes a lot of “excesses on the national electricity grid” (E11and E18). 
Programmed or frequent blackouts are considered the main challenge facing the planner and 
the disaster responder at the same time. Because of the misuse of the national electricity network 
and the resulting obstructions, fire engines cannot access the scene safely, smoothly and 
quickly. This also causes a lot of minor problems, such as unauthorised electricity wiring, 
especially for Simi-Generic Generators, that prevents the prompt arrival of civil defence teams 
at the scene (E9, E11, E12, E16, E17, E20, and E25-E28). Interviewee E22 defined Simi-
Generic Generators as “machines owned by citizens that locally produce electricity. They 
supply neighbourhoods with electricity depending on the possible amount of produced voltage. 
They are operated and supervised by the workers in coordination with the local government, 
which is responsible for determining times of operation and the amount of money paid by 
citizens in exchange for providing them with electric power when the national electricity has 
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been cut off”. From Figure 4.2 it can be clearly seen that there is chaotic wiring, especially near 
these generators, and this is considered a huge challenge facing the civil defence teams when 
responding to an emergency event, as fire engines cannot access the scene safely, smoothly and 
quickly, therefore, the response team cannot implement the plan strictly, particularly in terms 
of time and safety.  
 
Figure 4.2 Simi-Generic Generator 
 
To conclude, these subsections have reviewed the planning weaknesses for planners and 
disaster responders during the planning process. Figure 4.3 shows the sub-themes of planning 
weaknesses. In the section that follows, planning strengths sub-themes will be discussed.  
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Figure 4.3 Weaknesses during the Planning Stage 
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- Random housing, shops, and poor urban planning 
- Lack of passable roads to reach the scene 
- Random storage of materials  
- Programmed cutting off of National Electricity  
- Unauthorised electricity wiring 
- Defect in urban planning 
- Road maintenance 
- Security blocks 
- Lack of coordination with security agencies 
- Multitude of concrete barriers 
- Weakness of public awareness which results in not making way for fire engines 
Citizens’ 
Irresponsible 
Intervention 
Education on 
Disaster Risk 
Endowment of 
Equipment, 
Tools and 
Infrastructure 
- Lack of clarity in the mechanisms declaration of emergency  
- Lack of a unified national legal framework for disaster risk reduction and response  
- Absence of special civil defence Court 
- Deactivation of the law of teaching the civil defence curriculum 
- Lack of awareness of the laws by the various organisations 
- Civil defence teams are not allowed to enter some sensitive areas  
- Dual or sequential bombings  
- Absence of security sense 
- Lack of knowledge about the people who carry out explosions and the time 
and place of the explosion  
- Lack of seriousness of the local police in excluding citizens from risk sites 
The Security 
Situation 
Lack of Schematic 
Specialist Staff 
- Lack of specialized staff is in the field of civil engineering and Statistics 
- Lack of specialist and ordinary staff, especially divers and engineering staff 
- Problem of elderly and disabled staff who are unfit to work 
Coordination 
between 
Organisations 
- Lack of cooperation from the rest of the organisation in executing the plan 
- Overlap in responsibilities with other departments  
- Intersections that occurred between the executive authorities 
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4.3.2 Strengths during the Planning Stage 
To obtain a whole picture about the current Disaster Response Administrative System, points 
of strength in the planning stage were revealed from interviewees’ responses, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.4 below.  
 
Figure 4.4 Nodes for Planning Strengths 
 
4.3.2.1 Education on Disaster Risk 
Education about disaster risk is one of the important subjects which should take priority in the 
planning process. Within the context of the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence, there 
are a lot of “ongoing sessions within the specialities” (E16) and “specialised courses” (E20) 
for the employees of the directorate to deal with different kinds of disasters. Regarding the 
practices, according to interviewee E10, “carrying out prior practices” are considered as one 
of the strengths in the planning process. Interviewee E21 agrees with this point and added, 
“Practices exist, although they are differentiated to deal with the disasters in the provinces”. 
Self-protection teams for each organisation, on the other hand, have a good opportunity 
“through their participation in training courses (4 sessions during the first half of the year and 
4 sessions through the other half of the year)” (E4). Consequently, self-protection teams’ 
rehabilitation was a continuous process during the year. Self-protection teams mean a team 
consisting of a group of volunteers working within the organisation to respond to any incident 
as fast as they can. An effective planning process recognises the importance of volunteer team 
workers, therefore, this point is considered one of the strengths in the planning process from 8 
interviewees’ perspectives. 
4.3.2.2 Endowment of Equipment, Tools, and Infrastructure  
It is widely acknowledged that the implementation of plans cannot go ahead without the prior 
preparation of equipment, tools, and infrastructure. Interviewee E13 confirmed that 
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“equipment and devices are very good so that disaster response planning can rely on the 
equipment and do proper planning of activities for disaster response”. In the same way, 
Interviewee E16 stated that “the directorate have modern and fast vehicles, similar to 
developed countries in the world”. Meanwhile, interviewee E10 argued that to support the 
planning process, “preparing tools for the implementation of plans” is the first priority for the 
directorate. In addition, interviewee E3, who is the Director of the Planning and Follow-up 
Department, spoke of the “existence of support for civil defence directorates’ infrastructure 
through building modern headquarters, civil defence centres and strategic stores”. It can be 
seen that the directorate supports the planning process with equipment, tools, and infrastructure.  
4.3.2.3 Planning Process  
As the research looked further at the points of strength in the planning process, an expert, E3, 
who has experience and some background in planning, gave a clear indication that “the 
Directorate have proper planning”. Interviewees E10 and E19 agree with this point. 
Interviewee E3 added, “Plans are developed with clear visions, goals, objectives and tasks”. 
Interviewee E8 agrees with this point and added, “There is a continuous work in planning to 
develop, modernise, and bring plans from countries with experience”. Interviewee E18 points 
out that “the plan is applicable and realistic, attributable to applying it after consultation with 
the rest of the departments within the directorate”. Moreover, interviewee E3 acknowledged 
“the existence of a general contingency plan and sub-plans in the departments of civil defence 
in the provinces”. On this point interviewee E21 asserts: “Vigorous efforts exist to secure a 
national contingency plan for some specialised types of disasters such as radiological, 
chemical, and biological emergency plans”. This point was also supported by interviewee E7 
who stated that “as a result of terrorist acts in the north of Iraq, a general plan was developed 
for disaster prevention in case the dams collapse”. Regarding this specific case, interviewee 
E7 declared that “currently, the Ministry of Defence in coordination with the rest of the 
ministries and relevant organisations are responsible for implementing this plan”.  
Regards updating the plans, interviewees E10, E12, E14, and E16 mentioned this advantage in 
their responses. Interviewee E16 emphasised that the “…plan is updated annually”. 
Interviewees E10, E12, and E14 agreed with this point and added that plans are updated 
annually so as to benefit from the mistakes of previous plans. Similarly, interviewee E10 
supports this point: “the plans are placed, adjusted, and prepared annually so as to benefit 
from the mistakes in plans of previous years”.  Interviewee E12 added that experts “analyse 
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the accidents and take feedback, especially after large disasters” to take advantage of them 
during the planning process.  
Further, interviewee E6 confirmed that “planning is good as a result of the accumulation of 
experience and availability of staff”. The interviewees E12, E14, and E15 also gave the same 
reason: that planners have technical and academic expertise as well as “experienced and 
efficient planning staff who have an extensive practical experience and an accumulation of 
experience.” 
Moreover, interviewee E11 boldly gave his response that “the information is followed-up and 
updated from time to time”. Interviewees E4, E16, E17, E20, and E25-E28 agree on the same 
point in their responses: “Periodic inspections existed for organisations and facilities, 
especially the important ones, and an examination of the extent of their application of the safety 
and security requirements” (E26). Interviewee E20 pinpointed one of the most important 
strengths during the planning process as follows: “full knowledge of the geographical area of 
each civil defence centre (labs, hospitals, departments, etc. ...........)”. Interviewee E20 clarifies 
this point: “the classification of infrastructure for each geographic area is done according to 
their importance (A, B, C). Periodic inspections of these structures test for the application of 
safety standards and the readiness of backing teams or self-protection teams to respond to the 
disaster” (see Section 4.10.4). Interviewee E16 supported this point and believes that “ongoing 
visits to these projects and inspecting them about the extent of the application of safety 
standards, is considered one of the advantages of the planning process”. Further, interviewee 
E4 clarified the number of times for this investigation every year. This view is expressed by 
these responses: “conduct inspections for the geographical area to each centre every six 
months”, “a semi-annual inspection of emergency supplies and entrances to buildings”. 
Experts stress that all these inspections are essential to implement the plan strictly. 
4.3.2.4 Supporting Ordinances  
Interviewees E3, E4, and E7 believe that the “adoption of the Civil Defence Act No. (44) for 
the year 2013 and decisions on the management of acts of civil defence in emergency situations 
and large accidents” is considered a major advantage for the planning process as functions and 
delegation of responsibilities to all staff is prescribed in it. This point was also supported by 
interviewee E13, who sees this from the operative point of view, “The new Civil Defence Act 
No. 44 of 2013 is good in theory but in practice difficult to apply”. Similarly, interviewee E21 
mentions, in the same context but in a general way that despite “the existence of laws related 
127 
 
to disasters such as the Civil Defence Act and the Public Health Act”, there is a “lack of a 
unified national legal framework for disaster risk reduction and response”. Interviewee E3 
added another strength, “The existence of special task contexts in Iraq (work guide of civil 
defence centres)”. Further, interviewee E4 puts emphases on the “final update of the Civil 
Defence Act No. 44 of 2013”. Interviewee E7 highlights as a strength that “creating a 
particular civil defence Court” in Baghdad serves to decrease the amount of correspondence 
and ensures the prosecution of offenders of the civil defence instructions. Interviewee E21 adds 
another point related to “the existence of codes of Construction and Safety Standards” to 
ensure the application of safety and industrial requirements for public and private facilities as 
well as to make society more resilient. By applying building codes, protection against the threats 
of terrorism and natural disasters can be enhanced. Interviewee E7 also mentioned the 
“activation of the closing down law related to facilities, projects and shops that violate the 
safety and industrial requirements”. The Closing Law is one of the laws within the Civil 
Defence Act No. 64 of 1978, but it was deactivated after 2003. Accordingly, it can clearly be 
seen to be applying the law strictly, disaster responder can implement the plan smoothly and 
flexibly. Therefore, it is considered a major advantage for the planning process.   
This section has discussed the four themes of strength for the planning process. From this 
discussion, various sub-themes have been revealed as shown in Figure 4.5. The next section 
will debate the weaknesses during the planning stage. 
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Figure 4.5 Strengths during the Planning Stage 
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- Specialized courses  
- Carrying out prior practices  
- Self-protection teams’ rehabilitation 
- Equipment and devices are very good  
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- Preparing tools for the implementation of plans 
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directorates’ infrastructure 
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- Plans are developed with clear visions, goals, objectives and tasks 
- Continuous work in planning 
- Plan is applicable and realistic  
- Existence of a general contingency plan and sub-plans 
- National contingency plans for some specialized types of disasters 
- Plan is updated annually 
- Planners have technical and academic expertise 
- The information is followed-up and updated from time to time  
- Periodic inspection existed for organizations and facilities 
- Full knowledge of the geographical area of each civil defence centre 
- The classification of infrastructure for each geographic area 
- Conduct inspections for the geographical area to each centre every 
six months 
- Adoption of the Civil Defence Act No. (44)  
- Work guide of civil defence centres  
- Final update of the Civil Defence Act 
- Creating a particular civil defence Court 
- Existence of codes of Construction and Safety Standards 
- Activation of the closing down law related to facilities, projects 
and shops that violate the safety and industrial requirements 
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4.3.3 Recommendations for the Planning Stage 
To complete the evaluation process for the current Disaster Response Administrative System 
planning stage, and after determining the points of weakness for this stage, a set of 
recommendations were revealed from the responses of the interviewees. These 
recommendations have been categorised into sub-nodes as listed in Figure 4.6 below:      
 
Figure 4.6 Nodes for Planning Recommendations 
4.3.3.1 Education on Disaster Risk  
It has commonly been assumed that good educating and training might lead to improve 
preparedness and response at all levels before during and after disasters. Moreover, the capacity 
of staff and community could be built and fostered by doing so. According to interviewee E21 
“building and strengthening the institutional capacity for preparedness and response from 
the potential risks” is essential when the disaster strikes. In order to gain proper planning, 
experts stressed the importance of education for both the staff and public. From the 
recommendations obtained from the experts’ own experience, courses in the field of planning 
are suggested by interviewees E3 and E18. This can be seen by these responses: “Intensify 
external training courses in the field of planning” and “schematic staff contribution in 
external courses in the field of planning”. Similarly, interviewees E3, E8, E15, E17, and E25-
E28 stressed attending internal and external courses and focusing on attending external 
courses in order to transfer experience and knowledge as well as to deal with the modern 
techniques in responding to the disaster. Moreover, because of bureaucracy and nepotism, the 
external courses are limited to high-ranking officers and staff. Therefore, interviewee E3 
recommended “involving the intermediate and lower staff in courses outside Iraq”. 
Interviewee E19, on the other hand, proposed another idea; “Conducting studies and research 
in the field of planning relying on previous experiences and global research”. This would 
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enhance the planning process.  Interviewee E6 went on to add a suggestion related to 
“continuous training for staff”, where planning and the responding process could be further 
improved. Interviewee E19 agreed with this suggestion and added: “…..conduct joint exercises 
for the plans with the relevant organisations”. In a similar way, interviewee E6 proposed 
“carrying out field practices of the different incidents in order to determine the pros and cons 
of implementation and thus address the negatives”. Interviewees E11, E22, and E25 support 
this view by stressing on field practices due to their importance in supporting teamwork and 
providing a response in a coordinated manner.  
To ensure community safety during disaster, skills and provisions for disaster preparedness and 
response can be developed by providing a comprehensive education over generations. Such 
development could be achieved by “increasing community awareness and involving civil 
defence material in curriculum” (E9). Interviewees E8, E16 and E19 agreed with these 
recommendations, stating the necessity of “educating the public” by “…..including a civil 
defence syllabus in the curriculum of schools and universities” and “preparing a community 
education programme as a support”. Moreover, interviewee E21 highlighted “training and 
dissemination of knowledge about risk management”, also “increasing awareness of the risks 
through education in all its stages”. Further, interviewees E8, E19, and E21 emphasise 
continuous communication with the public to raise awareness of the threats of risks and 
the dangers of approaching the scene, which is necessary to avoid the dangers of the sequential 
bombing. Interviewee E20 agreed with the aforementioned view and raised a new important 
point in terms of using media in community education to raise awareness about the role of 
civil defence during the responding stage. Additionally, interviewee E21 put emphasis on 
“disaster preparedness at the community level by focusing on the community safety behaviour 
and practices”, “apply education, knowledge and innovation techniques to build a safety 
culture among the public to enhance the ability to deal with disasters at all levels”, and “ensure 
broad local community participation (tribal - religious - other civil society organisations) in 
preparedness and response to disasters”. 
4.3.3.2 Endowment of Equipment, Tools, and Infrastructure     
In this section interviewees E3, E6, E16, E18, and E21-24 highlighted the importance of using 
sophisticated equipment and mechanisms, special heavy rescue equipment (such as 
shovels, excavators, etc.), equipping with modern planning equipment such as  a fast internet 
system, and linking the directorates of civil defence with the e-government network. 
Interviewee E21 pinpointed an early warning system in his recommendations, stating the need 
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for “securing effective early warning systems for different threats, such as radiological, 
chemical, and biological weapons”. Moreover, interviewee E3 put emphasis on “maintaining 
the planning of special supplies”. Interviewee E18 highlighted another suggestion, stating that 
he would like to see the “set up of fire nozzles and a security cameras network within the 
required technical specifications”. In addition, interviewees E6, E18 and E22-E24 had the 
same opinion, by proposing the increase and modernisation of civil defence centres within 
the scientific criteria for distribution according to geographical area and population. So that 
disaster response planning can rely on such civil defence centres and do proper planning of 
activities for disaster response.    
4.3.3.3 Financial Resources      
To implement the plan properly, “resources should be accurately estimated” (E1), as well as 
that “adequate financial resources should be allocated” (E12). Moreover, to enhance and 
encourage all the employees in different departments within the directorate to do their roles that 
are allocated in the response plan, “danger allowances for each employee of civil defence 
classes should be allocated” (E19). According to interviewee E19, “a danger allowance is the 
amount of money allocated to the employees of the Ministry of Interior who work within a hot 
spot (hot spot means the vulnerable areas that encounter the risk of terrorism and include north 
of Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah AL-Dien, Al-Anbar, and Ninawa)”. 
4.3.3.4 Law Activation 
It seems to be responding to disasters is a shared responsibility between the responders and 
community. Therefore, law enforcement might have vital roles in responding to disasters such 
as being first responders in disaster incidents and providing the community with safety and 
security. As such, interviewees E4 and E14 put emphasis on “activating the decisions of the 
civil defence services under Law No. 64 of 1978 amended by Act 44 of 2013, which are 
applicable so far” due to the importance of the commitment to such a law when implementing 
a response plan. 
4.3.3.5 Planning Process  
To arrange an appropriate action in order to response in an effective and timely manner, 
response planning processes might be considered as a critical tool which is prepared in advance 
to solve problems that probably arise while responding to the disaster. To enhance this tool, 
interviewee E10 stated the need for “developing a unified plan to response to the disaster for 
the governorate, which includes the participation of all organisations with all its possibilities 
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to determine responsibilities, duties, and the hierarchy”. In a similar way, interviewees E6, 
E20, E23, E25 put emphasis on preparing prior plans to any disaster and preparing the 
elements of the plan (human resources, modern machine, and infrastructure). Interviewee E23 
is of the opinion that “increasing the number of civil defence centres depending on the 
scientific criteria for distribution according to geographical area and population”.  
In addition to what has been mentioned before, interviewee E8 stress that “attention and 
support for the planning process should be given by the decision-makers”. Interviewee E10 
added that “before starting the planning process, planners should focus on disaster 
forecasting and monitoring”. Interviewee E10 agrees with this suggestion, adding that 
“addressing the negatives occurring after each accident” might decrease the margin of error 
in future planning. However, interviewee E11proposed the idea of providing the planning 
process with updated feedback from the staff by “holding regular meetings with all the officers 
and staff members and consulting them about all that would raise the work efficiency, 
development, remove the obstacles, and find solutions to them”. This point was also supported 
by interviewee E12, who sees this from the operative point of view by “giving opportunities to 
junior directors to participate in making plans because they represent the future managers”. 
Regarding the coordination between the authorities and the rest of the relevant organisation, 
interviewee E18 asserts the point of ensuring that roads are open for civil defence teams. 
This can be seen in interviewee E18’s response: “There is a need for coordination between 
the authorities and the rest of the relevant organisations in relation to roads being open”. In 
a similar way, interviewee E6 put emphasis on “removing excesses from the national electricity 
grid”. Interviewee E13 highlights another different point, which can be seen by this response: 
“The need to apply and update safety standards for buildings”.     
4.3.3.6 Specialist Staff  
Many interviewees (E8, E14, E16, E18, and E19) argue that specialised staff are needed in 
planning departments. Interviewee E18 believes that “specialised technical staff in planning 
should be increased”. While interviewee E14 recommends that planning departments should 
“rely on competent and experienced people with academic achievement, who have been 
trained through the internal and external planning courses”. These recommendations are based 
on the remarkable shortages in experienced and specialised planning staff, particularly technical 
staff. This shortage might lead to a decrease in the efficiency of the plans.   
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To sum up, various suggestions have arisen from the arguments in this section. A summary of 
the planning recommendations’ sub-themes is presented in Figure 4.7 below. In the next 
section, planning stage summary is provided. 
 
4.3.4 Planning Stage Summary 
In summary, it can be seen that there are various strengths and weaknesses that have been 
highlighted in this stage. It is apparent that, in the planning stage, the strengths are also the 
weaknesses, and vice versa. In the section that flow, interview analysis of the organising stage 
is presented. 
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Figure 4.7 Recommendations for the Planning Stage 
- Activating the decisions of the civil defence services under Law No. 64 
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and response from the potential risks  
- Intensify external training courses in the field of planning  
- Attending internal and external courses 
- Involving the intermediate and lower staff in courses outside Iraq 
- Conducting studies and research in the field of planning relying on 
previous experiences and global research 
- Continuous training for staff 
- Conduct joint exercises for the plans with the relevant organisations 
- Carrying out field practices 
- Increasing community awareness and involving civil defence material 
in curriculum 
- Training and dissemination of knowledge about risk management 
- Continuous communication with the public to raise awareness of the 
threats of risks 
- Raise awareness about the role of civil defence  
- Ensure broad local community participation (tribal - religious - other 
civil society organisations) in preparedness and response to disasters 
- Using sophisticated equipment and mechanisms  
- Special heavy rescue equipment  
- Linking the directorates of civil defence with e-government network 
- Effective early warning systems 
- Maintaining the planning of special supplies 
- Set up of fire nozzles and a security cameras network within the 
required technical specifications 
- Increase and modernisation of civil defence centres 
- Resources should be accurately estimated 
- Adequate financial resources should be allocated to implement the 
plan 
- Danger allowances 
- Developing a unified plan to response to the disaster for the 
governorate 
- Preparing prior plans to any disaster and preparing the elements of the 
plan 
- Increasing the number of civil defence centres 
- Attention and support for the planning process should be given by the 
decision-makers 
- Planners should focus on disaster forecasting and monitoring  
- Addressing the negatives occurring after each accident 
- Holding regular meetings with all the officers and staff members 
- Giving opportunities to junior directors to participate in making plans 
- Ensuring that roads are open for civil defence teams 
- There is a need for coordination between the authorities and the rest of 
the relevant organisations  
- Apply and update safety standards for buildings 
- Specialized technical staff in planning should be increased  
- Rely on competent and experienced people with academic achievement 
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4.4 Interview Analysis – Organising Stage 
As the research looks further at the organising stage of the civil defence administrative system, 
many sub-themes have been revealed from experts’ responses. The following subsections will 
briefly discuss these sub-themes.                                                                     
4.4.1 Weaknesses during the Organising Stage    
In order to conduct a proper evaluation for every stage of the current administrative system in 
the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence, extracting points of weakness for every stage is 
very valuable in order to complete this evaluation. Figure 4.8 below demonstrates the nodes for 
organising weaknesses.  
 
Figure 4.8 Nodes for Organising Weaknesses 
4.4.1.1 Coordination with Relevant Organisations  
Interestingly, 23 out of 28 interviewees highlighted that coordination between organisations is 
the most challenging issue during the organising process. Based on interviewee E10’s response, 
there is a “failure in organising between the directorate and other organisations”. Interviewee 
E19 also pointed out “an absence of cooperation from the rest of the relevant organisations”. 
Interviewees E2, E4, E10, and E20 agreed with these views, and furthermore, interviewees E2 
and E20 pinpointed the weakness of these organisations in responding to disaster from other 
organisations such as services and security organisations. This failure was explained by some 
interviewees as follows: “The multiplicity of responsible agencies at the scene, especially from 
the rest of the organisations such as security and police” (E4), also, “Failure in the 
implementation of other organisations” (E4), “Plans not being applied strictly by the rest of 
the organisations” (E14), “Failure to apply the security cordon properly” (E19), 
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“Intervention by the senior leadership of other organisations” (E13), and a “Lack of 
knowledge of the objectives, tasks and duties of the rest of the organisations” (E20) . 
Interviewee E16 mentioned the same reason: “Intervention of some organisations without 
relevant knowledge”. Interviewees E12 and E13 gave two other reasons: “Jobs overlapping 
with the other organisations at the scene” and “occurring intersections between the executive 
authorities (civil defence) and local governments in the provinces”. Moreover, interviewees 
E6, E11, E19, and E22-E24 determined another outcome of that failure in organising between 
the directorate and other organisations, namely that the support from the rest of the 
organisations is not fast enough when responding to disasters, particularly when requesting 
heavy rescue equipment.   
With regards to the coordination between the federal ministries and local governments, 
according to interviewee E21, there is a “weakness in the mechanisms of coordination 
between the federal ministries and local governments on the subject of disasters” (E21). In 
the case of coordination with donor countries, interviewee E20 argued that: “The coordination 
with donor countries is centralised. This leads to the absence of any role for the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence in this regard”. 
With respect to coordination with the security authorities, interviewees E2, E4, E9, E11, E17 
and E25-28 made a bold statement regarding the closure of roads. This can be seen in 
interviewees’ responses as follows: “Closing the roads because of the security situation 
impedes accessing the scene as soon as possible”, “Sudden banditry on the roads as a result 
of lack of coordination with the security authorities”, “Blocking roads without warning”, 
“Closing the roads in an informal manner (lack of coordination with security agencies)”, 
“Non-cooperation of the security forces to ensure passable roads for the Civil Defence vehicles 
by putting a lot of concrete barriers and checkpoints in unnecessary locations”. Further, 
interviewees E4 and E12 emphasised the problem of a security breach and gave reasons for that 
breach: “Sequential bombings because of a security breach due to the lack of effective checking 
devices” as well as the “absence of a Security Camera network”. 
However, interviewees E3, E4, E11, E17 and E25-E28 mentioned the absence of coordination 
with the service organisations, stating: “Chaos is caused by service projects  cutting off roads 
without following a defined timetable and thereby producing a lack of safety and security 
standards”, “Absence of a municipal role in the periodic adjustment of roads”, “Defect in 
urban planning, especially for the narrow streets”, “A lack of a coding system for buildings”, 
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“The difficulty of acquiring land for the establishment of the civil defence centres”, 
“Programmed cutting off of National Electricity”, and “Failure to provide buildings with a fire 
nozzle network”, and even when having a fire nozzle network, these nozzles are unsuitable for 
vehicles’ water hoses.     
As discussed above, the organising process had faced different weaknesses with various 
organisations, which related to the response process, security, services, donor countries, federal 
ministries and local governments.   
 
4.4.1.2 Coordination within the Organisation 
Whilst responding to disasters, “confusion and chaos” become the dominant picture at the 
scene, as was interviewee E1’s opinion. This situation occurs due to a number of reasons, as 
interviewees E3, E4, E8, E11, E12, E20, and E21 explained in their responses. They reported 
“some incorrect distribution of tasks”, “accumulated tasks”, “overlapping duties which were 
not previously prepared within the work schedule and will become emergency duties”, “failure 
of some officials to fulfil their responsibilities due to not putting the right person in the right 
place” also because of “decentralization of some administrative decisions”, “absence of 
employment choices (because free choice is the foundation of success) and often there is no 
choice for the concerned person”, “continuous movements from time to time between the 
departments and administrative units without any justification or feasibility of these 
movements”, “commissioning staff members with tasks and duties far from their field of work 
and their specialty”, “the top official’s lack of knowledge about the work details of the staff”, 
“obstruction of the work without rational justifications” as well as the “lack of some flexibility 
in administrative power during the exceptional situation of disasters at the various 
administrative levels”. 
Regarding commissioning people for important administrative tasks, the Iraqi General 
Directorate of Civil Defence has long suffered from this sensitive problem, particularly after 
2003. Interviewees E6 and E22-E24 focused on this by stating that giving important 
administrative tasks to staff with no experience is a problem. Interviewee E4 agrees with an 
aforementioned view. Further, interviewee E11 has another point of view within the same 
context, stating that due to the previous “lack of adoption of standards when accepting new 
staff members”, there are “differences and difficulties in the assimilation of orders and 
instructions as a result of the different educational levels for staff”.  
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Regarding the organisational structure, according to interviewee E8, “cancelling or merging 
branches within the organisational structure will cause a reduction in work efficiency”. 
Interviewee E11 attributed this decrease in work efficiency to the “lack of seriousness of the 
heads of administrative units to address the administrative problems”. Interviewee E3 focused 
on different points such as “commissioning planning department staff with duties outside the 
scope of their work”, “a frequent replacement of those who are responsible for planning, is 
leading to a lack of communication data” as well as “lack of credibility by giving, updating 
and following-up information”. 
4.4.1.3 Correspondence Delays and Red Tape 
It is widely known that effective coordination for activities and responsibilities is considered 
an essential ingredient for disaster response management and to achieve disaster response plans. 
Interviewees E3, E11, E13, and E20 believe that bureaucratic and administrative red tape are 
challenged to the administrative system in the directorate. Furthermore, interviewees E3 and 
E13 highlighted correspondence delays which were deemed to be a major factor affecting the 
organising process as poor coordination would cause a loss of time. This can be seen by this 
response: “A large amount of correspondence within the hierarchy, from the top to the lower 
level, is not feasible or beneficial, and implementing it is just a waste of time and effort”. 
Further, such bureaucracy might deter some of the employees to do their jobs to the fullest. 
4.4.1.4 Employees' Rights 
Employees have rights in their workplace, wherever this may be, and organisations legitimately 
have processes that aim to establish a structure of working relationships that allows employees 
to interact and cooperate. Realising such interactions and cooperation, particularly when 
responding to a disaster, is important for raising morale and general mental health of staff. 
Unfortunately, the administrative systems in the directorate disregard many important things to 
allow people to perform the response to the fullest. Interviewees E5, E9, E12, and E21 criticised 
the system of daily working hours for civil defence centres (24 hours on and 24 hours off) 
which applied from 2007. They added that this system is not comfortable for the staff compared 
to (24 hours on and 48 hours off). Interviewee E12 described it as “very exhausting for staff”. 
With regards to vacations and travel outside Iraq, interviewee E12 emphasised that “officers 
and staff members are not allowed to travel outside Iraq for vacation or for their studies until 
obtaining approval from the Minister”. Further, “Authority to grant any vacation to travel 
outside Iraq is limited exclusively to the minister’s authority and it sometimes takes more than 
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a year to get it” (E13). Interviewees E13, E17 and E25-E28 confirmed this point. Interviewee 
E13 added, “it sometimes takes more than a year to get the authorization to travel outside 
Iraq”. However, interviewee E13, who had a legal background, highlighted an important point 
in the law of service and retirement of the Internal Security Forces No. 18 of the year 2011: 
“Legally, there is a mandatory vacation of two weeks for each staff member with full salary, 
but this law is not applicable to staff”. This point caused the interviewees resentment. This 
could be seen from their body language and the loudness of their voices. Interviewee E3, 
further, blames the staff shortage problem on not taking enough vacations, especially for 
directors who have important positions. Staff shortage problems will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Interviewee E13 added another important point which has a negative impact on the psyche of 
staff as he mentioned in his response: “It is difficult for staff members to complete the 
requirements for obtaining postgraduate degrees in various disciplines, as it is subject to 
bureaucracy and nepotism.  Another difficulty is the development of additional conditions such 
as age requirement”. This bureaucracy and nepotism might deter some of the employees to do 
their jobs to the fullest. 
In addition, interviewees E4, E6, E9, E11, E12, and E22-E24 highlighted an important point in 
terms of health and life insurance as well as periodic medical and fitness examinations, as 
mentioned below: “Lack of health insurance for staff members as well as a lack of attention to 
the psychological aspects of their health”, “lack of health insurance for the staff”, “absence of 
periodic medical and fitness examinations for the staff”, and “lack of health and life 
insurance”. The researcher noticed that this point generated despair and frustration for the staff 
through the way they speak about it. Moreover, interviewee E11 raised another point of 
weakness in terms of staff rights and compensation as follows: “Failure to ensure easy and 
quick compensation and rights for those who are exposed to injuries during the accidents”.  
Interviewees E4-E6, E14, and E21-E24 pinpointed a bold statement regarding employees who 
are unfit to work (medically classified): “The existence of the elderly and disabled employees 
(affiliated within the permanent staffing), who are unfit to work, causes a burden on the 
Directorate of Civil Defence”; “employees who are unfit to work (medically classified) as class 
/ b and c / II of Article (3) of the physical fitness of the Internal Security Forces Regulation No. 
31 of 1980, which is located under the law of service and retirement of the Internal Security 
Forces No. 18 for the year 2011 p. 214, are considered a burden on the organisation”. They 
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added that this problem might increase due to thoughtless transfers between the different 
branches of the Ministry of Interior, for example, by moving a lot of employees, who are unfit 
to work, from the federal police department to the directorate. 
4.4.1.5 Hierarchy and Centralization Problems 
One of the important tasks for organising is assigning groups of essential activities (to achieve 
response objectives) to a competent manager with authority necessary to supervise it. But at the 
disaster scene different points of weakness appeared regarding this matter. Interviewees’ E3, 
E11, and E21 felt that a major problem was apparent at the scene of an incident with the 
presence of more than one system of leadership causing a failure to obtain satisfactory 
results. Interviewees E3 and E21 added, “….multiple decision-makers from the same 
organisation and other organisations, at the time of the incident”. Interviewee E11 pointed out 
another problem: “The lack of consultation with stakeholders in the decision-making”.    
In terms of officials' experience and their level of scientific knowledge, interviewees E3, E4, 
E6, and E22-24 touched on this point by stating different views such as: “Lack of understanding 
of the guidance or orders due to a lack of scientific knowledge”, “delegating to unqualified 
officials with respect to their scientific level of knowledge, experience, and personality”, 
“giving important administrative tasks to staff with no experience”. Conversely, interviewee 
E12 stressed, “not giving adequate opportunities for junior managers in planning”. However, 
interviewees E6 and E22-24 shed light on the same point (Section 4.4.1.8): giving sensitive 
positions to those who have a relationship with political parties in Iraq after 2003. Those people 
did not have adequate experience and qualifications to implement administrative tasks. 
4.4.1.6 Lack of Equipment 
To achieve the objectives of the directorate in responding properly to disaster, the organising 
process aims to coordinate and direct its resources is crucial. Resources, such as equipment, 
tools, and infrastructure are considered the most significant resources during responding to the 
disaster in addition to financial resources. With respect to the availability of equipment, tools, 
and infrastructure, interviewees E6, E7, E17, E18, E20 and E22-E24 repeated their answers, 
mentioned in section 4.3.1.4, because of the importance of these points from the interviewees’ 
perspective. Further, interviewee E20 summarised all aforementioned points in one comment: 
“Lack of possibilities in terms of equipment, personnel, training, and coordination”. 
Moreover, as the availability of the financial resources has a significant impact on the 
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organising process, interviewees E10 and E14 also insisted on repeating their comments in 
Section 4.3.1.5).  
4.4.1.7 Lack of Staff   
To achieve a strong response to the disaster, coordinating manpower resources is crucial to 
conduct proper organisation. In addition to what was mentioned in Sections 4.3.1.6, 
interviewees E3- E6, E8, E11, E12, and E17 -E28 have the same point of view, that there is a 
lack of staff compared to the staffing of the official organisational structure. Interviewee 
E5, who is a director of administrative affairs, determined that the percentage of the shortage 
in the number of staff within the whole directorate is 40% compared with the official staff 
number in the annual organisational structure. Interviewee E5 gave the reason for this shortage 
by stating “recruitment doors did not open for new employees for more than three years”. 
This problem appears due to delaying in authorising the updated official organisational structure 
for more than one year by the key official in the Ministry of Interior. This point was confirmed 
by interviewees E7, E11, and E21, stating that the lack of staff members is due to the lack of 
new staff members’ recruitment since 2005. Interviewee E18 added another reason: “Staffing 
shortage as a result of ill-considered decisions which adversely affect the implementation of 
the plan”. Moreover, interviewees E6 and E22-E24 mentioned this reason in their responses as 
follows: The existence of the elderly and disabled employees (affiliated within the permanent 
staffing) who are unfit to work (medically classified) causes a burden on the Directorate of 
Civil Defence. While interviewee E12 explained the consequences as a result of this shortage 
as follows: “the effectiveness of the organisational structure will be affected by staff shortage”, 
similarly, interviewee E3 gave another consequence by saying that there is “failure in not 
keeping pace with modern development due to lack of external courses and lack of staff”. 
Interviewee E3 added: “Because of the lack of appointments to some of the important directors’ 
positions which leads to not taking enough vacations, there is a negative effect on the regulatory 
process”. Interviewee E20 also added another consequence of the staff shortage by stating 
“staff reducing causes a reduction in sections or department”, which might lead to other 
regulatory problems. However, interviewees E3, E18, E19, and E20 assert a “lack of 
specialised staff” in different disciplines such as schematics, engineering, and diverse staff. 
Interviewee E18 agreed with the latter view by adding “Lack of scientific qualifications for 
staff in the field of organisation”. 
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4.4.1.8 Nepotism and Cronyism 
Allocating responsibilities into an appropriate structure is a vital task in the organising process. 
In addition to bureaucracy and the delays with correspondence mentioned above, nepotism and 
cronyism are widely deemed as an issue in the administrative system of the Iraqi General 
Directorate of Civil Defence. Nepotism is the act of giving work or employment benefit to a 
family member and cronyism is the same action but for friends or colleagues. This can be seen 
by this response: “The effect of cronyism is seen in the application of orders and instructions 
in general, and in a lack of equality for all” (E11). Regarding the hierarchical distribution, 
interviewees E4, E6, E12, E20, and E22-24 touched on this point by saying there is: 
“favouritism in the administrative distribution of hierarchical tasks”, “the control of personal 
relationships, nepotism, political parties and blocs in giving managerial positions”, “putting 
the right man in the wrong place as a result of cronyism”. In addition to the exploitation of 
these positions and their resources for personal purposes, “exploiting fire fighting vehicles 
for personal purposes” (E20), for example, is a problem facing the organiser in the directorate.   
Regarding the control of political parties and blocs in giving managerial positions, after 
2003 a huge problem developed by officers becoming managers without having any 
compatibility, efficiency or ability for the job. Interviewee E4 pinpointed this problem by 
stating that there was a “lack of compatibility, efficiency and the ability to accommodate the 
work by officers who joined the service after 2003 due to their not having previous experience 
and adequate knowledge. They were given important responsibilities as a result of their 
relationship with political parties in Iraq”.  
Although nepotism and the influence of political parties have a major role in giving managerial 
positions, postgraduate studies for staff are also affected by this problem (E12 and E13). 
Quoting interviewee E12: “Staff members are only allowed to complete their postgraduate 
studies after obtaining approval that is affected by nepotism and political parties”. 
4.4.1.9 Staff Movement and Reduction of Sections 
According to interviewees E4, E16-E18 and E25-28, the organising process has faced changes 
to its permanent staff which were not thought through, as in the words of the interviewees: 
“Transfers between departments in the same organization and other organisations were not 
very well thought through” and there were “unhelpful or thoughtless transfers of experts 
inside and outside the Directorate”. Interviewee E16 pointed that sometimes there is “transfer 
or temporary transfer of some staff to other organisation”. Based on interviewee E18’s opinion, 
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this problem occurred because of “ill-considered decisions, such as the random transfers, by 
people in higher positions”. This point was also supported by interviewee E16, who stated the 
consequence of these random transfers by saying there were “thoughtless staff changes, which 
cause confusion”. Confusion is not the only consequence, but the staff changes also lead to 
“staff reducing and a reduction of sections” (E20) which have appeared in the organisational 
structure for the directorate.  
This section described the nine weaknesses at the organising stage. A summary of organising 
weaknesses’ sub-themes are illustrated in Figure 4.9. The following is a detailed argument of 
strengths during the organising stage.   
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Figure 4.9 Weaknesses during the Organising Stage  
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- Weakness of responding to disaster from other organisations 
- The multiplicity of responsible agencies at the scene 
- The plans are not applied strictly by the rest of the organisations 
- Intervention by the senior leadership from other organisation 
- Lack of knowledge of the objectives, tasks and duties of the rest of the 
organisations 
- Jobs’ overlapping with the other organisations at the scene 
- Support from the rest of the organisations is not fast enough when responding to 
disasters 
- Weakness in the mechanisms of coordination between the federal ministries and 
local governments 
- Coordination with donor countries is centralised 
- Coordination with the security authorities 
- Coordination with the service organisations 
- Correspondence  
- Effect of cronyism is seen in the application of orders and instructions in general, 
and in a lack of equality for all 
- Control of personal relationships, nepotism, political parties and blocs in giving 
managerial positions 
- Putting the right man in the wrong place as a result of cronyism 
- Exploitation of these positions and their resources for personal purposes 
- Postgraduate study for staff are affected by nepotism and political parties 
Nepotism 
and 
Cronyism 
Coordination 
within the 
Organisation 
Employees' 
Rights 
- Confusion and chaos 
- Some incorrect distribution of tasks 
- Failure of some officials to do their responsibilities 
- Decentralization of some administrative decisions 
- Absence of employment choice 
- Continuous movements from time to time 
- The top official’s lack of knowledge about the work details of the staff 
- Lack of clear exceptional administrative powers during disasters at the various 
administrative levels 
- Commissioning people with no experience for important administrative tasks 
- Cancelling or merging branches within the organisational structure 
- System of daily working hours 
- Vacations and travel outside Iraq 
- Difficulties in front of ambitious staff 
- Health and life insurance as well as periodic medical and fitness examinations 
- Failure to ensure easy and quick compensation and rights for those who are 
exposed to injuries during the accidents 
- Employees who are unfit to work (medically classified) 
- Presence of more than one system of leadership at the scene  
- Lack of consultation with stakeholders in the decision-making 
- Officials' experience and their level of scientific knowledge 
Hierarchy and 
Centralization 
Problems 
Lack of Equipment - Lack of possibilities in terms of equipment, personnel, training, and coordination 
Lack of Staff 
- Lack of staff compared to the staffing of the official organizational structure 
- Shortage in the number of staff by 40% 
- Recruitment doors did not open for new employees for more than three years 
- The existence of the elderly and disabled employees who are unfit to work  Lack 
of specialized staff 
Staff Movement and 
Reduction of Sections 
- Unhelpful or thoughtless transfers for experts inside and outside the Directorate 
- Thoughtless staff changes, which cause confusion  
- Staff reducing and a reduction of sections 
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4.4.2 Strengths during the Organising Stage    
Although the organising process has a lot of weaknesses, it also has points of strength as 
illustrated in Figure 4.10. In the following two subsections the organising strengths will be 
argued briefly. 
 
Figure 4.10 Nodes for Organising Strengths 
 
4.4.2.1 Coordination 
It is widely acknowledged that proper coordination might improve the responding process. In 
the Iraqi context, despite having various problems during this process, the experts describe the 
organisation process as a “quick response and good organisation” (E13). Similarly, 
interviewees E3 and E10 praise its “proper leadership” and “good management”. This is due 
to various reasons as mentioned in the interviewees E3, E11, E12, E15, and E20 responses: 
“follow-up for each joint work”, “working hard and desiring to develop”, “the adoption of 
scientific methods whilst conducting business ”, using “modern and efficient devices”, 
“putting the right man in the right place”, and following “central decisions”.                                                          
Regarding the distribution of tasks and duties, interviewees E8, E11, E15, E19, and E20 have a 
good impression. This appeared through their responses as follows: “The duties and 
responsibilities are known by all staff members”, the employees “try to be knowledgeable 
about the details of the work and determine the duties and tasks”. This causes “non-
overlapping duties” or “lack of overlapping in work between units, departments and branches 
within the directorate”. This non-overlapping in duties is also because of “dividing the work 
between teams for sectors within the incident site” and “working as a team”. Interviewee E19 
described this process as a “mini operations centre within the incident site”. Moreover, 
interviewee E16 attributed the strength of the organising process to the “strong military 
hierarchy”. Meanwhile, interviewees E3, E4, E6, E14, and E22-E24 pointed out the existence 
of the entire organisational structure approved by the Ministry of Interior and the job 
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descriptions to ensure the implementation of duties. These had been mandated by the 
Directorate, which also updated the annual organisational structure.   
In terms of documentation, interviewees E3 and E18 raised this point by saying there is 
“continuously updated documentation (electronic and paper)” and “documentation exists for 
firefighting, rescue, and bomb disposal”.  
In addition, interviewee E7 stated that “cooperation and coordination between the directorate 
and the rest of the organisation when responding to the incident seems to be good”, due to 
“reducing the number of security checkpoints in Baghdad”. 
4.4.2.2 Staff 
In addition to proper coordination, a knowledgeable staff in terms of experience and 
qualifications are deemed to be a cornerstone of any organising process (E4, E8, and E14). 
Interviewee E14 strongly believes that “most of the officers have Bachelor qualifications or 
above in the different disciplines of engineering, science, and administration” particularly 
“…..efficient planning staff that have extensive practical experience”. Interviewees E4 and 
E8 confirm E14’s point of view, stating that there is “accumulated experience for staff 
members and disaster responders” and that “experienced, professional people get put into 
important positions”.  
The organising strengths are highlighted in this subsection. A summary for organising 
strengths’ sub-themes is showed in Figure 4.11. What follows is an argument about weaknesses 
during the organising stage.    
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Figure 4.11 Strengths during the Organising Stage  
 
 
4.4.3 Recommendations for the Organising Stage    
After obtaining organising weaknesses and strengths, and in order to complete the evaluation 
for the current administrative system, the researcher asks the experts for any recommendations 
to improve the organising process in the future. These recommendations are illustrated in 
Figure 4.12 below and will be discussed in the next sections.   
 
Figure 4.12 Nodes for Organising Recommendations 
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Coordination 
- Most of the officers have Bachelor qualifications or above in the 
different disciplines of engineering, science, and administration 
- Efficient planning staff that have extensive practical experience 
- Accumulated experience for staff members and disaster responders 
- Quick response and good organization 
- Proper leadership 
- Following-up for each joint work 
- Working hard and desiring to develop  
- Adoption of scientific methods whilst conducting business 
- Putting the right man in the right place 
- Central decisions 
- Duties and responsibilities are known by all staff members 
- Lack of overlapping in work between units, departments and branches 
within the directorate 
- Working as a team 
- Strong military hierarchy 
- Existence of the entire organizational structure approved by the 
Ministry of Interior 
- Documentation 
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4.4.3.1 Coordination  
In order to gain proper organisation, experts stressed the importance of central leadership for 
all accidents. Interviewees E10 and E11 mentioned this point in their responses: “The 
importance of centralisation with flexibility in decision-making” (E10), “focusing on the 
central leadership for all accidents” (E11). Further, interviewee E8 stressed, “Showing 
interest in the organisation by the key officials and decision-makers”. This might happen, 
from interviewee E4, E8, E14, and E19’s perspectives, by “constantly updating the 
organisational structure”, “the elimination of favouritism and bias”, “transfer and 
application of experiences from more developed countries”, “the use of global systems 
(organisational structures)”, “attending external courses for an exchange of knowledge in 
the field of organising” and “communicating with international bodies with experience in 
organising rescue operations”. Further, interviewee E12 recommended “separating the 
General Directorate of Civil Defence from the Ministry of Interior”.     
4.4.3.2 Coordination between Organisations   
To guide any nation to respond to different hazards, scalable, flexible, and adaptable 
coordinating structures can be built to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, 
linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organisations, and the private sector. To do 
so, interviewee E21 put emphases on “governance risk management to ensure the integration 
of all efforts including government institutions, civil society organisations, the private sector, 
media, and public efforts”. This governance might be obtained by “developing a unified plan 
to respond to the disaster for the governorate, which includes the participation of all 
organisations with all possibilities to determine responsibilities, duties, and the hierarchy” 
or by “identifying an effective operations centre” (E10). Interviewees E6, E20, E22, and E25 
agree with this suggestion, stating the need for “effective interaction between the 
governmental organisations especially services”. Experts focused on a different specific 
organisation in addition to organisations that are relevant to the response process, as mentioned 
below: “higher coordination with the relevant organisations at the incident” (E19), “effective 
coordination with water organisations about installing and maintaining a fire nozzles network” 
(E12), “imposing the security cordon properly” (E20), and removing excesses on the national 
electricity grid system (E6, E22-E24). In addition, due to the utmost importance of organising 
response process, interviewee E21 highlights two other different points, which can be seen by 
these responses: “preparing disaster response and addressing systems with good resources, 
and readiness depends on the national and local capacities alike”, and “adopting national 
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multiple risks approach for disaster management and mobilizing of capacities at 
comprehensive government level without focusing on one executive organisation”. 
4.4.3.3 Employees' Rights  
Staff can be helped in balancing their responsibilities at work and at home by the way that they 
arrange their working hours. Interviewee E11 proposed the idea of “taking into account the 
psychological aspects for all employees”. Such aspects might be provided by “adopting global 
official working hours (1 day on- 2 days off) or (morning, evening, night)” in their work at 
civil defence centres instead of (12 hours on- 12 hours off). Interviewees E9 and E12 agreed 
with this suggestion. 
Within the context of employees' rights, interviewee E3 sheds light on the staff’s wishes in his 
recommendations, as in this quote: “Account should be taken of staff wishes to work within a 
certain department”. This recommendation was also supported by interviewee E11, who added 
two other important points, namely competence and experience. These suggestions can be seen 
clearly in the words of the interviewee: “adoption of competence, experience, and personal 
preference for the field of work”.  
Regarding staff rights to have their vacation outside Iraq, vacations to complement their 
studies, and health insurance, interviewees E4, E17, and E25-E28 pointed out the 
aforementioned rights in the Iraqi Act for Civil Service No. 42 of 1960 and law of service and 
retirement of the Internal Security Forces No. 18 for the year 2011. Those interviewees 
recommended activating certain paragraphs of these laws within this context, as interviewee 
E17 quoted: “Employees should get their full insurance rights by the Iraqi Act for Civil Service 
No. 42 of 1960, including the right to a vacation outside of the country, vacations to complement 
the study, and health insurance”, “activation of certain paragraphs of the law of service and 
retirement of the Internal Security Forces No. 18 for the year 2011, with respect to the staff 
members vacation enjoyment outside Iraq”.   
As far as the problem of employees who are unfit to work (medically classified) is concerned, 
interviewees E5, E6, E16, and E21-E24 made three suggestions: firstly, transferring them to the 
Social Welfare organisation. Secondly, transfer them to the morning shifts as administrators in 
civil defence centres. Thirdly, replace them by recruiting new employees with experience.  
150 
 
4.4.3.4 Staff and Equipment 
According to interviewee E3, who has a lot of experience in planning, the key stakeholders 
should “provide the Directorate with modern staff, instruments and equipment”. Besides that, 
interviewee E3 asserted that “staff integration, particularly with specialists, is needed”. 
Similarly, interviewees E4, E8, E11, E17, and E25-E28 stressed increasing staff in the staffing, 
adoption of standard staff that are approved by the key stakeholders, recruit a sufficient number 
of staff with scientific competencies and qualifications as well as commissioning people 
experienced in the implementation of organising tasks.  
Regarding equipment, interviewees E17, and E25-E28 proposed providing staff members 
with modern individual protection equipment that keeps pace with modern world 
technology. Further, interviewees E6 and E22-E24 suggested developing telecommunications 
and informatics in the provinces. Moreover, interviewee E16 recommended “distributing 
fire engines in some densely populated places”.  
A set of various recommendations for the organising stage is shown in this section. Figure 4.13 
gives the summary of recommendations for the organising stage sub-themes. The following 
section is a summary of the interview analysis. 
 
4.4.4 Organising Stage Summary 
To conclude, different strengths, weaknesses and recommendations have emerged from 
interview analysis. It can be seen that the strengths that are appeared in the organising stage are 
similar to its weaknesses. Following is the analysis of the interviews in the directing stage. 
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Figure 4.13 Recommendations for the Organising Stage  
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s 
Coordination 
between 
Organisations 
Coordination 
- Central leadership for all accidents 
- Showing interest in organisation by the key officials and 
decision-makers 
- Constantly updating the organisational structure 
- Elimination of favouritism and bias 
- Transfer and application of experiences from more developed 
countries 
- Attending external courses for an exchange of knowledge in 
the field of organising 
- Separating the General Directorate of Civil Defence from the 
Ministry of Interior 
- Governance risk management to ensure the integration of all 
efforts 
- Participation of all organisations with all its possibilities to 
determine responsibilities, duties, and the hierarchy 
- Identifying an effective operations centre 
- Effective interaction between the governmental 
organisations especially services 
- Preparing disaster response and addressing systems with 
good resources 
- Adopting of the national multiple risks approach for disaster 
management and mobilizing of capacities at comprehensive 
government level without focusing on one executive 
organisation 
- Taking into account the psychological aspects for all employees 
- Adopting global official working hours (1 day on- 2 days off) 
- Staff wishes to work within a certain department 
- Adoption of competence, experience, and personal preference for 
the field of work  
- Back to the previous system of daily working hours 
- Activating a certain paragraphs of laws regarding staff rights to 
have vacation outside Iraq, vacations to complement their 
studies, and health insurance 
- Transferring the (medically classified) to the Social Welfare 
organization or to the morning shifts as administrators in civil 
defence centres or replace them by recruiting new employees 
- Provide the Directorate with modern staff, instruments and 
equipment 
- Staff integration, particularly with specialist is needed 
- Commissioning people experienced in the implementation of 
organising tasks 
- Providing staff members with modern individual protection 
equipment that keeps pace with modern world technology 
- Developing of telecommunications and informatics in the 
provinces 
- Distributing fire engines in some densely populated places 
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4.5 Interview Analysis – Directing Stage 
The third stage of the disaster response management system is the directing stage. Different 
sub-themes have been identified from interviewees’ responses. 
4.5.1 Weaknesses during the Directing Stage  
In order to complete the important elements in the evaluation of the current Disaster Response 
Administrative System, different points of weakness have emerged from interviewees’ 
transcriptions. In the subsection that follows, directing weaknesses’ sub-themes as presented in 
Figure 4.14 below will be discussed in the next subsections. 
 
Figure 4.14 Nodes for Directing Weaknesses 
4.5.1.1 Citizens’ Irresponsible Intervention 
It is part of the Iraqi culture to want to help in times of crisis. It is, therefore, common to have 
a lot of people coming to the scene after an incident has occurred to help victims, although this 
can be a hindrance to the official disaster responders. Interviewees E1, E2, E6, E8, E12, E13, 
and E22- E24 find this matter one of the most critical challenges during the directing stage. All 
of these interviewees mentioned public intervention in matters outside the scope of their 
responsibility. This theme also appeared in the planning challenges stage. Interviewee E11 
criticises this behaviour because it is very “difficult to contain the chaos during the incident 
because of the irresponsible intervention of citizens”. Interviewees E3 and E4 gave the reason 
for this intervention as being due to the “lack of society's awareness regarding non-intervention 
in the work of responders in the course of their duties”, and “lack of citizen awareness of the 
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necessity of non-interference and the crowd near the scene”. Moreover, due to the poor security 
situation in Iraq, this intervention might be exploited by suicide bombers, which potentially 
increases the number of losses for such an incident. This point was confirmed by interviewee 
E20, stating that the “ignorance by citizens to the seriousness of the proximity to the scene and 
exploiting this by suicide bombers” causes these additional problems. Interviewee E20 also 
stressed the lack of citizen knowledge regarding the explosive materials as follows: “the lack 
of knowledge and familiarity with the dangerous and explosive materials by people is evident”. 
In addition, Interviewees E10 and E15 pointed out that “citizens gathering around the scene” 
might hinder the responders in their work. Interviewee E13 attributed this gathering to the “lack 
of society awareness in general, such as the crowd at the location of the accident”. 
4.5.1.2 Communication and Information 
Effective directing of resources, when responding to terrorist incidents, requires assessing 
information prior to, during, and after such events. According to interviewees E14, E17, E25-
28, there is a “lack of intelligence information to figure out who and when and where gets the 
terrorist incident”. The interviewees gave different reasons for this lack of knowledge, for 
example, “Delay in reporting” (E16), “the poor quality of the mobile network while reporting” 
(E8), “False calling” (E12), “lack of security camera systems” (E18). 
Regarding the communication, there are different areas of difficulties in the communication 
when responding to disasters, such as “weakness of telecommunications networks during 
disasters, there are often no alternatives” (E21), “outdated communications devices and there 
is no regular maintenance for them” (E17, E25- E28). 
4.5.1.3 Coordination between Organisations and Commanding the Scene 
There is no doubt that a lot of difficulties appear in achieving overall co-ordination in any 
community disaster. One of these difficulties is the “coordination with the rest of the 
government organisations” (E10). It is widely believed that local organisations have an 
important role in responding to disaster through saving lives and supporting evacuees’ right 
after a disaster. But at the same time, if this rule is not applied correctly, this might lead to 
serious consequences, especially in extreme events. Interviewee E4 agreed with this view and 
went on to assert that there is a “lack of cooperation from the rest of the organisation 
according to the plan”. Interviewees E14 and E16 support this point and believe that there is 
“too much variation in performance during the implementation of the response plan by other 
organisations” and “some organisations intervene without knowing what they are doing” 
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which worsens the situation. Interviewees E11 and E21 also mentioned this point in their 
responses, stating: “failure in the implementation of plans from other organisations”, “the 
plans are not applied strictly by the rest of the organisations”.   
Interviewees E2 and E19 raise an important point regarding the “weakness of responding to 
disaster from other organisations, such as services and security organisations”. Such 
weaknesses might cause delays while responding to disasters. This point was confirmed by 
interviewee E8, stating that “the civil defence teams are not allowed to enter some sensitive 
areas in the country until after obtaining security permissions, leading to delays in response”. 
This point was also supported by interviewee E19, who sees this from the operative point of 
view, “late arrival of the supporting rescue machines of relevant departments” might cause 
a delay in responding to the disaster.  
In terms of commanding the scene, interviewees E11, E13 and E21 pinpointed this point as one 
of the most important challenges during the directing process as follows: “presence of too many 
leaders at the scene causing failure to obtain satisfactory results”, “multiple sources of 
decision making at the scene” which might increase the chaos at the scene. Interviewee E16 
touched on this point by stating different views such as: “there is a difficulty in commanding 
the scene due to the intervention from responsible persons or non-experienced higher ranks 
from other organisations. This led to limit the authority of command at the scene”. 
Consequently, this might have a negative effect on directing the process during the response to 
disasters. Further, interviewee E19 puts emphasis on the “failure to secure the site before the 
intervention of civil defence teams” which killed a lot of disaster responders. Whilst 
interviewees E6, E19, E22-E24 add other points of weakness related to the “delay in reaching 
the scene because of the security roadblocks” and “weakness in the water pressure in the fire 
nozzles”. 
4.5.1.4 Fire nozzle network 
The most important tool for any firefighter or responder is the fire nozzle; it tends to be used as 
a primary weapon for the responders. In Iraq, there is a “lack of adequate fire nozzles” (E18). 
Interviewee E19 stressed the “absence of fire nozzles, especially in commercial areas”. 
Interviewee E9 confirmed this point stating: “there is an inadequate number of fire nozzles, 
despite setting up new networks, but sometimes these do not work properly”. Interviewee E10 
gave a reason for this defect, stating that there is a “failure in the installation of new fire 
nozzles” causing these to malfunction. Interviewee E4 added, “too few fire nozzles and these 
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being buried or having weak water pressure causes more problems”. Interviewee E19 
attributed this shortage and malfunction to the “lack of regular maintenance of the old fire 
nozzle network”. 
4.5.1.5 Frequent Blackouts from National Electricity 
Iraq has suffered from programmed cutting off of National Electricity since the First Gulf War 
in 1991, due to the significant damage in many power stations and transmission lines. Electricity 
is frequently cut off in any 24 hour period, and this results in illegal wiring by households, who 
wire up a connection to the national grid, because they need power throughout the day and 
night. This illegal wiring is often poorly constructed and consequently dangerous since the 
wires often hang down to head height. When responders are driving tall vehicles to the scene 
of a disaster, they are often forced to drive through these live wires, making themselves subject 
to an electric shock, and sometimes vehicles can get stuck in the wires. Interviewee E17, E25-
E28 stressed this important point as it generates a lot of challenges for the responders, for 
example, “having illegal wires connecting to the national electricity grid system as a result of 
frequent power shortages” can lead to more losses amongst responders’ teams (E4, E6, E11, 
E18, and E22- E24). This point was also supported by interviewee E7 who saw this from the 
operative point of view: “frequent use of generators due to a lack of supply of national power”. 
Interviewees E4, E6, E7, E10, E11, E22- E24, agreed with E7’s view, stating that “random 
wiring, especially for Simi-Generic Generators that prevent the arrival of civil defence teams 
to the scene” cause many problems. Similarly, interviewees E12, E13, E17, E20, E25-E28 
assert the same point, adding “random wiring for Simi-Generic Generators and consequent 
excess on the national electricity grid” will cause delays in responding to disasters. 
Furthermore, interviewee E10 raises a slightly different challenge, although linked to electricity 
supply, by stating that there is a “weakness in the electrical network maintenance”. This 
weakness can have a significant impact on responders’ lives since the very poor levels of safety 
can be fatal. Furthermore, by using low-quality electrical materials, such as illegal wires, this 
might also increase deaths of responders, as well as the general public. Interviewees E6, E22- 
E24 also mentioned the “absence of quality control on imported materials, particularly 
electric” can have a huge impact on safety. 
4.5.1.6 Individual Mistakes 
Undoubtedly, mistakes happen when responding to extreme events. To avoid duplication of 
mistakes, lessons should be learned from experts’ experience, especially when the price of error 
could be human lives. According to interviewee E1, “individual mistakes” might happen while 
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responding to a disaster. Interviewee E12 gave a reason for these mistakes as being that “tasks 
overlapped”, while interviewee E11 gave another reason, the “misplaced judgement in 
rushing to the scene or task without a thought about the potential consequences”. 
Interviewees E4 and E14 highlight an important point about “failing to secure the site before 
the intervention of civil defence teams”. Such failure might cause many responders’ and 
peoples’ lives. Mistakes in responding to a disaster are attributed by interviewees E2 and E3 as 
being an “over-reliance on others to do the work” and “full compliance with laws and 
regulations (there is not enough flexibility)”. Based on interviewee E8’s responses, there is a 
“failure to maintain the public and private property in some cases” which might increase the 
physical damage to such property. However, interviewee E16 pointed to the problem of “false 
reporting or fictitious accidents”, which are made by irresponsible people. Consequently, such 
false reporting can lead to disaster responders’ resources being wasted. 
4.5.1.7 Misuse of Machines and Equipment 
It is widely acknowledged that the capability of disaster responders’ mobility could be enhanced 
by using more sophisticated and reliable machines and equipment. Through interviewees’ 
responses, a number of weaknesses identified related to “misuse of machines and equipment” 
(E9).  Interviewee E12 touched on this problem as follows: “equipment is not updated” and 
“machinery maintenance is limited to remedial maintenance only”. Interviewee E8 explains 
this point of weakness more by stating: “There is a lack of care for firefighters’ equipment at 
the scene, causing rapid deterioration of this equipment”. 
4.5.1.8 Moral and Financial Incentives 
It is generally accepted that responding to extreme events such as terrorism requires good 
morale in the disaster responders’ team. To maintain this morale, two types of incentives are 
given to staff that have done special or unusual work while responding to disasters. Points of 
weakness have been revealed from experts’ responses related to the application of this point. 
According to interviewees E4 and E14, “the authority of giving financial incentives is 
exclusively limited to the director of the General Director of Civil Defence in Baghdad”. This 
means the directors of all the Civil Defence branches in all Iraqi cities cannot give any financial 
incentives to their employees. Moreover, despite having morale incentives from heads of 
departments or general managers, there is no financial benefit. Unlike the morale 
incentives are given by the Prime Minister and the minister which might lead to a 6 month or 
one-year promotion (with consequential financial reward). 
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4.5.1.9 Providing the Right Relief Supplies for People in Need at the Right Time 
One of the main problems in public management is the effective logistical supply when 
responding to extreme events on a large scale. Interviewee E3 stressed this problem, stating that 
there is an “exaggeration of logistical supply” in some cases, meaning that in reality, the 
situation is often more difficult than reported.  
4.5.1.10 Security Cordons 
Scene security is important for all agencies involved in the response. Unauthorised access to 
the scene of an emergency might jeopardise rescue activities or any investigations. To facilitate 
the operations of the disaster response services and other agencies and to prevent unauthorised 
interference with evidence or property, security cordons are established around the scene. 
According to interviewees E2, E4, E9, E13, E19, E21, there is often a “failure to impose a 
proper security cordon”. As a consequence, it is “difficult to contain the chaos during the 
incident because of the irresponsible intervention of citizens” (E6, E11, E22-24). Similarly, 
interviewees E16 and E19 stated that there are “incorrect procedures in imposing security 
cordons” and it might “be dependent on mood” (E3). Interviewee E3 also raised a different 
challenge, regarding control access, by stating, “the permission to go through the security 
cordon is subject in some cases to the mood of the enforcer”. Interviewee E8 touched on this 
point by stating: “there is often some ignorance in setting up of the security cordon by the 
authorities, who are responsible for it, leading to confusion and delay in responding, as well 
as having a negative influence on criminal evidence”. Based on interviewee E11’s opinion, this 
problem sometimes occurs because of a possible “lack of seriousness in the local police for 
the citizens’ exclusion risk sites and emptying the area of people so that civil defencemen can 
work properly without people intruding”.  
4.5.1.11 Speed of Response 
It is widely acknowledged that speed of response is essential for effective disaster response 
because more lives can be saved. However, sometimes delays occur and this can have a 
detrimental effect on the rescue effort. Some of the interviewees suggested reasons for the 
responders’ delay; interviewee E4 attributed it to “the multiplicity of responsible agencies at 
the scene, especially from other organisations”. This point was also supported by interviewee 
E11 who saw this from the operative point of view: “varying periods of time can pass in 
response to a disaster for the other stakeholders who are related to the response process”. In 
a similar way, interviewee E19 criticises the “slow response from the rest of the relevant 
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organisations”. Interviewee E8 brought up an important challenge for the directing process 
regarding obtaining security permissions when entering some sensitive areas.  
Due to the shortage of heavy rescue equipment, as shown in section 4.3.1.4 and section 4.4.1.6, 
interviewees E6, E19, and E22-24 shed light on an important point regarding this aspect, “the 
support from the other organisations is not fast enough in responding to a disaster, particularly 
when requesting heavy rescue equipment”. Moreover, interviewees E7 and E16 attributed the 
delay in response to the lack of public awareness with respect to giving priority to emergency 
vehicles such as fire engines attending the scene. Interviewee E12 agreed with the 
aforementioned view and added another reason as follows: “the tribal mindset of people has a 
negative impact on the response to the disaster”. This refers to the difficulty in responding to, 
for example, a female victim, from a male responder. In addition to that, a different reason and 
point of view emerged from the interview transcriptions: “legal proceedings in the case of 
exposure to traffic accidents” (E7), “false calling” (E12),“delay in reporting” (E16), 
“multitude of decision sources” (E13), “exploiting firefighter vehicles for personal purposes” 
(E20), and “lack of financial allocation for the Directorate (which led to the failure to 
implement some of the tasks included in the plan).  All of these points had a negative effect on 
the speed of completion of duties, according to E3, together with a “lack of understanding of 
the guidance or orders given due to a lack of education and limited mental capacity”. There 
was also reference to the problem of maintenance from E3, saying “defective equipment and 
devices were not regularly and properly maintained”. 
4.5.1.12 Sub-sequential Bombings 
Due to the poor security situation in Iraq, sub-sequential bombings occur frequently. This 
problem is considered the main challenge facing the responders in the directing stage. 
According to interviewees E7 and E12, there is a “fear of double bombings”. The terrorists 
use women, addicted teenagers, the elderly and disabled, especially people with mental illness, 
as well as animals and dead bodies to carry bombs (E6, E21- E24). So the responders cannot 
predict when and where the bombing will happen. Interviewees E15 and E21 touched on this 
point by stating: “there is a lack of knowledge about the people who carry out explosions and 
the time and place of the explosion”. Interviewees gave reasons for this problem as being due 
to subsequent or sequential bombings as a result of the absence of security and awareness of 
the security men (E6, E11, E22- E24), in addition the lack of effective checking devices (E4, 
E14, E17, E25-28), “the lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives” (E16), and 
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the “ignorance of citizens to the seriousness of being close to the scene since this could be 
exploited by suicide bombers” (E20). 
4.5.1.13 Traffic Jams and Closing the Roads by the Security Checkpoints and 
Concrete Barriers 
There is constant traffic congestion at security checkpoints throughout the country, and 
especially in Baghdad. This is a particular problem for responders trying to get to the disaster 
scene since the traffic congestion can cause delay. Interviewees E6, E10, E12, and E22-E24 
had the same opinion about the traffic jams as being a major challenge facing responders in 
the directing stage. Interviewees E3, E8 and E12 agreed with this point and saw another 
challenge regarding security checkpoints, saying that congestion at security checkpoints 
causes delay in the arrival of civil defence teams, while interviewee E11 points out that there is 
a “traffic difficulty in passing through some unpaved roads in many neighbourhoods and 
residential areas” and the “chaotic nature of road works without proper notification or 
signage, as well as the lack of safety and security standards,  since there exists no clear 
timetable of works to be completed”.  
However, interviewees E2, E7, E16, E17, and E25-E28 brought up a new challenge for the 
directing process regarding security concrete barriers, saying that there was a multitude of 
concrete barriers and closed roads because of the security reasons.  
In terms of closing the roads because of the security situation, interviewees E2, E11 and E19 
mention that there are sudden road closures as a result of a lack of coordination with the security 
authorities who have decision-making powers. This problem happens because of the security 
situation which impedes access to the scene. 
4.5.1.14 Unplanned Random Development 
Due to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent Iraq War, the majority of Iraqi cities have 
often faced severe infrastructural damage. After 2003, due to the security breach and a lack of 
strong leadership in the government, all of this had a significant impact on the adequacy of rules 
and regulations that do not meet societal needs, which is why most people are not committing 
to the current regulations. Subsequently, this random situation appears. 
In terms of poor urban planning, according to E10, E13, E17, E20, and E25-E28, Iraqi cities 
suffer from poor urban planning such as random housing, factories and shops especially in 
shopping centres which make the response process very difficult and time-consuming.  
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Regarding the lack of regular route networks in some areas, one of the interviewees, E11, 
captured this problem as follows: “the existence of random residential complexes that do not 
have regular route networks is an issue”. Interviewee E3 and E20 grumbled about the narrow 
streets as mentioned in their transcriptions: “defect in urban planning, especially regarding the 
narrow streets” and there is an “imbalance in the width of streets and alleys”. However, 
interviewees E6, E11, E18, E20, and E22-E24 attribute the problem of narrow streets not only 
to poor urban planning, but to abuses taking place on the main roads and markets, such as 
vendors using the road's forbidden hard shoulder to sell goods, “random exploitation of the 
road's forbidden hard shoulder”, “exploiting the road's forbidden hard shoulder by vendors”. 
Such problems hinder the mobility of the response teams' vehicles due to the huge size of the 
vehicles. However, interviewee E11 raises a different challenge: “there is an absence of 
municipal roles in the adjustment of roads periodically” which causes a delay in reaching the 
scene. Interviewees E4, E7, E12, E18 on the other hand, provided a different reason for delays: 
“the absence of a building coding system which has negative effects on the response time”. 
With regard to random storage of goods, interviewees E7, E13 and E20 criticise this point. 
Interviewee E7 briefly explained that “random storage of goods in the commercial market areas 
can cause fast spreading fires” which make the response process very difficult. Interviewee E20 
gave an important reason for this: “there is a failure to follow the conditions of safety and 
security in storage”. 
To sum up, the previous subsections have presented directing weaknesses that the disaster 
responders face during the directing process. Figure 4.15 clearly illustrates the sub-themes of 
directing weaknesses. In the section that follows, directing strengths sub-themes will be 
discussed. 
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Figure 4.15 Weaknesses during the Directing Stage 
Sub-Sequential Bombings 
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- Multiple sources of decision at the scene  
- Fear of the double bombings  
- Lack of knowledge about the people who carry out explosions and the time 
and place of the explosion  
- Security breach due to the lack of effective checking devices  
- Failure in the installation of new fire nozzles 
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Providing the Right 
Relief Supplies  
- Having illegal wires connecting to the national electricity grid system  
- Frequent use of generators  
- Random wiring, especially for Simi-Generic Generators   
- Electrical network maintenance and absence of quality control  
Misuse of Machines 
and Equipment 
Moral and Financial 
Incentives 
- Exaggeration of logistical supply 
- Failure to impose a proper security cordon   
- Incorrect procedures in imposing security cordons   
- The permission to go through the security cordon is subject in some cases to 
the mood of the enforcer 
- Lack of seriousness in the local police for the citizens exclusion risk sites 
Security Cordons 
- Varying periods of time can pass in response to a disaster for the other 
stakeholders 
- Delay in reporting, false calling, and multitude of decision sources 
- Lack of understanding of the guidance or orders 
- Defective equipment and devices were not regularly and properly maintained 
Speed of Response 
- Security checkpoint and concrete barriers   
- Chaotic nature of road works without proper notification or signage  
- Closing the roads because of the security situation  
Unplanned Random 
Development 
Traffic Jams and 
Closing the Roads  
- Poor urban planning and lack of regular route networks in some areas    
- Using the road's forbidden hard shoulder to sell goods  
- Absence of municipal role in the adjustment of roads periodically 
- Absence of buildings coding system 
Individual Mistakes 
- Tasks overlapping and dependency in work 
- Misplaced judgement in rushing to the scene or task  
- Failing to secure the site before the intervention of civil defence teams 
- There is not enough flexibility 
- Failure to maintain public and private property in some cases 
- False reporting or fictitious accidents 
- Equipment is not updated   
- Machinery maintenance is limited to remedial maintenance only 
- Lack of care for firefighters’ equipment at the scene, causing rapid 
deterioration of this equipment 
- The authority of giving financial incentives is exclusively limited to the 
director of the General Director of Civil Defence in Baghdad  
- Despite having morale incentives from heads of departments or general 
managers, there is no financial benefit 
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4.5.2 Strengths during the Directing Stage    
A lot of weaknesses were revealed from interviewees’ responses in the previous section, despite 
that, there were more points of strength. These points are demonstrated in Figure 4.16 below 
and will be discussed in the next sections.     
 
Figure 4.16 Nodes for Directing Strengths 
 
4.5.2.1 Decisions-Making 
It is widely known that the critical component of any disaster response is decisions- making. 
Therefore, the success of that response is dependent upon effective decisions being made in a 
timely manner. Interviewee E1 praised the “existence of specific contexts to respond to the 
disaster” and “proper appreciation of the position” due to their active role in decisions- 
making. Interviewee E3 mentioned that “the ability to make decisions” is one of the advantages 
of directing process, particularly the “centralization in decision-making” (E8). Moreover, 
interviewee E3 attributed the strength of the directing process to the “ability to evolve” and 
“the ability to urge the staff and to convince them”. Interviewee E15 supported this point and 
believes that “control of the scene” one of the most important strengths during the directing 
process.                 
4.5.2.2 Disaster Response Team Characteristics 
Responses to terrorism activities in a disaster situation are typically complex problems with 
dire consequences that must be solved in a very short amount of time to limit damage to people, 
property and environment. Interviewees E1 and E4 stated that disaster response teams must be 
precise, have experience, react quickly and react with courage. Similarly, interviewee E11 
supports this point in saying that responders: “must not hesitate and have courage in facing 
all types of accidents”.  
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Regarding the existence of experienced and efficient officers and ranks, interviewees E14 
and E16 mentioned this advantage in their responses. Interviewees E4 and E19 gave the reason 
for that efficiency as being due to “accumulated experience for the responders”, while 
interviewee E16 attributes this to “a strong military hierarchy” and “speed of response”. 
Interviewees E10, E12, E13, E15, E19, and E20 supported the latter point. Interviewee E13 
added that, with these experienced and efficient responders, there is a “quick response and good 
organisation”. On this point interviewee E15 asserts: “speed in transferring the injured, 
evacuating the victims and moving the deceased”. 
In terms of preparedness for the disaster, interviewees E4, E10 and E14 mentioned that 
responders are on standby 24/7. Based on interviewee E20’s opinion, this positive point appears 
because of the “proactive detection of a second or subsequent incident prevents further 
casualties”. Whilst interviewee E10 attributes this point to “…… proper implementation of the 
plans” which leads to “good implementation and thus good results”.  
Regarding morale during responding to a disaster, interviewee E11 argued that “morale is 
always boosted during work” and the disaster response team are “insisting on the completion 
of work in the shortest time and as efficiently as possible”. This point was also supported by 
interviewee E3 who saw this from the operative point of view: “the serious taken with regard 
to work”. Interviewee E4 adds another point related to “altruism” as one of the major Iraqi 
society aspects especially when a large-scale disaster happens.   
Interviewee E14 on the other hand, highlights as a strength that “there is an initial response 
centre that notifies all the relevant organisations as soon as possible”. Interviewee E11 also 
touched on this point in saying “the response from many of the government organisations 
when asked for support is usually good, if sometimes delayed”. The importance of this support 
during disaster response activity is of the utmost. 
4.5.2.3 Existence of Modern Machines and Equipment 
Existence and preparation of equipment that used for high-level disasters response and assist in 
their activities appeared to be the crucial factor for effective disaster response. Interviewee E14 
puts emphases on “the existence of modern machines and equipment”. Interviewees E12 and 
E19 on the other hand, highlight as a strength that speed or effectiveness of communications, 
especially light rescue mechanics. 
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Regarding the fire nozzles network, according to interviewee E13, “the existence of 
operational fire nozzles network which subjects to weekly tests and there is coordination with 
the water organisation regarding the installation, maintenance, and repairing fire nozzles 
network” are considered as one of the strengths in the directing process. 
4.5.2.4 Morale Incentives 
There is no doubt that morale incentives or morale boosts, in the form of financial incentives 
or acknowledgement letters, have a significant impact on individuals’ behaviour particularly in 
large extreme events. Interviewee E2 acknowledged “obtaining morale incentives when 
responding correctly and quickly to the disaster, especially in major accidents helps”. 
Interviewees E4, E5 and E18 agree with this point and added: “when getting the morale 
incentives from the minister or the prime minister, six months or a year will be added for the 
years of service of staff members”. These types of incentives might encourage the disaster 
response team to respond more effectively and quickly.  
The four themes of strength for the directing process have been discussed in this section. 
Various sub-themes have appeared from this discussion as illustrated in Figure 4.17. In the next 
section, a set of recommendations will be discussed in detail.  
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Figure 4.17 Strengths during the Directing Stage 
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- Existence of specific contexts to respond to the disaster  
- Proper appreciation of the position  
- Centralization in decision-making  
- Ability to evolve  
- Ability to urge the staff and to convince them  
- Speed or effectiveness of communications, especially light 
rescue mechanics  
- Existence of operational fire nozzles network  
- Obtaining moral incentives when responding correctly and 
quickly to disaster  
- When getting the moral incentives from the minister or the 
prime minister, six months or a year will be added for the years 
of service of staff members   
- Do not hesitate and have courage in facing all types of accidents 
- Existence of experienced and efficient officers and ranks   
- Accumulated experience  
- A strong military hierarchy  
- Speed of response  
- Preparedness for the disaster 
- Proactive detection of a second or subsequent incident prevents 
further casualties 
- Morale is always boosted during work  
- Insisting on the completion of work in the shortest time and as 
efficiently as possible 
- The serious taken with regard to work  
- Altruism 
- Initial response centre that notifies all the relevant organisations 
as soon as possible 
- Response from many of the government organisations when 
asked for support is usually good, if sometimes delayed 
Disaster 
Response Team 
Characteristics 
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4.5.3 Recommendations for the Directing stage    
To conduct a good evaluation for the current administrative system, and after determining the 
points of weakness and strength for the directing stage, a set of recommendations emerged from 
the responses of the interviewees. In Figure 4.18 below, different sub-themes have been 
highlighted from these recommendations.  
 
Figure 4.18 Nodes for Directing Recommendations 
 
4.5.3.1 Attention for Obligations 
In order to reduce human vulnerability, attention should be given to disaster response rules and 
principles. Such principles were emerged to address various aspects regarding disaster 
response. Interviewee E3 highlighted the importance of obligations and following the correct 
contexts and systems at work. Interviewee E11 agree with this view and asserts on the 
“adoption of the orders and instructions contained within the operations leadership curricula 
of the fire, rescue, and safety”. Moreover, interviewee E1 put emphasis on “assessing the 
situation accurately” and “estimating the resources accurately”. Interviewee E3 supports the 
latter suggestion and added the disaster responders should “rationalise the consumption of 
resources” as much as they could. Interviewee E3 also asserts the point of “daily inspection of 
the work requirements” and “giving attention to personal equipment when wearing them and 
sustain them on a regular basis”. Interviewee E11 highlighted another suggestion, stating that 
every disaster responders should “focus on the central leadership of all accidents”. Because 
such centralisation might enhance the directing process. Consequently, the chaos at the scene 
might decrease significantly.  
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4.5.3.2 Coordination with Relevant Organisations 
It is widely acknowledged that effective coordination is an essential ingredient for disaster 
response management. For this purpose, interviewees E10 and E19 recommended: “increasing 
coordination between organisations while responding to emergency situation”. Such 
coordination might needs “increase the mobilisation speed of the various relevant agencies 
in various organisations by updating and test of inter-institutional response” (E4). This 
mobilisation speed, from interviewee E19 point of view, requires continuing “conducting joint 
exercises with the relevant organisations”. Interviewees E3 on the other hand stated the need 
for “opening up to the countries or supporting organisations, which are related to respond 
to the disaster”. Interviewee E6, E22-E24 put emphasis on the necessity of “installing fires 
nozzles network in public and private places, markets, and shops” and “…..maintaining it 
regularly” as well as “removing stalls from the road's forbidden hard shoulder that hinders 
the civil defence teams work”. However, interviewee E8 proposed the idea of providing the 
buildings with the coding system because of its impact in reducing disaster response time.  
4.5.3.3 Providing Modern Technology and Equipment 
Once the major event occurs, the response is often quickly and need modern technology and 
equipment. Therefore, interviewees E3 and E14 proposed the idea of “providing the directorate 
with modern equipment and devices which keep pace with modern era”. Interviewees E15 
and E16 highlighted another suggestion, stating that they would like to see the “install of 
effective modern Security Cameras System everywhere”. However, interviewee E16 proposed 
the idea of “using GPS system” while responding to the disaster. 
4.5.3.4 Staff and Public Education and Training 
It has been reported that to meet the increasing demand caused by hazard impacts on larger 
populations, response alone is not sufficient. By sharing knowledge between communities and 
individuals, hazards and risks might be identified quickly and fast action will be taken to build 
safety and resilience, and reducing future hazard impacts. Interviewees E4, E8, E10, E16, and 
E19 agree with this view, stating the necessity of educating the public. Interviewees E8, E10 
and E19 also emphasise on the dangers of approaching the scene and citizens should not crowd 
around the scene. Interviewees E4 highlighted the importance of “……. conducting public 
educational activities” to achieve good public awareness. Interviewees E4 and E8, on the other 
hand, proposed another idea; “engaging the civil defence material with the curriculum of 
education and higher educational ministry to increase public awareness”.  
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Interviewees E3, E8, E14, and E19 went on to add a suggestion related to staff educating. 
Moreover, interviewee E3 put emphasis on “the importance of educating the staff about 
periodic maintenance of the machines and equipment”. Interviewee E8, on the other hand, 
stated the need for “increasing awareness about the importance of the security cordon from 
the concerned authorities”. However, interviewee E3 “emphasis on fitness and continuous 
exercise” and proposed the idea of “self-development for each member of staff” as well as 
“continuing training and development. Do not stop at a certain point”. Interviewee E14 
agrees with this suggestion, adding that “increasing training and doing drills, rehearsals and 
practices, especially on modern instruments and equipment” might decrease the margin of 
error in responding to the disaster.  Moreover, to enhance the directing response process 
between different organisations, “joint exercises with the relevant organisations should be 
conducted” (E19). 
From the arguments in this section, various suggestions have arisen to enhance the directing 
process. Figure 4.19 below presented a summary of the directing recommendations’ sub-
themes. In the section that follows, a discussion of the controlling stage is provided. 
4.5.4 Directing Stage Summary 
To sum up, various strengths, weaknesses and recommendations have been highlighted in this 
stage. Some of the strengths are also the weaknesses, and vice versa. The following sections 
will analyse interview responses for controlling stage. 
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Figure 4.19 Recommendations for the Directing Stage 
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Coordination 
with Relevant 
Organisations 
Attention for 
Obligations 
- The importance of obligations    
- Adoption of the orders and instructions contained within the 
operations leadership curricula of the fire, rescue, and safety 
- Assessing the situation accurately 
- Estimating the resources accurately 
- Rationalize the consumption of resources 
- Daily inspection of the work requirements 
- Giving attention to personal equipment when wearing them and 
sustain them on a regular basis 
- Focus on the central leadership of all accidents 
- Increasing coordination between organizations while responding 
to emergency situation  
-  Increasing the mobilization speed of the various relevant 
agencies in various organizations by updating and test of inter 
institutional response 
- Conducting joint exercises with the relevant organizations 
- Opening up to the countries or supporting organizations, which 
are related to respond to the disaster 
- Installing fires nozzles network in public and private places, 
markets, and shops 
- Maintaining fires nozzles network regularly 
- Removing stalls from road's forbidden hard shoulder that hinder 
the civil defence teams work 
- Providing the buildings with coding system  
- Providing the directorate with modern equipment and devices 
which keep pace with modern era 
- Install of effective modern Security Cameras System everywhere 
- Using GPS system 
- The necessity of educating the public 
- Conducting public educational activities 
- Engaging the civil defence material with the curriculum of education 
and higher educational ministry  
- The importance of educating the staff about periodic maintenance of 
the machines and equipment 
- Increasing awareness about the importance of the security cordon 
from the concerned authorities 
- Emphasis on fitness and continuous exercise 
- Self-development for each member of staff 
- Continuing training and development. Do not stop at a certain point 
- Increasing training and doing drills, rehearsals and practices, 
especially on modern instruments and equipment 
- Joint exercises with the relevant organisations should be conducted 
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4.6 Interview Analysis – Controlling Stage 
As the research looks further at the controlling stage of the civil defence administrative system, 
many sub-themes have emerged from experts’ responses. The following subsections will briefly 
discuss these sub-themes. 
4.6.1 Weaknesses during the Controlling stage    
Different weaknesses related to the controlling stage were brought up by the experts. 
Figure 4.20 showed the controlling sub-themes which will be discussed in the following 
subsections.  
 
Figure 4.20 Nodes for Controlling Weaknesses 
4.6.1.1 Lack in Modern Technology and Equipment 
To respond swiftly and efficiently to disaster resulting from terrorism, modern technology and 
equipment are crucial to act immediately. This technology might enhance the information flow 
both to and from stakeholders. So, the absence of a Security Cameras network which is 
important to watch what happened first from all directions is considered the main challenging 
facing the controlling stage (E4, E12, and E20). However, interviewee E3 raises different 
challenges: “the absence of a central alarm system”. According to interviewee E20, the 
controlling process becomes more difficult because “specialised firefighting aircraft do not 
exist” because of their role in the speed of response to incidents. As controlling aims to 
measure, maintain or improve response performance, such a lack of modern technology might 
hinder the control process to accomplish the response objectives and the devised plans to 
achieve such objectives. 
Regarding the existence of GPS system, interviewee E19 emphasised the “deactivation for the 
GPS system in rapid response to the incident”, while interviewee E7 stressed the “lack of 
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GPS system for fire vehicles”. Such lack is due to “non-participation in the satellite system 
that is used for disaster management” (E7).  
In terms of risk assessments’ equipment, interviewee E19 mention that there is a “lack of 
modern equipment for risk assessments when the event occurs”. Interviewees E16 supports 
this point and asserts on “the lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives”. This 
shortage in such important devices might lead to serious consequences, as mentioned in 
interviewee E4 response: “dual Bombings because of a security breach due to the lack of 
effective checking devices”. Interviewee E4 also criticised the “lack of a coding system for 
buildings” which might lead to increase the chaos while responding to the disaster.  
4.6.1.2 Mistakes in Decision Making 
A smooth and effective decision-making process can be very difficult, particularly in a disaster 
time, due to the dynamic environment of disasters. In this regard, interviewee E4 and E16 have 
the same opinion regarding the “failure in decision-making”. Interviewee E10 attributed these 
negative points as being about “relying on staff with little experience”. Interviewee E1 added 
other reasons such as “improvising in decision-making and implementing the resolution 
without advice”. Interviewee E11 went on to assert that there is an “emotional impact in taking 
some decisions”. This might negatively affect the control process. A clear indication is given 
by interviewee E15 that there was “weakness in the training on commanding, controlling and 
decision-making”. Such weaknesses might lead to “ineffective determination of the causes of 
accidents since evidence can be destroyed; this work needs precision and professionalism in 
conducting the investigation” (E10). This is supported by interviewee E6, E11, E22-E24, who 
highlight the “lack of adequate knowledge and expertise among the officers and staff 
members in how to deal with the central leadership at the scene” and “lack of experience in 
controlling the disaster site”. Based on interviewee E3’s responses, there is “inaccuracy in 
giving orders”. However, interviewee E20 pointed out the problem of imposing punishment on 
staff as, for example, “addressing negatives after the analysis of the incident is not effective, 
people need incentives and a focus on the positives rather than the negatives”. Conversely, 
interviewee E11 also shed light on the punishment problem, as he believes that there is 
sometimes a “lack of using the powers to punish uncommitted staff as a result of their 
negligence”. Interviewee E11 added another point of weakness by stating: sometimes there is 
“tepidity after responding to the incident for a period of time and lack of obeying received 
orders and instructions and stationing within their competence and duty”. Moreover, 
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interviewee E3 went on to assert that there is an “exaggeration in logistical supply”. This 
might lead to a waste of resources. 
4.6.1.3 Misuse of Machines, Equipment and Resources 
To keep the machines and equipment in good repair and operating safely and efficiently, 
continuous maintenance is vital, especially for machines and equipment that are used in 
responding to the disaster. According to Interviewee E12, there is a “lack of continuous 
maintenance of machines and personal equipment”. Interviewee E4 confirmed this point and 
added an “absence of periodic maintenance of the equipment and personal supplies” is 
considered one of the main weaknesses in controlling the response process. However, 
interviewee E3 also adds that “incorrect usage of devices and equipment” may lead to damage 
being caused much faster for these machines. Interviewee E6, E22-E24 pointed out that 
sometimes there is a failure in using appropriate resources in the response, which might 
worsen the situation. 
4.6.1.4 Multiple Sources for the Decision 
Undoubtedly, responding to disaster demands critical decisions that might be made in awkward 
circumstances. Despite the fact that disaster decision-making is typically posed as a series of 
dilemmas, presence more than leadership at the scene will increase the problems and cause 
the failure to obtain satisfactory results (E11). Interviewee E13 agreed with E11 that the 
“intervention of the senior leadership from other organisation” have a negative impact on 
controlling process. Interviewee E21 asserts that there is a “lack of knowledge about who is 
responsible at the scene”. Interviewee E4, agreeing with E21’s view and gave good reasons 
for this problem: “multiple sources of the decision at the scene, especially from the rest of the 
organisations” due to “the multiplicity of responsible agencies at the scene”. Interviewee E3 
supported this view and complained about “the permission to enter the security cordon is 
subject in some cases to moods”. According to interviewee E12, this problem appeared due to 
the “overlapping in the business with the rest of organisation at the scene”. However, 
interviewee E19 raises different challenges: “response delay for the relevant organisations to 
take the necessary actions in responding to the event”. Such delay might cause loss a lot of 
people lives. 
4.6.1.5 Public Education 
To reduce the vulnerabilities to any disaster, public awareness and education should be targeted 
as main priorities of any disaster management action. In interviewee E3’s opinion, there is a 
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“lack of citizen awareness of the necessity of non-interference and the crowd near the 
scene”. Interviewees E12 and E13 have the same opinion of “citizens intervention at the 
scene”. They criticise this irresponsible action because it could negatively affect the controlling 
process at the scene. Interviewee E3 on the other hand, raises a different challenge, regarding 
making room for emergency vehicles, by stating, “on the roads, there is no system to make 
room for emergency vehicles”. However, interviewee E8 raises different challenges: “false 
reporting” and “not to give the exact address when reporting”.  
4.6.1.6 Risk Assessments 
As each disaster is a unique event, it requires careful assessment. To manage the immediate 
response properly, risk assessments can be considered a vital process to reduce the underlying 
risk factors. Interviewees E3 and E4 focused on this by stating that there is “failure in 
conducting proper risk assessments and mapping”. Based on interviewee E19’s opinion, this 
problem occurred because of the “lack of modern equipment for risk assessments when the 
event occurs”. However, interviewee E6 gave a different reason for this problem: “the scale 
of the disaster is incorrectly estimated”. Interviewees E22-E24 also confirmed this point. 
4.6.1.7 Security Cordon 
By cordoning off the disaster area, the police will probably ensure that the disaster responder’s 
teams can do their job quickly and smoothly. According to interviewee E3 and E9, there is a 
failure in applying the security cordon properly and it might be applied with moods. 
Consequently, the response effort might disturb, perhaps because of citizen irresponsible 
intervention, as mentioned in section 4.3.1.1. Interviewee E3 raised another challenge, which 
is the “permission to enter the security cordon is subject in some cases to moods”. This could 
be a cause of late response to the incident. 
To sum up, seven points of weakness at the controlling stage have been extracted from 
interviewees’ transcriptions and discussed in this section. A summary of controlling 
weaknesses’ sub-themes are presented in Figure 4.21. In the section that follows, Strengths 
during the controlling stage will be debated. 
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Figure 4.21 Weaknesses during the Controlling Stage 
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- Absence of Security Cameras network   
- Absence of a central alarm system 
- Specialised firefighting aircraft do not exist 
- Deactivation for the GPS system in rapid response to the incident 
- Lack of GPS system for fire vehicles 
- Non-participation in the satellite system that is used for disaster management 
- Lack of modern equipment for risk assessments when the event occurs 
- Lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives 
- Lack of coding system for buildings 
- Presence more than leadership at the scene will increase the problems and 
causing the failure to obtain satisfactory results  
- Intervention of the senior leadership from other organisation 
- Lack of knowledge about who is responsible at the scene 
- Multiplicity of responsible agencies at the scene 
- Overlapping in the business with the rest of organization at the scene 
- Response delay for the relevant organizations to take the necessary actions 
in responding to the event 
Multiple 
Sources for 
the Decision 
Public 
Education 
- Lack of citizen awareness of the necessity of non-interference and the 
crowd near the scene 
- Citizens intervention at the scene 
- In the roads, there is no system to make room for emergency vehicles 
Mistakes in 
Decision 
Making 
- Failure in decision-making 
- Relying on staff with little experience 
- Improvising in decision-making and implementing the resolution without 
advice 
- Emotional impact in taking some decisions 
- Weakness in the training on commanding, controlling and decision-making 
- Ineffective determination of the causes of accidents 
- Lack of adequate knowledge and expertise among the officers and staff 
members in how to deal with the central leadership at the scene 
- Lack of experience in controlling the disaster site 
- Inaccuracy in giving orders 
- Addressing negatives after the analysis of the incident is not effective 
- Lack of using the powers to punish uncommitted staff as a result of their 
negligence 
- Tepidity after responding to the incident for a period of time and lack of 
obeying  received orders and instructions and stationing within their 
competence and duty 
- Exaggeration on logistical supply 
Misuse of 
Machines, 
Equipment 
and Resources 
- Lack of continuous maintenance for machines and personal equipment 
- Absence of periodic maintenance of the equipment and personal supplies 
- Incorrect usage of devices and equipment 
- Failure in using appropriate resources in the response 
Security 
Cordon 
- Failure in applying the security cordon properly and it might be applied 
with moods 
- Permission to enter the security cordon is subject in some cases to moods 
- Failure in conducting proper risk assessments and mapping 
- Lack of modern equipment for risk assessments when the event occurs 
- The scale of the disaster is incorrectly estimated 
Risk 
Assessment
s 
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4.6.2 Strengths during the Controlling Stage 
Although the controlling process has a lot of points of weakness, it also has points of strength 
as presented in Figure 4.22. In the following three subsections, the controlling strengths will be 
discussed briefly. 
 
Figure 4.22 Nodes for Controlling Strengths 
4.6.2.1 Disaster Response Team Characteristics 
Relying on experienced staff tends to be one of the most important things that support the 
control process while responding to a disaster, particularly with decision makers.  Interviewee 
E1 believes that “decision making after consultation with the rest of the staff” is considered 
a major advantage for the control process, while interviewee E15 mentioned that “relying on 
an official who has experience, personality, and decision-making ability” is vital for the 
control process. Interviewees E10, E11, and E16 agreed with this point and acknowledged the 
accumulated experience and work knowledge for the disaster responders as being critical in 
the response. 
With regard to good management and control at the scene, interviewees E3, E11, E15, E16, 
and E19 mentioned that experienced staff play a significant role in contributing to an efficient 
and effective response. Interviewee E19 stated that “there is better coordination, which is also 
faster, between the older officers and sectors’ officials within the incident area”, but at the 
same time “the experienced staff tend to have more authority to act” (E16). Further, 
interviewee E12 confirmed that “the orders are implemented strictly” due to the existence of 
“supporting laws and regulations” (E16).  
In terms of response speed, interviewees E3 and E19 believe that the speed of response is the 
first priority for the responders, in addition to the chivalry and magnanimity, which is the 
most common feature between disaster responders. On this point interviewee E19 
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acknowledged the “quick and serious response to the incident and providing the necessary 
supplies to control the incident” were contributing factors to the success of the response. 
4.6.2.2 Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure 
Effective disaster response is facilitated by using robust and well-functioning equipment to 
support affected populations. In this regard, Interviewees E3, E10 and E12 have the same 
perspective. For example, there is an “availability of materials and equipment” (E3) in 
addition to the “……..good devices and machines” (E10) as well as devices can be used to 
support “filming the scene during the control process and after suppressions” (E12).  
Interviewee E3 on the other hand, highlights as a strength that “most of the area are covered 
by civil defence centres”. Similarly, interviewees E6, E22-E24 mention, in the same context 
but in a general way that “each centre within the directorate is responsible for a specific 
geographical area. It has full knowledge of all the details of this geographical area and 
projects that are classified according to the applicable classification (A, B, C) according to the 
importance of the building or project” (see section 4.10.4). Such knowledge might offer a good 
support for controlling process. 
4.6.2.3 Feedback 
To overcome weaknesses that happened in past response to incidents, good feedback and 
assessment will probably provide the common pitfalls, mistakes, obstacles that might face 
disaster responder in future. To do so, interviewees E4, E12, and E20 assert on the analysing 
process to get the feedback. This can be seen by these responses, “convening meetings after 
each large accident for the purpose of determining weakness and strength points and getting 
the feedback”, “analysing the incident after the response to the disaster and find the positive 
and negative points in the response and trying to address the negative points”, “filming the 
scene during the control process and after suppressions in order to identify the cause of the 
accident and take advantage of it in the analysis after the incident response process”. Further, 
interviewee E20 puts emphases on the “reports submitted for any accident”, because they are 
very vital to determine the points of weakness while responding to the disaster. Interviewee 
E14 added another strength, “the existence of a ministerial form which is responsible for the 
staff evaluation”. Such evaluation might encourage them to improve their performance.  
This section has discussed the three themes of strength for the controlling process. Various sub-
themes have been revealed from this discussion as shown in Figure 4.23. The next section will 
discuss recommendations for the controlling stage. 
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Figure 4.23 Strengths during the Controlling Stage 
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- Availability of materials and equipment 
- Good devices and machines 
- Filming the scene during the control process and after suppressions 
- Most of the area are covered by civil defence centres 
- Full knowledge of all the details of this geographical area and projects   
- Decision making after consultation with the rest of the staff 
- Relying on an official who have experience, personality, and decision 
- Accumulated experience  
- Work knowledge  
- Good manageability and controlling the scene 
- There is a high coordination and fast communication between the 
oldest officer and sectors’ officials within the incident area 
- The first and last opinion to the oldest officer 
- The orders are implemented strictly 
- Supporting laws and regulations 
- The chivalry and magnanimity 
- Quick and serious response to the incident 
- Analysing process to get the feedback 
- Convening meetings after each large accident for the purpose of 
determining weakness and strength points and getting the feedback 
- Analysing the incident after the response to the disaster and find the 
positive and negative points in the response and trying to address the 
negative points 
- Filming the scene during the control process and after suppressions in 
order to identify the cause of the accident and take advantage of it in 
the analysis after the incident response process 
- Reports submitted for any accident 
- The existence of a ministerial form which is responsible for the staff 
evaluation 
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4.6.3 Recommendations for the Controlling Stage 
Having discussed what is the weaknesses and strengths in the current Disaster Response 
Administrative System, the experts has been asked to for any recommendations to improve the 
controlling process in the future in order to complete the evaluation for the current 
administrative system. In the next sections, these recommendations as showed in Figure 4.24 
will be discussed. 
 
Figure 4.24 Nodes for Controlling Recommendations 
 
4.6.3.1 Coordination with the Relevant Organisations 
To facilitate an effective response and to avoid confusion, different actors and entities should 
be operated in a coordinated and timely manner by avoiding gaps. Such gaps might be avoided 
by conducting skilful coordination among the wide range of potential stakeholders. To do such, 
interviewee E19 suggested that “higher coordination with the relevant organisations in the 
incident” is critical to avoid confusion. In terms of coordination with security authority, 
interviewee E12 proposed “activation of the role of the Yellow Ribbon (the security cordon) 
during the incident to keep the criminal evidence at the scene”. Besides that, interviewee E3 
asserted that “evacuating the streets from vehicles in case of emergency” may provide 
assistance during responding to the disaster. 
4.6.3.2 Decision-Making 
It could be argued that smooth and effective decision-making process might be crucial for 
disaster responders to provide a fast response. To do so, different recommendation were 
provided by experts to enhance the response process. For example, Interviewees E1 stated the 
need for “stopping the improvisational behaves” and “assessing the situation accurately”. 
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Moreover, despite the fact that the importance of centralization, interviewee E10 put emphasis 
on the flexibility in decision making. However, interviewee E11 proposed the idea of “stop 
holding periodic movements without staff desire because of its negative impact on the 
psychological state of them”. He also highlighted the importance of “adopting the principle of 
reward more than the principle of punishment to raise and sustain morale”. 
4.6.3.3 Modern Technology and Equipment 
It seems to be considerable attention has been given in recent years worldwide to the modern 
technology such as remote sensing satellite data as it might provide urgent assistance and useful 
information in all phases of the disaster management cycle. Further, due to the critical of the 
actions taken in the initial minutes of the disaster, modern technology and equipment might 
have a significant role while responding to the disaster. In order to gain proper controlling, 
experts stressed the importance of modern technology and equipment in their responses. 
Interviewee E2 recommended “continuing support of modern equipment”. Interviewee E6, 
E23 and E24 support this suggestion and proposed to keep up with the world development in 
the field of response to the disaster. To provide a fast and effective response, interviewees 
E2, E6, E7, E12, E15, E19, and E21-E24 are of the opinion introducing modern technologies 
in the field of rescue and firefighting for disasters. Within the same context, interviewee E19 
sheds light on “equipping with modern heavy rescue equipment”. Besides that, interviewee 
E3 asserted that “providing aircraft system that facilitates the control process” as well as 
“linking the directorate with satellite system and activate the subscription” might enhance 
the controlling process. Interviewee E7 supported this view and proposed the idea of 
“managing the disaster by signing up for satellite system”. This point was supported by 
interviewee E15, who stressed on “using GPS system in the machines used for responding to 
the disaster”. Interviewee E21 added, “invest all types of modern technology and scientific 
research in strengthening capacity to respond to disasters and risk reduction”. 
In terms of telecommunications and informatics, interviewees E6, E23, and E25 assert the point 
of developing of telecommunications and informatics in the provinces. Such development 
might be achieved through “equipping the province with modern and effective monitoring 
systems” (E15), “providing the country with Security Cameras network” (E2, E7). 
4.6.3.4 Risk Assessment 
If a hazard occurs, risk assessment could play a significant role in identifying, analysing, and 
evaluating the risk and what could happen. To foster this role, interviewee E21 assert on 
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“identifying, assessing, and monitoring all types of disaster risks, the priority of these risks 
according to its geographical distribution and strengthen the early warning equipment”. By 
doing such process, the impacts from hazards could be reduced. 
4.6.3.5 Training and Joint Exercises with the Relevant Organisations  
To ensure rapid and effective disaster response to the extreme event, the response mechanisms 
need to strengthen and develop by conducting training and joint exercises with the relevant 
organisations. Interviewee E10 confirm this point and asserted that “training and decision-
making practices” seems to be vital for controlling process. In a similar way, interviewee E19 
proposed “increasing the competent cadres and conducting joint exercises with the relevant 
organisations”. Interviewee E11 went on to add two suggestions related to “holding periodic 
seminars and meetings with all the officers and staff members in the field of controlling and 
administrating the accident site in order to teach them how to deal with orders and 
instructions” and “circulating the instructions concerning accidents management and 
control by using official documents and punish all opposes to such documents”. Interviewee 
E21 raised a new important point in terms of using “a comprehensive assessment of the risks, 
vulnerability, and the available capacity at all levels and by multi-region”. Moreover, 
interviewee E1 put emphasis on “accurate resource estimating” due to its role in the 
preservation of resources.  
To sum up, various recommendations have emerged from the discussions in this section. A 
summary of the controlling recommendations’ sub-themes is illustrated in Figure 4.25 below. 
In the next section, controlling stage summary is provided. 
 
4.6.4 Controlling Stage Summary 
In brief, it can be seen that there are different strengths, weaknesses and recommendations that 
have been highlighted in this stage. It is apparent that, in the controlling stage, some the 
strengths are also the weaknesses, and vice versa. In the next section, a summary of the 
interview analysis is provided. 
181 
 
 
Figure 4.25 Recommendations for the Controlling Stage 
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- Introducing modern technologies in the field of rescue and 
firefighting for disasters 
- Equipping with modern heavy rescue equipment 
- Providing aircraft system that facilitates the control process 
- Linking the directorate with satellite system and activate the 
subscription 
- Managing the disaster by signing up for satellite system 
- Using GPS system in the machines used for responding to the disaster 
- Invest all types of modern technology and scientific research in 
strengthening capacity to respond to disasters and risk reduction 
- Developing of telecommunications and informatics in the provinces 
- Equipping the province with modern and effective monitoring 
systems 
- Providing the country with Security Cameras network. 
- Training and decision-making practices 
- Increasing the competent cadres and conducting joint exercises with 
the relevant organisations 
- Holding periodic seminars and meetings with all the officers and staff 
members in the field of controlling  
- Circulating the instructions concerning accidents management and 
control 
- Comprehensive assessment for the risks, vulnerability, and the 
available capacity at all levels and by multi-region 
- Accurate resource estimating 
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4.7 Summary of the Interview Analysis 
Interviews about the planning, organising, directing, and controlling stages were analysed in 
greater detail after categorising every stage into the main themes: Weaknesses, Strengths, and 
Recommendations for disaster response management. Every main theme has also sub-themes, 
which have been extracted from interviewees’ responses. In the next section, the analysis of the 
importance of Disaster Response Management factors against their implementation will be 
presented. 
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4.8 Implementation of Disaster Response Management Factors 
After obtaining the elements of good practice disaster response management and categorising 
them by the four management stages from secondary data (please refer to Section 2.10 in the 
literature review and Appendix B, C), the questionnaire survey has been conducted based on 
these elements. The questionnaire survey will help the researcher to evaluate their 
implementation in addition to identifying the importance of these elements (see Appendix E for 
questionnaire) through conducting a gap analysis. The following sections move on to describe 
in detail the analysis of the importance against the implementation of these factors at the four 
management stages (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling). In this section, the gaps 
between levels of importance and implementation will be presented which further confirms the 
limited implementation of several elements of good practice disaster response management. 
Overall gaps during disaster response management in Iraq will be identified by using these 
elements.   
 
4.8.1 Implementation of Disaster Response Management Factors at the 
Planning Stage 
4.8.1.1 Analysis of the Importance of Planning Process Factors against their 
Implementation  
In the themes of the planning process, as shown in Figure 4.26, a large gap has been noticed 
between the importance of “prior planning of public shelters” and its implementation. The gap 
has been narrowed compared with the aforementioned one at “flexibility in switching to 
alternative plans”, “human settlement relocation from disaster prone areas”, “well-planned 
emergency relief supply system”, “prior planning of logistic centres”, and “government unity 
of leadership to plan as a whole” factors. However, no gap has been revealed for the 
“systematically maintaining disaster and loss inventory” factor.    
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Figure 4.26 Comparison of the Importance of Planning Process Factors against their 
Implementation at the Planning Stage 
 
4.8.1.2 Analysis of the Importance of Financial Resources Factors against their 
Implementation  
Figure 4.27 illustrates financial resources factors. It can be clearly seen from Figure 4.27 that 
“reserve funds for institutional strengthening” and “budget mobilisation” factors have a large 
gap. These two gaps are relatively equal, but at the same time, they are three times as large as 
the “budget allocation” factor gap. 
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Figure 4.27 Comparison of the Importance of Financial Resources Factors against their 
Implementation at the Planning Stage 
 
4.8.1.3 Analysis of the Importance of Supporting Ordinances Factors against their 
Implementation at Planning Stage 
It is clear from Figure 4.28, which shows the supporting ordinances factors, that the four factors 
have a similar gap.   
 
Figure 4.28 Comparison of the Importance of Supporting Ordinances Factors against their 
Implementation at the Planning Stage 
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4.8.1.4 Analysis of the Importance of Education about Disaster Risk Factors 
against their Implementation at the Planning Stage 
Regarding the factors of education about disaster risk, which is demonstrated in Figure 4.29 
below, the factor “undertaking public educational activities” has the smallest gap compared 
with the other factors. On the other hand, the factor that has the largest gap is “community 
preparedness and training”. The rest of the factors are quite similar to each other and also have 
a large gap.   
 
Figure 4.29 Comparison of the Importance of Education about Disaster Risk Factors against 
their Implementation at the Planning Stage 
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4.8.2 Implementation of Disaster Response Management Factors at the 
Organising Stage 
4.8.2.1 Analysis of the Importance of Coordination Problems Factors against their 
Implementation  
Figure 4.30 shows coordination problems factors within the organising stage. According to 
Figure 4.30, two large gaps have appeared at the “volunteer management” and “Reasonable 
organisational structure and clear awareness of responsibilities” factors. Though the gap has 
disappeared with the other two factors, “search and rescue” and “coordination between 
departments within the organisation”, the rest of the factors are quite similar to each other.    
 
 Figure 4.30 Comparison of the Importance of Coordination Problems Factors against 
their Implementation at the Organising Stage 
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4.8.2.2 Analysis of the Importance of Problem of Interplay Factors against their 
Implementation at the Organising Stage 
As highlighted in Figure 4.31 the majority of the respondents had no opinion about most of the 
factors except “community emergency response teams”, “establishing formal linkages between 
involved groups”, and “establishing informal linkages between involved groups”. Such a large 
number of ‘no opinion’ answers is due to not having the authority to conduct such 
organisational activity, such as formulating memoranda of understanding and mutual aid 
agreements as well as following protocols with agents, because this authority is limited to the 
Ministry of Interior. At the same time, the rest of the factors have a large gap also.   
 
Figure 4.31 Comparison of the Importance of Problem of Interplay Factors against their 
Implementation at the Organising Stage 
 
4.8.2.3 Analysis of the Importance of Hierarchy and Centralization Factors against 
their Implementation  
Within the theme of hierarchy and centralization, all its factors, except for “clearly defined 
goals and commitments by key stakeholders”, have a similar gap. It can be noted that the 
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excepted factor has a relatively larger gap than the gaps of the other factors. This can be seen 
clearly in Figure 4.32 below, which shows the factors of hierarchy and centralisation.  
 
Figure 4.32 Comparison of the Importance of Hierarchy and Centralization Problems Factors 
against their Implementation at the Organising Stage 
 
4.8.3 Implementation of Disaster Response Management Factors at the 
Directing Stage 
4.8.3.1 Analysis of the Importance of Command Centre Factors against their 
Implementation  
Figure 4.33 indicates to command centre factors within directing stage. There are two 
noticeable gaps at “non-EOC organisations being mobilised for emergency response” and 
“hazard monitoring and forecasting”. However, the gap has been vanished at “key officials 
being briefed” and “clear procedure of reporting and submitting information”. The rest of 
factors seem to be having a similar gap.  
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Figure 4.33 Comparison of the Importance of Command Centre Factors against their 
Implementation at the Directing Stage 
 
4.8.3.2 Analysis of the Importance of Communication Factors against their 
Implementation  
Figure 4.34 illustrates communication factors. It can be clearly seen from Figure 4.34 that 
“Providing appropriate reports for the media” and “transferring information about the disaster 
to the public from the organisation or vice versa” factors have a large gap. These two gaps are 
relatively equal, but at the same time, they are three times as large as the “emergency public 
information, Information (communication outside organisations)” and “public information and 
community participation” factors gap. Moreover, as can be seen, the two factors “effective 
communication mechanisms, communication (inside organisations)” and “information sharing 
between the various relevant agencies in various organisations” have a similar gap. 
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Figure 4.34 Comparison of the Importance of Communication Factors against their 
Implementation at the Directing Stage 
 
4.8.3.3 Analysis of the Importance of Providing the Right Relief Supplies Factors 
against their Implementation  
As shown in Figure 4.35, a large gap has been noticed between the importance of “application 
of modern logistics technology” and its implementation. The gap has been narrowed compared 
with the aforementioned one at “emergency shelter arrangements”, “effective logistics 
management”, “existing of emergency evacuation requirements”, “determination of the 
locations of emergency evacuation requirements”, and “timely and accurate relief needs 
assessment” factors. However, the small gap has been revealed for the “inventories of 
emergency resources” and “determination of the locations of emergency resources” factors. 
Few of the respondents had no opinion about the implementation of “timely and accurate relief 
needs assessment”, “the security of relief aid during distribution and transportation”, 
“application of modern logistics technology”, and “the ability to inventory and unify the 
resources available” factors. This few number of ‘no opinion’ answers is due to non-occurrence 
of these factors within their direct duties at the directorate, but within external committees 
which formed with relevant organisations. 
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 Figure 4.35  Comparison of the Importance of Providing the Right Relief Supplies 
Factors against their Implementation at the Directing Stage 
 
4.8.3.4 Analysis of the Importance of Speed of Response Factors against their 
Implementation  
Regarding the factors of speed of response, which is demonstrated in Figure 4.36 below, the 
factors “very short response time to start the emergency plan”, “the clarity of tasks and 
responsibilities”, and “evacuation” have the smallest gap compared with the other factors. On 
the other hand, the factor that has the largest gap is “the effectiveness of the financial incentives 
provided”. The rest of the factors are quite similar to each other and also have a large gap. 
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Figure 4.36 Comparison of the Importance of Speed of Response Factors against their 
Implementation at the Directing Stage 
 
 
4.8.4 Implementation of Disaster Response Management Factors at the 
Controlling Stage 
4.8.4.1 Analysis of the Importance of Evaluations Factors against their 
Implementation  
According to Figure 4.37, three small gaps have appeared at the “conducting risk assessments”, 
“statistics and feedback of loss information” and “evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the management system” factors. Though the gap has disappeared with the “effective damage 
reporting system” factor, the rest of the factors are quite similar to each other and have a large 
gap. 
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Figure 4.37 Comparison of the Importance of Evaluations Factors against their Implementation 
at the Controlling Stage 
 
4.9 Summary of the Questionnaire Survey Analysis 
Having compared the importance and implementation for good practice disaster response 
management factors through its four stages (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling), 
a gap analysis was conducted to present the gaps between levels of importance and 
implementation of these factors. Such gaps were further confirmed the limited implementation 
of several elements of good practice disaster response management. The next section will 
discuss the documents related to the current administrative system of disaster response 
management and other organisations that are related to disaster response in Iraq.  
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4.10 Document Analysis 
In order to increase the reliability and validity of the data that was obtained from interviewees’ 
responses and the questionnaire survey conducted at the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence (IGDCD), the researcher sought to find more documents from this directorate related 
to the current administrative system of disaster response management and other organisations 
that are related to disaster response in Iraq. The unpublished internal statistic, studies and 
reports, and different laws will be discussed in the following sections. Before proceeding to 
examine these documents and analysing them, it will be necessary to present them in Table 4.1  
as follows: 
 
Table 4.1 Documents Details 
No. Name Type Source 
1 Number of Killed in General Directorate of Civil 
Defence in Baghdad and the provinces while 
responding to disaster 2003–2015 
Internal Statistic IGDCD 
2 Staff Shortage Internal Statistic IGDCD 
3 Number of unfit to work (medically classified) as 
(a, b, c, does not fit) by Directorate 
Internal Statistic IGDCD 
4 Number of unfit to work (medically classified)  by 
Medical Classifications (a, b, c, does not fit) 
Internal Statistic IGDCD 
5 The law of service and retirement of the Internal 
Security Forces No. 18 of 2011 
Law IGDCD 
6 The number and status of the fire nozzles in the 
province of Baghdad in 2014 
Internal Statistic IGDCD 
7 The current, required number of civil defence 
centre per 100,000 people in the province of 
Baghdad 
Internal Statistic IGDCD 
8 The study of civil defence centres within the limits 
of the Municipality of Baghdad 
Study IGDCD 
9 Draft of national strategy for disaster management 
in Iraq 
Study IGDCD 
10 Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015 (HFA) Follow-up (HFA) IGDCD 
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Building the resilience of nations and 
communities to disasters UNISDR 
Follow-up to Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence 
2005 – 2015 
11 Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020 Study IGDCD 
12 Civil Defence Act No. 44 of 2013 Law IGDCD 
13 Civil Service Act No. 24 of 1960 amended Law IGDCD 
 
 
4.10.1 Number of Killed in the General Directorate of Civil Defence in 
Baghdad and the Provinces  
Statistics in Section 2.12.3 have shown that many Iraqi people have been affected by terrorist 
operations. In this section, statistics about the number of killed will be discussed in order to 
show one of the challenges facing the employees in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence in Baghdad and the provinces, while responding to disasters. 
While responding to the terrorist events, a lot of employees (disaster responders) from the 
General Directorate of Civil Defence in Baghdad and all Iraqi provinces were killed. This 
unsafe situation is considered a major challenge to all the employees in these directorates. It 
can be seen clearly from Figure 4.38 that more than 60 employees were killed during 2006 and 
2007. This number decreased dramatically in the following year. In 2011 and 2014 the number 
increased slightly to 26.    
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Figure 4.38 Number of Killed in the General Directorate of Civil Defence in Baghdad and the 
Provinces, while Responding to Disaster 2003–2015 (General Directorate of Civil Defence, 2016) 
 
4.10.2 Staff Shortage  
Figure 4.39 below illustrates the percentage of staff shortages, as defined from the optimal 
number to the actual number employed, in the directorates of civil defence in Baghdad and the 
Iraqi provinces. Figure 4.39 clearly shows the significant shortage in most of the Iraqi 
provinces, which has been due to the employment opportunities not being offered to all during 
the last five years. When these doors originally opened in 2003, the majority of people who 
wished to work in these areas could not apply for these jobs because of the poor security 
situation, especially in the Sunni triangle provinces in Iraq. The statistics in Figure 4.39 support 
this view through the noticeable higher shortages in these provinces: more than 50% in Al-
Anbar, Kirkuk, Salah AL-Dien, Diyala, and Ninawa, whereas the shortages are 17.5% in 
Baghdad Al-Rusafa, and Maysan and Thi Qar had a similar shortage of 20.7%. To sum up, the 
Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence, in general, is suffering from staff shortages of 
almost 40% which is considered one of the marked weakness points in this directorate. 
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Figure 4.39 Percentage of Staff Shortage in the Directorates of Civil Defence in Baghdad and the 
Iraqi Provinces (General Directorate of Civil Defence, 2016)   
 
4.10.3 Unfit to Work (Medically Classified) 
In terms of health and fitness, the regulation of the physical fitness of the Internal Security 
Forces No. 31 of 1980, that is located under the law of service and retirement of the Internal 
Security Forces No. 18 for the year 2011, categorised the staff into three classes as illustrated 
in the law section below: 
Article3: Policemen are classified into three categories in terms of health and fitness:(Iraqi 
Government, 2011, p. 214) 
First (I): First class includes: 
a) Policemen in continuous service that requires special effort and especially physical 
ability, which includes commandos, divers, and any others that require these qualities. 
b) Policemen in continuous service in the other departments within the internal security 
forces. 
Second (II): Second class includes: 
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a) Technical policemen who actually practised their trade or profession or jurisdiction in 
the internal security forces. 
b) Policemen in the other departments that do not require a high physical and 
psychological efforts, such as those in administrative and clerical work and similar 
work. 
c) Policemen in continuous service, where the special Military Medical Committee have 
deemed them, at some point during their service,  unfit to take up arms but able to do 
other jobs. 
Third (III): Third class includes: Policemen who are not fit to continue in service in the 
Internal Security Forces. 
 
Figure 4.40 Number of Unfit to Work (Medically Classified) Classifications (a, b, c, unfit) 
 
According to the statistics in Figure 4.40, the problem of employees of the General Directorate 
of Civil Defence who are unfit to work (medically classified), is concentrated in class b/ II of 
Article (3), with staff whose work does not require much physical and psychological effort. 
There were 511 employees who could not respond to any event. They could only do 
administrative and clerical work. Consequently, this adds a burden on the current administrative 
system of disaster response management in Iraq.    
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Figure 4.41 Number of Unfit to Work (Medically Classified) as (a, b, c, unfit) by Directorate 
 
As mentioned before, the problem of employees of the General Directorate of Civil defence 
who are unfit to work (medically classified) is considered a critical problem facing the current 
administrative system of disaster response management in Iraq. Due to the statistics obtained 
from the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence, there are a large number of employees who 
are categorised as unfit to work (medically classified) distributed throughout the directorates of 
Baghdad and all Iraqi cities except in the region of Kurdistan. According to Figure 4.41, the 
Baghdad (Al-Rusafa) directorate had the largest number of employees who were unfit for work 
(medically classified) (173). Moreover, the Baghdad (Al-Karkh) and Babylon directorates took 
the second and third places with 82 and 62 respectively. However, the Salah AL-Dien 
directorate had the smallest number of them (7). 
 
4.10.4 Projects Classification                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
In order to keep pace with urban growth in the country, for the distribution of civil defence 
service centres, there needs to be knowledge of a range of influencing variables on the level of 
their performance efficiencies, such as the distribution of population density, facilities, and 
service buildings. Thus, buildings and projects are classified into three categories, depending 
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on the nature of their activities, importance, and the degree of severity of its danger for people. 
Each civil defence centre serves a number of residential places as well as classified projects, as 
follows: (Urban Planning Department, 2014)  
Class A: Projects and vital installations, which include electric power plants, large factories, 
storage units, granaries, airports, ports, and the headquarters of the ministries (vital 
installations). 
Class B: This category includes service departments such as municipalities and 
communications. 
Class C: This category includes shops, pharmacies as well as housing. 
 
4.10.5 The Required Number of Civil Defence Centres in the Province of 
Baghdad 
In order to study the real situation of the civil defence centres and their distribution, then 
measuring their efficiency, the study of population growth and its distribution is required. 
According to Urban Planning Department (2014), the estimated population of 2010 is adopted 
to calculate the deficit, current and required number of civil defence centres per 100,000 people 
in the Baghdad Governorate. 
Table 4.2 The Current and Required Number of Civil Defence Centres per 100,000 People in the 
Province of Baghdad (Urban Planning Department, 2014) 
Civil defence centre building Population according to 
estimates of the 
population in 2010 The current number The required number 
per 100,000 people 
Deficit 
27 63 37 6,335,353 
 
It can be seen from Table 4.2 that 63 civil defence centre buildings will be required in the future 
if we adopt a building for every 100,000 people. Consequently, the deficit totalled 37 buildings. 
Of the current civil defence centres, there are 11 that need to be rebuilt. Moreover, some civil 
defence centres only have a small built-up area, ranging from 250-1000 m2, and 4 of them need 
to be expanded. Moreover, because the civil defence centre sites were chosen randomly, most 
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of them are located in the province of Baghdad and on roads where the speed limit drops to 30 
km / h, which reduces the speed and access of civil defence vehicles to the scene and causes 
many losses. However, only 10 buildings are located on the main roads, which is equivalent to 
approximately 37% of the current number (27). Further, there are areas on the outskirts of the 
Baghdad Municipality which have no civil defence centres. 
 
4.10.6 The Status of the Fire Nozzles in the Province of Baghdad 
It is widely acknowledged that fire nozzles are considered an important part of equipment for 
firefighting and a major weapon against fire. As the purpose of the installation of fire 
extinguishing nozzles is to provide a steady source of water to extinguish the fire, they are 
connected to the public water network. These nozzles are placed in clearly visible sites that are 
easily accessible by the civil defence teams in the case of emergency. Such nozzles serve all 
buildings and constructions in various districts of the city and it should be checked and 
maintained periodically to ensure its safety and effectiveness when required. Thus the status of 
the fire nozzles in Baghdad Governorate has been discussed in this study in order to evaluate 
the current situation for these services, in addition to civil defence centre services.  
 
Table 4.3 The Number and Status of the Fire Nozzles in the Province of Baghdad in 2014 (Urban 
Planning Department, 2014) 
Number of valid fire 
nozzles 
Number of faulty fire nozzles Total Number of Proposed fire 
nozzles 
947 603 1550 242 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3, the total number of fire nozzles in the province of Baghdad is 
about 1550 nozzles and the working ones number 947 while there are 603 faulty nozzles. This 
situation requires increasing the number of fire nozzles and repairing the faulty ones in the 
province of Baghdad.  
4.10.7 Summary of Document Analysis 
Different documents have been reviewed related to the current administrative system of disaster 
response management and response practices within the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
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Defence (IGDCD), and other organisations that are related to disaster response in Iraq. To 
increase the reliability and validity of the data that was obtained from interviewees’ responses 
and the questionnaire survey conducted at this directorate, unpublished internal statistic, reports 
and studies, and different laws were analysed and discussed in this section. The section that 
follows will provide a summary of this chapter.   
 
4.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the data analysis by using three key techniques, namely; interviews, 
questionnaire survey, and document analysis. Before presenting the discussion of each 
technique, case study back round was provided to have a general idea about the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence. The analysis of interview responses has started by categorising 
each stage as being either a weakness, strength, or recommendation for disaster response 
management. Subsequently, sub-themes were extracted from the collected data on each main 
theme. After that, implementation of good practice disaster response management factors was 
checked by conducting questionnaire survey. The gaps between levels of importance and 
implementation were presented which further confirms the limited implementation of several 
elements of good practice disaster response management. The final section in this chapter has 
examined and analysed different kinds of documents, such as unpublished internal statistic, 
reports and studies, and different laws related to the current administrative system of disaster 
response management and response practices within the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence (IGDCD). To sum up, to increase the reliability and validity of the data, the research 
was triangulated its data by using different techniques to make this study more robust. The 
findings relating to the disaster response management will be provided in the next chapter. 
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 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented the data analysis of the single case study through using a triangulation 
method between the disaster response expert interviews, questionnaire survey, and document 
analysis. This chapter discusses the findings, which emerged from the analysis of the three 
methods presented in the previous chapter, the primary data, with the data obtained from 
previous scholars, the secondary data. Therefore, the discussion takes a cross analysis approach 
to discuss weaknesses, strengths, and recommendations within the four Disaster Response 
Management stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling). Accordingly, 
this chapter is divided into three main sections, each of which presents the results relating to 
the main themes: weaknesses, strengths, and recommendations for disaster response 
management. An important finding is that some strengths were also discussed as being 
weaknesses, that is, the themes appeared in both sections. The organisation of the structure of 
the findings is similar to the interview themes and sub-themes discussed in Chapter 4 since the 
majority of the themes are extracted from the interview data.    
5.2 Weaknesses during Disaster Response Management 
This section analyses the weaknesses during disaster response management across the four 
stages of management as shown in  Table 5.1. The research study findings in these four stages 
will be presented in this section by comparing the expert interview findings with the gaps of 
implementation for Disaster Response Management factors, document analysis findings, and 
findings from the literature review. The themes below move on to describe in greater detail the 
weaknesses during disaster response management. 
 
 Table 5.1 Weaknesses during Disaster Response Management Stages 
 Planning 
stage 
Organising 
stage 
Directing 
stage 
Controlling 
stage 
Coordination between Organisations and 
Commanding the Scene 
X X X X 
Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure X X X X 
Citizens’ Irresponsible Intervention X  X  
Education on Disaster Risk X   X 
Stage 
Weaknesses 
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Traffic Jams and Closing the Roads by the Security 
Checkpoints and Concrete Barriers 
X  X  
The Security Situation X  X  
Unplanned Random Development X  X  
Lack of Staff X X   
Individual Mistakes and Mistake in Decision Making   X X 
Misuse of Machines, Equipment and Material   X X 
Security cordon   X X 
Financial Resources X    
Planning Process X    
Supporting Ordinances X    
Coordination within the Organisation  X   
Correspondence Delays and Red Tape  X   
Nepotism and Cronyism  X   
Employees' Rights  X   
Hierarchy and Centralization Problems  X   
Staff Movement and Reduction of Sections  X   
Communication and Information   X  
Frequent Blackouts for the National Electricity   X  
Morale and Financial Incentives   X  
Providing the Right Relief Supplies for People in 
Need at the Right Time 
  X  
Speed of response   X  
Risk Assessments    X 
 
5.2.1 Coordination between Organisations and Commanding the Scene 
To avoid confusion and to facilitate an effective response, skilful coordination among the wide 
range of possible stakeholders that might provide assistance during a disaster, such as utility 
companies, the military, private sector entities, and NGOs, is critical (UNISDR & UNOCHA, 
2008). The magnitude or the complexity of the needs associated with disaster response cannot 
be addressed without coordination, particularly, coordination between organisations. As inter-
organisational collaboration remains one of the main challenges (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006), 
this point appears in all four stages of Disaster Response Management in Iraq. According to the 
interview analysis in Sections 4.3.1.2, 4.4.1.1, 4.5.1.3, and 4.6.1.4, more than 80% of the 
interviewees referred to coordination between organisations as a major challenge facing the 
disaster response process. Meanwhile, the answers given to the questionnaires, which are 
analysed in Section 4.8.2.1 and Section 4.8.3.1, pinpoint four important failures in the 
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implementation of a “coordination between organisations”, “government unity of leadership to 
coordinate as a whole”, “the involvement and support of the army”, and “non-EOC 
organisations being mobilised for emergency response”. Consequently, the gaps that there are 
between these three important factors and their implementation might support the interviewees’ 
opinions. Further, documents analysis in Appendix I-Section I.2.2 also upholds this challenge. 
Committee 101 (2010), in its points of weakness, mentions that there is a “weakness of the 
mechanisms of coordination between the federal ministries and local governments on the 
subject of disaster”. Similar to the findings of the primary data, the literature which has been 
reviewed thus far, such as (Banipal, 2006; Baris, 2009; Bharosa et al., 2010; Chen, Sharman, 
Rao, et al., 2008; Greiving  et al., 2012; International Risk Governance Council, 2009; 
Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007; Meissner et al., 2002; Saeed, 2012; Terawi, 
2008; Unlu et al., 2010) tend to support the interviews’ opinions of the difficulty in coordination 
between different organisations due to intersections and overlaps that occur in responsibilities 
of such organisations.  
Based on interviewees’ opinion, cooperation from the rest of the organisation according to the 
plan was lacked. This view was upheld by questionnaire’s responders. Figure 4.26 is showed a 
gap in implementing “drawing up organisational disaster plans and integrating them with 
overall community-mass-emergency plans” factor. It seems to be due to failure in implementing 
“government unity of leadership to plan as a whole” factors. Such failure might lead to other 
problems such as overlapping in responsibilities with other organisations and intersections 
between the executive authorities. Committee 101 (2010) upheld this view, stating that, on the 
subject of disaster, there was a weakness of the mechanisms of coordination between the federal 
ministries and local governments. Similarly, Planning Department (2015) attributes this failure 
to the limited attention that has been given by organisations and institutions in terms of 
preparing disaster response plan. Moreover, conflicting mandates and overlapping jurisdictions 
due to multiple institutions might lead to a fragmented response capacity. Further, there is no 
coordinating body or focal agency to ensure an integrated response by the multiple agencies 
working on Disaster Risk Reduction in Iraq (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). Quite similar 
problem has appeared in Taiwan, according to Chen et al. (2006), the coordination mechanism 
did not develop well between the central government and local governments. Further, LeClerc 
(2015) stressed that response will not be successful if the communication and organisation 
structures set up prior to the disaster is not able to accommodate a variety of factors when 
coordinating response between multiple agencies. In the USA, only modest levels of interaction 
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across all jurisdictional levels within the network of actors identified for the Katrina response 
system (Comfort & Haase, 2006). These modest levels of interaction might happen due to not 
involving all jurisdictional levels and other agencies in the planning process which happens 
also in Taiwan. As a result, the Disaster Prevention and Response Operational Plans (DPROPs) 
become reports on bookshelves. A further result, many supporting agencies were not known 
their roles in the disaster management mechanism (Chen et al., 2006; Lindell & Perry, 2001; 
Lindell et al., 1996). Interviewees of this study also had the same point of view stating that, in 
Iraq, some organisations intervene without knowing what they are doing (refer Section 4.4.1.1). 
In the UK’s emergency response, ideas concerning co-ordination in the disaster response are 
confused. Such confusion might partly because of co-ordination by planning is not clearly 
distinguished from co-ordination by feedback, in which performance misunderstandings or 
mistakes are adjusted by means of peer-group pressure (Hills, 1994).  
Based on Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008) the coordination of emergency response is 
complicated by factors such as multi-authority and massive personal involvement; 
infrastructure interdependencies; the high demand for timely information; and conflict of 
interest. Uhr et al. (2008) support this view indicating that the complexity of the response 
operation was often due to the unclear distribution of authority in the disaster response. Such 
unclear distribution sometimes causes confusing. This view was also supported by 
interviewees’ opinion stating that due to the intervention from other organisations, there is a 
difficulty in commanding the scene. Moreover, although working partnerships were crucial to 
the immediate response and subsequent recovery (Batho et al., 1999), this might led to limit the 
authority of command at the scene, based on interviewees’ opinion. They further explained: 
presence more than leadership at the scene will increase the problems and causing the failure 
to obtain satisfactory results. In agreement, Comfort (2007) and Nolte and Boenigk (2013) 
found that most of the management problems that are highlighted by researchers and 
practitioners might be attributed to joint disaster management activities of public and non-profit 
organisations. Such joining was possibly lacked to information exchange, coordination, and 
trust. Comfort (2002) touch in this problem, stating that some organisations might not have 
linked them to a larger community-wide response process. Because of the variation of the size 
and type of organisations involved in response operations, the disparity in knowledge, skills, 
access to information, and equipment widens among the participants in the response process.  
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5.2.2 Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure 
Responses to disastrous events rely on the assets and manpower of the central and provincial 
government and with support from non-governmental agencies and international donors 
(Goodyear, 2009). According to Perry and Lindell (2003), in order to meet the disaster 
demands, resources (personnel, facilities, equipment and materials) are needed by emergency 
response organisations. Therefore, identifying the demands that a disaster would impose upon 
those organisations should be required by the planning process. The findings of the primary 
data showed that, in the context of Iraq, a large gap is present regarding the “endowment of 
equipment, tools and infrastructure” factor in Figure 4.26 and consequently affects all four 
stages of disaster response management. This point was also supported by most of the 
interviewees; many suffer from the shortage of heavy rescue equipment. They attributed that 
to the late arrival of the supporting rescue mechanics from relevant organisations. The 
secondary data upheld this view; according to Goodyear (2009), to plan for mitigate and 
respond to future disasters in Iraq, stronger technical and infrastructural capabilities are 
imperative within the Government of Iraq and other disaster risk reduction stakeholders. This 
is due to limited access to professional equipment and training by civil services institutions 
which greatly contribute to weakening disaster management systems. Humayun and Al-Abyadh 
(2014) also support this view stating that scientific equipment and human resources that are 
used to assess and monitor risk are lacked in Iraqi government departments, those are 
responsible for undertaking risk assessments and monitoring. Further, Larson et al. (2006) 
upheld this point, stating that local first-responder resources are often overwhelmed by large-
scale emergency incidents, such as acts of terrorism, human-caused accidents, and acts of 
nature.  
Regarding the civil defence infrastructure, interviewees also shed light on the scarcity of civil 
defence infrastructure. Document analysis also supported this point and this was thoroughly 
discussed in Section (4.10.5). In addition to the issues relating to the scarcity of infrastructure, 
according to Robert and Lajtha (2002), the design and functionality of the Crisis Command 
Centre (CCC) can have an important effect on the behaviour and continuing motivation of the 
Crisis Management Team member during a disaster. 
Despite the existence of a fire nozzle network, the majority of the interviewees affirm the 
scarcity of the network, especially in commercial areas, which can lead to an inefficient 
response. In agreement, document analysis in Section 4.10.6 illustrated that only 947 from the 
total number of fire nozzles in the province of Baghdad (1550) are in working order and the 
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rest are faulty, despite the fact that one participant claimed that there is some coordination with 
the water organisation regarding the installation, maintenance, and repair of the fire nozzles 
network. In fact, water organisation installed new networks, but sometimes these do not work 
properly due to weak water pressure or unsuitability of the network for vehicles’ water hoses, 
for example. Further, because of the outdated fire nozzle network maps, some of these nozzles 
are not visible – they are sometimes buried in the ground and there is a lack of awareness of 
them.      
Apropos misuse of machines, equipment and resources, interviewees stressed the lack of 
regular maintenance for machines and personal equipment, as well as incorrect usage of devices 
and equipment; in addition, sometimes resources are not used in an appropriate manner by the 
responders when attending the scene.  
5.2.3 Citizens’ Irresponsible Intervention 
Recent disasters have shown that it is difficult for policy makers to respond to citizens’ reactions 
to disasters (Pennings & Grossman, 2008). In Iraq, the culture of the community is such that 
they tend to help people during difficulties. However, the lack of knowledge and understanding 
of the people who try to help the disaster responders make it a very difficult situation, and thus 
this factor appears in two stages: the planning and the directing stages. This affects proper 
implementation of the plans (that have been previously prepared) during the disaster response 
due to the difficulty of containing the chaos during the incident. According to the interview 
analysis in Section (4.3.1.1), about 50% of the interviewees referred to the lack of Society's 
awareness as a major reason for citizens’ intervention. Meanwhile, questionnaire respondents, 
in their answers, which are analysed in Section (4.8.1.4), pinpoint two important failures in 
implementation: the “community capabilities audit”, and the “community preparedness and 
training” factors. Insufficient public training with little review as to what they learn may have 
a huge impact on their level of awareness, and, in turn, this affects their behaviour during 
disaster events. Moreover, two documents within documents analysis in Section (I.2.2) and 
(I.2.3) also upheld this challenge. Firstly,  Committee 101 (2010) in its weakness points mention 
that there is a “lack of community awareness of disaster response and risk reduction”. 
Secondly, the Planning Department (2015) assert that there are challenges in “the weakness of 
community awareness”. In agreement, within the literature review, Schneider (1992) 
considered the unpredictably of the public's response to any specific disaster as being a problem. 
Moreover, Helbing et al. (2006) stress that it is hard to coordinate many people and different 
organisations that have not collaborated before and do not know each other’s command 
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structures. Similarly, it was found that in France, there was a frequent complaint from Crisis 
Management Team (CMT) members about the explosion of irrational attitudes and behaviours 
of citizens, the media and even politicians. If they had a sounder grasp of the symbolic or even 
sacred aspects underlying many crisis situations and had received appropriate training, they 
might respond differently, or at least with greater understanding (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). 
Likewise, in Turkey, Baris (2009), points out that poor awareness and lack of action of 
population and institutions resulted in the lack of knowledge of modern disaster risk factors. 
According to Patterson, Weil, and Patel (2010), the weaknesses and strengths of the community 
should be taken into account because not every community is equal and not all communities 
are helpful. Communities might play a role that is harmful to their members or to society 
overall. For instance, “community cohesion in disaster response may encourage members to 
remain in vulnerable locations because they have a false sense of security or desire to maintain 
community solidarity. Certain shared practices, beliefs, etc, may lead communities & their 
members to act in ways that make them more vulnerable”. On the contrary, in western societies, 
citizens often act rationally in disaster situations as they do in everyday life to save most of the 
victims by providing the initial aid or materials to help (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). In 
agreement, Patterson et al. (2010) added that cooperative behaviour and teamwork that 
government lacks can be urged by well-functioning public organisations that have the trust of 
their members. They further have strong abilities to assess needs and allocate services and 
goods equitably and efficiently. Accordingly, including communities in disaster response and 
making meaningful partnerships between publics and government agencies is important.  
On the other hand, some interviewees attributed citizens’ intervention to the security breach 
and to the failure in imposing a security cordon properly (refer Section 4.3.1.1 and Section 
4.5.1.1). Similarly, in the UK, cordon access was a problem on the day of the blast of 
Manchester city centre's bombing in 1996, and afterwards, since some people disregarded the 
cordon. A few people were still in the area nearby to the bomb when it exploded, and some of 
these were severely injured, even police toured the area in vehicles and used a helicopter to 
inform people to evacuate the city centre. However, the appropriate authority resolved this 
situation by imposing strict controls for those who wanted to enter (Batho et al., 1999). 
Moreover, based on interviewees’ opinion, due to the poor security situation in Iraq, additional 
problems might happen through such irresponsible intervention or citizens gathering around the 
scene. As this behaviour can be exploited by suicide bombers, the number of losses for such an 
incident will potentially increase. At the same time, this behaviour might hinder the responders 
in their work. 
211 
 
5.2.4 Education on Disaster Risk 
Disaster education is now accepted as an essential component in formulating the proper disaster 
risk reduction strategies for any country. An opportunity to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities 
risks of various social groups can be obtained by adapting proper application of technical and 
scientific knowledge on disasters (Shaw, Mallick, & Takeuchi, 2011). According to the primary 
data findings, this theme appears in two stages of the disaster response management cycle: the 
planning and the controlling stages. According to interviewees’ point of view, because the 
material of civil defence is not covered in the curriculum as in the past, public education is 
considered one of the common challenges during the planning stage. Consequently, this 
challenge might cause problems for the planners and the responders, in that the public remain 
uneducated as to the best way to respond. Questionnaire respondents partially agree with this 
aforementioned view, although their answers about factors “undertaking public educational 
activities”, “involvement, education and review” have a smaller gap (between importance and 
implementation) compared with the other factors. This may be because of the public educational 
activities only being limited to employees in particular organisations and students in secondary 
schools and higher education, so the questionnaire respondents partially agreed with the 
interviewees. Committee 101 (2010) within document analysis supported this challenge stating 
that there is a “weakness in capabilities at all levels particularly in local communities”. This 
point was also supported by Planning Department (2015) who sees this from the operative point 
of view “non-inclusion of all society segments in capacity building”. Similarly in secondary 
data, in Turkey, one of many problems in organising a proper disaster management and 
response system are the absence of an organised educational program for the general public 
(Baris, 2009). Whilst in the Caribbean, training materials, in most cases, were focused on 
prevention and response to the hazardous event with little or no focus on vulnerability 
(Ferdinand et al., 2012).   
In the case of staff education, several interviewees had suffered due to the lack of internal and 
external courses and practices, particularly those specialised courses in the field of planning are 
very rare as well as exercising the national plan to respond to the disaster. These weaknesses 
are upheld from questionnaire’s responders in Section (4.8.1.4.). It can be seen in Figure 4.29 
that most of the factors have a large gap indicating that the staff have insufficient training and 
knowledge in different aspects, such as disaster drills, simulations, updating and testing of the 
inter-institutional response. However, according to Committee 101 (2010), lack of training on 
contingency plans in a large number of important facilities are one of the problems which are 
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raised in document analysis. Moreover, the majority of Iraqi provinces shown in Table I.1 
required an urgent need for more training and development, more technical knowledge and 
skills of planning, and exercise for better preparedness and response (Committee 101, 2010, pp. 
7-8). Similarly, Planning Department (2015) have the same point of view and supports these 
weaknesses by stating “the need for human and material capacity building”. In agreement, 
Goodyear (2009) limited training greatly contributed to weakening disaster management 
systems in Iraq. May et al. (2015) support these views stating that in the preparation for major 
incidents, insufficient staff training has been identified as a problem because education and 
training have been accepted as cornerstones of an effective disaster response. Moreover, 
conceptual gaps have emerged from disaster situations that happened over the last decade 
related to teaching staff, including senior managers, how to identify and make effective 
decisions under conditions of stress and in the absence of sufficient time, resources, and 
information? Further, due to the rapid change in the landscape of disaster management in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms, traditional disaster management training methods are 
proving to be inadequate and ineffective. Consequently, a new approach to disaster 
management is required (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). 
In terms of disasters drills, interviewees and questionnaire’s respondents have a similar point 
of view that appears in the large gap for the factor “disaster drills, rehearsals and simulations”. 
This point acquired a good support from Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) stated that 
unfortunately, community drills may occur rarely, may not check the plan and the participants 
effectively, and may create a misplaced sense of security. In agreement, Madry (2015) stressed 
that standardised training is important and it is a vital component in the use of any equipment 
or technology. However other interviewees raise an important challenge “weakness of 
schematic awareness and experience of associate members and leaders”.Perry and Lindell 
(2003) agree with this view, stating that a general lack of awareness on planning for natural and 
technological disasters on the part of law-enforcement officials, elected officials, and policy 
actors who direct much of the terrorism plan construction. Further, Desforges and Waeckerle 
(1991) stress on experience, because it is a key element in the success of a response. 
Putting many barriers in front of ambitious staff to complete their studies or attending courses 
outside the country is considered one of the major problems that are appeared in interviewees’ 
responses. This view was also supported by questionnaire respondents in their answer about 
“developing techniques for knowledge transfer” and how the gap is large. Further, based on 
interviewees’ opinion, the lack of citizens’ awareness with respect to the Civil Defence is 
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also another problem facing planning process. According to questionnaire respondents’ answers 
shown in Figure 4.29, although the gap of “undertaking public educational activities” factor 
was small, the gap of “community capabilities audit” factor was much larger than the latter one. 
This might give a good reason for this lack. Moreover, despite school students, employees in 
organisations and projects have training on the acts of the civil defence (Planning Department, 
2015), such training did not cover all society segment. Further, Due to Emergency Management 
Australia (2004) opinion, if response plans and programs are well prepared, the community’s 
ability can cope with the impact of emergencies. 
5.2.5 Difficulties in Reaching the Disaster Scene 
It is widely acknowledged that one of the main problems facing teams of disaster responders in 
Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, is traffic jams. This was highlighted in two of the four stages 
of disaster response management (planning and directing). The reasons behind this problem are 
certainly having too many vehicles in spite of there being few efficient roads. Moreover, the 
limited number of public transportation compared to private ones adds to the problem. 
According to interviewees’ opinion, undoubtedly, the defect in urban planning, road 
maintenance, and security blocks are considered the major causes of traffic jams in Iraq. 
Moreover, the multitude of concrete barriers and security checkpoints can impede the fire 
engines and the responder teams to reach the scene smoothly and quickly. The interviewees are 
also of the opinion that the lack of coordination with services and security agencies is a vital 
factor causing this problem. This view was also supported by the questionnaire data in Section 
(4.8.2.1). 
5.2.6 Security Situation 
According to interviewee opinion, because of a security breach due to the lack of effective 
checking devices, dual or sequential bombings were increased significantly. Such increase 
leads to a dramatic rise in casualties between responders’ team as illustrated in Figure 4.38 
within document analysis, and the rest of the people as showed in Figure 2.17 in Section 
(2.12.3). Moreover, based on interviewees’ opinion due to the absence of security sense and 
the lack of seriousness of the local police in exclusion the citizens from risk sites, there is a 
lack of knowledge about the explosion implementers and the time and place of the 
explosion. This absence of security sense and knowledge can cause many losses. Planning 
Department (2015) agree with the aforementioned view, stating that the weakness of the 
security and political stability is a major challenge facing Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence. Similarly, Committee 101 (2010) supported this view, arguing that terrorism and 
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security risks are one of its challenges and it might lead to another challenge which is the 
presence of large numbers of displaced people and refugees may continue for some time to 
come. Such large numbers of displaced people and refugees overwhelmed the helping capacity 
of the government in general and the civil defence directorate in particular. Questionnaire’s 
respondents agree with this important problem. This agreement is according to large gaps in 
implementing “human settlement relocation from disaster prone areas” and “prior planning of 
logistic centres” factors which appeared in Figure 4.26 indicating that the disaster responders’ 
ability to help people after evacuation is limited.  
5.2.7 Unplanned Random Development 
One of the major problems that hinder the response process is the unplanned random 
development of roads, buildings, wiring, storage facilities and so on. Since 2003, there have 
been many unplanned random developments in Iraq. The primary data shows that the majority 
of the interviewees stressed the poor urban planning such as random housing, factories, and 
shops. Cavdur, Kose-Kucuk, and Sebatli (2016) support this view stating that the unwanted 
effects of disasters all around the world have been increased due to the increase in infrastructure 
complexities, populations, combined with the fast and unplanned urbanisation. Document 
analysis has also confirmed this point in Section (I.1).  concluded that “overrun many of the 
popular markets on roads forbidden hard shoulders leads to closing the main streets completely 
and this is what affects the smooth flow of traffic and lack of access of civil defence teams to 
the accident place at the right time” and “the proliferation of street vendors (Ganabr and 
Albesttiyat), most of which are flammable, which caused the expansion of the fire and spread 
to other places”. Consequently, based on interviewees’ opinions, new challenge “lack of 
passable roads to reach the scene” has been generated as a result of the aforementioned 
problem. However, “random storage of materials” was also another challenge facing planning 
process. Moreover, the problem of programmed cutting off for national electricity has also 
a good space in interviews and document analysis. According to interviewees’ opinion, 
although there is programmed cutting off for National Electricity, sometimes there is a deficit 
in electricity feeding reaches to 2 hours a day. To cover this deficit two other problems will be 
generated. Firstly, illegal excesses on the national electricity grid. Secondly, random wiring 
for Simi-Generic Generator has appeared. Urban Planning Department (2014) confirm these 
challenges, stating that connecting electric wires randomly, that leads to increase loads on the 
national electricity grid in addition to the formation of spider grid of electric wires, which were 
the cause of the fires get and spread, especially in the popular markets and reliance on private 
215 
 
generators that is not committed to the safety and security conditions. The scattering quantities 
of fuel and oils have been observed near these generators and not to be stored regularly and that 
was the cause of the fires get. This situation leads to the recurrence of fire accidents in popular 
markets and residential areas. From this argument, it is apparent that the obstructions and risks 
for responders’ teams and fire engines are huge. In the USA and Canada, 50 million people 
were left without electricity for around 48 hours because of the largest blackout that probably 
ever occurred in 2003 in north-eastern areas of North America. Despite this relatively short 
period of time, the blackout caused chaos in many aspects of modern life, such as the water 
supply, traffic systems, petrol stations, radio and TV stations, and mobile phone networks. 
Consequently, this situation limited the ability to inform the public about the problems and there 
was a lack of communication generally (Helbing et al., 2006). Considering the situation in Iraq, 
in terms of the length of time without power, it is unsurprising that there are problems of 
communication and the efficient running of everyday life. 
5.2.8 Lack of Staff 
Adequate staffing is one of the general requirements of any organisation, and particularly 
disaster response organisations. Goodyear (2009) asserts that the assistance and manpower of 
the central and provincial government is a critical aspect when responding to catastrophic 
events. In agreement, Emanuele et al. (2009) stress the importance of replacing people, 
machinery and technologies so that, if one stops working for any reason, it can be rapidly 
substituted by another. According to the findings of primary data, twenty of the twenty-eight 
interviewees talked about the lack of staff compared to the staffing of the official 
organisational structure, meaning that there are gaps in the structure and this can cause 
serious problems. There are 40% fewer staff in reality, compared with the official staff 
requirement as described in the organisational structure of the general directorate of civil 
defence 2009, shown in Appendix J. Interviewees also discussed different reasons for this 
shortage, such as a lack of recruitment of new staff, delays in authorising the updated official 
organisational structure, ill-considered decisions, and the existence of the elderly and disabled 
employees who are unfit to work (as shown in Section 4.3.1.6). Interviewees further mentioned 
the consequences due to this shortage as explained in Section 4.4.1.7. The internal statistics 
showed in Section 4.10.3 within the document analysis also confirm these views. Another 
problem is that the General Directorate of Civil Defence are still referring to the old official 
organisational structure from 2009 (as shown in Appendix J), which whilst it has been updated 
several times, it is yet to be authorised for use from the key official in the Ministry of Interior, 
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due to correspondence delays and red tape. In agreement, Iraqi civil services institutions 
declared that their disaster response capacity is impeded by primary constraints such as fiscal 
resources and manpower (Goodyear, 2009). Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) also support this 
view stating that scientific equipment and human resources that are used to assess and monitor 
risk are lacked in Iraqi government departments, those are responsible for undertaking risk 
assessments and monitoring. The specific agency in Taiwan, Disaster Prevention and Response 
Committees (DPRCM), is further suffered from the same point. It does not have a full-time 
staff due to budget limitations in both central and local governments. Such limitation certainly 
lead to difficulty in hire additional staff (Chen et al., 2006).   
According to interviewees’ opinion, lack of specialised staff is an important problem facing 
planning process. Interviewees are in the opinion that civil engineering, organisation and 
statistics field needs more specialists. However, other interviewees prefer to mention again the 
medically classified problem, which has been discussed in section 4.10.3. 
5.2.9 Individual Mistakes and Mistake in Decision Making 
Decision-making can be seen as a problem-solving activity terminated by a solution considered 
to be satisfactory. Thus, it is a process of choice that can be rational or irrational and can be 
based on implicit or explicit assumptions (Platt, 2015). Because disaster demands critical 
decisions that must be made in difficult conditions (Platt, 2015), decision making is considered 
a critical component of any disaster response (Platt, 2015; Torma-Krajewski & Powers, 2010). 
Therefore, the success of that response is dependent upon effective decisions being made in a 
timely manner (Torma-Krajewski & Powers, 2010). This theme appeared in directing and 
controlling stages. According to interviewees’ opinion, failure in decision-making might 
happen due to different reason, for example, individual mistakes, misplaced judgement, lack of 
flexibility, tasks overlapped, weakness in the training on commanding, controlling and 
decision-making, relying on staff with little experience, failing to secure the site before the 
intervention of civil defence teams, and false reporting or fictitious accidents.  
Apropos misplaced judgement, interviewees in the opinion that individual mistakes and 
misplaced judgement might happen while responding to a disaster. In agreement, Desforges 
and Waeckerle (1991) stress that response to disasters might be plagued by different recurring 
problems such as errors in judgment. Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) added although 
experienced and knowledgeable leaders make sound decisions when faced with difficult or 
unexpected problems, mistakes in judgment, especially those committed early, will be 
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magnified quickly as the response proceeds. According to Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (2015), there are common reasons behind the failure of organisations in learning from 
and even repeat mistakes and errors, namely, failure of leadership, failure of communications, 
failure to plan, lack of ethics and resource conflicts. Goodyear (2009) support this view stating 
that decision- makers’ inability to reconcile competing demands for resources may cause 
humanitarian disasters in Iraq. Further, although perceived risk by community or individual has 
been thought to be a major element of decision-making (Patterson et al., 2010), planners’ 
inability to anticipate potential hazards and to appreciate their significance may also cause 
humanitarian disasters (Goodyear, 2009). 
With respect to tasks overlapping, according to Uhr et al. (2008), a ‘blurriness’ appeared when 
responding to the flood situation in southern Sweden in 2004. Such vagueness might due to 
different ways of interpretation for various staff functions roles, partly as providing decision 
backing, partly as exercising a decision role, and partly as something in between. In Iraq also 
both interviewees and questionnaire’s respondents agree with this view, as can clearly see the 
gap for implementing “the clarity of tasks and responsibilities” factor in Figure 4.36.  
Regarding training on commanding, controlling and decision-making, based on 
interviewees’ opinion, there is a weakness in this aspect. Such negative point might lead to 
relying on staff with little experience or sometimes causes failure in controlling the disaster 
site. Addressing negatives as well could be affected negatively through using the powers only 
to punish staff instead of using incentives to motivate them. These views were also supported 
by questionnaire’s respondents in their answers about “properly exercising decision-making”, 
and “competencies of managers and team members” factors and how the gaps are large in 
Figure 4.32. Robert and Lajtha (2002) confirm this view stating that conceptual gaps have been 
emerged from disaster situations that happened over the last decade related to teaching staff, 
including senior managers, how to identify and make effective decisions under conditions of 
stress and in the absence of sufficient time, resources, and information.  
In terms of improvisation in decision-making, during response operation, improvisation in 
directing decisions and initiatives were taken by officers on the accident scene, in Sweden, 
without negotiation with other officials might cause diverge from existing plans (Uhr et al., 
2008). Few interviewees confirm this view and criticised the negative point of improvising in 
decision-making and implementing the resolution without advice. This view was also supported 
by questionnaire respondents in their answers about “effective consultation with key 
stakeholders and target beneficiaries” and how the gap is large in Figure 4.32 indicating that 
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consultation with key stakeholders is limited. In spite of the above view, few interviewees stated 
that there was not enough flexibility in decision-making. Questionnaire’s respondents have also 
upheld this view through the large gap in implementing “flexibility of decision making” factor 
which has been appeared in Figure 4.32. 
With reference to random and imprecise information, this is a problem because the decision-
makers do not have sufficient knowledge regarding the timing, resource needs and scope of the 
disaster event and this can slow the response and cause inefficiency in the disaster relief plans, 
indeed, (Barbarosoğlu & Arda, 2004) describe this as “a complex stochastic decision problem”. 
Similarly, in Iraq, interviewees added that false reporting or fictitious accidents are considered 
a problem that can plague responders since the information is not accurate. 
5.2.10 Misuse of Machines, Equipment and Material 
After the training of disaster responder, it almost absolutely that the tools they use must work, 
as needed, each and every time, and that the staff can learn to operate them effectively (Madry, 
2015). In agreement with this view, interviewees, in both directing and controlling stages, 
criticised kind of maintenance they obtained when maintaining their machines and personal 
equipment. Relying on only remedial maintenance (maintenance that is performed after a fault 
in order to correct that fault (Oxford University Press, 2004) instead of preventive maintenance 
(maintenance performed on a regular basis, and intended to prevent failures or to detect 
incipient failures) (Oxford University Press, 2004) might cause rapid deterioration of these 
machines. Consequently, huge operational problems probably happened to the disaster 
responder team at the scene. In addition to maintenance, not updating the equipment was also 
found as a negative point by interviewees.   
5.2.11 Security cordon 
By establishing a security cordon, disaster responders can be protected from danger. According 
to the College of Policing (2016), there are two types of cordons: an inner cordon and outer 
cordon. “The inner cordon encloses the scene of an incident and contains any area of hazard or 
contamination. The size of the inner cordon is determined by the incident. The outer cordon 
creates a safe working area for the emergency services and responding agencies. The radius of 
the cordoned area depends on the type and scope of the incident, the availability of resources 
and the needs of the community. The tactical commander determines this in consultation with 
other emergency services”. In the context of Iraq, based on interviewees’ opinion, there is often 
a failure in imposing a proper security cordon. Interviewees tried to give some reasons for this 
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failure, for instance, it could be attributed to adapting incorrect techniques in imposing the 
cordon in the first place, or having unclear cordon access authorisation, or the lack of expertise 
by local police in maintaining the cordon. This view was upheld by the questionnaire 
respondents. Figure 4.36 shows the gaps in implementing the “existence of the cordon” and 
“cordon access authorisation” factors. Such gaps further confirm the failure in applying this 
important cordon and adopting unsuitable procedures to access it by disaster responders. In 
agreement, some scholars see controlling the exclusion zone as being critical. According to 
Batho et al. (1999), to prevent further injury, physical danger or looting, controlling the 
exclusion zone is considered a critical process. On the day of the bomb blast in Manchester in 
1996, and in the days after, there was a problem in ensuring access for those people who needed 
to get through the cordons, while keeping out any who did not require access. On the day of the 
blast, for example, getting through the barriers of the outer cordon was deemed as one of the 
difficulties faced by both emergency planners and building surveyors trying to travel into the 
city centre. In the days following the bomb, getting appropriate access for specific people past 
the inner cordon, while preventing access by members of the public was also a problem, as 
people still wanted to carry on as normal, even when they realised there was a bomb, and so 
maintaining the inner cordon once it had been established was extremely difficult (Batho et al., 
1999).  
5.2.12 Financial Resources 
In Iraq, responses to disastrous calamities rely on the manpower and assets of the central and 
provincial government and with assistance from non-governmental agencies and international 
donors (Goodyear, 2009). In the USA, to effectively support emergency planning, the United 
States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) allocates substantial funds, 
particularly to product civil defence plans to counter possible nuclear attack, for example 
(Handmer & Parker, 1991). In comparison, in Iraq, from the interviewees’ point of view of the 
planning stage, although financial support is very important in planning for an adequate 
response process, the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence suffer from limited 
possibilities and budget restrictions. This happens because of the failure in Budget allocation 
and mobilisation. Questionnaire respondents upheld this point, based on the large gaps that 
appear in Figure 4.27; particularly the gaps related to “reserve funds for institutional 
strengthening” and “budget mobilisation” factors; this further confirms the lack of allocating 
and mobilising funds as being a weakness. This view was also supported by document analysis. 
According to Planning Department (2015), there is a need for the material capacity building as 
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well as a need to allocate the budgets for disaster management. This requirement is due to an 
increase in the financial resources necessary for the implementation of risk reduction program. 
In agreement, Iraqi civil services institutions declared that their disaster response capacity is 
impeded by primary constraints such as fiscal resources and manpower (Goodyear, 2009). 
Similarly, in the literature review, Taiwan local government did not have enough budgets to 
perform all four phases of disaster management (Chen et al., 2006). While in Turkey, strong 
financial resources are needed to agencies responsible for DRR (disaster risk reduction) 
activities. Such resources become inadequate when distributed among several units (Baris, 
2009). Whilst in the USA, a major obstacle that was hampered emergency responders was their 
funding. Such funding was stalled and side-tracked due to three reasons: the slow distribution 
of funds by federal agencies, a politicised appropriations process, and bureaucratic red tape at 
all levels of government. In the Caribbean, the financial resources for community based disaster 
organisations and training programmes was lacked. This lack therefore, is considered as a main 
challenge for such organisations (Ferdinand et al., 2012). 
In terms of emergency budget, some of the interviewees believe that financial process is 
hampered by allocating authorization and limiting the choices made in emergency 
allocations. The aforementioned view is upheld by the findings of the document analysis in 
Section (I.3). According to Planning Department (2015), the presence of red tape and a large 
number of committees is considered a major challenge to fund allocating process. Further, due 
to the lack of emergency allocations, it does not ensure except relatively little resources as a 
treatment and a preliminary intervention. On the other hand, interviewees have many challenges 
regarding employees’ allowances such as overtime and transportation allowances, risk 
allowances. Such challenges might deter staff performance during responding to disaster. 
5.2.13 Planning Process 
Ongoing terrorist attacks worldwide are likely to sustain attention to disaster planning, mainly 
in the Middle East countries (Perry & Lindell, 2003). Further, due to such attacks on urban 
areas, disaster planning responses to human-made disasters is a growing area of serious debate 
within the field of urban management (Batho et al., 1999). In Iraq, based on interviewees’ 
opinion that appears in the planning stage, there is an ignorance of the importance of 
planning. Such ignorance also appeared in the questionnaire respondents’ answers, shown in 
Figure 4.26, due to the gap of “level of prior planning”, “existence of an evacuation plan”, and 
“flexibility in switching to alternative plans” factors, which indicate the limited attention to 
planning. According to Planning Department (2015), since the concept of disaster 
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management is a new idea, it needs a political support to include it in future programs and 
plans. For this reason, such ignorance might appear. Similar problems have arisen in the US 
within the context of creating plans for terrorist incidents; the assertion of the existence of a 
plan as a document rather than an assertion on the planning procedure brings positive outcomes 
for the threat (Jenkins, 2001; Smithson & Levy, 2000) cited in (Perry & Lindell, 2003, p. 336). 
According to Barenbaum (N.D.), many organisations fall prey to numerous unexpected 
problem areas along the way, despite spending hundreds of hours into plan development. Often, 
the plan is ineffective or worse yet, improperly executed. In agreement and in the case of plan 
implementation, due to some interviewees’ opinions, the plans are not implemented strictly. 
This was confirmed by questionnaire’s responders’ answers in Figure 4.26. It can be seen 
clearly that the majority of the planning process factors have a large gap. The document analysis 
is also in the opinion that there is a lack of contingency plans in a large number of important 
facilities, which is designed according to standardised criteria, and training on it. Further, there 
is a weakness in contingency planning for disaster risk reduction in projects of development 
plans and regional development projects (Committee 101, 2010). Moreover, According to Uhr 
et al. (2008) both the literature and empirical findings indicate that sometimes response 
operations diverge from existing plans when adapting to an event and its consequences. As the 
fact that the response to Sweden collapsed in 2005 did not follow fixed plans or procedures 
which are criticised by an officer who participated in the response operation. Majchrzak et al. 
(2007) support this view stating that in the immediate aftermath of catastrophic events, the 
government disaster response plans for organised and timely response broke down in 
unexpected ways and failed to meet the urgent needs of those affected. From interviewees’ 
point of view, sometimes the plans are unenforceable and cause confusion. This might be 
due to the lack of understanding of what has been planned. As a result, there is a weakness 
in the implementation of the plan. Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) confirm this point, stating 
that poor understanding of the response plan is a recurring problem that plague response to 
disasters. This view was also supported by Committee 101 (2010) stressed on the weakness in 
contingency planning for disaster risk reduction in projects of development plans and regional 
development projects. Hills (1994, p. 71) on the other hand, criticised the emergency planning 
in the UK stating that it suffers from a lack of precision in some of its fundamental concepts, 
and has clichés that need to be eliminated. However, the unique character of each disaster and 
the poor understanding of the response plan are considered two of the recurring problems that 
plague response to disasters (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991). Moreover, Kovel (2000) describe 
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the difficulty of disaster response planning as an incomplete puzzle with no guidelines on how 
to place them together even its pieces were present.  
As regards planning for public shelters, several interviewees shed light on this problem. 
Similarly, a clear indication was given in Figure 4.26 by questionnaire’s responders when the 
largest gap has been noticed between the importance of “prior planning of public shelters” and 
its implementation. Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) support this view stating that in order to 
anticipate needs correctly, the numerous problems a disaster poses must be first identified by 
the disaster response planners. Further, to meet the numerous needs created by disruption of 
services and major property damage, a comprehensive strategy is required by the disaster 
response planners. 
Regarding early warning systems, despite the completion of the first stage of the early warning 
systems in all Iraqi city centres, interviewees and questionnaire respondents were agreed that 
this presents as a weakness. Committee 101 (2010), as shown in the document analysis in 
Section (I.2), also concurred with this point. Similarly, Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) argue 
that the provisions for adequate early warning systems are lacking in Iraq’s existing DRR 
framework. Goodyear (2009) argues that this is partly due to the lack of synergy between the 
National Development Strategy and the National Disaster Management Plan, which causes 
there to be a lack of proactive preparedness and mitigation, including the early warning systems. 
Goodyear (2009) also points to the problems of cooperation and collaboration between disaster 
management stakeholders, causing emergency response mechanisms to be flawed. 
In terms of duties, a clear indication given by interviewees about overlapping duties, which 
are not previously prepared within the work schedule and it might become emergency duties. 
In agreement, Handmer and Parker (1991) stressed that one of the problems of disaster planning 
is that goals set by central government may not appeal to those responsible for their 
implementation. Uhr et al. (2008) added that the roles of the various staff functions, during 
Sweden collapsed in 2005, were interpreted in differing ways, partly as exercising a decision 
function, partly as providing decision support and partly as something in between. This 
blurriness was also demonstrated in the response to the flood situation in southern Sweden in 
2004. From interviewees’ point of view, there was a weakness in response to disaster due to 
different capabilities and competencies and the extent of knowledge of the tasks and actions in 
responding to a disaster. This view is supported by Saeed (2012, pp. 3-4) who explained that 
due to the dynamic situation in a disaster, new activities (which have not occurred before) may 
be required apart from those already planned. So new plans have to be made and incorporated 
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with old plans and plans of other organisations. Terawi (2008) agreed with interviewees’ view 
and added the most important obstacles facing crisis management are humanitarian challenges, 
organisational challenges, and challenges related to information and communication. Eight 
challenges are related to humanitarian challenges, as listed below:  
a) Staff psychological and social side is not considered. 
b) Deficiencies in the understanding of the vulnerabilities related to the crisis, trends and 
objectives. 
c) Not taking into account individual and cultural differences between employees. 
d) Not to verify the accuracy and reliability of data and information by the employees. 
e) Not to do the capacity development and employees’ preparations to endure pressure. 
f) Failure in understanding employees’ roles during the crisis and beyond. 
g) Weak employees interest to efforts made by decision-makers about crisis management. 
h) The appropriate academic qualifications are lacked from crises team. 
 
However, several interviewees believe that responding to disaster from other organisations 
was time-consuming and weak. Planning Department (2015) confirm this point and attribute 
this to a limited attention by organisations and institutions in terms of preparing disaster 
response plan. However, Goodyear (2009) attribute the weakness in disaster management 
systems in Iraq to the absence of a central authority assigned to create a strategic plan among 
all participants, including non-governmental organisations and civil society also. Similarly, a 
clear indication was given in Figure 4.26 by questionnaire’s respondents when a large gap has 
been noticed between the importance of “government unity of leadership to plan as a whole” 
and its implementation. Further, According to LeClerc (2015), despite putting plans by all 
agencies, they are not always coordinated properly. Further, the response plans that were 
previously developed by response agencies might forget to utilise when a disaster first occurs 
because these response agencies become focused on the immediate problems in front of them. 
Or some organisations might not have emergency plans (Comfort, 2002). Robert and Lajtha 
(2002) confirm this view stating that the vast majority of emergency response plans remain 
unknown to key persons who are likely to become involved with the disaster response. 
Regarding terrorist attacks planning, due to the involvement of different kinds of organisations 
that may not normally deal with one another (Desforges & Waeckerle, 1991) and because of 
working partnerships are crucial to the immediate response and subsequent recovery (Batho et 
al., 1999), an inter-organisational testing process is complicated (Desforges & Waeckerle, 
1991). 
224 
 
Apropos flexibility in planning processes, based on Uhr et al. (2008) opinion, a complex and 
dynamic environment can call for certain flexibility in plans, organisation, and procedures. This 
point is overlooked in the planning processes and in bureaucratic structures. Questionnaire 
respondents confirm this view, shown in Figure 4.26, where the gaps of “flexibility in switching 
to alternative plans” factor are relatively large compared with the other factors, meaning that 
the flexibility in the planning process is limited.  
With regard to safety standards and construction codes, from an interviewees’ point of view, 
there was a weakness in the application of building codes and occupational safety standards in 
public and private facilities. This view was also supported by questionnaire respondents, 
illustrated in Figure 4.26, where the gaps of “enforcement of safety standards and construction 
codes” and “updating of safety standards and construction codes” are relatively large compared 
with the other factors in Section (4.8.1.1). This means that construction codes are neither 
updated nor implemented adequately. Document analysis confirms this point, stating that there 
is a weakness in the application of building codes and occupational safety standards in public 
and private facilities. Further, there is a weakness in the application of safety standards in 
industrial facilities and particularly Electrical Installations (Committee 101, 2010). Apropos 
the establishment of new civil defence centres, Urban Planning Department (2014) concluded 
that there is a failure in land selection to build up new civil defence centres according to the 
international standards in terms of population, area, and location (main road). Because of the 
majority of civil defence centres in the Baghdad Governorate (67.7%) are located on roads, 
which have a maximum speed of 30 km/h, as shown in Figure 5.1 below, delays in responding 
to disasters will usually happen and can, in turn, increase the number of losses.   
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Figure 5.1 Plan of Civil Defence Centres Locations with Reference to Road Network in Baghdad 
Governorate (Urban Planning Department, 2014, p. 36) 
 
Traditional methods for disaster management planning and training are proving to be ineffective 
and inadequate. Accordingly, a fresh approach to disaster management is required (Robert & 
Lajtha, 2002). Notwithstanding the importance of feedback for the planning process, there 
is a lack of feedback and taking the officers and staff members’ proposals as well as the lack of 
seriousness in dealing with research and reports. This was confirmed by Planning Department 
(2015), stating that there is a lack of studying and documenting the previous experiences for 
the purpose of re-use them in program development. This view was also supported by Desforges 
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and Waeckerle (1991), reported that recurring problems that plague response to disasters arise 
from lack of accurate information from previous experiences. Further, one of the common 
reasons behind the failure of organisations in learning from and even repeat mistakes and errors 
is a failure to plan. The feedback loop between learning the lesson and changing behaviour 
might be broken-down if past mistakes are repeated. A lesson cannot really be said to have been 
learned if it is repeatedly repeated (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015). In 
agreement, Robert and Lajtha (2002) stressed that the enormous majority of disaster response 
plans are outdated by the time that they are published; are not kept up to date; are published in 
inappropriate formats, and contain reams of practically useless pages of information. In many 
cases, the existence of outdated disaster response plans is worse than having no plan at all. Such 
disasters may well develop into larger scale disasters for the organisations concerned because 
of inept/bungled emergency response actions/inactions. 
Interviewees also faced other problems namely; amendments to the plans are the validity of 
the General Directorate of civil defence only and adequate opportunities are not giving for 
junior managers in planning. Conversely, Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) stressed on the 
errors in judgment that will be magnified rapidly as the response proceeds, especially those 
committed early. Other interviewees confirm the latter view, stating that there is inefficiency in 
decision making with respect to planning. This might be due to lack of competency of those in 
the central leadership of the ministry. However, other interviewees attribute this inefficiency to 
the lack of unified decisions. Questionnaire respondents confirm this view in their answers 
about “government unity of leadership to plan as a whole”, which is illustrated in Figure 4.26, 
meaning that there is a limited collaboration between different organisations, causing there to 
be fragmented planning. Similarly in US, much of the terrorism plan creation directors, such as 
policy actors, law-enforcement officials, and elected officials, were lacked a general awareness 
of the literature on planning for natural and technological disasters (Jenkins, 2001; Smithson & 
Levy, 2000) cited in (Perry & Lindell, 2003, p. 336).  
5.2.14 Supporting Ordinances 
Based on the findings of the primary data,  interviewees (talking about the planning stage) and 
Committee 101 (2010) in the document analysis, strongly believe that there is a “lack of clarity 
in the mechanisms of the declaration of emergency in the disaster areas and legal 
implications of this announcement” , “lack of a unified national legal framework for disaster 
risk reduction and response (the existence of multiple systems, leading to failures in the 
application when multi nature disasters occur)” as well as “state structural changes not being 
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reflected in the laws and regulations of disaster management from 2003 onwards (powers of 
the governors, the development of the region, the new ministries such as the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, Environment, and Displacement and Migration)”. These points of view are 
also supported by questionnaire respondents’ answers, which are presented in Figure 4.28. 
Similarly, Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) confirm that the existing laws do not take account 
of disaster contingency planning also it fail to assign the federal, governorate and district levels 
with the necessary responsibilities to respond effectively to disasters. This might indicate that 
the development of institutional and legislative systems for DRR in Iraq is adopting a reactive 
approach.  
Furthermore, according to Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014), there are a number of laws, which 
have a direct bearing on DRR, namely, the Public Health Law 1981, the Emergency Use Law 
1969, and the Civil Defence Law 1978. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) added that these laws 
enacted prior to 2003 fail to adequately address all of the vagaries of DRR because the issue of 
the disaster was not addressed in a holistic manner when these laws were designed. Humayun 
and Al-Abyadh (2014) concluded that the lack of standards and criteria for assessing cases of 
emergencies in Iraq is one of the most significant weaknesses in the existing disaster legislation, 
especially such legislation that is unequipped to assess and respond to multi-hazard risks. 
Further, there is a failure in addressing mitigation and preparedness by the two key laws relating 
to DRR, the Emergency Use Law 1961 and the Civil Defence Law 1978, which were provided 
for relief and response mechanisms for addressing hazards. Additionally, to provide support 
and care for victims in the event of a disaster, the Social Care Law No 126 of 1980 has been 
placed to provide such assistance by the State of Iraq. However, the provided support is not 
delivered in detail through this law. Although the scope of the Social Care Law in relation to 
disaster response is complementary to the Civil Defence Law, the two laws do not cross-
reference each other (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). 
However, in Taiwan, supporting ordinances and regulations have not been developed well at 
different government levels (Chen et al., 2006). Whereas in the United Kingdom, the 
organisational and legislative arrangements for disaster response are extremely complex (Hills, 
1994). In addition to this issue, although most of the interviewees praised the updated Civil 
Defence Law No (44) for the year 2013, other interviewees criticise the deactivation of some 
important sections such as the law of teaching the civil defence curriculum. Accordingly, 
community awareness can be decreased and might have a negative effect on response process.  
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Interviewees were of the opinion that although Civil Service Act No. 24 of 1960 ensures 
employees’ right to travel outside Iraq or to complete their study, key official put a lot of barriers 
in front of staff, for example, staff is not allowed to travel outside Iraq until obtaining the 
approval from the Minister. Such approval might take more than one year. In addition to this 
matter, other interviewees criticise the lack of awareness of the laws from the various 
organisations. Such lack might lead to delay in responding to the disaster. 
However, the absence of special civil defence courts in the provinces is another challenge facing 
the response process. Questionnaire respondents confirmed this point in their answers as shown 
in Figure 4.28. 
5.2.15 Coordination within the Organisation 
During complex incidents, rapid coordination is deemed as critical to support a fast response 
given the chaotic nature of such incidents. Based on Goodyear (2009) opinion, a comprehensive 
and coordinated disaster management system of risk management is lacking in Iraq. According 
to interviewees’ opinions that emerged in the organising stage, although the overall organisation 
process is good, there are many weakness points such as the incorrect distribution of tasks, the 
failure of some officials to do their responsibilities, the decentralisation of some administrative 
decisions, and cancelling or merging branches within the organisational structure. The 
questionnaire respondents’ views, that are illustrated in Figure 4.30, also supported this 
position, where the gaps between “reasonable organisational structure and clear awareness of 
responsibilities” and “volunteer management” are relatively large compared with the other 
factors in Section 4.8.2.1. Such a gap might emerge because of the delays that have occurred in 
updating the organisational structure, which has led to chaos in delegating different 
responsibilities at different levels. In addition to this, such a large gap indicates that the 
management of volunteers before, during, and after a disaster is limited.  In Turkey, based on 
Baris (2009), many organisational and institutional problems have been appeared in organising 
a proper disaster management and response system. One of these problems is the absence of a 
single organisational structure focused on disaster management, containing all disaster 
management aspects. As a result, the impacts of disasters has been dramatically exacerbated. 
Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008) also saw the coordination of disaster response is so 
challenging because it involves factoring in exigencies typical of an emergency situation such 
as sudden and unexpected events; great uncertainty; high amounts of time pressure and urgency; 
the risk of possible mass casualty; large-scale impact and damage; severe resource shortages; 
and the disruption of infrastructure support necessary for coordination like telecommunications, 
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electricity, and transportation. Similarly, Mohammadfam, Bastani, Esaghi, Golmohamadi, and 
Saee (2015) stated that the most important challenge that may lead to breakdowns to the 
response between teams is a lack of coordination. It is also accepted as a crucial hidden problem 
which has been principally ignored. Moreover, Uhr et al. (2008) concluded that the distribution 
of authority in the disaster response was often unclear and sometimes confusing.  
5.2.16 Correspondence Delays and Red Tape 
Although red tape appears significantly in real-world endeavours to foster performance of 
public organisations, it could be a negative phenomenon, which can be negatively associated 
with job satisfaction. According to the interviewees’ points of view, one of the major challenges 
facing various management systems in the directorate is the bureaucratic red tape. This theme 
emerged in the organising stage. The document analysis of Planning Department (2015) 
supported this opinion, stating that “the presence of red tape and a large number of committees, 
especially at a financial exchange process” are considered one of the challenges facing the 
directorate. Moreover, Ljungholm (2014) concluded that the red tape is an obstacle to public 
sector performance. Besides that, Schneider (1992) admitted that the problems under unusually 
severe disaster circumstances are exacerbated by bureaucratic policies and procedures. 
5.2.17 Nepotism and Cronyism 
After the fall of the former regime in 2003, several parties have emerged on the political scene. 
Such parties tend to take their roles in various institutional administrative systems by activating 
the role of cronyism. From an interviewees’ point of view that emerged in the organising stage, 
by doing so, loyalists for those parties might be appointed without relevant professional 
experience to be qualified for their posts. Consequently, the extent to response to a disaster 
could be affected negatively. Similarly, in the USA, it appears to have been cronyism 
surrounding many political appointments in the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency) and the DHS (Department of Homeland Security), which were considered particularly 
damaging given the importance of the roles, indeed it was argued that this was one of the 
underlying causes of the “worst failures of crisis leadership in recent US history (the response 
to Hurricane Katrina)” (Boin et al., 2010). This view was supported by the questionnaire 
respondents, as “generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of labour” had a gap 
quite similar to the majority of other factors shown in Figure 4.30, this indicates that there is an 
inefficient and ineffective allocation of duties. 
230 
 
5.2.18 Employees' Rights 
Responders provide a huge effort when the disaster strikes, as a human response, but it is 
important that they understand and know the law that might ensure their rights. Both 
interviewees and Desforges and Waeckerle (1991) agreed that post-traumatic psychological 
problems can face both the rescuers and the victims because of the horrors of a disaster. Despite 
that, from interviewees’ point of view, that emerged in the organising stage, unfortunately, the 
employees in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence are unaware and unknowing of 
their rights in different aspects, for example, the system of daily working hours, vacations and 
travel outside Iraq, health and life insurance, as well as periodic medical and fitness 
examinations, and ensuring easy and quick compensation and rights for those who are exposed 
to injuries during the accidents. Since there is an obligation on the State of Iraq placed within 
the Social Care Law No 126 of 1980, according to Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014), assistance 
and support to victims in the event of a disaster is provided by the state. But, there are two 
problems in implementing this obligation: firstly, the aforementioned support does not provide 
detail and secondly, although the scope of the Social Care Law in relation to disaster response 
is complementary to the Civil Defence Law, the two laws do not cross-reference each other. 
5.2.19 Hierarchy and Centralization Problems  
When responding to complex incidents and tasks, hierarchical organisations might face 
challenges. Consequently, it is quite possible tasks cannot be performed effectively because the 
capacity of the individuals at the top can be exceeded when the incident is complex. According 
to some interviewees’ opinions, that emerged in the organising stage, the presence of more than 
one system of leadership caused a failure to obtain satisfactory results, while others mentioned 
the problem of decision-making when responding to disaster, as well as the problem of officials' 
experience and their level of scientific knowledge. These were confirmed by questionnaire 
respondents’ answers in Figure 4.32. It can be clearly seen that all the factors in this Figure, 
except for “clearly defined goals and commitments by key stakeholders”, have a similar gap. 
This means the clarity of determining goals and commitments is insufficient. The document 
analysis also shows that there is a “lack of clear exceptional administrative powers during 
disasters on the various administrative levels” (Committee 101, 2010). Further confirmation of 
this aspect is demonstrated in the literature; according to Withanaarachchi and Setunge (2014), 
there is a failure in carrying out the most important aspect of decision making during disasters. 
Such failure happened from the highest ranking officer to the lowest ranking officer who was 
involved in decision making due to the breakdowns in the chain of command. Platt (2015) 
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confirms this view and added as a disaster requires critical decisions that should be made in 
awkward situations, a series of dilemmas might be faced disaster decision-making. Besides that, 
Torma-Krajewski and Powers (2010) affirm that the success of disaster response is dependent 
upon effective decisions being made in a timely manner. Therefore, it is a critical component 
of any disaster response. Uhr et al. (2008) agreed with interviewees’ views and added that the 
distribution of authority in the disaster response was often unclear and sometimes confusing. 
However, the impacts of disasters might be exacerbated due to the absence of a single 
organisational structure focused on disaster management in Turkey (Baris, 2009), in Taiwan, 
one of the many issues appears in the past five years is that the coordination mechanism did not 
develop well between the central government and local governments (Chen et al., 2006). 
Moreover, Terawi (2008) illustrates different organisational obstacles: 
 
a. Lack of interest by the top management of crisis management. 
b. The weakness of harmony and coordination between senior management and the 
departments and sections. 
c. Curtail the role of administrative leaders during a crisis. 
d. The tendency of organisations to the central decision-making during a crisis. 
e. The weakness of the presence of a clear definition of tasks and responsibilities that lie with 
crisis manager. 
f. The weakness of rehabilitation and training policies offered in the field of crisis management. 
5.2.20 Staff Movement and Reduction of Sections 
It is widely acknowledged that high levels of personal fitness and stamina are usually demanded 
in many sections of the directorate of civil defence to remain active in such sections. By 
knowing pre-existing medical condition (Hypertension, Asthma, and Epilepsy) or an 
inadequate personal fitness level, measures can be taken to ensure that no one is put at risk. 
Based on interviewees’ opinion, by moving a lot of employees who are unfit to work from 
different branches of the Ministry of Interior, such as the federal police department to the 
directorate, this can lead to a massive problem within the directorate as it mentioned in Section 
4.5.5. Interviewees have also highlighted the staff reducing and a reduction of sections, 
thoughtless transfers of experts inside and outside the Directorate and staff changes, which can 
cause confusion within the directorate. Such problems might happen due to ill-considered 
decisions. Accordingly, this confusion might be reflected on the whole responding process. 
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5.2.21 Communication and Information 
One of the most critical requirements for various aspects of Disaster Management is 
communication. Such requirement is vital during a wide range of actions to impart knowledge 
and information in order to increase public awareness and mass education, call up various 
resources and intimation to authorities, warn of the impending threat of disaster, and conducting 
disaster management in general. Based on some interviewees, within the directing stage, there 
is a weakness of telecommunications networks during disasters because there are often no 
alternatives or due to outdated communications devices. Questionnaire respondents’ answers 
support this view regarding “Emergency public information (communication outside 
organisations)” factor and there answers unsupportive regarding “Effective communication 
mechanisms communication (inside organisations)” factor through the gap analysis that appears 
in Section 4.8.3.2. Committee 101 (2010) within the document analysis also supports this view. 
In agreement, Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) stressed that there is no dedicated 
communication system in place to alert provincial, regional and local governmental 
organisations in at threat places. According to Comfort and Haase (2006), the responsible 
organisations’ capacity is seriously hampered by the severity of disruption in the 
communications infrastructure. As a result, building technical support is needed to conduct an 
organisational action in disaster response. Moreover, during the 2005 Katrina flood, failures in 
communication is considered one of the shortcomings in federal emergency response (Baker 
& Refsgaard, 2007). Failure of communications is also one of the common reasons 
organisations fail to learn from and even repeat mistakes and errors (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2015). Banipal (2006) found that the inter-operability issue was a major 
operational problem experienced during hurricane Katrina. Because of the existing system was 
not scalable enough to support hundreds of additional users, the out of state volunteers were 
unable to use it. In agreement, Manoj and Baker (2007) stated that communication, particularly, 
lack of radio interoperability, is considered a major challenge in responding to disasters. The 
inter-agency communications were extremely difficult because each group communicates with 
radios set to orthogonal frequencies. Consequently, when more groups become involved the 
problem is compounded. Further, according to GSMA (2012), in times of political or 
environmental disasters, coordination between mobile network operators and governments can 
be difficult, particularly in countries that have highly centralised or authoritarian regimes. 
Therefore, one of the common reasons behind the failure of organisations in learning from and 
even repeat mistakes and errors is a failure of communications (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2015). 
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In terms of information, Comfort et al. (2003) indicate that different types of information are 
required during different phases of disaster response. The efficiency of information flow 
throughout the network of responding organisations is enhanced by accessing to core 
information. Moreover, Bharosa et al. (2010) show in their surveys that information and system 
quality is one of a number of obstacles facing individuals when responding to a disaster, despite 
the fact that they are aware of the need for information sharing and coordination. Ferdinand et 
al. (2012) support this view stating that because of poor information sharing, collaboration 
between organisations was found to be minimal. From an interviewees’ point of view, because 
of the lack of intelligence information to figure out who and when and where gets the terrorist 
incident. Many responders are killed as discussed in document analysis section 4.10.1. 
Ogasawara et al. (2014) support this view stating that gaps in available information in the 
immediate aftermath of large, wide-area disaster can result in fatal delays in decisions for the 
most urgent lifesaving response activities. Sinclair et al. (2012) added that although there is 
information available about decision making, not all emergency managers understand its 
relevance to emergency management or aware of the existence of this information.  
Regarding Emergency public information, the questionnaire respondents, that are illustrated 
in Figure 4.34, said that there is little transparency when transferring information about the 
disaster to the public, so the gaps between “transferring information about the disaster to the 
public from the organisation or vice versa” and “providing appropriate reports for the media” 
are relatively large compared with the other factors in Section 4.8.3.2. 
5.2.22 Frequent Blackouts for the National Electricity 
Since the First Gulf War in 1991, Iraq has suffered from programmed cutting off of National 
Electricity. Due to frequent cutting off in any 24 hour period, the illegal wiring is connected to 
the national grid by households as well as random wiring, especially for Simi-Generic 
Generators. All these consequences can prevent the arrival of civil defence teams to the scene 
or sometimes lead to more losses amongst responders’ teams. However, weakness in the 
electrical network maintenance and absence of quality control on imported materials, 
particularly electrical, can have a huge impact on safety. This theme appeared in the directing 
stage. 
5.2.23 Morale and Financial Incentives 
It is widely acknowledged that incentives might play as a chief motivational force in any 
business. In a disaster situation, performance can be improved and fostered by rewarding 
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employees with financial incentives, such as bonuses, or morale incentives, such as 
acknowledgement letters. Based on interviewees’ opinions, within the directing stage, in Iraq, 
financial incentives were given to motivate the disaster responders, but the authority of giving 
financial incentives is exclusively limited to the director of the General Director of Civil 
Defence in Baghdad. Consequently, employees in all Civil Defence branches in all Iraqi cities 
might not have this reward. This view was also supported by questionnaire respondents in their 
answer about “the effectiveness of the financial incentives provided” and so the gap is large 
compared to the other factors in Figure 4.36, which indicates that providing this kind of 
incentive is inefficient and ineffective because it is limited to the key officials. Similarly, Both 
interviewees and questionnaire’s respondents criticised morale incentives that are given to 
employees from heads of departments or general managers because there is no financial benefit 
from them. However, a promotion of 6 months or one year (with consequential financial 
reward) will be awarded from the Prime Minister and the minister.   
5.2.24 Providing the Right Relief Supplies for People in Need at the Right 
Time 
One important aspect and difficulty at the same time, in the first few days after the disaster, is 
finding the best assignment of available resources to affected areas. There are three limiting 
factors affected this process, namely, time, quantity and quality of the resources. Therefore, 
disaster managers should locate an optimal schedule for allocating resources in space and time 
to the affected zones. This problem is hard to solve due to the difficulty in processing and 
assessing all incoming information in an adequate manner (Fiedrich et al., 2000). Based on the 
findings of the primary data, one of the interviewees upheld this view, within the directing 
stage, and added that in some cases there is an exaggeration of logistical supply. Such mistake 
in the allocation of resources might result from the lack in accessing the actual situation in a 
right manner. At the same time sending wrong or too many supplies means losing resources 
and time (Smirnov et al., 2007). Similarly, dispatching more resources than the victims actually 
need by response organisations in actual events might lead to time lag to return their resources 
to the normal level, particularly when they use all of them in the beginning stage of a disaster. 
Since, the local first-responder resources are often overwhelmed by large-scale emergency 
incidents, such as acts of terrorism, human-caused accidents, and acts of nature (Larson et al., 
2006), the delays in deployment and mistargeting of aid is considered one of the shortcomings 
in federal emergency response during the 2005 Katrina flood (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). 
Comfort et al. (2003) discuss this point stating that although organisations might have 
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resources, inefficient distribution might happen, which may lead to a serious problem of 
coordination. The above views were confirmed by questionnaire respondents’ answers in 
Figure 4.35. It can be seen that the majority of factors in this Figure have a relatively large gap, 
except for the gaps for “inventories of emergency resources” and “determination of the 
locations of emergency resources” factors. Questionnaire respondents further pointed out that 
there is a large gap in implementing the “application of modern logistics technology” compared 
with the other factors in Figure 4.35. This means that applying modern technology such as GIS 
is limited when providing resources, as well as being an inefficient and ineffective procedure 
to obtain, position, maintain, and assess the resources.    
The literature further supports the above view, based on Muaafa et al. (2014) techniques for 
supplying optimal strategies for disaster resources to respond efficiently and effectively to 
disasters is still lacked, although there were several studies contributed to improve disaster 
response plans, particularly the disaster resources scheduling problem. Further, one of the 
common reasons behind the failure of organisations in learning from and even repeat mistakes 
and errors is resource conflicts (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015). Moreover, it 
is very difficult to assess the damage, impact and resource need precisely beforehand because 
it is almost impossible to know the timing and the intensity of any calamity (Barbarosoğlu & 
Arda, 2004). Comfort and Haase (2006) support this view stating that actual performance 
failure might happen under stress of disaster if the current knowledge of resources and risks are 
lacked. In contrast, in the UK, a co-ordinated response is possible because disaster response is 
organised at the local level, where knowledge of available resources is most complete (Batho 
et al., 1999). However, in the USA, one of the least understood problems in public management 
is the effective mobilisation of response to extreme events on a large scale (Comfort, 2002). 
Madry (2015) added that getting the right resources and people to the right place at the right 
time is the greatest challenge.  
5.2.25 Speed of response 
Complex problems with serious consequences that are emerged from disaster situation need to 
be solved in a very short amount of time in order to limit destruction to individuals, property 
and environment (Torma-Krajewski & Powers, 2010). In agreement, Madry (2015) stressed 
that time is the real enemy when responding to a major disaster. In a similar way, Miller (2007) 
noted that time should be considered when examining disaster response. Interviewees in their 
responses, which emerged in the directing stage, confirm these views and attribute the delay in 
responding to disaster to different causes, such as, multiplicity of responsible agencies, 
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multitude of decision sources, delay in reporting, delay in entering some sensitive areas, lack 
of financial allocation, lack of understanding of the guidance or orders, support delay from the 
other organisations when requesting heavy rescue equipment, defective equipment and devices 
as explained in Section 5.2.2. Questionnaire respondents upheld these views, based on the gap 
analysis that appeared in Figure 4.36; particularly the small gaps related to “very short response 
time to start the emergency plan”, “evacuation”, and “the clarity of tasks and responsibilities” 
factors. This indicates that there are slight delays when responding and evacuating the victims, 
due to different reasons as presented above, in addition to limited clarity of allocating tasks and 
responsibilities. The  upheld these views and concluded in his study that the arrival speed of 
civil defence vehicles will be reduced because of the majority of civil defence centres in 
Baghdad Governorate (67.7%) located on roads, which have maximum speed 30 km/h. Such 
Location will decrease the speed of civil defence vehicles to arrive at the scene and can raise 
the number of losses. Perry and Lindell (2003) added another two points to aforementioned 
factors, namely, inadequate information and risk assessment, that are quick reactions based on 
them. Such points might cause response delay and insufficient protective measures. In addition 
to above points, the sheer amount of debris and broken glass can also cause a serious delay in 
ambulances arrival to the scene of a bomb blast in Manchester at 1996 (Batho et al., 1999). 
5.2.26 Risk Assessments 
Within disaster stress, actual performance might almost fail, if the current knowledge of risks 
and resources is absent (Comfort & Haase, 2006). Further, planners’ inability to anticipate 
potential hazards and to appreciate their significance may cause humanitarian disasters 
(Goodyear, 2009). In addition to this issue, essential information might be provided by risk 
assessment. Such assessment still needs to be conducted in Iraq (Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 
2014). Based on the findings from primary data, this view is upheld by interviewees’ responses 
that emerged in the controlling stage: there is “failure in conducting proper risk assessments 
and mapping”.  This failure might be due to a lack of modern equipment for risk assessments 
or incorrect estimation of the scale of the disaster. Questionnaire respondents’ answers support 
this view regarding “Conducting risk assessments”, “Developing techniques for assessments”, 
and “Hazard evaluation and mapping” factors through the gap analysis that emerged in Section 
4.8.4.1. Their answers in Figure 4.33 and Figure 4.37 further upheld the interviewees’ view. It 
can be seen that “Hazard monitoring and forecasting”, “Scaling of the disaster”, and “Hazard 
evaluation and mapping” factors in these Figures have a noticeable gap, which indicates that 
disaster scaling and hazard monitoring, forecasting, evaluation and mapping is limited. 
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Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) also support this view stating that prediction capabilities and 
necessary monitoring to supply timely estimates of possible risks faced by publics, the 
environment, and the economy have yet to be developed. Moreover, scientific equipment and 
human resources that are used to assess and monitor risk are lacked in government departments; 
those are responsible for undertaking risk assessments and monitoring. Similarly, based on 
Goodyear (2009), risk analysis based on an inspection of risks and the vulnerabilities and 
capacities of the first responders charged to assist in times of emergencies and resident 
populations that are included in Iraqi risk management is lacked.  
5.3 Summary of the Weaknesses 
To sum up, many weaknesses were revealed from the interviewees’ transcriptions, 
questionnaire respondents, document analysis, and the literature review. Twenty-six 
weaknesses as sub-themes have been recognised in this section. Two of these weaknesses 
appeared in all four stages of disaster response management, namely, coordination between 
organisations and commanding the scene and endowment of equipment, and tools and 
infrastructure; whereas nine points of weakness appeared in two different stages. The rest of 
the weaknesses appeared in only one stage. The majority of these points emerged from both 
primary and secondary data. Notably, eight themes emerged from only the primary data, such 
as the difficulties in reaching the disaster scene, the security situation, unplanned random 
development, misuse of machinery, equipment and materials, employees' rights, staff 
movement and reduction of sections, frequent blackouts of the National Electricity, and morale 
and financial incentives. Only one theme, that of trust, emerged in the secondary data, yet did 
not appear in the primary data. Interestingly, the weaknesses were determined either stemming 
from external challenges or being present within the internal disaster response management. 
The following section will discuss the findings of the strengths during the planning stage.  
 
5.4 Strengths during Disaster Response Management 
Different points of strengths have emerged from interviewees’ responses in the four disaster 
response stages. In this section, a cross analysis for these strength points will be conducted for 
the four stages of management, as presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Strengths during Disaster Response Management Stages 
 Planning 
stage 
Organising 
stage 
Directing 
stage 
Controlling 
stage 
Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure X  X X 
Disaster Response Team Characteristics  X X X 
Education about Disaster Risk X    
Planning Process X    
Supporting Ordinances X    
Coordination  X   
Decision-Making   X  
Morale Incentives   X  
Feedback    X 
 
5.4.1 Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure 
This theme emerged in three stages, namely, planning, directing, and controlling. Despite 
having a gap in implementing the “endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure” factor, 
which indicates the shortage of some equipment, as shown in Figure 4.26, interviewees believe 
that equipment and devices are very good. However, at the same time, they stressed that there 
is a shortage of heavy rescue equipment, for instance, aviation, which consequently leads to 
request them from relevant organisations when responding to disaster. This procedure can lead 
to the late arrival of the supporting rescue mechanics. In addition to this issue, despite having 
modern and fast vehicles, there is a lack of modern and effective devices in terms of detecting 
explosives, positioning information GPS, and software, particularly in the field of planning. 
Besides that, although interviewees praised light rescue mechanics as another strength point, 
they, at the same time, criticised the misuse or incorrect usage of machines, equipment and 
resources and the failure in maintaining them regularly as discussed in Section 4.3.1.4. 
Apropos communication devices, based on interviewees’ opinion, in spite of the speed or 
effectiveness of such devices, at the time of disaster, they were extremely overwhelmed with 
hundreds of additional users, particularly if these devices were outdated, the communication 
problem was compounded.  
According to interviewees’ opinion, although, support for civil defence directorates’ 
infrastructure has existed through building modern infrastructure, there is a dearth of such 
infrastructure. As each civil defence centre covers a specific area of each Iraqi city, to have a 
full knowledge of all the details of such geographical area and projects is impossible, for 
Stage 
Strengths 
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example, there are 63 civil defence buildings in Baghdad alone, based on document analysis 
that was discussed in Section 4.10.5. 
5.4.2 Disaster Response Team Characteristics 
In major incidents, sufficient staff with good training might be identified as a critical factor for 
effective disaster response. It is expected that the disaster responder team will respond to the 
incident as effectively and reasonably as possible to achieve high performance in the actual 
response operations (Mohammadfam et al., 2015). To do so, based on interviewees’ opinions, 
which emerged in three deferent stages, namely, organising, directing, and controlling,  having 
accumulated experience, precise skill, speed, efficiency, preparedness through being on stand-
by 24/7, having a strong military hierarchy, proactive detection of the threat, boosted morale, 
work commitment, altruism, chivalry, magnanimity, quick and courageous reaction without 
hesitation in facing all types of accidents, are all positive features for disaster responders in 
Iraq. Moreover, despite the shortage in staffing within the directorate, they are characterised by 
their extensive practical experience and scientific qualifications. Further, although there are 
different causes for delays in responding to a disaster, as discussed in Section 4.5.1.11, 
interviewees assert a quick response and good organisation, particularly speed in transferring 
the injured, evacuating the victims and moving the deceased. To prevent further casualties, 
notwithstanding this, a lack of modern and effective devices to detect explosives as explained 
in Section 4.5.2.2, there is proactive detection of a second or subsequent incident. 
Sometimes this detection with such devices causes a lot of responders to lose their life. Because 
of the altruism, chivalry, and magnanimity, which are the most common features between 
not only disaster responders, but all Iraqi society when a large-scale disaster happens, they 
sometimes rush to intervene and save lives before even the completion of the detection process. 
In addition, interviewees praised people relying on an official who has experience, 
personality, and decision-making ability notwithstanding individual mistakes and misplaced 
judgement that might happen while responding to a disaster, as discussed in Section 4.5.1.6. In 
agreement, according to Emanuele et al. (2009), professionalisation in managing disaster can 
lead to a relevant staff rationalisation.  
5.4.3 Education about disaster risk 
Based on interviewees’ opinion within the planning stage, specialised courses have been 
conducted for staff to deal with different kinds of disasters. The Planning Department (2015) 
support this, stating that workshops and training courses were held in first aid, rescue, 
evacuation, and disaster medicine to train staff of the Civil Defence Directorate to perform the 
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duties mandated. Questionnaire respondents, in their answers, confirm this point. It can be seen 
from Figure 4.29 that the gap for “specific training of professionals such as rescue workers and 
medical staff” is small compared with the other factors. Several interviewees, meanwhile, 
attribute the appearance of this small gap to the lack of internal and external courses, 
particularly those specialised courses in the field of planning, which are very rare (see Section 
4.3.1.3). To gain knowledge and exchange information and experience from other countries, 
some courses, in particular, external ones, were sometimes assigned to specific staff. This might 
happen because of favouritism and influence of relations with political parties.  
Committee 101 (2010), the Planning Department (2015) and interviewees have the same 
opinion regarding the existence of prior practices to deal with the disasters in the provinces, 
but at the same time there is still an urgent need for more training and development, more 
technical knowledge and skills in planning, and exercises for better preparedness and response, 
especially with regard to the national plan to respond more effectively to disasters. Gap analysis 
in Figures 4.26 and 4.29 attributes this view in terms of implementing “disaster drills, rehearsals 
and simulations” and “the extent to which emergency plans are rehearsed”. 
Regarding self-protection teams, interviewees strongly affirmed that each organisation has a 
continuous rehabilitation for the self-protection of teams during the year. This view was 
supported by questionnaire respondents. As shown in Figure 4.29, although there was a good 
implementation for “undertaking public educational activities”, there was a weakness in 
implementing “community capabilities audit”. This large gap appears because such activity 
might not cover all society’s segments. The Planning Department (2015) upheld this view, 
stating that school students, employees in organisations and projects have been trained on the 
acts of civil defence and how to conduct themselves during major accidents and emergencies. 
Moreover, although seminars and courses are carried out in the organisations and projects by 
the Environmental Protection police centres in Baghdad and the provinces in order to raise 
awareness of the causes of disaster risk for some society segments, still these seminars are 
insufficient to cover all society segments to build capacity.  
5.4.4 Planning Process 
According to the Emergency Management Australia (2004), to build a community's ability to 
cope with the impact of emergencies and to minimise the hazard effects, plans and programs 
preparation for response actions should be taken during and immediately after a hazard impact. 
Moreover, by conducting well-thought-out and rehearsed response planning activities, lives can 
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be saved (Larson et al., 2006). In Iraq, despite the gaps that appeared in the implementation of 
the following factors: “applicable emergency response plan and regulations”, “the level of prior 
planning”, “pre-determined strategies”, and “drawing up organisational disaster plans and 
integrating them with overall community-mass-emergency plans” and despite the ignorance of 
the importance of planning by key officials, the Directorate do have proper planning. 
According to the Planning Department (2015), such ignorance might appear because the 
concept of disaster management is a new idea in Iraq. Therefore, political support is needed to 
include it in future programs and plans. Proper planning was considered as a strength in the 
planning stage, from interviewees’ perspectives, due to continuous work on planning. Further, 
because the plans are developed with clear visions, goals, objectives and tasks, it became 
applicable and realistic, but sometimes the plans are unenforceable and cause confusion or 
the plans are not strictly implemented due to the lack of understanding of what has been planned 
or due to overlapping duties. Many scholars, for instance, Barenbaum (N.D.), Desforges and 
Waeckerle (1991), Hills (1994, p. 71), Majchrzak et al. (2007), and Uhr et al. (2008) support 
the aforementioned interviewees’ view as discussed in Section 4.3.1.7.  
Regarding the existence of a general contingency plan and sub-plans, both interviewees and 
questionnaire respondents have the same point of view on this matter. Committee 101 (2010) 
also supported this point, stating that the emergency plan exists in key ministries (the Ministry 
of Health and Ministry of Interior / Civil Defence Directorate) to tackle disasters. In addition, 
vigorous efforts have been maintained to secure a national contingency plan for some 
specialised types of disasters such as radiological, chemical, and biological emergency plans. 
Such contingency plans, at the same time, do not cover all the important facilities as discussed 
in 4.3.1.7.  
In terms of updating plans, information, safety standards, and construction codes, because 
the planners have the technical and academic expertise, updating and following-up is a 
continual process in the directorate, based on interviewees’ opinions. They, at the same time, 
criticise the fact that they do not have the authorisation to amend the plans because this 
authorisation is limited to the General Directorate of Civil Defence only. The questionnaire 
analysis revealed the same findings regarding “continually updating obsolete materials 
(documents) and strategies”, “systematically maintaining disaster and loss inventory”, 
“enforcement of safety standards and construction codes”, and “updating of safety standards 
and construction codes”. Whilst Committee 101 (2010) confirmed the interviewees’ opinion 
regarding the existence of codes of Construction and Safety Standards, they simultaneously 
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criticise the weakness in the application of building codes and occupational safety standards in 
public and private facilities, particularly the Electrical Installations.  
As regards the knowledge of the geographical area for each civil defence centre, several 
interviewees shed light on an important feature of the current planning process, which is the 
periodic inspection of organisations and facilities. Bi-annual inspections have been 
conducted for each geographical area (each centre). Each geographical area has different types 
of infrastructure, which are classified into three classes (A, B, C), depending on the nature of 
their activities, importance, and the degree of vulnerability. The Urban Planning Department 
(2014) in the document analysis confirms this point, as discussed in Section (I.1). 
Regarding studies about disaster management, based on interviewees’ opinion, despite the 
fact that there are research reports submitted by officers and staff members in order to develop 
the work, remove the obstacles, and add new things, there is, at the same time, a lack of 
seriousness in dealing with such research reports. According to the Planning Department 
(2015), although there is a lack of study and documentation of previous experiences for the 
purpose of re-using them in program development, there are studies which have been prepared 
by the staff of the Civil Defence Directorate about the types of disasters and their consequences, 
and how to reduce their risks. Further, the General Directorate of Civil Defence is the most 
prominent stakeholder in preparing a framework for disaster management strategy in Iraq. In 
the field of planning and providing information, there are studies submitted by researchers in 
universities, or from those concerned with disasters, which can be used for further development.  
5.4.5 Supporting Ordinances 
There are a number of laws, which have a direct bearing on DRR, namely, the Public Health 
Law 1981, the Emergency Use Law 1969, and the Civil Defence Law 1978. However, these 
laws, enacted prior to 2003, fail to adequately address all of the vagaries of DRR since the 
issues of the disaster were not addressed in a holistic manner when these laws were designed 
(Humayun & Al-Abyadh, 2014). In addition, interviewees (experts) within the planning stage, 
document analysis from Committee 101 (2010), and the Planning Department (2015) appreciate 
the importance of the updated Civil Defence Law No (44) for the year 2013 in organising 
work in the field of disaster management, despite the deactivation of some important sections, 
such as the law of teaching the civil defence curriculum. Moreover, based on interviewees’ 
opinion, there are work guides for civil defence centres. The questionnaire shows a similar 
level of implementation in all elements, except “the involvement of local jurisdictions” factor, 
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that has a slightly larger gap as shown in Figure 4.28. Interviewees agree and attribute this point 
to the creation of a particular civil defence court in Baghdad only, whereas other branches 
in the provinces do not have such a court.   
5.4.6 Coordination 
It could be argued that effective coordination is an essential ingredient for disaster response 
management. Based on the findings of the primary data, several interviewees, within the 
organising stage, believed that despite having some weaknesses in this theme as discussed in 
Section 5.2.15, generally, there is good organisation, due to proper leadership, central 
decisions, strong military hierarchy, working as a team, continuous documentation, and lack of 
overlap in work between units, departments, and branches within the directorate. The 
questionnaire respondents, illustrated in Figure 4.30, supported this view, with the gaps 
between “coordination between departments within the organisation” and “search and rescue” 
are relatively small, compared to the other factors in Section 4.8.2.1, which indicates that there 
is good coordination within the directorate. Document analysis also added that the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence is the most prominent stakeholder that has prepared a framework 
for the disaster management strategy in Iraq (Planning Department, 2015). 
Even though a comprehensive and fully coordinated disaster management system of risk 
management is lacking in Iraq (Goodyear, 2009), the General Directorate have good 
management due to following-up every element, and enthusiastically working hard to develop 
the adoption of scientific methods whilst conducting business. Interviewees also stressed the 
importance of central decisions and strong military hierarchy for the overall organisation 
process, whilst simultaneously criticising the decentralisation of some administrative decisions. 
Conversely, different scholars, as discussed in Section 5.6.10 stressed the importance of 
decentralisation during a disaster. For instance, Kapucu and Garayev (2011) put emphasis on 
non-traditional approaches and tools characterised by non-hierarchical structures and flexibility 
in decision-making. Kapucu and Garayev (2011) stated that because of the ineffectiveness of 
the traditional disaster management tools, the traditional approaches characterised by hierarchy 
and centralisation have been replaced by decentralised emergency management systems. 
Nazarov (2011) and UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) confirm this view, while Withanaarachchi 
and Setunge (2014) stressed that decision-making must be flexible during unexpected incidents. 
Interestingly, one of the twenty-eight interviewees supported the aforementioned view and 
talked about the lack of clear exceptional administrative powers during disasters at the various 
administrative levels; the document analysis showed similar findings (Committee 101, 2010). 
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Although the distribution of authority in the disaster response was often unclear and sometimes 
confusing (Uhr et al., 2008), based on interviewees opinion, duties and responsibilities are 
known by all staff members, despite some incorrect distribution of tasks. Moreover, as 
interviewees praised the idea of putting the right person in the right place, at the same time 
criticised inappropriate resource allocations that were made after 2003, regarding 
commissioning people with no experience for important administrative tasks. Such wrong 
allocations were conducted due to the control of political parties and blocks in giving 
managerial positions as discussed in Section 4.4.1.8.  
Interviewees also put emphases on the existence of the entire organisational structure 
approved by the Ministry of Interior, but they at the same time criticised tow things regarding 
this matter. Firstly, the ill-considered decisions in terms of cancelling or merging branches 
within the organisational structure, which might lead to reduce the efficiency of work. 
Secondly, the long authorisation process for updating organisational structure. Unfortunately, 
the General Directorate of Civil Defence are still referring to the old official organisational 
structure from 2009 (as shown in Appendix J), which whilst it has been updated several times, 
it is yet to be authorised for use from the key official in the Ministry of Interior, due to 
correspondence delays and red tape.  
5.4.7 Decision-Making 
It is widely considered that decision-making and problem-solving are critically important skills 
in disaster management. Being able to make decisions and solve problems effectively is a 
necessary and vital part of the job for every disaster manager, planner, and first responder 
(FEMA, 2005). According to interviewees’ opinion within the directing stage, although a 
failure in decision-making might happen due to different reasons as discussed in Section 5.2.9, 
they, at the same time, praised the existence of specific contexts to respond to the disaster and 
proper appreciation of the position. Meanwhile, having the ability to evolve, to urge staff, and 
to convince them, are also different positive features for disaster response decision-making in 
Iraq. 
Apropos centralisation in decision-making, though the interviewees considered centralisation 
in decision-making is a positive point, much of the current literature on decision-making has 
stressed decentralisation in decision-making (see Section 5.4.6 and 5.6.10), such as Kapucu & 
Garayev (2011), Nazarov (2011), UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008), and Withanaarachchi and 
Setunge (2014). Questionnaire respondents further agree with interviewees’ opinion as clearly 
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shown in Figure 4.33. There was a good implementation for the “Key officials being briefed” 
factor. 
5.4.8 Morale Incentives 
Given the nature of the work for employees in disaster situations, it is important that people 
feel valued and motivated to complete their work to the best of their ability. According to MSG 
Experts (2008), to motivate employees to greater action, there are two types of incentives, 
namely, monetary incentives (financial incentives) and non-monetary incentives (morale 
incentives). The latter one cannot be measured in terms of money. A manager makes use of 
morale incentives, whenever (s)he has to satisfy the psychological requirements of 
subordinates. Morale incentives can be categorised as providing security of service, giving 
praise or recognition, having suggestion schemes, ensuring job enrichment, and providing 
promotion opportunities. Based on interviewees’ opinion that emerged from the directing stage, 
responding correctly and quickly to the disaster, especially in major accidents, may result in the 
responder obtaining morale incentives from one of the key officials, for instance, heads of 
departments, general managers, the prime minister, and the minister. Normally, when receiving 
morale incentives from the minister or the prime minister, six months or a year is added for the 
years of service of staff members. Such an addition also gives a consequential financial reward. 
In comparison, and meanwhile, interviewees criticise the fact that morale incentives are 
obtained from heads of departments or general managers that have no financial benefit from 
them. Still, this kind of incentive can help maintain morale to disaster responders’ teams. MSG 
Experts (2008) support this positive point stating that a combination of financial and non-
financial or morale incentives all help to bring motivation and enthusiasm to work in difficult 
situations. 
5.4.9 Feedback 
By convening meetings after each large accident, analysis of the process is conducted for the 
purpose of determining weaknesses and strengths and obtaining feedback. Such meetings, 
from interviewees’ opinion, were considered a positive point in the current disaster response 
practices, in terms of addressing the negative points when responding to such incidents. 
Interviewees, within the controlling stage, criticise the process of addressing negatives after the 
analysis of the incident, in terms of imposing punishments on staff that are not effective; rather, 
people need incentives and a focus on the positives rather than the negatives. Interviewees also 
praised other positives, including filming the scene in order to identify the cause of the accident 
and take advantage of it in the analysis process, as well as submitting reports for any accident. 
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Recommendations 
Questionnaire respondents’ answers support this view regarding the “clear procedure of 
reporting and submitting information” and an “effective damage reporting system” through the 
gap analysis that appears in Section 4.8.3.1 and Section 4.8.4.1. 
5.5 Summary of the Strengths 
Nine points of strengths have emerged from both primary and secondary data through 
conducting cross-analyses of the four Disaster Response Management stages in Iraq (Planning, 
Organising, Directing, and Controlling). The findings show that two points of strengths, 
namely, the endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure and disaster response team 
characteristics were appeared in three different stages, while the rest of strength point appeared 
in only one stage. Interestingly in this section, some strengths were also discussed as being 
weaknesses, that is, the themes appeared in both sections. After discussing critically these 
important findings, the next section will present the recommendations that are suggested to 
enhance the disaster response process.  
 
5.6 Recommendations for Disaster Response Management 
The recommendations across the four stages of disaster response management are analysed in 
this section. The similarity and the differences of the recommendations across different stages 
are identified in Table 5.3.   
Table 5.3 Recommendations for Disaster Response Management Stages 
 Planning 
stage 
Organising 
stage 
Directing 
stage 
Controlling 
stage 
Endowment of Equipment, Tools and 
Infrastructure 
X X X X 
Education about Disaster Risk X  X X 
Coordination   X X X 
Specialist Staff  X X   
Planning Process X    
Financial Resources X    
Law Activation X    
Employees' Rights  X   
Attention for Obligations   X  
Decision-Making    X 
Risk Assessment    X 
Stage 
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5.6.1 Endowment of Equipment, Tools and Infrastructure 
It could be argued that the capability of disaster responders’ mobility could be enhanced by 
using sophisticated and reliable machines and equipment. It can be seen that this theme 
appeared in all stages of disaster response management. According to interviewees’ points of 
view, by using sophisticated equipment and machines as well as special heavy rescue 
equipment, the response process might become faster and easier than before. In agreement, 
Goodyear (2009) stresses the need for robust technical and infrastructural abilities within the 
GoI and other disaster risk reduction participants is an imperative to plan for, mitigate and 
respond to future disasters in Iraq. Further, maintaining planning supplies was one of the 
interviewees’ recommendations. Regarding systems and networks, interviewees 
recommended linking the directorates of civil defence with the e-government network, using 
a GPS system while responding to a disaster, as well as setting up effective early warning 
systems. This view was supported by Wehbe (2013), stating that the establishment of systems 
and networks of a regional early warning system for monitoring the multiple threats to the 
region is one of six recommendations within the second main theme of the Arab Strategy. 
Similarly, Terawi (2008) emphasised the need for an effective early warning system in 
organisations, in order to prevent crises before they occur and prepare to deal with the crises 
that cannot be avoided. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) support this view and recommended 
investment in necessary technology and equipment, and building the technical capacity of 
organisations with early warning systems and information dissemination functions. Moreover, 
the majority of the interviewees stressed setting up a fire nozzles and security cameras 
network within the required technical specifications. In terms of civil defence centres, based 
on interviewees’ opinions, the number of modern civil defence centres should be increased. 
Further, the telecommunications and informatics in the provinces need to be developed. 
Such improvement could be achieved by equipping the province with modern and effective 
monitoring systems and linking the directorate with satellite systems and activate the 
subscription. Besides that, by providing aircraft systems the control process might be 
facilitated. It could also be achieved by establishing well-designed communications and 
information infrastructure prior to the disaster, which is required to support organisational 
performance in a rapidly changing environment. Such establishment would contribute 
substantially to achieving disaster risk reduction goals by enabling communities to manage their 
own risk more efficiently and effectively (Comfort & Haase, 2006). According to Smirnov et 
al. (2007), the application of new technologies including context-aware interoperability of 
participants and operational decision support assistance are required for disaster response 
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operations. Moreover, the Urban Planning Department (2014) emphasised the need for 
completing the information base in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence by using GIS 
information systems and updating it annually, as well as keeping pace with the global progress 
in this service. GSMA (2012) on the other hand, suggested the idea of spreading early warning 
messages and vital information to citizens prior to and/or in the aftermath of a disaster. Such 
information spreading might be a crucial way in which they can help to support government 
agencies to enhance disaster responses. 
5.6.2 Education about Disaster Risk 
By providing a comprehensive education over different generations, skills and provisions for 
disaster preparedness and response can be developed in order to ensure community safety 
during a disaster. Goodyear (2009) stated that capacity development is a key component of 
strengthening community-level preparedness. This theme appeared in all stages of disaster 
response management, except the organising stage.  
Within the context of knowledge dissemination about risk management, interviewees 
recommended that the public should be educated by increasing awareness of the risks through 
education in all its stages, continuous communication with the public, particularly media that 
are important in raising awareness about the role of civil defence. Abosuliman, Kumar, and 
Alam (2013) upheld this view stating that attention should be taken to community awareness 
and preparedness. The UNISDR (2015) gave another suggestion to educate the public; that is 
creating awareness programs geared to disaster risk reduction and mitigation. Davies (2005) 
supports this view stating that communities must be prepared at all levels to ensure an efficient 
and effective response to disaster situations. In addition, Wehbe (2013) pinpoints one of the 
five main themes of the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020, namely building 
confrontational ability through knowledge, public advocacy, research, and training. This main 
theme recommended six points as follows:  
a. Work on the availability of risk and disaster events information at all levels and its 
accessibility by all parties concerned. 
b. Ensure the use of educational materials and curricula and methodologies for the most 
recent level to take into account the contexts and realities of regional, national and local 
emerging risks. 
249 
 
c. Raising public awareness, launching campaigns and support activities to shed light on 
disaster risk reduction action, and disaster management practices with the participation 
of the community. 
d. Creating regular opportunities for training and developing the skills of managers, 
decision-makers, and volunteers from the community besides ensuring women 
participate fully.  
e. Ensure the flow of resources to support ongoing scientific research, which aims to find 
solutions that can be applied especially in the short and medium term. 
f. Developing acceptable criteria and indicators to monitor the progress of risk reduction 
and clarify the benefits of investment in this area. 
  
As far as staff education is concerned, interviewees suggested that continuous training for 
staff by intensifying external and internal training courses in the field of planning might 
lead to a more robust response to the disaster. Moreover, the intermediate and lower staff should 
be involved in such courses. In a similar way, Committee 101 (2010) recommended, shown in 
Table I.1, that more knowledge and skills of planning are required. Also shown in Table I.1, 
most of the Iraqi governorates recommended training and development, especially training for 
different kinds of disasters. Further, more capacity building is preferred. This suggestion was 
supported by the UNISDR (2015) stating that it was important to speed up building capacities 
and competencies for those working in the field of disaster risk reduction as well as involving 
all society segments in capacity building. The UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) agree with the 
aforementioned view and added capacity development as a central strategy for reducing risk. 
Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) also support this view and recommended training to develop 
staff capacity for disaster management in executive authorities including the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence. However, Terawi (2008) pinpoints the need to focus on holding 
training programs and workshops in the field of service management for staff, training on how 
to look for warning signals, tracking and analysing them, and to take the necessary 
precautionary measures to prevent crises. In a similar way, Davies (2005) recommended that 
education and training must be both theoretical and practical with an emphasis on the 
integration of the theory learned in practice through the use of simulation. Abosuliman et 
al. (2013) agree with this view stating that responders should be continually trained with good 
practices and preparedness. Such training could be paramount to successful disaster prevention 
and management. 
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Based on interviewees’ opinions, training and practices in decision-making as well as holding 
periodic seminars and meetings with all the officers to teach them how to deal with orders and 
instructions in order administrate the accident site. Goodyear (2009) upheld this view and added 
that by offering professional disaster management training to senior Government officials, 
disaster preparedness can be recognised as an active link between disaster response, 
rehabilitation and development programs. According to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (2015), when the officers include themselves in such exercises through clarifying their 
responsibilities and actions throughout the incident, including admitting to any tactical errors 
they may have made, the firefighters will more willingly admit their own or recognise errors by 
others, once they know the officer is willing to acknowledge a less-than-perfect performance. 
Additionally, corrective action should be undertaken to identify and correct problems, if 
operations failed to go as planned. Such corrective action may include increasing company-
level training, arranging for remedial individual training or simply reviewing departmental 
policy and procedures with personnel (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015). 
Interviewees also put emphasis on conducting a comprehensive assessment of the risks, 
vulnerability, and the available capacity at all levels and by multi-regions. In addition, 
conducting joint exercises with the relevant organisations according to the plans might 
facilitate the response process.  
 
Regarding research and studies in the field of planning, interviewees suggested that studies 
and research should be conducted in the field of planning relying on previous experiences and 
global research. 
In terms of community participation in responding to a disaster, according to the UNISDR and 
UNOCHA (2008), community participation are required to achieve effective disaster risk 
reduction. In different disaster management lifecycles, Jahangiri et al. (2011) also found that 
the community contribution is needed to achieve successful disaster management. Similarly, 
Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) concluded that citizens’ preparation should be promoted by 
providing campaigns for specific incidents to let citizens prepare themselves for unusual 
accidents. Such preparation and education should include both males and females, because 
gender is a core factor in disaster risk reduction (UNISDR & UNOCHA, 2008).   
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5.6.3 Coordination  
This theme appeared in all stages of disaster response management, except the planning stage. 
Interviewees emphasised the need for central leadership with flexibility in decision-making 
for all accidents while others stressed showing interest in the organisation by the key officials 
and decision-makers. Such interest might be conducted by updating the organisational 
structure regularly and eliminating favouritism and bias in the work. In the same way, 
Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) recommended that to obtain better alignment between some 
organisations and with ministries and institutions with similar jurisdictions and mandates, the 
administrative structure of them should be revised. According to Handmer and Parker (1991), 
by adapting the best structures, innovation and adaptive behaviour might be encouraged. By 
doing so, operational units can respond independently, without central control, which may not 
be available in any case. Conversely, the effect of the “bureaucratic imperative” might be 
reduced by adopting a looser structure. Because bureaucracies tend to apply strong central 
control, thus the initiative of operational sections will be constrained.  
There is also an issue of trust between employees and their superiors, beyond the hierarchy 
structure. The stressful and potentially harmful environment provides no opportunity for a 
participatory approach, thus trust is necessary so that orders are obeyed unquestionably and 
compromising operation outcomes are minimised (Emanuele et al., 2009). Trim (2004) also 
argues that there is a need for trust among staff. “Whatever approach is used, it is necessary to 
establish trustworthy and respectful relationships that facilitate co-operation and 
communication between the parties involved” (Trim, 2004, p. 223). According to Krackhardt 
and Stern (1988), trust enhances cooperation. They claim that once trust has been lost, 
cooperation is diminished, and that cooperation without initial trust is very difficult to 
implement. Creating a sense of trust among the different stakeholders, who are expected 
to work as a team, is therefore, crucial. 
Moreover, Chen, Sharman, Rao, et al. (2008) stressed adopting new technology elements that 
have emerged in recent years to enable better emergency response coordination such as 
wireless mesh networks (CalMesh; calmesh.calit2.net), sensor networks (ASPECT; 
www.epa.gov/naturalevents/flyinglab.htm), knowledge management systems (RKBP; 
www.rkb.mipt.org), geographic information systems (CATS; cats.saic.com), communication 
standards (CAP; www.incident.com/ cap), incident forecast and analysis programs (SLOSH; 
www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/nhp/slosh_link.shtm), peer-to-peer communication platforms 
(Microsoft Groove; www.groove.net), collaborative work systems (E-Team; www.eteam.com), 
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and command and control systems (DisasterLAN; www.disasterlan.com). Such technologies 
might address parts of the problem and have to be leveraged to improve coordination. 
By establishing strong coordination mechanisms between different organisations at the time of 
disaster, the response process might become easier. To support a comprehensive program, a 
network should be developed by determining the other players in disaster response and 
preparedness. Not only that, the regional and governorate level of coordination for disaster 
preparedness, mitigation and response should be strengthened by vesting responsibility to a 
dedicated, professional disaster management entity that would report to the regional 
government/Governor at the regional/governorate levels (Goodyear, 2009). From the 
interviewees’ point of view, higher coordination with the relevant organisations is very 
important especially with utility services organisation, security organisation in order to impose 
the security cordon properly and install and maintain a fire nozzles network as well as remove 
excesses on the national electricity grid system. Such coordination might mean increasing the 
mobilisation speed of the various relevant agencies in various organisations by updating 
and testing of inter-institutional response. Providing the buildings with the coding system 
is also one of the suggestions that might have an impact on reducing disaster response time. 
Moreover, by evacuating the streets from vehicles in case of emergency and removing stalls 
from roads that are forbidden such as the hard shoulder, the civil defence teams might reach the 
scene in a timely manner. 
Wehbe (2013) suggests strengthening cooperation between the Arab countries with respect 
to disaster response, preparedness, and recovery. In addition, future attention has been 
suggested by Abosuliman et al. (2013) to the top five areas, namely, identification and 
coordination of the organisational responsibilities, training of response teams, community 
awareness and preparedness. Furthermore, expertise connecting groups in institutions are 
needed as well as the adoption of new frameworks that promote coordination, flexibility, 
and rapid response in order to achieve institutional development (Baker & Refsgaard, 2007). 
Besides that, the UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008)  suggested that disaster risk reduction can be 
enhanced by using an important tool such as public-private partnerships. 
The UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) experiences have shown that a critical feature of an 
effective disaster preparedness capability is the extent to which different actors and entities 
operate in a coordinated and timely manner by avoiding gaps, duplication of effort, and parallel 
structures.  Skilful coordination among the wide range of potential stakeholders that may 
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provide assistance during an emergency (such as the military, NGOs, utility companies and 
private sector entities) is critical to avoid confusion and to facilitate an effective response. 
Ensuring a clear central focal point and location for coordination, such as an Emergency 
Operations Centre is also essential. 
5.6.4 Specialist Staff 
It is widely agreed that team working can better be accomplished with the employment of as 
many competencies as possible (Emanuele et al., 2009). Besides that, Goodyear (2009) stated 
that skilled people in disaster management are required at all levels of preparedness and 
response with a clear understanding of their role within that system. According to interviewees’ 
opinions, that emerged in the planning and the organising stages, specialised technical staff in 
planning and organising should be increased as well as relying on competent and 
experienced people with academic achievement to achieve staff integration within the 
standard staff that is approved by the key stakeholders. This point was confirmed by Desforges 
and Waeckerle (1991) stating that a key element in the success of a response is experience. This 
is because experienced and knowledgeable leaders make robust decisions when faced with 
difficult or unexpected problems. Chen et al. (2006) further recommended that the best way to 
address staff shortages in Taiwan is adjusting manpower from other agencies in the same 
governmental body. 
5.6.5 Planning Process 
It could be argued that disaster response planning is a responsibility at all levels of the 
organisation. Planning priorities might differ according to the context and scope of the situation 
whether local, national or regional. It is essential to work on response plans in consultation and 
cooperation with those who will have to implement or approve them (International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2007). Based on interviewees’ opinions, within the 
planning stage, attention and support for the planning process should be given by the 
decision-makers in the directorate. Perry and Lindell (2003) confirm this suggestion indicating 
that sustaining attention should be given to disaster planning, especially in Middle Eastern 
countries, due to continuing terrorist attacks worldwide. In agreement, Desforges and 
Waeckerle (1991) stress that proper planning and preparation enable the community to deal 
better with destruction and death in the wake of disasters. Terawi (2008) confirms this point, 
stating that work should be undertaken to make the crisis planning process an important and 
essential part of the strategic planning process, and the major element of the organisational 
general plan. Moreover, according to interviewees’ opinions, planners should focus on 
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disaster forecasting and monitoring as well as prior plans preparation to any types of 
disaster. Similarly, Barbarosoğlu and Arda (2004) suggested that response planners should be 
proactively prepared for an effective response and should possess robust and generic decision 
tools and models to improve their disaster relief and response capability. Further, the UNISDR 
(2015) propose developing mechanisms, procedures, and systems to save and disseminate 
data concerning hazard and recovery. According to the UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008), by 
adapting a multi-hazard approach, effectiveness can be improved.  
Regarding the planning feedback process, in order to address the negatives occurring after 
each accident, regular meetings with all the officers and staff members should be 
conducted. In agreement, Perry and Lindell (2003) suggested that critiques of the plan are 
probably one way to resolve the problems of the disaster planning process. This 
recommendation was also supported by Terawi (2008) who sees this from the operative point 
of view, the need to adopt a periodic review system of disaster management plans and test 
them in conditions similar to the actual situations of crisis and work to improve them, thus 
people get used to working under stress and strain in the event of a real crisis in this field.  
However, developing a unified plan to respond to the disaster was a good recommendation 
from interviewees due to their emphasis on different aspects in terms of coordination between 
the authorities and the rest of the relevant organisations, ensuring road opening for civil defence 
teams, to apply and update safety standards for buildings, and study any decision or law 
to be issued. Humayun and Al-Abyadh (2014) support this recommendation, stating that an 
effective and efficient response to disasters requires a national perspective. Further, all agencies 
should be included in planning to achieve integration in planning. Therefore, preparation for 
organisations’ response should be conducted by disaster planning to deal cooperatively with 
situations full of chaos and uncertainty. Consequently, based on Prideaux (2004), a well-
planned disaster response mechanism is needed in many countries, and some including 
Australia, have yet to develop appropriate response mechanisms for their tourism industries. 
Chen et al. (2006) further stressed that the establishment of the mandated requirements should 
be coupled with technical and financial assistance from the central government as well as 
professional groups because Taiwan is a centralised state. According to Handmer and Parker 
(1991), individuals and organisations should be capable of working efficiently without the 
normal energy, communications and transport infrastructures, as these may not be operating 
after a harsh event. Human resources, emerging from the community and other organisations, 
should also be coordinated. 
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However, the UNISDR (2015) suggest finding newly obliged legislation to prepare plans and 
programs to reduce the potential for disaster risk as well as finding appropriate work 
environments for staff. Handmer and Parker (1991) raised a new important point in terms of 
roles and responsibilities, stating that unambiguous roles and responsibilities should be 
determined within the disaster planning structure. 
Further, Baker and Refsgaard (2007, p. 331) proposed a general strategy of adaptive 
management as follows: “emphasise the importance of participatory planning with institutional 
actors where both initial response organisations, as well as institutions involved in longer term 
recovery,  are involved in emergency response exercises”. Whereas, Hale et al. (2005, p. 131) 
suggested in their findings “an organisation’s crisis response communication plan should 
structure and coordinate the separate but interdependent steps of observation, interpretation, 
choice, and dissemination”. In addition, to ensure the appropriate response across the service 
spectrum, including voluntary organisations, planning must be taken in order to obtain a 
forthcoming optimum response to a disaster situation. Moreover, the availability of expertise 
must be taken into account when planning and preparing for a disaster in order that the 
most effective response can be made to the challenges that will inevitably emerge in a disaster 
(Davies, 2005). Baker and Refsgaard (2007) on the other hand, put emphasis on developing 
the plans, that operate horizontally and across scales, by practising, evaluating, and re-
planning the plans in order to develop appropriately matched institutional responses and be 
able to determine the scale of the disaster. To ensure plans have been developed, gaps should 
also be defined in the national, governorate and community level preparedness plans advocating 
with policy makers to reduce the impact of disaster incidents on vulnerable communities 
(Goodyear, 2009). Moreover, to invest senior managers’ time, a strategic and critical group 
planning process could be enhanced by using group support technology/electronic meeting 
rooms (Money & Harrald, 1995). Handmer and Parker (1991, p. 306) went on to add a 
suggestion related to “planning should be "reality based", grounded in what is likely to happen 
rather than on myths and misconceptions long overturned by disaster research”. Besides that, 
many of the personal contacts that are generally necessary for effective response should be 
established by those who are involved in the planning process. They should also have thought 
carefully about the involvement and likely behaviour of those at risk, the mass media, and the 
rest of the world.  
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5.6.6 Financial Resources 
Interviewees, within the planning stage, were of the opinion that in order to implement the plan 
properly, adequate financial resources should be allocated. Resources allocated should depend 
on accurate estimations. In a similar way, the Planning Department (2015) suggest three 
recommendations as follows:  
a. Necessary funds should be allocated to provide financial resources. 
b. Provide financial resources necessary for the implementation of a risk reduction 
program which seeks to guarantee disaster mitigation. 
c.  Propose determining the amount of emergency funds that can be easily disseminated 
in emergency situations. 
Similarly, Wehbe (2013) stressed ensuring the availability of regional, national and local 
financial reserves and applying precautionary mechanisms that are known to all concerned 
parties to ensure an effective response and recovery when needed. Moreover, analysing the 
existing and emerging financial mechanisms for disaster risk reduction as well as identifying 
and developing the most efficient means to risk transfer and to fund it. Moreover, Humayun 
and Al-Abyadh (2014) recommended increasing the contingency reserve appropriations to 10% 
of the federal budget. Unused allocations may be rolled over to subsequent years in order to 
build up a reserve fund for a response to large-scale disasters.  
5.6.7 Law Activation 
The Civil Defence Law 1978 was approved to provide clear relief and response mechanisms 
for addressing hazards. Thus, interviewees, within the planning stage, are of the opinion of 
activating the decisions of the civil defence services under Law No. 64 of 1978 amended 
by Act 44 of 2013. In addition to this issue, Goodyear (2009) stressed that a structured and 
strategic agency responsible for policy formation, information sharing and the formulation of 
disaster management capacities in terms of early warning, preparedness, mitigation, relief, 
rehabilitation and recovery activities at the provincial and district level is essential and severely 
needed in Iraq. 
5.6.8 Employees' Rights 
The adoption of competence, experience, and personal preference for the field of work is one 
of the interviewees’ suggestions in accordance with the importance of staff wishes to work 
within a certain department. This theme emerged in the organising stage. Moreover, the 
interviewees proposed going back to the previous system of daily working hours for civil 
defence centres - 24 hours on and 48 hours off. Several interviewees pointed out the staff 
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rights to have their vacation outside Iraq, vacations to complement their studies, and 
health insurance in the Iraqi Acts and recommended activating certain paragraphs of these 
laws. Besides that, the problem of employees who are unfit to work is taken in interviewees’ 
consideration when they recommended to replace them by recruiting new employees with 
experience and transferring them to the Social Welfare organisation or to the morning shifts as 
administrators in civil defence centres.  
5.6.9 Attention for Obligations 
It is a widely held view that disaster response rules and principles should be given good 
attention in order to reduce human vulnerability. Various aspects regarding disaster response 
might be addressed by using such rules. Interviewees, within the directing stage, are of the 
opinion that there should be an adoption of the orders and instructions contained within the 
operations leadership curricula of the fire, rescue, and safety. Such adoption might be 
achieved by conducting a daily inspection of the work requirements. According to Handmer 
and Parker (1991), operational groups should contribute in developing general policies and 
guidelines which help to ensure that their actions contribute to disaster response priorities. 
5.6.10 Decision-Making 
Poor disaster management might be due to poor decision making. Therefore, efficient and 
effective decision-making needs to be investigated and understood, learned, practised, and 
effectively executed during the response (Sinclair et al., 2012). In addition, decision making 
must be flexible, responsive, and capable of reacting to the unexpected in a timely and effective 
manner. To do so, people in responsible places must carry out their duties or should get the 
required guidance and training (Withanaarachchi & Setunge, 2014). To enhance the response 
process, interviewees, within the controlling stage, recommended having central leadership 
with flexibility in decision-making for all incidents, however, Kapucu and Garayev (2011) 
put emphasis on a non-traditional approach and tools characterised by non-hierarchical 
structure and flexibility in decision-making. Kapucu and Garayev (2011) stated that because 
of the ineffectiveness of the traditional disaster management tools, the traditional approaches 
characterised by hierarchy and centralisation have been replaced by decentralised emergency 
management systems. Similarly, in Japan, the disaster management system is decentralised 
because decentralisation enables more government agencies to be involved in disaster 
management, although to various extents and bearing various responsibilities. By doing so, the 
overall disaster management system might be enhanced by fostering development disaster 
coping capability of each body or region individually (Nazarov, 2011). In a similar way, the 
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UNISDR and UNOCHA (2008) suggested that to implement the Hyogo Framework, 
responsibility should be decentralised for disaster risk reduction. Clearly, the literature and the 
primary data findings are in conflict here, the literature recommending decentralisation in 
disaster management, yet the interviewees in the Iraqi context felt that it was more important to 
have a centralised decision-making structure with some flexibility. Since this thesis focuses on 
the Iraqi context, centralisation with some flexibility is taken in the final recommendations 
made. 
Furthermore, interviewees recommended assessing the situation accurately to stop the 
improvisational behaviours. Based on Desforges and Waeckerle (1991), such an assessment 
should be taken by the most experienced senior person who takes charge of the scene to conduct 
an immediate survey of the area, the number of victims, and their injuries. While other 
interviewees put emphasis on the staff having input into decision making in terms of moving 
staff as required. Moreover, new control techniques that adapt the principle of reward, 
more than the principle of punishment, might be needed to raise and sustain morale. In 
agreement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2015) stressed that during the 
corrective action, a learning exercise should be considered by officers, if operations failed to 
go as planned. To do so, success or corrective action should be acknowledged, and similarly, 
mistakes should be learnt from and prevented from being made in the future, not to publicly 
embarrass those responsible for making them. Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) shed light on the 
importance of the correct information in decision making, stating that “in all phases of a disaster 
or serious accident, it is necessary for all those involved (citizens and government alike) to 
make decisions based on the most correct information”. Similarly, developing information 
and decision management competencies and procedures are probably needed to increase the 
effectiveness of the disaster response (Sinclair et al., 2012). Moreover, to achieve a balance 
between top-down and bottom-up influences, the versatility within the system must be known 
by decision makers at a high system level (Uhr et al., 2008). In addition to this issue, the 
capacity of practising managers should be updated and upgraded. Such capacity requires a 
continuing commitment from them to function in their specific areas of responsibility, while 
simultaneously adjusting their performance to the constraints and resources available in 
neighbouring jurisdictions (Comfort & Haase, 2006). In a similar way, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (2015), clarify the importance of immersing officers in corrective action 
exercises. The officers in such exercises can explain their responsibilities and actions during 
the incident, including admitting any tactical mistakes they may have made. 
259 
 
5.6.11 Risk Assessment 
To identify and assess the likelihood and consequences of potentially disastrous events, risk 
assessment is needed to provide information about the most important threats society faces and 
thereby contribute to a culture of risk amongst communities and individuals. Interviewees, 
within the controlling stage, assert that identifying, assessing, and monitoring all types of 
disaster risks is important, and the priority of these risks according to its geographical 
distribution. Wehbe (2013) supported this suggestion and recommended ensuring the 
availability of multiple risk assessments of national and local damage. Such risk 
assessments include key sectors with a focus on urban centres or settlements. Wehbe (2013) 
further recommended ensuring the existence of necessary institutional capacity to conduct an 
assessment of damage and losses. In agreement, Goodyear (2009), in his conclusions, asserts 
that to save lives and protect assets and resources before they are lost, greater attention should 
be paid to preventive strategies. Such tasks might require analysing different activities 
continuously, such as evaluating the capacity of key stakeholders and the most vulnerable 
groups to respond to threats/disasters at the time of local or national disasters, identifying 
hazards, describing, listing, and mapping of key hazards, and evaluating the geographical 
distribution of threats. However, Baker and Refsgaard (2007) put emphasis on determining the 
scale of the size of the disaster, to develop a response strategy and implement the plan by the 
institutions that are operating in the disaster response arena. 
 
5.7 Summary of the Recommendations 
In brief, sets of recommendations have emerged from both primary data and secondary data. 
Appendix L shows the first draft of these recommendations. The recommendation for the 
endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure was present in all disaster response 
management stages, while recommendations for education about disaster risk and coordination 
were made in three of these stages. However, themes related to having specialist staff appeared 
in two different stages. The rest of the suggestions were only present in one stage.  
Interestingly, the literature and the primary data findings were found to be in conflict, the 
interviewees felt that centralisation was a key point, but with some flexibility, yet the literature 
has consistently suggested that decentralisation is preferable in achieving better disaster 
management. Since this thesis focuses on the Iraqi context, centralisation with some flexibility 
is taken in the final recommendations made.  
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After completing the validation process, which is illustrated in the next section, the final sets of 
recommendations or themes will be finalised, after the refinement process.   
 
5.8 Validation 
Based on the primary data obtained from the semi-structured interview responses, the 
questionnaire, and the document analysis, as well as the secondary data that was compared and 
discussed in detail within the context of the research themes (see Section 5.6), sets of 
recommendations were suggested that enhance the current disaster response practices, in order 
to enhance the overall process to effectively respond to disaster (See Appendix L).  
With the intention of verifying and validating the recommendations, three executives 
responsible for disaster response in the main administration (purposely selected) from the Iraqi 
General Directorate of Civil Defence were invited to participate in semi-structured interviews.  
These groups of recommendations were examined in terms of appropriateness of the 
recommendation and whether they were classified appropriately under the different research 
themes.  
After giving the invitation letter (see Appendix K) and receiving participation agreement, the 
validity interviews were conducted with three experts involved with disaster response teams 
and who showed interest during the data collection stages for further support. The interviews 
with these experts were conducted in Arabic. Thus, their responses required translation after 
finishing the transcribing process. 
The validation interviews were executed at a suitable time for each interviewee. It took between 
30 to 35 minutes, where feedback was taken at the same time. Before starting the interviews, 
the interviewees were briefed on the current status of the case study in relation to the current 
disaster response practices, by presenting the findings in terms of recommendations to enhance 
the four Disaster Response Management stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and 
Controlling). Accordingly, these sets of recommendations were presented.  
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5.8.1 Refinement of the Recommendations 
In the previous section, the validation process of the recommendations was discussed and 
presented. To refine the recommendations, the interviewees were questioned about the 
appropriateness of the recommendation, and to check whether they were classified 
appropriately under the different research themes.  
A positive response was obtained combined with some amendments that were suggested to 
refine the recommendations related to the endowment of equipment, tools, and infrastructure, 
coordination, the planning process, employees' rights, financial resources, and law activation. 
All the interviewees were satisfied with the classification under the different research themes. 
Feedback was received from three experts in order to reshape the draft of the recommendations, 
and the final sets of recommendations were finalised after this validation process. The final 
recommendations, after validation, are shown below. 
 
5.9 Final Recommendations 
It can be seen from the recommendations below that few comments from experts suggested any 
improvements or changes; in fact, the experts felt that this was a true representation of the 
context of Iraq, thus the recommendations were clear and realistic, for the Iraqi context. This is 
an important point because there are different views expressed in the primary and the secondary 
data. For example, the experts suggested centralisation with some flexibility in decision 
making, and this has been adopted in the final recommendations. Where there were suggestions 
made, these have been incorporated and the recommendations modified to become the final 
recommendations as shown below. The following, therefore, are grouped into themes, for each 
of the final recommendations, and these are underlined below. 
5.9.1 Endowment of Equipment, Tools, and Infrastructure 
 More use of sophisticated equipment and machines, including special heavy rescue equipment 
to enable the response process to become faster and easier. 
 To link the directorates of civil defence with the e-government network for effective 
collaboration. 
 To set up effective early warning systems (or critical incident management) for all districts 
and towns, in order to prevent crises before they occur and to get prepared to deal with 
inevitable crises. 
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 To set up fire nozzles and security camera networks adhering to the required technical 
specifications by stakeholders or the authorities concerned. 
 To develop telecommunications and informatics in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces. 
 To increase the number of modern civil defence centres, especially in areas with high 
population increase. 
 To complete the database in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence by using the most 
up to date and globally progressive GIS information systems. 
 To use the mobile network to spread early warning messages and vital information to citizens 
prior to a disaster and/or aftermath of a disaster. 
 To invest in necessary technology and equipment, and build the technical capacity of 
organisations with early warning system and information dissemination functions. 
 
5.9.2 Education about Disaster Risk 
 To provide continuous training for staff, of all levels, by intensifying external and internal 
training courses in the field of disaster response. 
 To reactivate some sections of civil defence Law No. 44 of 2013 to facilitate teaching civil 
defence in the curriculum. 
 To provide education at all stages (primary, secondary, higher) to increase knowledge and 
awareness of disaster risks. 
 To educate the public through continuous communication, particularly through the media, to 
raise awareness about the role of civil defence in terms of disaster response. 
 To conduct joint exercises such as multifunctional exercises with the relevant organisations 
according to the emergency response plans. 
 To incorporate previous experience and global research on disasters when devising the 
response plan. 
 To conduct training and practices in decision-making. 
 To conduct a comprehensive risk assessment, to include vulnerability and available capacity 
at all levels and by multi-region. 
 Education and training must be both theoretical and practical with an emphasis on the 
integration of the theory learned into practice through the use of simulation. 
 To improve the value of citizen response by preparing citizens for specific incidents triggered 
by terrorism through the provision of regular training, campaigns and skill development 
programmes. 
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 To emphasise inclusivity, especially of gender, when providing education. 
 To enhance trust among the people towards the disaster responders. 
 
5.9.3 Coordination 
 To update the organisational structure of the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence 
regularly according to the current situation requirements. 
 To eliminate favouritism, nepotism and bias in work environments. 
 To increase the mobilisation speed of the various relevant agencies in various organisations 
by updating and testing of inter-institutional response. 
 To provide buildings with a specific location address such as a postcode by the authorities 
concerned. 
 To strengthen cooperation between Iraq and the surrounding countries with respect to disaster 
response, preparedness, and recovery. 
 To develop a response strategy and implement institutional plans in disaster response 
organisations. 
 To adapt new technologies that have emerged in recent years to enable better emergency 
response coordination, such as wireless mesh networks (CalMesh), sensor networks 
(ASPECT), knowledge management systems (RKBP), geographic information systems 
(CATS), communication standards (CAP), incident forecast and analysis programs 
(SLOSH), peer-to-peer communication platforms (Microsoft Groove), collaborative work 
systems (E-Team), and command and control systems (DisasterLAN). 
 Attention should be given to identify and coordinate organisational responsibilities. 
 To obtain disaster response expertise connecting groups in institutions. 
 To adopt new frameworks in disaster response that promote coordination, flexibility, and 
rapid response in order to achieve institutional development. 
 To create a sense of trust among the different stakeholders who are expected to work as a 
team. 
 
5.9.4 Planning Process 
 The staff at all levels and disciplines should be heard, consulted and cooperated with when 
making decisions about the response planning process. 
 To focus on disaster forecasting and monitoring. 
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 To prepare additional plans for different or unusual types of disaster. 
 To conduct regular meetings with all the officers and staff members to improve the planning 
process based on their feedback and experience. 
 To develop mechanisms, procedures, and systems to save and disseminate data concerned 
with hazard and recovery. 
 To introduce legislation to prepare plans and programs to reduce the potential for disaster 
risk, as well as find appropriate work environments for staff. 
 The availability of expertise must be taken into account when planning and preparing for a 
disaster. 
 To adopt a periodic review system of disaster management plans and test them in conditions 
similar to the actual situations of disaster and work to confront them. 
 To develop the plans by practising, evaluating, and re-planning the plans in order to develop 
appropriately matched institutional responses and be able to determine the scale of the 
disaster. 
 Planning should be "reality based", grounded in what is likely to happen rather than on myths 
and misconceptions long overturned by disaster research. 
 Unambiguous roles and responsibilities should be determined within disaster planning 
structures. 
 
5.9.5 Specialist Staff 
 To increase the number of specialised technical staff with competence and experience, 
together with academic qualifications. 
 
5.9.6 Employees' Rights 
 To employ motivated, competent and experienced staff in disaster response management.  
 To return to the previous system of daily working hours for civil defence centres - 24 hours 
on and 48 hours off. 
 To improve the approval process to enable staff to complete their education and to have their 
vacation outside Iraq. 
 To provide health insurance for staff. 
 To conduct periodic medical examinations. 
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 To replace employees who are unfit to work, by transferring them to the Social Welfare 
organisation or to the morning shift as administrators in civil defence centres. These staff 
could be replaced through the recruitment of new staff. 
 
5.9.7 Financial Resources 
 To allocate budgets based on appropriate estimations. 
 To improve the mechanism to mobilise funds to the necessary departments on time. 
 To make the availability of funds flexible depending on each emergency requirement. 
 To make funding authorisation process more flexible through the removal of ‘red tape’. 
 To reduce the number of committees in the budget approval and authorisation process. 
 To ensure the availability of regional, national and local financial reserves and apply 
precautionary mechanisms that are known to all concerned parties. 
 To analyse the existing and emerging financial mechanisms for disaster risk reduction. 
 To increase the contingency reserve appropriations to 10% of the federal budget. Unused 
allocations could be rolled over to subsequent years in order to build up a reserve fund for 
response to large-scale disasters. 
 
5.9.8 Attention for Obligations 
 Attention should be given to disaster response rules and principles. 
 To conduct daily inspection of the work requirements. 
 Operational groups should contribute in developing general policies and guidelines. 
 
5.9.9 Decision-Making 
 To provide central leadership with flexibility in decision-making. 
 To assess situations accurately and stop the improvisational behaviour. 
 New control techniques that adapt the principle of reward more than the principle of 
punishment might be needed to raise and sustain morale. 
 Efficient and effective decision-making needs to be investigated and understood, learned, 
practised, and effectively executed during the response. 
 To develop information and decision management competencies and procedures. 
 System versatility must be understood by decision makers at a high system level. 
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5.9.10 Law Activation 
 To activate all the decisions of the civil defence services under Law No. 64 of 1978 amended 
by Act 44 of 2013. 
 To improve clarity and transparency in the mechanisms of the declaration of an emergency. 
 To produce a unified national legal framework for disaster risk reduction and response. 
 To update the structure of the ministries to reflect the laws and regulations of disaster 
management. 
 
5.9.11 Risk Assessment 
 To identify, assess, and monitor all types of disaster risks, the priority of these risks according 
to its geographical distribution. 
 To ensure the availability of multiple risk assessments of national and local damage in areas 
including key sectors with a focus on urban centres or settlements. 
 To ensure the existence of necessary institutional capacity to conduct an assessment of 
damage and loss. 
 To determine the scale and size of the disaster. 
 
Having represented the final modified recommendations, which were grouped under eleven 
different themes, these are presented in Figure 5.2 below. This is a PEST analysis diagram, 
which is a business tool to classify different factors, which influence a phenomenon such as a 
disaster response management, into political, economic, sociocultural and technological factors. 
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Figure 5.2 Classification of Study Recommendations into PEST Factors 
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5.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the data analysis and findings of the single case study. The findings, 
which emerged from the primary data analysis of the three methods presented in the previous 
chapter (disaster response expert interviews, questionnaire survey, and document analysis) 
were discussed, in conjunction with the data obtained from previous scholars in the secondary 
data. Different sub-themes have been presented and discussed in the context of the main themes: 
weaknesses, strengths, and recommendations, within the four Disaster Response Management 
stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling) through conducting a cross 
analysis approach between these stages. The majority of the sub-themes are extracted from the 
interview data. Therefore, the organisation of the structure of the findings is similar to the 
interview themes and sub-themes discussed in Chapter 4. 
Apropos weaknesses, twenty-six points of weakness were identified. Two of these weaknesses 
emerged in all four stages of disaster response management, namely, coordination between 
organisations and commanding the scene and endowment of equipment, tools, and 
infrastructure; whereas nine points of weakness appeared in two different stages. The rest of 
the weaknesses appeared in only one stage. The majority of these points emerged from both 
primary and secondary data. Notably, eight themes emerged from only the primary data, such 
as the difficulties in reaching the disaster scene, the security situation, unplanned random 
development, misuse of machinery, equipment and materials, employees' rights, staff 
movement and reduction of sections, frequent blackouts of the National Electricity, and morale 
and financial incentives. Only one theme, that of trust, emerged in the secondary data, yet did 
not appear in the primary data. Interestingly, the weaknesses determined either stem from 
external challenges or are present within the internal disaster response management system. 
Citizens’ irresponsible interventions, the security situation itself, coordination between 
organisations, and unplanned random developments are some of the weaknesses that were 
recognised as external challenges. Besides the external challenges, some of the internal 
weaknesses were the lack of staff education, financial resources in the administration, the 
planning process and supporting documentation available.  
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, a number of strengths were elicited from the cross 
analysis within the case study. An important finding, within this section, is that some strengths 
were also discussed as being weaknesses; that is, the themes appeared in both sections. 
Moreover, to complete the evaluation to the current disaster response practices, sets of 
recommendations were suggested, to enhance the overall process to effectively respond to a 
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disaster. Through conducting validity interviews with three disaster response experts, in order 
to verify and validate these recommendations, the suggested refinements for the 
recommendations were incorporated into the final recommendations. There was general 
agreement between the primary and secondary data findings, however, there was one point that 
differed: the centralisation (primary) or decentralisation (literature) in decision making. The last 
section of this chapter presented the refinement process and showed the final recommendations. 
This chapter has illustrated the findings of the single case study. The succeeding chapter draws 
up conclusions by linking the objectives of the study with the overall research findings from 
the primary and secondary data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
270 
 
 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
After presenting the data analysis of the single case study for each of the interviews, 
questionnaire survey, and document analysis in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 included a combined 
approach, between interviewee opinions and the key issues derived from literature, by using 
cross analysis. By using such an approach, weaknesses, strengths, and recommendations within 
the four Disaster Response Management stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and 
Controlling) were discussed. In this concluding chapter, the results of the overall study will be 
summarised to identify the main conclusions and recommendations of this research.  
Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, the achievement of each 
objective of the study is discussed. Secondly, theoretical and practical implications are given. 
Thirdly, the limitations of the study are presented. Finally, further research areas are suggested. 
 
6.2 Synthesis on the Objectives of the Study 
As presented in Chapter 1, this study aimed to evaluate and make recommendations to disaster 
response management in Iraq with particular reference to terrorism, because this area of study 
is important and the gap emerged from the literature review on the paucity of studies carried 
out (see Section 1.2). To meet the aim of this research, sets of objectives and research questions 
were developed. Five research objectives and five research questions have been examined to 
achieve the aim of this study (see Section 1.3). Through obtaining four types of input, namely 
the literature review, the semi-structured interviews, the questionnaire survey, and the 
document analysis, these five research objectives were achieved. The sections that follow will 
summarise and present the key findings related to each research objective of the study.  
 
6.3 Objective 1: Critically Review the Significance and the Challenges 
of Disaster Management in General and the Disaster Response 
Management Stage in Particular. 
This objective has been achieved by reviewing the literature in both languages (English and 
Arabic). The importance of reviewing the Arabic literature is to identify the related 
terminologies and how those terminologies were used and adopted in the Arabic literature. 
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Various academic papers, articles, professional blogs and experts’ websites, books were 
reviewed.  
It is widely acknowledged that disaster management is a very complex, difficult, and dangerous 
activity (see Section 2.7). Disaster management aims to reduce the likelihood of a major 
incident or disaster occurring, so that the consequences of these incidents will minimise when 
they occur. Accordingly, disaster management aims to be proactive. To conduct proper disaster 
management, the sequence of activities that are logical, integrated and progressive should be 
acted as a cycle called the Disaster Management Cycle (see Section 2.7.1). There are different 
phases of this cycle, such as response, reconstruction, mitigation, and preparedness. Different 
scholars use the same concepts for these phases but in different terms. One of the most critical 
phases of the Disaster Management life cycle is the response phase, identified in disaster 
research literature (see Section 2.8). The complexity of the disaster response mission, in some 
cases, will be increased due to the high volume of potential casualties as well as the urgency of 
a fast response. In addition, as delays of minutes can cost lives and property, and because the 
impact of disaster on affected victims will be decreased by conducting an efficient response, 
there are critical needs for developing an effective and efficient disaster response strategy and 
rapid deployment of resources (e.g. medical resources, food, clothing, shelter, etc.) whenever 
disasters strike. Therefore, such critical need creates an economically costly and complex 
planning paradigm. Further, since disaster demands critical decisions that must be made in 
difficult circumstances, it was considered that responding to a disaster is a serious challenge. 
Because of the immediate risk of significant loss, stress, and time pressure, disaster response 
presents a unique environment. This environment is constantly changing, and the response 
activities during a disaster must operate in this environment. Therefore, if the disaster has 
caused large amounts of damage over a wide area with numerous unforeseen events, mounting 
a rapid and accurate response is difficult. Accordingly, to operate response activities in a 
constantly changing environment calls for a distinct research effort. In particular, since 9/11, 
there have been significant efforts to suggest improvements in the ability to respond to disasters. 
Moreover, many challenges facing disaster response management in different aspects and in 
various countries have emerged and been discussed by reviewing the literature, as shown in 
Section 2.9. These challenges have been categorised into challenges during the planning, 
organising, directing, and controlling phases. By doing so, elements of good practice in disaster 
response management have been extracted (see Appendix B) and categorised into four disaster 
response management stages (see Appendix C). 
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As previously stated, Disaster Management has four stages, namely, response, reconstruction, 
mitigation, and preparedness. One of the most critical phases of the Disaster Management Life 
Cycle is the response phase, as delays of minutes can cost lives and property. Further, Disaster 
Response Management (in all four stages) faces various challenges and obstacles from different 
aspects and in various countries. 
6.4 Objective 2: Evaluate and Synthesise the Current Status of Disaster 
Response Management Stemming from Terrorism in Iraq. 
The literature review demonstrated that extensive research has been carried out on disaster 
management but none of them has been created to adequately cover the problem of disaster 
response management in Iraq. In terms of Iraqi contexts, only three studies, which focussed on 
disaster management in Iraq have been found and reviewed (see Section 2.13.1). Two of these 
studies have focused on human-made calamities such as conflicts, terrorism, and industrial 
hazards because of the longstanding conflict and wars in Iraq. 
Responses to catastrophic events, in Iraq, depend on the assets and manpower of the central and 
provincial government and with assistance from non-governmental agencies and international 
donors. The Iraqi disaster response management has a number of issues, which hinder its 
success. The post-war transitions in Iraq have affected the institutional capacities of the state to 
respond in an efficient manner. Furthermore, it appears that the lack of a national platform to 
organise the efforts of multiple institutions at all tiers of government have serious limitations 
for the current institutional and legislative systems for DRR. Moreover, no rigorous effort has 
been made to institute a comprehensive disaster risk management framework due to a lower 
frequency of natural disasters in recent years. In addition to that, there are a number of laws, 
which were enacted prior to 2003 and are directly related to DRM/R such as the Emergency 
Use Law 1969, Civil Defence Law 1978 and Public Health Law 1981. Nevertheless, these laws 
have yet to be synchronised with the emerging legal and institutional arrangements in post-2005 
Iraq. Such laws do not take account of disaster contingency planning. This means that the 
development of institutional and legislative systems for DRR has a reactive approach. Literature 
revealed that the primary constraints that impede the disaster response capacity of civil services 
institutions are inadequate fiscal resources and manpower as well as a reservation to align 
themselves with government systems. Besides that, Iraq’s institutional disaster management 
ability is restricted, both on the national and subnational fields. Further, there is a lack of 
comprehensive and coordinated disaster management system of risk management in Iraq. 
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Literature suggested that the social work play a key overall role in responding to strategies that 
create a disaster, and in avoiding human-made disaster. Moreover, the social development 
strategies and human rights principles should be promoted by professionals through political 
practice and within social work education to face human-made disasters.  
To conclude, Iraq and the Middle Eastern region of the world do not receive adequate coverage 
in the disaster literature. Moreover, there is a dearth of research on the impact the current 
disaster response status in Iraq has had in addressing the problems, as very little empirical data 
is available in this context. In addition, disaster risk reduction (DRR) in Iraq requires effective 
disaster preparedness and response mechanisms, people-centered early warning systems, 
responsible enforcement of policies and legislation, careful development planning, scientific 
knowledge, public understanding, and political and legal commitment. 
6.5 Objective 3: Critically Evaluate the Weaknesses in the Disaster 
Response Management Stage with Particular Reference to Iraq. 
By obtaining the theoretical understanding from completing the first and second objective, the 
researcher invests it in designing both of the semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire 
survey in order to achieve the third, fourth, and fifth objective. By participating in different 
conferences with theory-based papers (see Appendix A), the researcher was helped to bring to 
light her theoretical knowledge and to draw the route towards the empirical phase of this study. 
To conduct a proper evaluation of the current disaster response practices, a comprehensive 
literature review was conducted. By reviewing a large amount of literature from overall the 
world, a number of good practices for disaster response management were identified (see 
Appendix B). To evaluate each stage of the four Disaster Response Management stages in Iraq 
(Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling), the identified elements were categorised by 
these management stages (see Appendix C). By doing so, the questionnaire survey design was 
obtained (see Appendix E). Such questionnaire intends to capture the difference between the 
levels of importance and implementation of the elements of good practice disaster response 
management, and to identify the overall gaps in every stage of disaster response management 
in Iraq.  
To meet this objective, the data were collected from both primary and secondary data. Apropos 
primary data, the semi-structured interviews, the questionnaire survey, and the document 
analysis were conducted to provide insight into the dynamic nature of the Iraqi civil defence 
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response to acts of terrorism and large-scale destruction. A single holistic case study approach 
was adopted with these three different data collection techniques. Such triangulation in data 
collection enhances the possibility of obtaining rich and comprehensive data. The research 
presented data from the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence. 
According to the findings of this study, twenty-six weaknesses emerged from both primary and 
secondary data (see Section 5.2). Two of these weaknesses appeared in all four stages of disaster 
response management, namely, coordination between organisations and commanding the scene 
and endowment of equipment, tools, and infrastructure; whereas nine points of weakness 
appeared in two different stages. The rest of the weaknesses appeared in only one stage. The 
majority of these points emerged from both primary and secondary data. Interestingly, eight 
themes emerged from only the primary data, such as the difficulties in reaching the disaster 
scene, the security situation, unplanned random development, misuse of machinery, equipment 
and materials, employees' rights, staff movement and reduction of sections, frequent blackouts 
of the National Electricity, and morale and financial incentives. Only one theme, that of trust, 
emerged in the secondary data, yet did not appear in the primary data.  
Most significantly, many of the shortcomings pointed out in the current disaster response 
management consist of weaknesses that are internal to the General Directorate of Civil Defence, 
such as education about disaster risk, endowment of equipment, financial resources, the 
planning process, and supporting ordinances; and that are external to the General Directorate 
of Civil Defence, such as citizens’ irresponsible interventions, the particular security situation, 
coordination of organisations, and unplanned random building development.  
In general, overall gaps during disaster response management in Iraq were identified by using 
good practice disaster response management factors. Moreover, the capacities of the current 
disaster response management in responding to disaster incidents, compared to established 
disaster response management factors when responding to human-made hazards, was reviewed 
(See Appendix E). By doing so, twenty-six weaknesses emerged from both primary and 
secondary data. It was revealed that good practices for disaster response management are not 
sufficiently implemented when compared with the importance attached to them. 
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6.6 Objective 4: Critically Evaluate the Strengths in the Disaster 
Response Management Stage with Particular Reference to Iraq 
According to the findings in Chapter 4, nine points of strengths have emerged from both the 
primary and the secondary data. Through conducting cross-analyses of the four Disaster 
Response Management stages in Iraq (Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling), the 
findings show that two points of strength, namely, endowment of equipment, tools and 
infrastructure and disaster response team characteristics appeared in three different stages, 
while the rest of the strength points appeared in only one stage. An important finding is that 
some strengths were also discussed as being weaknesses, that is, the themes appeared in both 
sections.  
To conclude, nine points of strengths of the current disaster response practices were identified, 
in order to make recommendations to improve the immediate response system to serve Iraq’s 
disaster management in the future.   
6.7 Objective 5: Make Recommendations to Improve the Effectiveness 
of Disaster Response Management Stemming From Terrorism in 
Iraq 
The recommendations of this study were created to enhance disaster response management in 
Iraq through a series of expert interviews (see Sections 4.3.3, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 4.6.3); document 
analyses (see Section 4.10 and Appendix I), and a comprehensive literature review (see Chapter 
2). The recommendation for the endowment of equipment, tools, and infrastructure was present 
in all disaster response management stages, while recommendations for education about 
disaster risk and coordination were made in three of these stages. However, themes related to 
having specialist staff appeared in two different stages. The rest of the suggestions were only 
present in one stage. 
Sets of recommendations emerged from this study, prior to validation (see Appendix L). After 
validation, the final set of recommendations were identified (see Section 5.9). The final sets of 
recommendations were made up of different themes and also, interestingly, one of the 
recommendations had a different focus in the Iraqi context, in that the generic literature 
recommended decentralisation as the best way forward in a disaster management context; yet, 
the Iraqi experts recommended that centralisation (with some flexibility) was preferable. The 
latter was adopted in this study.  
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The final sets of recommendations, which were grouped under eleven different themes, were 
further classified under the PEST business tool to show the influence of political, economic, 
sociocultural and technological factors on disaster response management. 
To summarise, eleven sets of recommendations were identified in this study, after the validation 
process, to improve the immediate response system to serve Iraq’s disaster management in the 
future. Such sets of recommendations were linked to the PEST business tool to show how these 
recommendations influence different sectors of society.  
6.8 Contribution to Theory 
Although there is extensive literature on disaster studies in developed countries, there is a dearth 
of literature in the context of developing countries. Because very little research has been 
conducted in Iraq and in the Arab World more generally, this research contributes to the disaster 
literature in a developing country context, as it is unique in its findings. This uniqueness is 
because of the very limited attempts that have been made in the past to explore disaster response 
management in Iraq, possibly due to the difficulty in collecting data during terrorism activities. 
Therefore, this research helps to provide insight into the dynamic of the Iraqi civil defence 
response to acts of terrorism and large-scale destruction, besides offering ideas for lines of 
further inquiry. Exploring and evaluating the current situation related to disaster response 
management in Iraq has been identified as a way of addressing the problems faced, by 
effectively responding to disasters stemming from terrorism in Iraq. Information was collected 
to prepare this research on the current state of disaster response in Iraq. The character and nature 
of Iraq’s hazards, particularly human-made ones, and their risk of becoming a complex disaster 
was sought. Besides that, challenges and obstacles facing disaster response management 
throughout the world were reviewed. Thus, this study contributes to theory by identifying 
various types of challenges facing disaster response management globally. In addition to that, 
primary data, collected and analysed in Chapter 4, has not been published before. Therefore, it 
is expected to be the main contribution to theory.  
Further, the proposed recommendations complement the existing literature, since one particular 
finding was different to the previous study. Previous studies had found that decentralisation 
was the good practice solution; however, in the Iraqi context, this was found to be inappropriate 
and in fact, centralisation with an element of flexibility was found to be more suitable, thereby 
further enriching the knowledge of disaster response management.  
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In addition, this research has been prepared with the overall goal of enhancing the 
understanding of the current state of disaster response management stemming from terrorism 
in Iraq. To assess the level of response to human-made disasters, a review of existing disaster, 
particularly terrorism, was undertaken. Besides that, elements and factors that influence the 
disaster response management process were found in the literature. Overall gaps during disaster 
response management in Iraq were identified by using these factors. Moreover, the capacities 
of the current disaster response management in responding to disaster incidents, compared to 
established disaster response management factors when responding to human-made hazards, 
was reviewed (See Appendix E). The original contribution to knowledge is the identification of 
these good practice disaster response management factors. Further, this research contributed to 
knowledge by identifying the weaknesses and the strengths of the current disaster response 
practices and analysed all the problems and the defects in every element, in order to make 
recommendations to improve the immediate response system to serve Iraq’s disaster 
management in the future.  
6.9 Contribution to Practice 
By conducting a proper evaluation of the current disaster response practices through identifying 
points of weakness, strengths, and recommendations, the response process in its four stages 
(Planning, Organising, Directing, and Controlling) will be improved, which will ultimately 
minimise the loss of life and damage to property. By proposing sets of recommendations for 
the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence, this will raise awareness and possibly address 
these weaknesses and enhance disaster response practices. Addressing these weaknesses will 
help to improve Iraq’s ability to respond more effectively and efficiently to disasters. Besides 
that, enhancing disaster response practices will increase the level of resilience of society by 
improving their knowledge and awareness of disaster risks and training them in how to act in a 
disaster situation. Suggesting these sets of recommendations to stakeholders in the Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior/ the General Directorate of Civil Defence means they will, at least, be 
considered in the development of programs that will contribute to strengthening disaster 
response management in the future. Accordingly, the national disaster response management at 
the central, regional, governorate and community levels in Iraq will strengthen. Moreover, the 
capacity building and institutional development support on disaster response management in 
Iraq will develop. Furthermore, this study not only proposes sets of recommendations, but it 
also reveals the value of disaster management in general and the disaster response management 
stage in particular. 
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Decision makers in the government in Iraq can benefit from this research in their mission to 
meet the disaster response management knowledge needs. At the same time, their mission to 
educate the disaster response professionals working in the disaster management sector in Iraq 
can be promoted by considering the outcomes of this study. This will, in turn, enhance a quick 
response performance of all disaster management authorities. 
To respond successfully to disaster, the factors of good practice disaster response management 
identified should be carefully considered for effective disaster management. By considering 
these factors, organisations will be aware of their needs, problems, and the defects in every 
element. To improve the response process, organisations need to be aware of their needs and 
coordinate with those organisations that can fulfil their needs.  
This research might also be used in other countries that are at risk of human-induced hazard. 
However, the context of Iraq is very particular and so careful consideration must be exercised 
to ensure that the context is similar enough to warrant the findings being used elsewhere. 
 
6.10 Limitations of the Study 
This section presents the limitations of this research. The main limitations of this study relate 
to different points. 
1. There is a lack of secondary data in terms of information and statistical data that are related 
to the research topic. Therefore, to increase the credibility of this research, the researcher 
obtained documents from different governmental organisations, such as the Iraqi Ministry 
of Interior, Iraqi Ministry of Health, and General Directorate of Civil Defence, in Baghdad. 
2. The main limitations that affected the study are the resources of time and money. For 
example, the embassy should be responsible for all payments for travel expenses, however, 
due to the unsettled situation, the researcher paid for this. In terms of a time resource, strikes 
by transportation staff meant that sometimes roads were blocked and interviews had to be 
rescheduled or postponed. 
3. During the researcher’s IA exam, the research situation was discussed; the researcher was 
potentially open to two types of risk. The first risk was collecting the data from Iraq, in 
being exposed to terrorism activities. For example, the place where the interviews were 
conducted has been attacked by terrorists at least 3 times. The second risk was accessing 
the websites related to terrorist activity, controlled by the government in the UK. In order 
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to minimise this limitation, the required procedures were followed and approved by the 
University of Salford. 
4. Due to the strict security restrictions in all the governmental institutions, all electronic 
devices were confiscated, including recording devices, therefore the interviews could not 
be recorded, which meant that the transcription process became more difficult. 
5. The interviewees could not provide their contact number, due to the sensitive workplace 
and concerns about personal safety. The situation there is very unstable and sometimes they 
have to leave their workplace for urgent reasons. 
6. The researcher could not conduct more than one interview on any given day, also the 
interviews were sometimes disrupted, so it was either completed on the same day or 
completed another day; this is all due to the unsettled situation. 
7. There were personal limitations during this study, including the amount of travel time to 
and from interviews, which happened to be during Ramadan, and the extremely hot weather 
conditions, which often reached more than 50 degrees. There is a law in Iraq that states that 
when the temperature exceeds 50 degrees, a national holiday is announced. The researcher 
faced this issue 3 times during data collection, thus putting, even more, pressure on time 
allocation. Other months of the year would have been more comfortable, but family 
commitments meant that data collection had to be conducted during the summer school 
holidays. Personal circumstances meant that there was no other option. All of these factors 
limited the primary data collection. 
8. Some of the information obtained for this thesis is extremely sensitive in political terms. 
The researcher had to convince the primary data providers that this work would only be 
published in academic journals or conferences, not published in the media.  
9. There were cultural limitations in terms of gender; all of the institutions employ males, the 
researcher is female, and this restricted actions.  
10. There were difficulties in translating the specific terminology. Many meetings were held 
with English language experts to ensure that the transcription was accurate. 
11. The hardest experience, and therefore a limitation, was when interviewees expressed grief 
and horror about terrorist attacks, about people being killed and injured, people being burnt, 
and other such horrific incidents. This affected normal sleep patterns and caused upset to 
the researcher. 
 
280 
 
6.11 Further Research 
Further research could be conducted to build on the foundation laid in this thesis to further 
enhance knowledge in disaster response management. The following are some suggested future 
areas of work. 
1. Similar studies with a different research boundary. 
There are a number of stakeholders involved during the disaster response stage in Iraq; 
namely, the General Directorate of Civil Defence, the Health Department, NGOs, and the 
Iraqi Red Crescent Society. For this study, the case study boundary was the General 
Directorate of Civil Defence. Thus, further research could be conducted on evaluating 
disaster response management in other key sectors, such as the Health Department, NGOs, 
and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. 
2. Similar studies with different units of analysis. 
The unit of analysis of this study was disaster response management - one of four different 
stages for disaster management; namely, response, reconstruction, mitigation, and 
preparedness. However, future studies could be carried out on different disaster management 
stages. 
3. Similar studies with different contexts. 
Recently, terrorist activities are a reality not only in Iraq and the Middle East but throughout 
the world. Therefore, future studies could be carried out in countries at risk of human-
induced hazards, such as Syria, Libya, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  
4. Similar studies with different scenarios, such as the response to floods, volcanoes, fires or 
any natural disaster. Insights into different types of disasters can help to identify different 
needs for the disaster response process. 
5. Management of the Mosul Dam. 
The Mosul Dam, in Iraq, is vulnerable to attack from terrorists or from a lack of regular 
maintenance, due to terrorist attacks on the nearby city of Mosul. If this dam were to 
collapse, it would cause a natural disaster on a large scale. According to Filkins (2017), large 
parts of Mosul would be submerged in less than three hours, and riverbanks, towns, and 
cities containing the heart of Iraq’s population would be flooded. He said that in four days, 
a wave as high as sixteen feet would hit Baghdad, a city of six million people, putting as 
many as 1.5 million lives at risk (Filkins, 2017). 
 
281 
 
6.12 Summary of Contribution to Knowledge 
The main findings of this study, obtained from both primary data and secondary data, has been 
summarised in this chapter. Although disaster response management is generally accepted as 
being important, no single study exists which adequately covers the problem of disaster 
response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq. Through conducting this study, this 
gap was identified and addressed. Meanwhile, it contributes to the knowledge as follows: 
 Drawing up the challenges facing disaster response management throughout the world 
in general, and those facing the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence in 
particular. 
 Identifying the factors of good practice in disaster response management. 
 Identifying the overall gaps during disaster response management in Iraq. 
 Identifying points of weakness and strengths on the current disaster response practices in 
Iraq. 
 Proposing sets of recommendations for the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence. 
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 ELEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICE DISASTER 
RESPONSE MANAGEMENT 
Author Good Practice 
(Carreño et al., 
2007) 
 
(Carreño et al., 
2005) 
 
(Cardona, 
2005) 
 
(Cardona, 
2006) 
Identification of risk (Cardona, 2005; Carreño et al., 2005; Carreño et al., 
2007) 
 
1) Systematic disaster and loss inventory. 
2) Hazard monitoring and forecasting. 
3) Hazard evaluation and mapping. 
4) Vulnerability and risk assessment. 
5) Public information and community participation. 
6) Training and education on risk management. 
 
 risk reduction 
1) Risk consideration in land use and urban planning. 
2) Hydrographical basin intervention and environmental protection. 
3) Implementation of hazard-event control and protection 
techniques. 
4) Housing improvement and human settlement relocation from 
prone-areas. 
5) Updating and enforcement of safety standards and construction 
codes. 
6) Reinforcement and retro fitting of public and private assets. 
 
 disaster management 
 
1) Organization and coordination of emergency operations. 
2) Emergency response planning and implementation of warning 
systems. 
3) Endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure. 
4) Simulation, updating and test of inter institutional response. 
5) Community preparedness and training. 
6) Rehabilitation and reconstruction planning.  
 
 governance and financial protection 
1) Interinstitutional, multisectoral and decentralizing organization. 
2) Reserve funds for institutional strengthening. 
3) Budget allocation and mobilization. 
4) Implementation of social safety nets and funds response. 
5) Insurance coverage and loss transfer strategies of public assets. 
6) Housing and private sector insurance and reinsurance coverage.  
(Quarantelli, 
1997a) 
 
(Quarantelli, 
1997b) 
 
(Hughey, 
2008) 
1) Correctly recognising differences between response and agent-
generated demands. 
2) Adequately carrying out generic functions. 
3) Effectively mobilising personnel and resources. 
4) Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division of 
labour. 
5) Adequately processing information. 
6) Properly exercising decision-making. 
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7) Developing overall coordination. 
8) Blending emergent and established organisational behaviours. 
9) Providing appropriate reports for the news media. 
10) Having a well-functioning emergency operations centre (Hughey, 
2008; Quarantelli, 1997a, 1997b). 
(Henstra, 2010) Response Policies (Henstra, 2010) 
1) Emergency operations centre. 
2) Incident management system. 
3) Evacuation plan. 
4) Emergency shelter arrangements. 
5) Volunteer management. 
6) Community emergency response teams. 
7) Search and rescue. 
8) Emergency public information. 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
critical success factors for successful disaster management (Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006) 
1) Effective institutional arrangement. 
2) Coordination and collaboration. 
3) Supportive laws and regulations. 
4) Effective information management system. 
5) Competencies of managers and team members. 
6) Effective consultation with key stakeholders and target 
beneficiaries. 
7) Effective communication mechanism. 
8) Clearly defined goals and commitments by key stakeholders. 
9) Effective logistics management. 
10) Sufficient mobilization and disbursement of resources(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 2006). 
(Faulkner, 
2001) 
Ingredients of the tourism disaster management planning process and its 
outcomes should include: (Faulkner, 2001) 
1) Risk assessment. 
2) Prioritisation. 
3) Protocols. 
4) Community capabilities audit. 
5) Disaster management command centre. 
6) Media and monitoring activities. 
7) Warning systems. 
8) Flexibility. 
9) Involvement, education and review. 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
The information requirements for Emergency Response stage :(Wallace 
& De Balogh, 1985) 
 
* Have EOC alert procedures been initiated and what is the detailed status 
of EOC mobilization? 
* What situation assessment procedures have been initiated? How is the 
damage reporting system operating? 
* What are our inventories of emergency resources and where are they 
located? 
* What local jurisdictions may be involved? 
* What "imminent danger" conditions (e.g., dam break) exist? 
286 
 
* What key officials need to be briefed and what is the required 
information needed for the briefing? 
* What emergency e evacuation requirements are there and where? 
* What non-EOC organisations must be mobilized for emergency 
response? 
* Have requirements assessment and legal procedures for requesting 
short-term emergency state and federal assistance been initiated? 
(Burling & 
Hyle, 1997; 
Quarantelli, 
1984) 
Disaster preparedness (Burling & Hyle, 1997, pp. 234-235; Quarantelli, 
1984, pp. 5-24) 
The Disaster Research Centre promotes the following general principles 
of disaster preparedness planning: 
• convening meetings for the purpose of sharing information; 
• holding disaster drills, rehearsals and simulations; 
• developing techniques for training, knowledge transfer and assessments; 
• formulating memoranda of understanding and mutual aid agreements; 
• educating the public and others involved in the planning process; 
• obtaining, positioning and maintaining relevant material resources; 
• undertaking public educational activities; 
• establishing informal linkages between involved groups; 
• thinking and communicating information about future dangers and 
hazards; 
• drawing up organizational disaster plans and integrating them with 
overall community-mass-emergency plans; and continually updating 
obsolete materials/strategies. 
(Fischer, 2005) Fischer (2005) presented three factors which effected the organizational 
response, namely, the extent to which emergency plans are rehearsed, the 
degree of prior disaster experience, and the level of prior planning. 
(Zhou, Huang, 
& Zhang, 2011) 
 
* Well-planned emergency relief supply system 
* Reasonable organizational structure and clear awareness of 
responsibilities 
* Applicable emergency response plan and regulations 
* Financial ensuring measures and prior planning of logistic centers and 
shelters 
* Education campaign on disaster prevention and response 
* Specific training of professionals such as rescue workers and medical staff 
* Strong ability to send out specific early warning about potential hazards 
* Regular organization of simulated disaster exercise 
* Very short response time to start the emergency plan 
* Government unity of leadership to plan and coordinate as a whole 
* The involvement and support of army 
* Timely and accurate relief needs assessment 
* The security of relief aids during distribution and transportation 
* Clear procedure of reporting and submitting information 
* Effective emergency information system to ensure information 
transferring 
* Application of modern logistics technology 
* Reconstruction and staff comforting 
* Statistics and feedback of loss information 
* Evaluation on the efficiency and effectiveness of the management system 
* Continuous improvement of the operational system of emergency 
management 
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(Terawi, 2008) 1) Information and Communication 
A) Information exchanging between employees in the organization refers to 
the disaster 
B) Transferring information about the disaster to the public from the 
organization or vice versa 
C) Information sharing between the various relevant agencies in various 
organisations  
2) The clarity of tasks and responsibilities 
3) The effectiveness of the incentives provided 
4) Coordination between organisations  and departments within the 
organization 
5) The availability of resources in the organization 
A) The ability to assess the resources availability  
B) The ability to inventory and unify the resources available 
(Lettieri et al., 
2009) 
The literature shows mainly two classifications of agents. On one hand Wybo 
and 
Kowalski (1998) argues a functional classification that they use for both 
actors and technologies. These classifications have been developed 
specifically for command centers. Agents are classified against four 
functions: 
(Committee 101) perception (data collecting and processing); 
(2) analysis (decision making); 
(Frykberg & Tepas 3rd) communication (inside organisations); and 
(4) information (communication outside organisations). 
On the other hand, authors such as Kreps (1983) and Perry (1991) argue a 
sectorial classification that defines the various sectors involved in disaster 
management. In detail they identify: 
. public sector (the most relevant and responsible actor); 
. private industry (including all economic sectors); and 
. volunteer agencies (i.e. Red Cross and NGOs).  
(Batho et al., 
1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluating the response 
On the positive side a number of factors were identified by those involved in 
responding to the devastation caused by the bombing as being helpful to the 
response process. 
 Pre-determined strategies 
 Training 
 Communication 
 Cordon access 
 Evacuation 
 The scale of the disaster 
 Lack of structures for recovery 
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 ELEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICE DISASTER 
RESPONSE MANAGEMENT CATEGORISED BY 
MANAGEMENT STAGES  
 
Author Stage Theme Good Practice 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) 
(Fischer, 2005) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, 
& Russell, 1999) 
Planning planning 
process 
- The extent to which emergency plans 
are rehearsed.  
- The level of prior planning. 
- Evacuation plan. 
- Prioritisation. 
- Educating the public and others 
involved in the planning process. 
- Drawing up organizational disaster 
plans and integrating them with overall 
community-mass-emergency plans; and 
continually updating obsolete 
materials/strategies. 
- Systematic disaster and loss inventory. 
- Risk consideration in land use and 
urban planning. 
- Hydrographical basin intervention and 
environmental protection. 
- Housing improvement and human 
settlement relocation from prone-areas. 
- Reinforcement and retro fitting of 
public and private assets. 
- Emergency response planning and 
implementation of warning systems. 
- Endowment of equipments, tools and 
infrastructure. 
- Rehabilitation and reconstruction 
planning. 
- Well-planned emergency relief supply 
system 
- Applicable emergency response plan 
and regulations 
- Financial ensuring measures and prior 
planning of logistic centers and shelters 
- Government unity of leadership to plan 
and coordinate as a whole 
- Pre-determined strategies 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño et 
al., 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
Planning financial 
resources 
- Reserve funds for institutional 
strengthening. 
- Budget allocation and mobilization. 
- Implementation of social safety nets 
and funds response. 
- Insurance coverage and loss transfer 
strategies of public assets. 
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- Housing and private sector insurance 
and reinsurance coverage. 
- Financial ensuring measures and prior 
planning of logistic centers and shelters 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) 
Planning management 
framework and 
factors 
- Incident management system. 
- Updating and enforcement of safety 
standards and construction codes. 
 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
Planning program 
integration 
- Adequately carrying out generic 
functions. 
- Effective institutional arrangement. 
 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
Planning supporting 
ordinances 
- Supportive laws and regulations. 
- What local jurisdictions may be 
involved? 
- Have requirements assessment and 
legal procedures for requesting short-
term emergency state and federal 
assistance been initiated? 
- Applicable emergency response plan 
and regulations 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
(Batho, Williams, 
& Russell, 1999) 
Planning education 
about disaster 
risk 
- Involvement, education and review. 
- Community capabilities audit. 
- Undertaking public educational 
activities. 
- Training and education on risk 
management. 
- Community preparedness and training. 
- Education campaign on disaster 
prevention and response 
- Specific training of professionals such 
as rescue workers and medical staff 
- Training 
 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
Organising coordination 
problems 
- Developing overall coordination. 
- Generating an appropriate delegation of 
tasks and division of labour. 
- Volunteer management. 
- Search and rescue. 
- Coordination and collaboration. 
- Organisation and coordination of 
emergency operations. 
- Reasonable organizational structure and 
clear awareness of responsibilities 
- Regular organization of simulated 
disaster exercise 
- Government unity of leadership to plan 
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2011) and coordinate as a whole 
- The involvement and support of army 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
Organising “problem of 
interplay” 
coordination 
between the 
donor countries 
and the end 
beneficiaries 
- Protocols. 
- Formulating memoranda of 
understanding and mutual aid 
agreements. 
- Correctly recognising differences 
between response and agent-generated 
demands. 
- Blending emergent and established 
organisational behaviours. 
- Community emergency response teams. 
- Establishing informal linkages between 
involved groups. 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) (Fischer, 
2005) 
Organising hierarchy 
problems 
- Competencies of managers and team 
members. 
- The degree of prior disaster experience. 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) 
Organising deviant and 
chaotic 
- Implementation of hazard-event control 
and protection techniques. 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) 
(Fischer, 2005) 
Organising Centralized 
and 
decentralized 
- Properly exercising decision-making. 
- Effective consultation with key 
stakeholders and target beneficiaries. 
- Clearly defined goals and commitments 
by key stakeholders. 
- Flexibility. 
- Interinstitutional, multisectoral and 
decentralizing organization 
- The degree of prior disaster experience. 
-  
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Quarantelli, 
1984, pp. 5-24) 
Directing command 
centre 
- Emergency operations centre. 
- Adequately processing information. 
- Having a well-functioning emergency 
operations centre. 
- Effective information management 
system. 
- Disaster management command centre. 
- Media and monitoring activities. 
- Warning systems. 
- Have EOC (emergency operations 
centre) alert procedures been initiated 
and what is the detailed status of EOC 
mobilization? 
- What key officials need to be briefed 
and what is the required information 
needed for the briefing? 
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(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
(Batho, Williams, 
& Russell, 1999) 
- What non-EOC organisations must be 
mobilized for emergency response? 
- Convening meetings for the purpose of 
sharing information. 
- Thinking and communicating 
information about future dangers and 
hazards. 
- Hazard monitoring and forecasting. 
- Strong ability to send out specific early 
warning about potential hazards 
- Clear procedure of reporting and 
submitting information 
- Effective emergency information 
system to ensure information 
transferring 
- The scale of the disaster 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Enrico L 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño  et 
al., 2007)  
(Batho, Williams, 
& Russell, 1999) 
(Quarantelli, 
1988) 
Directing communication - Providing appropriate reports for the 
news media. 
- Emergency public information. 
- Effective communication mechanism. 
- Public information and community 
participation. 
- Communication 
- Intra- and inter-organisational 
behaviours between organisations. 
- From organisations to the public. 
- From the public to organisations. 
- Within systems of organisations. 
-  
(Zhou, Huang, & 
Zhang, 2011) 
(Batho, Williams, 
& Russell, 1999) 
Directing speed is 
typically 
essential 
- Very short response time to start the 
emergency plan 
- Cordon access 
- Evacuation 
(Hughey, 2008; 
Quarantelli, 
1997a, 1997b) 
(Henstra, 2010) 
(Moe & 
Pathranarakul, 
2006) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) (Zhou, 
Directing providing the 
right relief 
supplies for 
people in need 
at the right 
time 
- Effectively mobilising personnel and 
resources. 
- Emergency shelter arrangements. 
- Effective logistics management. 
- Sufficient mobilization and 
disbursement of resources. 
- What are our inventories of emergency 
resources and where are they located? 
- What emergency evacuation 
requirements are there and where? 
- obtaining, positioning and maintaining 
relevant material resources 
- Timely and accurate relief needs 
assessment 
- The security of relief aids during 
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Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
distribution and transportation 
- Application of modern logistics 
technology 
(Faulkner, 2001) 
(Wallace & De 
Balogh, 1985) 
(Burling & Hyle, 
1997, pp. 234-
235; Enrico Louis 
Quarantelli, 1984, 
pp. 5-24) 
(Cardona, 2005; 
Carreño et al., 
2005; Carreño et 
al., 2007) (Zhou, 
Huang, & Zhang, 
2011) 
Controlling Evaluations are 
critical 
- Risk assessment. 
- What situation assessment procedures 
have been initiated? How is the damage 
reporting system operating? 
- What "imminent danger" conditions 
(e.g., dam break) exist? 
- holding disaster drills, rehearsals and 
simulations; 
- Developing techniques for training, 
knowledge transfer and assessments. 
- Hazard evaluation and mapping. 
- Vulnerability and risk assessment. 
- Simulation, updating and test of inter 
institutional response. 
- Statistics and feedback of loss 
information 
- Evaluation on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the management 
system 
- Continuous improvement of the 
operational system of emergency 
management 
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 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Reference number  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Research Title: Evaluation of disaster response management in Iraq resulting from 
terrorism  
 
This questionnaire is based on an ongoing PhD which seeks to evaluate and synthesise the context of 
disaster response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq. The questionnaire intends to capture 
the difference between the levels of importance and implementation of the elements of the good 
practices disaster response management. As such this questionnaire is divided into 4 major sections 
based on the four functions of management planning, organising, directing and controlling. 
 
Section 1: General information. 
Section 2: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the planning stage. 
Section 3: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the organizing stage. 
Section 4: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the directing stage. 
Section 5: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the controlling stage. 
 
Scope: Is investigating disaster response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq.  
 
Confidentiality: The information collected will be used for the sole purpose of this study and for 
academic publications. The findings of the study will not be attributed to any specific personnel. 
Please return the completed questionnaire on or before: 
 
PhD Researcher                                                                    Supervisor 
Hajer Al-Dahash                                                                     Dr Udayangani Kulatunga 
Centre for Disaster Resilience, Room 346,                                  Email: U.Kulatunga@salford.ac.uk 
School of the Built Environment,                                             Tel: +44 (Committee 101) 161 295 6943    
University of Salford, 
Salford M5 4WT,  
UK 
Email: H.F.Al-Dahash@edu.salford.ac.uk 
Tel: +44(Committee 101)161 295 6942                                                                         
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Section 1: General information 
1. Your present job title: 
2. Years of experience in responding to disasters stemming from war operations and terrorism in 
Iraq: 
Note: The questionnaire is designed to capture 2 aspects of each element listed. One is the level of 
importance that each element has and the actual level of implementation of that element. As such you 
are required to tick 2 boxes either side of each indicator. 
Section 2: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the planning 
stage. 
The following tables present the elements of good practices disaster response management throughout 
different themes during the planning stage. Based on your experience, please tick the most appropriate 
box on the scale regarding the importance and implementation of the element during the planning stage. 
Elements of good Practices are defined as the set of factors which influence disaster response 
management.  
Planning is “selecting objectives and then establishing programs and procedures for achieving 
the objectives”. 
1. Planning process   طيطختلا ةيلمع 
The extent of importance  (ةيمهلأا ىدم)                                                                                  The extent of implementation  (قيبطتلا ىوتسم) 
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1 2 3 4 5  scale 1 2 3 4 5  
      The extent to which emergency plans are rehearsed 
ىلإ يأ ىدم متي بردتلا ىلع ططخ ئراوطلا 
      
      The level of prior planning 
ىوتسم طيطخت قبسم 
      
      Implementation of warning systems 
ذيفنت مظن راذنلإا 
      
      Existence of an evacuation plan 
دوجو ةطخ ءلاخلإا 
      
      Flexibility in switching to alternative plans 
ةليدب ططخ ىلإ لوحتلا يف ةنورملا 
      
      Drawing up organizational disaster plans and integrating 
them with overall community-mass-emergency plans. 
عضو ططخ ةيميظنت ةثراكلل اهجمدو عم ططخ ئراوطلا ةلماشلا عمتجملل 
      
      Pre-determined strategies 
افلس ةددحم تايجيتارتسلاا 
      
      Continually updating obsolete materials (documents) and 
strategies 
تنمزلا اهيلع افع يتلا تايجيتارتسلااو )قئاثولا( مزاوللا رارمتساب ثيدح 
      
      Systematically maintaining disaster and loss inventory 
ظافحلا ىلع درج ثراوكلا رئاسخلاو ةروصب ةمظتنم 
      
      Human settlement relocation from disaster prone-areas       
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ةداعإ وتنيط تانطوتسملا ةيرشبلا نم قطانملا ةضرعملا رطخل ةثراكلا 
      Endowment of equipment, tools and infrastructure 
فقولا نم تادعملا تاودلأاو ةينبلاو ةيتحتلا 
      
      Enforcement of safety standards and construction codes 
قيبطت ةملاسلاريياعم تانودمو اءانبل 
      
      Updating of safety standards and construction codes 
ثيدحت ريياعم ةملاسلا و تانودم ءانبلا 
      
      Well-planned emergency relief supply system 
ماظنل ديجلا طيطختلا تادادمإ ةثاغلإا يف تلااح ئراوطلا 
      
      Applicable emergency response plan  
ةطخ ةباجتسلاا يف تلااح ئراوطلا ةلباق قيبطتلل 
      
      Prior planning of public shelters 
طيطختلا قبسملا ئجلاملل ةماعلا 
      
      Prior planning of logistic centres  
طيطختلا قبسملا ةيتسجوللازكارملل  
      
      Government unity of leadership to plan as a whole 
ةموكحلا )قافتا( ةدحو يف ةدايق طيطختلا لكك 
      
2. Financial resources   ةيلاملا دراوملا  
 
      Reserve funds for institutional strengthening 
لاوملأا ةيطايتحلاا زيزعتلل يسسؤملا 
      
      Budget allocation  
) بيوبت( صيصخت ةينازيملا  
      
      Budget mobilization 
 كيرحت ةينازيملا  
      
3. Supporting ordinances ةمعادلا مظنلااة  
 
      Supportive laws and regulations 
نيناوقلا ةمظنلأاو ةمعادلا 
      
      The involvement of local jurisdictions 
كارشإ تاطلسلا ةيئاضقلا ةيلحملا 
      
      Legal procedures for requesting short-term emergency 
state and for initiating federal assistance  
 ريصقلا ىدملا ىلع ئراوطلا ةلاح بلطل ةينوناقلا تاءارجلإايف عورشللو 
ةيداحتلاا ةدعاسملا بلط 
      
      Applicable emergency response regulations 
جتسلاا حئاولةبا ئراوطلل قيطتلل ةلباق 
      
4. Education about disaster risk ثراوكلا رطاخم لوح ميلعتلا  
 
      Undertaking public educational activities 
مايقلا ةطشنأب فيقثت روهمجلا 
      
      Community capabilities audit 
تاردق ةعجارم / قيقدت عمتجملا 
      
      Involvement, education and review 
ةكراشم ميلعتلا ضارعتسلااو 
      
      Training and education on risk management 
بيردتلا ميلعتلاو يف لاجم ةرادإ رطاخملا 
      
      Community preparedness and training 
بهأت عمتجملا بيردتلاو 
      
      Disaster drills, rehearsals and simulations 
تاروانم ،ثراوكلا تابيردتلا ةاكاحملاو 
      
      Developing techniques for training 
ريوطت تاينقت بيردتلل 
      
      Developing techniques for knowledge transfer 
ريوطت تاينقت لقنل ةفرعملا 
      
      Simulation, updating and test of inter institutional 
response 
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،ةاكاحملا ثيدحتو ةباجتسارابتخاو ةيسسؤم ةكرتشم 
      Specific training of professionals such as rescue workers 
and medical staff 
بيردتلا نيينهملل صاخلا لثم لامع ذاقنلإا مقاوطلاو ةيبطلا 
      
      Educating the staff involved in the planning process 
فيقثت نيفظوملا نيكراشملا يف ةيلمع طيطختلا 
      
 
Section 3: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the 
organizing stage. 
The following tables present the elements of good practices disaster response management throughout 
different themes during organising stage. Based on your experience, please tick the most appropriate 
scale regarding the importance and implementation of the criteria during organizing stage. 
Organising is defined as “a process that managers use to establish a structure of working 
relationships that allow organisational members interact and cooperate to achieve organisation 
goals”. 
 
1. Coordination problems قيسنتلا لكاشم 
The extent of importance   (ةيمهلأا ىدم)                                                                                 The extent of implementation  (قيبطتلا ىوتسم) 
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1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5  
      Developing overall coordination 
قيسنتلاريوطت ماعلا 
      
      Generating an appropriate delegation of tasks and division 
of labour 
قلخ بادتنا بسانم ماهملل قتوميس لمعلا 
      
      Volunteer management 
ةرادإ نيعوطتملا 
      
      Search and rescue 
ثحبلا ذاقنلإاو 
      
      Organization and coordination of emergency operations 
ميظنت قيسنتو تايلمع ئراوطلا 
      
      Regular organization of simulated disaster exercises 
قيسنتلا مظتنملا نيرامتلل ةاكاحم ةثراكلا 
      
      Government unity of leadership to coordinate as a whole 
ةدحو ةموكحلا يف ةدايقلا قيسنتل لكك 
      
      The involvement and support of the army 
ةكراشم معدو شيجلا 
      
      Coordination between Organisations  
 قيسنتلا نيب تامظنملا  
      
      Coordination between departments within the organization 
قيسنتلا نيب ماسقلإا لخاد ةمظنملا 
      
      Reasonable organizational structure and clear awareness 
of responsibilities 
لكيهلا يميظنتلا  يقطنميعو ىوتسمو حضاو تايلوؤسملل 
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2. “Problem of interplay” and coordination between the donor countries and the end beneficiaries 
"لعافتلا ةلكشم"  نييئاهنلا نيديفتسملاو ةحناملا لودلا نيب قيسنتلاو 
 
      Following protocols 
عابتا تلاوكوتورب تاذ ةلص 
      
      Formulating memoranda of understanding and mutual aid 
agreements 
ةغايص تاركذم مهافت تاقافتاو ةنوعملا ةلدابتملا 
      
      Correctly recognising differences between response and 
agent-generated demands 
زييمتلا لكشب حيحص تافلاتخلاا تابلطتم نيب باجتسلااة ةدلوتملا تلااكولاو 
      
      Blending emergent and established organisational 
behaviours 
جزملا ،ئراطلا أشنأو تايكولسلا ةيميظنتلا 
      
      Community emergency response teams 
قرف عمتجملا ةباجتسلال ئراوطلل 
      
      Establishing formal linkages between involved groups 
ةماقا طباور ةيمسر نيب تاعامجلا ةكراشملا 
      
      Establishing informal linkages between involved groups 
ةماقا ريغ طباور ةيمسر نيب تاعامجلا ةكراشملا 
      
3. Hierarchy and Centralization problems    ةيزكرملاو يمرهلا لسلستلا لكاشم 
 
      Competencies of managers and team members 
تاءافك نيريدملا ءاضعأو قيرفلا 
      
      The degree of prior disaster experience 
ةجرد ةربخلا ةقباسلا ثراوكلل 
      
      Properly exercising decision-making 
ةسرامملا لكشب حيحص رارقلا عنصل 
      
      Effective consultation with key stakeholders and target 
beneficiaries 
رواشتلا لاعفلا عم باحصأ ةحلصملا نييسيئرلا نيديفتسملاو نيفدهتسملا 
      
      Clearly defined goals and commitments by key 
stakeholders 
ديدحتلا حوضوب فادهلأا تامازتللااو لبق نم تاهجلا ةينعملا ةيسيئرلا 
      
      Flexibility of decision making 
ةنورملا يف ذاختا تارارقلا 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the directing 
stage. 
The following tables present the elements of a good practices disaster response management throughout 
different elements during directing stage. Based on your experience, please tick the most appropriate 
scale regarding the importance and implementation of the criteria during directing stage. 
 
Leading or directing is defined as “a guiding of employees and subordinates to help them to 
attain the organization’s objectives with the maximum application of their abilities”. 
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1. Command centre  ةدايقلا زكرم 
The extent of importance  (ةيمهلأا ىدم)                                                                                  The extent of implementation  (قيبطتلا ىوتسم) 
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1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5  
      Disaster management command centre 
ثراوكلا ةرادإ ةدايق زكرم 
      
      Having a well-functioning emergency operations centre 
 رم دوجوديج لكشب لمعي ئراوطلا تايلمع زك 
      
      Effective information management system 
تامولعملا ةرادلإ لاعف ماظن 
      
      Adequately processing information 
فاك لكشب تامولعملا ةجلاعم 
      
      The detailed status of EOC mobilization 
رم ةئبعتل لصفم عضوئراوطلا تايلمع زك 
      
      Key officials being briefed 
علاطإ متي  نيلوئسملا رابك 
      
      Non-EOC Organisations  being mobilized for emergency 
response 
 ئراوطلا تايلمع زكرم ريغ تامظنملا- تلااحل ةباجتسلال دشح يرجي
ئراوطلا 
      
      Convening meetings for the purpose of sharing 
information 
تامولعملا لدابت ضرغل تاعامتجا دقع 
      
      Hazard monitoring and forecasting 
اهب ؤبنتلاو راطخلأا دصر 
      
      Strong ability to send out specific early warnings about 
potential hazards 
ذحت لاسرلا ةيوق ةردقةلمتحملا راطخلأا لوح ركبم تقو يف ةددحم تاري 
      
      Clear procedure of reporting and submitting information 
تامولعملاو ريراقتلا ميدقتل ةحضاو تاءارجإ 
      
      Effective emergency information system to ensure 
information transfer 
تامولعملا لاعف ماظن تامولعملا لقن نامضل ئراوطلا تلااح يف 
      
      Scaling of the disaster 
سايق قاطن )مجح( ةثراكلا 
      
2. Communication  تلااصتلاا 
 
      Effective communication mechanisms 
 communication (inside organisations) 
ةلاعفلا لاصتلاا تايلآ 
مظنملا لخاد( تلااصتلاا)تا 
      
      Emergency public information 
 information (communication outside organisations) 
ةماعلا ئراوطلا تامولعم 
)تامظنملا جراخ تلااصتلاا( تامولعملا 
      
      Providing appropriate reports for the media 
ملاعلإا لئاسول ةبسانملا ريراقتلا ميدقت 
      
      Public information and community participation 
ةيعمتجملا ةكراشملاو ةماعلا تامولعملا 
      
      Transferring information about the disaster to the public       
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from the organization or vice versa 
سكعلا وأ ةمظنملا نم روهمجلل ةثراك لوح تامولعملا لقن 
      Information sharing between the various relevant agencies 
in various Organisations  
تامظنملا فلتخم يف ةلصلا تاذ تلااكولا فلتخم نيب تامولعملا لدابت 
      
3. Providing the right relief supplies for people in need at the right time  
اغلإا تادادمإ ريفوتبسانملا تقولا يف نيجاتحملل ةحيحصلا ةث 
 
      Effectively mobilising personnel and resources 
دراوملاو نيفظوملا لاعف لكشب ةئبعت 
      
      Emergency shelter arrangements 
ئراوطلا تلااح يف ىوأملا تابيترت 
      
      Effective logistics management 
خلا ةرادإةيتسجوللا تامد/ ةلاعفلا دادملإاو لقنلا 
      
      Sufficient mobilization and disbursement of resources 
دراوملا نم تافورصملاو ةيفاك ةئبعت 
      
      Inventories of emergency resources 
ئراوطلا دراوملل درج مئاوق 
      
      Determination of the locations of emergency resources 
ئراوطلا دراوم عقاوم ديدحت 
      
      Existing of emergency evacuation requirements 
دوجو ئراوطلا تلااح يف ءلاخلإا تابلطتم 
      
      Determination of the locations of emergency evacuation 
requirements 
ديدحت ءلاخلإا تابلطتم عقاوم ئراوطلا تلااح يف 
      
      Obtaining relevant material resources 
ةلصلا تاذ ةيداملا دراوملا ىلع لوصحلا 
      
      Positioning relevant material resources 
ةلصلا تاذ ةيداملا دراوملا عضوم ديدحت 
      
      Maintaining relevant material resources 
 ظافحلاةلصلا تاذ ةيداملا دراوملا ىلع 
      
      Timely and accurate relief needs assessment 
تاجايتحا مييقت بسانملا تقولا يفو ةقيقد ةثاغلإا 
      
      The security of relief aid during distribution and 
transportation 
لقنلاو عيزوتلا ءانثأ ةثاغلإا تادعاسم نمأ 
      
      Application of modern logistics technology 
ةيتسجوللا ةثيدحلا ايجولونكتلا قيبطت 
      
      The ability to inventory and unify the resources available 
 ةحاتملا دراوملا ديحوتو درجلا ىلع ةردقلا 
      
4. Speed of response  ةباجتسلاا ةعرس 
 
      Very short response time to start the emergency plan 
ئراوطلا ةطخ ءدبل ادج ةريصق ةباجتسلاا نمز 
      
      The clarity of tasks and responsibilities 
تايلوؤسملاو ماهملا حوضو 
      
      The effectiveness of the financial incentives provided 
املا زفاوحلا ةيلاعفةمدقملا ةيد 
      
      The effectiveness of the moral incentives provided 
ةمدقملا ةيونعملا زفاوحلا ةيلاعف 
      
      Existence of cordon  
دوجو ينملأا قوط 
      
      Cordon access authorization   
نذلإا ينملأا قوطلا ىلإ لوخدلل )ضيوفتلا( 
      
      Evacuation 
ءلاخلإا 
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Section 5: Elements of good practices disaster response management during the 
controlling stage. 
The following tables present the elements of good practices disaster response management throughout 
different elements during controlling stage. Based on your experience, please tick the most appropriate 
scale regarding the importance and implementation of the criteria during controlling stage. 
Controlling is defined as “the measurement and correction of subordinates’ activities and the 
production processes, to ensure that the enterprise’s objectives and plans are being carried out”. 
 
1. Evaluations مييقتلا 
The extent of importance (ةيمهلأا ىدم)                                                                                   The extent of implementation  (قيبطتلا ىوتسم) 
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Elements of Good Practices  
تاسرامملا لضفأ نم رصانع 
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1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5  
      Conducting risk assessments  
رطاخملل تامييقت ءارجإ 
      
      Effective damage reporting system  
رارضلأا ريراقت دادعإ ماظن ةيلاعف 
      
      Requirements assessment (for requesting short-term 
emergency state and federal assistance) 
 ةدعاسملاو ريصقلا ىدملا ىلع ئراوطلا ةلاح بلطل( تابلطتم مييقت
)ةيداحتلاا 
      
      Developing techniques for assessments 
ريوطت تامييقتلا لجأ نم تاينقت 
      
      Hazard evaluation and mapping 
طئارخلا مسرو رطاخملا مييقت 
      
      Testing of inter institutional response 
ةكرتشملا ةيسسؤملا ةباجتسلاا رابتخا 
      
      Statistics and feedback of loss information 
رئاسخب ةقلعتملا تامولعملا نم لعفلا دودرو تاءاصحلإا 
      
      Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
management system 
ةرادلإا ماظن ةيلاعفو ةءافك مييقت 
      
      Continuous improvement of the operational system of 
emergency management 
ئراوطلا ةرادلإ ليغشتلا ماظنل رمتسملا نيسحتلا 
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 INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
                                                Interview reference number           
 
Semi-structured Interview Guideline 
Introduction 
The main aim of this interview is to understand the interviewee’s perspective about issues 
related to disaster response management in Iraq stemming from terrorism. The data collected 
from the interviews will help the researcher understand the current issues and concepts of 
disaster response management as they currently exist in this context. Accordingly, there are not 
right or wrong answers for the upcoming questions, rather it is a matter of reflecting the 
interviewee’s experience with the phenomena as they were conceived.         
Your rights 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without explanation. You 
have the right to ask that any data you have supplied to that point be withdrawn or destroyed. 
You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question that is asked of you. 
You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered (unless answering 
these questions would interfere with the study’s outcome). If you have any questions as a result 
of reading this information sheet, you may query the researcher at any time. 
Section 1:  
• You have been working in this directorate since……?  
• Which department do you belong to? 
• How would you describe the disaster response management stemming from terrorism in Iraq?  
Section 2: Weaknesses and issues in the disaster response management stages. 
1) Planning stage 
• What are the weaknesses of disaster response at planning stage? 
• Why do you think proper planning is needed for disaster response? 
• Who are the stakeholders involved?  
• What are the strengths of disaster response at planning stage?  
• How can we further improve the disaster response at planning stage?  
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2) Organising stage 
• What are the weaknesses of disaster response at organising stage?  
• Why do you think proper organising is needed for disaster response? 
• Who are the stakeholders involved?  
• What are the strengths of disaster response at organising stage?  
• How can we further improve the disaster response at organising stage?  
3) Directing stage 
• What are the weaknesses of disaster response at directing stage? 
• Why do you think proper directing is needed for disaster response? 
• Who are the stakeholders involved?  
• What are the strengths of disaster response at directing stage?  
• How can we further improve the disaster response at directing stage?  
4) Controlling stage 
• What are the weaknesses of disaster response at controlling stage? 
• Why do you think proper controlling is needed for disaster response? 
• Who are the stakeholders involved?  
• What are the strengths of disaster response at controlling stage?  
• How can we further improve the disaster response at controlling stage?  
 
 
Do you have any suggestion to the overall disaster response process? 
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 ACCESS DATA PERMISSION 
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 INCLUDING NAME PERMISSION 
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 RELEVANT DOCUMENT  
 
I.1 Study Conclusion  
According to the Urban Planning Department (2014), it can be concluded that there are a lot of 
problems facing civil defence teams, such as: (Urban Planning Department, 2014):  
a) The majority of civil defence centres in Baghdad Governorate (67.7%) are located on roads, 
which have a maximum speed limit of 30 km/h. This decreases the speed of civil defence 
vehicles to arrive at the scene. This late arrival can cause an increased number of losses.  
b) The overrun of many of the popular markets onto the hard shoulder, which is forbidden, 
leads to closing the main streets completely and this is what affects the smooth flow of traffic 
and lack of access to civil defence teams to the accident place at the right time. 
c) The prevalence of street vendors (Ganabr and Albesttiyat), with their often flammable stalls, 
causes the expansion of fires that can then spread to other places. 
d) Connecting electric wires randomly, which leads to increased loads on the national 
electricity grid, in addition to the formation of spider grids of electric wires, can cause fires 
which spread quickly and easily, especially in the popular markets. 
e) Reliance on private semi generic generators that are not compliant with the safety and 
security conditions. Fuel and oils have been observed near these generators, not stored 
properly, and this causes fires. This situation leads to the recurrence of fire accidents in 
popular markets and residential areas. 
 
I.2 Analysis of the Reality of Disaster Management in Iraq 
In 2010, The Iraqi National Security Council issued a decree to commission committee101 to 
take over a preparation for a proposal to the national strategy for disaster risk reduction in Iraq. 
After obtaining the strategic framework document approval by the Committee 101, a strategic 
draft has been prepared and contained in this document, in order to arrange it for discussion and 
approval.  
In general, this review has included enhancing the understanding of the current status of disaster 
risk reduction and to support the objectives of the Hyogo Framework (HFA) approved by the 
UN in 2005 in building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. 
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In this review, strengths, weaknesses, the expected threats, and opportunities have been 
identified, as shown below, in order to evaluate and display the reality of disaster management 
in Iraq. 
I.2.1 Strength Point: (Committee 101, 2010) 
1. The existence of laws related to disasters such as the Civil Defence Act, instructions 
and decisions related to this, and the Public Health Act. 
2. The existence of codes of Construction and Safety Standards. 
3. The existence of the emergency plan at key ministries to tackle disasters (the Ministry 
of Health and Ministry of Interior / Civil Defence Directorate). 
4. The existence of practices, although differentiated, to deal with the disasters in the 
provinces. 
5. The existence of vigorous efforts to secure national contingency plans for some 
specialised types of disasters, such as radiological, chemical, and biological emergency 
plans. 
I.2.2 Weakness Point: (Committee 101, 2010) 
 
1. Lack of community awareness of disaster response and risk reduction. 
2. Weakness of early warning systems. 
3. Weakness of the application of building codes and occupational safety standards in 
public and private facilities. 
4. Lack of contingency plans in a large number of important facilities designed according 
to standardised criteria, with appropriate training. 
5. Lack of clarity in the mechanisms for declaration of emergency in the disaster areas and 
legal implications of this announcement. 
6. Lack of a unified national legal framework for disaster risk reduction and response (the 
existence of multiple systems, leading to failures in the application when multi nature 
disasters occur). 
7. After 2003, state structural changes have not been reflected in the laws and regulations 
of disaster management (powers of the governors, the development of the region, the 
new ministries such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Environment, and 
Displacement and Migration). 
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8. Weakness of telecommunications networks during disasters; often there are no 
alternatives. 
9. Weakness of the mechanisms of coordination between the federal ministries and local 
governments on the subject of disaster. 
10. Lack of clear exceptional administrative powers during disasters on the various 
administrative levels. 
11. Weakness in capabilities at all levels particularly in local communities. 
12. Weakness interesting academic and research institutions in addressing the subject of 
disaster and risk reduction. 
13. Lack of documentation and systematic standard archives for disaster risk and its impact. 
14. The weakness of civil society organisations involved in disaster response and risk 
reduction. 
15. Weakness in contingency planning for disaster risk reduction in projects of development 
plans and regional development projects. 
I.2.3 Challenges: (Committee 101, 2010) 
1. Terrorism and security risks. 
2. The presence of large numbers of displaced people and refugees may continue for some 
time to come. 
3. Weakness in the application of safety standards in industrial facilities and particularly 
electrical installations. 
 
Table I.0.1 shows the response strategy and requirements for capacity-building for every local 
government in Iraq in addition to different types of risks and population exposure to such risks. 
It can be seen that the majority of provinces have an urgent need for more training. Further, 
there is a desire to exercise better preparedness and response as part of disaster risk reduction. 
Table I.0.1 The Most Important Risk-Prone Provinces in Iraq, Types of Risks and Population 
Exposure to Risks (Committee 101, 2010, pp. 7-8) 
Governorate Population 
(2007) 
Risk sources 
Natural or human-made 
Response strategy and 
requirements for capacity-building 
 
Al-Anbar 1.485.985 Transport accidents, floods, 
sandstorms, explosions, gas leaks, 
fire 
The local government and civil 
defence. The new government in 
place must be concerned with 
bringing about good results for the 
people who elected them. 
Babylon 1.651.565 Population displacement, terrorism, 
industrial accidents, fires, floods, 
health epidemics. 
The local government constitutes a 
response cell with health and civil 
defence. It needs to increase the 
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administrative and technical 
applications for disaster management. 
Baghdad 7.145.470 Water/air pollution, sandstorms, 
drought, water scarcity, terrorism, 
chemical and industrial accidents, 
health epidemics, radiation from a 
pounded and ravished nuclear reactor 
site. 
The ministries of environment, 
health, civil defence, and agriculture. 
Al-Basra 1.912.533 River pollution, radiation from the 
remnants of the army, the threat of an 
attack on an Iranian nuclear facility, 
sand storms, chemical and industrial 
accidents, terrorism, health 
epidemics, explosive remnants of 
war. 
Cell operations in the provinces to 
prepare the response strategy. 
Recommending training courses on 
good practices in other countries. 
Dohuk 505.491 Drought, earthquakes, pollution, 
conflicts, population displacement, 
fires, transport accidents, landslides. 
The local government, non-
governmental organisations, and civil 
society. A strong desire for training 
and development. 
Diyala 1.560.621 Drought, floods, transport accidents, 
environmental pollution, health 
epidemics, swine flu, fire, 
unemployment, lack of adequate 
shelter, health epidemics, explosive 
remnants of war. 
The local government and NGOs. An 
urgent need for more training. 
Erbil 1.542.421 Drought, dust storms, transportation 
accidents, floods, displacement, 
epidemics. 
The Kurdistan Regional Government 
Response. An urgent need for more 
training. 
Karbala 887.858 Disasters caused by human activity, 
epidemics, dust storms, drought. 
The emergency cells address crises 
including displacement and fires. 
There is a need for training to deal 
with other crises. 
Maysan 824.127 Earthquakes, drought, health 
epidemics, accidents, terrorism, 
unrest, explosive remnants of war, 
dust storms. 
Emergency cells in the provinces of 
local authorities, Environmental 
Council (Directorates managers in the 
province such as health, water, 
electricity, sanitation, agriculture, 
irrigation, municipal, traffic and 
education). 
Al-Muthanna 614.997 Drought, environmental pollution, 
fires, dust storms, radiation resulting 
from the depleted uranium. 
The Ministry of Water, Ministry of 
Irrigation, fire fighting. There is a 
need for technical knowledge in 
disaster risk reduction. 
Al-Najaf 1.081.203 Drought, transport accidents, 
environmental pollution, civil 
conflicts, industrial accidents, and 
fires, dust storms. 
Local authorities, civil defence, and 
the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC). Civil society 
organisations are more receptive of 
the local government. 
Ninawa 2.811.901 Drought, transport accidents, 
environmental pollution, civil 
conflicts, industrial accidents, fires, 
dust storms, collapse of dams, 
displacement. 
 
Al-Qadisiyah 990.483 Drought, epidemics, dust storms, 
internal conflicts. 
UNICEF and other international non-
governmental organisations. 
Kirkuk 902.019 Explosions, terrorism, conflict, 
pollution, displacement, health 
issues, inappropriate sites for 
Local authorities, non-governmental 
organisations, civil society, civil 
defence, health. There is a desire for 
more training and development. 
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internally displaced people, drought, 
dust storms. 
Thi Qar 1.616.950 Drought, water pollution, pollution, 
displacement, animal diseases, 
buildings’ combustion, the rapid 
outbreak of disasters, dust storms. 
The province, civil defence, and the 
Iraqi Red Crescent Society, the 
Ministry of Environment, NGOs. The 
desire to exercise better preparedness 
and response as part of disaster risk 
reduction. 
Salah AL-Dien 1.191.403 Floods, drought, dust storms, 
environmental pollution, chemical 
and industrial accidents, 
displacement. 
Crisis cells in the provinces. Capacity 
building is preferred. 
Sulaymaniyah 1.893.617 Population displacement, drought, 
health epidemics, earthquakes, the 
shelling from Turkey / Iran, 
terrorism, explosive remnants of war. 
Central and local government, non-
governmental organisations, the 
United Nations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
there is a need for more training for 
employees. 
Wasit 1.064.950 Drought, earthquakes, explosive 
remnants of war, torrents. 
Require more knowledge and 
planning skills. 
 
I.3 Hyogo Framework for Action 2013 – 2015 (HFA) 
In order to build the resilience of nations and communities to disasters, the UNISDR generate 
a practical guide to provide guidance on conducting an effective review of the progress made 
in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015. The Iraqi General 
Directorate of Civil Defence conducted a follow-up for its progress during three years (2013 – 
2015).This follow-up revealed the overall challenges as illustrated below:    
I.3.1 Overall Challenges (Planning Department, 2015) 
- The weakness of community awareness. 
- Increase the financial resources necessary for the implementation of risk reduction program. 
- The weakness of the security and political stability. 
- The need to allocate budgets for disaster management. 
- The need for human and material capacity building. 
- Non-inclusion of all society segments in capacity building. 
- The concept of disaster management is a new idea and it needs a political support to include 
it in future programs and plans. 
- Lack of study and documenting the previous experiences for the purpose of re-use in program 
development. 
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- Lack of allocations to the emergency division so that it does not have adequate resources to 
treat, as a preliminary intervention.  
- The presence of red tape and a large number of committees in the fund allocating process. 
- Limited attention has been given by organisations and institutions in terms of preparing 
disaster response plans. 
I.3.2 Strengths 
- School students and employees in organisations have been trained on the acts of the civil 
defence and how to behave in major incidents and emergencies.  
- To raise awareness of the causes of disaster risk for all society segments, seminars and 
courses are carried out in the organisations and projects by the Environmental Protection 
police centres in Baghdad and the provinces. 
- Studies have been prepared about the types of disasters and their consequences, and how 
to reduce their risks by Civil Defence Directorate staff. 
- The General Directorate of Civil Defence is the most prominent team member in 
preparation of a framework for the disaster management strategy in Iraq. 
-  Workshops and training courses are held in first aid, rescue, evacuation, and disaster 
medicine to train staff of the Civil Defence Directorate to perform the duties mandated. 
- There are disaster response plans in terms of practice and capacity building for the staff of 
the Directorate of Civil Defence. Training for such plans is conducted inside and outside 
Iraq. 
- To organise work in the field of disaster management, the Directorate General of Civil 
Defence has Civil Defence Law No. (44) for the year 2013.  
- There is an allocation in the budget of each administrative unit for emergency (crisis cell). 
This allocation contributes to ensure risk reduction resources and supports backing actors. 
Further, it helps in reducing risk size as well as human and material damage. 
- There are studies submitted by researchers in universities or from those concerned with 
disasters. Such research was applied in the field of planning and in providing information 
which can be used. 
I.3.3 Future Aspirations 
- Create awareness programs geared to disaster risk reduction and mitigation. 
- Necessary funds should be allocated to provide financial resources. 
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- Provide financial resources necessary for the implementation of risk reduction program 
which seeks to guarantee disaster mitigation. 
- Propose determining the amount of emergency funds that can be easily allocated in 
emergency situations. 
- Having an appropriate work environment. 
- Speed up building capacities and competencies for those working in the field of disaster 
risk reduction. 
- Involving all society segments in capacity building. 
- Design new legislation to prepare plans and programs to reduce the potential for disaster 
risk. 
- Develop mechanisms, procedures, and systems to save and disseminate data concerning 
hazard and recovery. 
 
I.4 Main Themes of the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020 
(Wehbe, 2013) 
Based on the priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action with regard to disaster risk 
reduction and by reference to the purpose of the Arab strategy for disaster risk reduction, five 
main themes of this strategy have been identified as follows: 
1. Strengthening the commitment to a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
disaster risk reduction in various sectors. 
a. Inclusion of risk reduction considerations in national policies and plans and legal 
frameworks concerning all vital sectors related to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
b.  The integration of climate change adaptation and mitigation actions in the development 
strategies. 
c. Ensure decentralisation for adequate resources allocated, community participation, 
collaboration with civil society and private sector groups at all stages of the planning, 
and implementation efforts to disaster management and risk reduction. 
d. Consider the regional forum and multi-sectoral national forums the main risk factors, as 
well as setting population priorities and the most vulnerable groups.  
2. The necessary capacity-building to identify, monitor, and assess disaster risk.  
a. Ensure the availability of multiple risk assessments of national and local damage. Such 
risk assessments include key sectors with a focus on urban centres or settlements. 
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b. Ensure the provision of capacity and systems for monitoring, recording, and distribution 
of data related to basic risks and vulnerabilities at the regional, national and local level. 
c. Ensure the inclusion of the data by type (data on gender) in risk assessments. 
d. Intensify efforts to understand and assess the potential impacts of climate change in the 
regions and sectors vulnerable to climate risks. 
e. The establishment of systems and networks of a regional early warning system for 
monitoring the multiple threats to the region. 
f. Forming a network of regional experts on disaster risk management and related issues. 
3. Building confrontational ability through knowledge, public advocacy, research, and 
training. 
g. Work on the availability of risk and disaster events information at all levels and its 
accessibility by all parties concerned. 
h. Ensure the use of educational materials and curricula and methodologies at the most 
recent level to take into account the contexts and realities of regional, national and local 
emerging risks. 
i. Raising public awareness, launching campaigns and support activities to shed light on 
disaster risk reduction action, and disaster management practices with the participation of 
communities. 
j. Creating regular opportunities for training and developing the skills of managers, 
decision-makers, and volunteers from the community, ensuring that women participate.  
k. Ensure the flow of resources to support ongoing scientific research, which aims to find 
solutions that can be applied especially in the short and medium term. 
l. Developing acceptable criteria and indicators to monitor the progress of risk reduction 
and clarify the benefits of investment in this area. 
4. Inclusion of disaster risk reduction in emergency, response, preparedness, and 
recovery plans and operations. 
a. Propose a strong policy to build the technical and institutional capacity as well as to 
establish disaster management mechanisms. 
b. Develop preparedness, precautionary, recovery, and reconstruction plans for disaster for 
all administrative levels as well as the involvement of all society sectors. 
c. Create healthy support systems during an emergency that works to provide free health 
care to the victims and help in dealing with the mental health effects of disasters (and 
other long-term effects). 
314 
 
d. Ensure the availability of regional, national and local financial reserves and apply 
precautionary mechanisms that are known to all concerned parties to ensure an effective 
response and recovery when needed. 
e. The integration of international quality standards in disaster response (SPHERE and 
IASC's guiding principles) (SPHERE PROJECT Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Humanitarian Response), (INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE 
a durable solution for internally displaced persons). 
f. Ensure the existence of necessary institutional capacity to conduct an assessment of 
damage and losses. 
g. Strengthen cooperation between the Arab countries with respect to disaster response, 
preparedness, and recovery. 
5. Improve accountability regarding disaster risk management at the local, national, 
and regional level. 
a. Ensuring that the quasi-national and local strategies to risk reduction include long-term 
plans to improve capacity development to match with the sufficient budget allocation. 
b. Implementation of plans and sectoral economic policies that limit the susceptibility of 
economic activities and basic services to deal with damage. 
c. Developing legislation and procedures for evaluating the effects of disaster risk for 
major development projects, especially major infrastructure projects.  
d. Include disaster risk reduction elements in urban planning and management of 
residential areas, including the application of the construction laws. 
e. Analysing the existing and emerging financial mechanisms for disaster risk reduction 
as well as identifying and developing the most efficient means to fund and transfer risk. 
f. Ensure the integration of disaster risk reduction measures in the recovery and 
rehabilitation processes post-disaster. 
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 THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF 
CIVIL DEFENCE 2009 
 
General Director 
Secretary 
Follow-up Officer 
Contracts Division 
Assistant General Director for 
Administrative and Financial 
Accounts Department 
Personnel management Dep. 
Processing Department 
Services Department 
Assistant General 
Director for Fire Affairs 
Rescue and Aid Department 
Firefighting Department 
Prevention and Industrial Safety Dep. 
Search and Rescue Team 
Assistant General 
Director of Training 
Affairs 
Preparing Curriculums Department 
Training Centre 
Studies and Research Department 
Physical training Department 
Assistant General 
Director of Technical 
Affairs 
Telecommunications and 
Informatics Department 
Repairing machinery and 
equipment factory 
Addressing Unexploded 
Ordnance Department 
Department of Planning 
and Follow-up 
Strategic Planning Sec. 
Statistics and Computer Sec. 
Investment Plan Sec. 
Research and Studies Sec. 
Legal Department 
Legal Litigation Sec. 
Investigative boards Sec. 
Individuals Issues Sec. 
Agreements and Contracts Sec. 
Department of 
Relations and Media 
Internal Relations Sec. 
External Relations Sec. 
Social Welfare Sec. 
Media and Photography Sec. 
Environmental Protection Police Directorate The directorates of Civil Defence in Baghdad 
Department of Engineering Works 
Inspection Department  
South Inspection Sec. 
Inspection Sec. 
Middle Inspection Sec. 
North Inspection Sec. 
Operations Department  
Control Sec. 
Administration Sec. 
C. D. Services Sec. 
Actions Sec. 
Auditing Department  
South Auditing Sec. 
Auditing General 
Headquarters Sec. 
Middle Auditing Sec. 
North Auditing Sec. 
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 INVITATION LETTER   
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Hajer Al-Dahash. I contacted some of you July 2015 to carry out an interview 
regarding disaster response management stemming from war operations and terrorism in Iraq. 
Bearing in mind that I will have a fair conversation with you prior to the interview to make 
sure you are fully aware of the research. 
 
I am contacting you now to conduct semi-structured interview to verify and validate the 
recommendations (see Appendix L please). It will be very much appreciated if you send me 
your availability for no more than 30 min interview in your convent time. 
 
I would like to thank you positively for your collaboration and looking forward to hear from 
you. 
 
Please note that I attached with this email a covering letter that includes background about the 
framework and the interviews’ questions. 
Sincerely, 
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 VALIDITY INTERVIEW GUIDELINES    
 
Recommendations to enhance current administrative systems and practices 
in response to disaster, stemming from terrorism in Iraq 
 
Brief description of human-made disasters in Iraq 
Disasters, including human-made ones, are an ever-present threat and are occurring at an 
increasing rate worldwide. Continuing terrorist attacks worldwide are likely to sustain attention 
on disaster response management, particularly in Middle Eastern countries. Since 2003, Iraq 
has been experiencing an unprecedented series of damaging events. Increased attention has 
been given to the country's arrangements for disaster management by policymakers. Disaster 
response, which refers to actions taken both before, during and after an emergency, in order to 
ensure that effects are minimised and that people affected are given immediate attention, is one 
of the critical phases in the Disaster Management System life cycle. The focus of this study 
will be on disaster response management associated with the events caused by war operations 
and terrorism activities in Iraq. 
This study aims to investigate the current practices related to disaster response management in 
Iraq with particular reference to war and terrorism. This exploration focuses on the 
achievement of the basic functions of the management operation (planning, organizing, 
directing, controlling). The evaluation of disaster response management is presented in terms 
of challenges, strengths and weaknesses and recommendations are suggested for effective 
disaster response management. 
Interview Participants   
The proposed participants represent the experts who are involved with disaster response teams. 
The identified participants include executives responsible for disaster response in the Iraqi 
General Directorate of Civil Defence. 
Confidentiality 
All data and information gathered shall be used for research purposes only with the informed 
consent of the organization involved and from the participants themselves.  
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Recommendations 
Sets of recommendations have been suggested through the analysis of information obtained 
from the interviews and other sources of evidence collected, within the context of the research 
themes. The aim of such recommendations is to overcome or minimise the weaknesses and 
challenges faced by the current administrative systems and the response practices in order to 
enhance the overall process to effectively respond to disaster.  
The sets of recommendations based on interviews, documents, and pertinent literature on 
disaster response management are presented below for validation, firstly to check the 
appropriateness of the recommendation, and secondly to check whether they are classified 
appropriately under the different research themes.   
 
 
Research  
Themes 
 تاعوضوملا
ةيثحبلا 
Recommendations 
تايصوتلا 
Experts 
remarks 
ءاربخلا تاحيرصت 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endowment 
of Equipment, 
Tools, and 
Infrastructure 
 
 تادعملا نم فقولا
 ةينبلاو تاودلأاو
ةيتحتلا 
More use of sophisticated equipment and machines, including special heavy 
rescue equipment to enable the response process to become faster and easier. 
 ةيلمع نيكمتل ةصاخ ةليقثلا ذاقنلإا تادعم كلذ يف امب ،ةروطتملا تلالآاو تادعملا مادختسا نم ديزملا
عرسأ حبصتل ةباجتسلاا لهسأو. 
 
To link the directorates of civil defence with the e-government network for 
effective collaboration. 
لاعفلا نواعتلل ةينورتكللإا ةموكحلا ةكبش عم يندملا عافدلا ةيريدم طبر. 
 
To set up effective early warning systems in order to prevent crises before they 
occur and to get prepared to deal with inevitable crises. 
 تامزلأا عم لماعتلل دادعتسلااو اهثودح لبق تامزلأا عوقو عنم لجأ نم ركبملا راذنلإل ةلاعف مظن عضو
اهنم رفم لا يتلا. 
 
To set up fire nozzles and security camera networks adhering to the required 
technical specifications. 
ةبولطملا ةينفلا تافصاوملاب ديقتلاو ةينملأا تاريماكلا تاكبشو قيرحلا تاهوف دادعإ. 
 
To develop telecommunications and informatics in the Iraqi provinces. 
 ةيقارعلا تاظفاحملا يف ةيتامولعملاو تلااصتلاا عاطق ريوطت. 
 
To increase the number of modern civil defence centres. 
ةثيدحلا يندملا عافدلا زكارم ددع ةدايز. 
 
To complete the database in the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil Defence by 
using the most up to date and globally progressive GIS information systems. 
بلا ةدعاق لامكتساةيقارعلا يندملا عافدلل ةماعلا ةيريدملا يف تاناي مادختساب تامولعملا مظن جلاةيفارغ GIS 
ةثيدحلا ايملاع ةمدقتملاو 
 
To use the mobile network to spread early warning messages and vital 
information to citizens prior to a disaster and/or aftermath of a disaster. 
 
 و ةثراك عوقو لبق نينطاوملل ةيويحلا تامولعملاو ركبملا راذنلإا لئاسر رشنل لاقنلا فتاهلا ةكبش مادختسا
ةثراك عوقو باقعأ وأ /. 
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To invest in necessary technology and equipment, and build the technical 
capacity of organisations with early warning system and information 
dissemination functions. 
 
 فئاظو ركبملا راذنلإا ماظن عم تامظنملل ةينفلا تاردقلا ءانبو ،ةمزلالا تادعملاو ايجولونكتلا يف رامثتسلاا
تامولعملا رشن. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education 
about Disaster 
Risk 
 
 
 لوح ميلعتلا
ثراوكلا رطاخم 
To provide continuous training for staff, of all levels, by intensifying external and 
internal training courses in the field of disaster response. 
 ةيلخادلا ةيبيردتلا تارودلا فيثكت للاخ نم ،تايوتسملا عيمج ىلع ،نيفظوملل رمتسملا بيردتلا ريفوت
ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا لاجم يف ةيجراخلاو. 
 
To reactivate some sections of civil defence Law No. 44 of 2013 to facilitate 
teaching civil defence in the curriculum. 
ماسقأ ضعب ليعفت  مقر يندملا عافدلا نوناق44  ةنسل2013 .ةيساردلا جهانملا يف يندملا عافدلا ميلعت ليهستل 
 
To provide education at all stages (primary, secondary, higher) to increase 
knowledge and awareness of disaster risks. 
ثراوكلا رطاخم نع يعولاو ةفرعملا ةدايزل )يلاعلاو يوناثلاو يئادتبلاا( لحارملا عيمج يف ميلعتلا ريفوت. 
 
To educate the public through continuous communication, particularly through 
the media, to raise awareness about the role of civil defence in terms of disaster 
response. 
 يعولا ىوتسم عفر ىلإ ،ملاعلإا لئاسو للاخ نم ةصاخو ،رمتسملا لصاوتلا للاخ نم روهمجلا فيقثت
ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا لاجم يف يندملا عافدلا رود لوح. 
 
To conduct joint exercises such as multifunctional exercises with the relevant 
organisations according to the emergency response plans. 
 ةباجتسلاا ططخل اقفو ةلصلا تاذ تامظنملا عم فئاظولا ةددعتم نيرامت لثم ةكرتشم تاروانم ءارجإ
ئراوطلل. 
 
To incorporate previous experience and global research on disasters when 
devising the response plan. 
ةباجتسلاا ةطخ عضو دنع ثراوكلا نع ةيملاعلا ثاحبلأاو ةقباسلا تاربخلا جمد. 
 
To conduct training and practices in decision-making. 
رارقلا عنص ةيلمع يف تاسرامملاو بيردتلا ءارجإ. 
 
To conduct a comprehensive risk assessment, to include vulnerability and 
available capacity at all levels and by multi-region. 
 يفو تايوتسملا عيمج ىلع ةحاتملا تاردقلاو رطاخملل رثأتلا ةيلباق لمشتل ،رطاخملل لماش مييقت ءارجلإ
نماقط .ةددعتم 
 
Education and training must be both theoretical and practical with emphasis on 
the integration of the theory learned into practice through the use of simulation. 
اهعضوو ةبستكملا ةيرظنلا نيب لماكتلا ىلع زيكرتلا عم ،ايلمعو ايرظن بيردتلاو ميلعتلا نوكي نأ بجيو 
ا مادختسا للاخ نم ذيفنتلا عضومةاكاحمل. 
 
To improve the value of citizen response by preparing citizens for specific 
incidents triggered by terrorism through the provision of regular training, 
campaigns and skill development programmes. 
نطاوملا دادعإ للاخ نم نطاوملا ةباجتسا ةميق نيسحت للاخ نم باهرلإا نع ةمجان ةنيعم ثداوحل ني
تاراهملا ةيمنت جماربو تلامحو ،مظتنملا بيردتلا ريفوت. 
 
To emphasise inclusivity, especially of gender, when providing education. 
ميلعتلا ميدقت دنع ،نيسنجلا نم ةصاخ ،عيمجلا كارشا وا ةيلومشلا ىلع ديكأتلا. 
 
To enhance trust among the people towards the disaster responders. 
ثراوكلل نيبيجتسملا هاجتاب سانلا نيب ةقثلا زيزعت. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To update the organisational structure of the Iraqi General Directorate of Civil 
Defence regularly. 
ظنتلا لكيهلا ثيدحترارمتساب قارعلا يندملا عافدلل ةماعلا ةيريدملل يمي. 
 
To eliminate favouritism, nepotism and bias in work environments. 
لمعلا تائيب يف زيحتلاو ةاباحملاو ةيبوسحملا ىلع ءاضقلا. 
 
To increase the mobilization speed of the various relevant agencies in various 
organizations by updating and testing of inter institutional response. 
ةئبعت ةعرس ةدايز/ دشح  رابتخاو ثيدحت قيرط نع تاسسؤملا فلتخم يف ةقلاعلا تاذ تاهجلا فلتخم
ةكرتشم ةيسسؤم ةباجتسا. 
 
To provide buildings with a specific location address such as a post code. 
ددحملا عقوملا ناونعريفوت ةينبلأل .يديربلا زمرلا لثم 
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Coordination 
قيسنتلا 
To strengthen cooperation between the Arab countries with respect to disaster 
response, preparedness, and recovery. 
شاعتنلااو ،بهأتلاو ثراوكلل ةباجتسلااب قلعتي اميف ةيبرعلا لودلا نيب نواعتلا زيزعت. 
 
To develop a response strategy and implement institutional plans in the disaster 
response arena. 
ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا ةحاس يف ةيسسؤملا ططخلا ذيفنتو ةباجتسلاا ةيجيتارتسا عضو. 
 
To adapt new technologies that have emerged in recent years to enable better 
emergency response coordination, such as wireless mesh networks (CalMesh), 
sensor networks (ASPECT), knowledge management systems (RKBP), 
geographic information systems (CATS), communication standards (CAP), 
incident forecast and analysis programs (SLOSH), peer-to-peer communication 
platforms (Microsoft Groove), collaborative work systems (E-Team), and 
command and control systems (DisasterLAN). 
 تلااح يف ةباجتسلاا قيسنت نيسحت نيكمتل ةريخلأا تاونسلا يف ترهظ يتلا ةديدجلا تايجولونكتلا دامتعا
لثم ،ئراوطلا 
 
Attention should be given to identify and coordinate organisational 
responsibilities. 
ةيميظنتلا تايلوؤسملا قيسنتو ديدحتل مامتها ءلايإ يغبني. 
 
To obtain disaster response expertise connecting groups in institutions. 
تاسسؤملا يف ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا ءاربخ نم ةطبارتم تاعومجم ىلع لوصحلا. 
 
To adopt new frameworks in disaster response that promote coordination, 
flexibility, and rapid response in order to achieve institutional development. 
 قيقحت لجأ نم ةعيرسلا ةباجتسلااو ،ةنورملاو قيسنتلا ززعت يتلا ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا يف ةديدج رطأ دامتعا
ةيسسؤملا ةيمنتلا. 
 
To create a sense of trust among the different stakeholders who are expected to 
work as a team.  
 لخدحاو قيرفك اولمعي نأ عقوتي نيذلا نأشلا باحصأ فلتخم نيب ةقثلا نم روعش ق. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning 
Process 
 
طيطختلا ةيلمع 
Staff at all levels should be heard, consulted and cooperated with when making 
decisions about the response planning process. 
عمسي نأ بجي، نواعتي و راشتسي  طيطختلا ةيلمع نأشب تارارق ذاختا دنع تايوتسملا عيمج ىلع نيفظوملا
ةباجتسلال. 
 
To focus on disaster forecasting and monitoring. 
اهدصرو ثراوكلاب ؤبنتلا ىلع زيكرتلا. 
 
To prepare additional plans for different or unusual types of disaster. 
إةثراكلا نم ةيداع ريغ وأ ةفلتخم عاونلأ ةيفاضإ ططخ دادع. 
 
To conduct regular meetings with all the officers and staff members to improve 
the planning process based on their feedback and experience. 
 ةيلمع نيسحتل نيفظوملاو طابضلا عيمج عم ةمظتنم تاعامتجا دقع ةدترملا ةيذغتلا ساسأ ىلع طيطختلا
مهتاربخو. 
 
To develop a unified plan to respond to the disaster to improve the coordination 
between the authorities and the relevant organizations. 
 تاذ تاسسؤملاو تاطلسلا نيب قيسنتلا نيسحتل ثراوكلل ةباجتسلال ةدحوم ةطخ عضوةلصلا. 
 
To develop mechanisms, procedures, and systems to save and disseminate data 
concerned with hazard and recovery. 
يفاعتلاو رطاخملاب ةينعملا تانايبلا رشنو ظفحل ةمظنأو تاءارجإو تايلآ عضو. 
 
To introduce legislation to prepare plans and programs to reduce the potential for 
disaster risk, as well as find appropriate work environments for staff. 
 ةبسانم لمع تائيب داجيإ كلذكو ،ثراوكلا رطاخم تلاامتحا نم دحلل جماربو ططخ دادعلإ تاعيرشت عضو
نيفظوملل. 
 
The availability of expertise must be taken into account when planning and 
preparing for a disaster. 
ةثراكل ريضحتلاو طيطختلا دنع تاربخلا رفاوت رابتعلاا نيعب ذخؤت نأ بجي. 
 
To adopt a periodic review system of disaster management plans and test them in 
conditions similar to the actual situations of disaster and work to confront them. 
 نم ةيلعفلا تلااحلا كلتل ةلثامم فورظ يف اهرابتخاو ثراوكلا ةرادإ ططخل ةيرودلا ةعجارملا ماظن دامتعا
اهتهجاوم ىلع لمعلاو ثراوكلا. 
 
To develop the plans by practicing, evaluating, and re-planning the plans in order 
to develop appropriately matched institutional responses and be able to determine 
the scale of disaster. 
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 بسانم لكشب ةيسسؤملا تاباجتسلاا ريوطتل ططخلا طيطخت ةداعإو ،مييقت ،ةسرامم للاخ نم ططخلا عضو
.ةثراكلا مجح ديدحت ىلع ةرداق نوكت ناو قباطتم و 
Planning should be "reality based", grounded in what is likely to happen rather 
than on myths and misconceptions long overturned by disaster research. 
ىلإ ةدنتسم" نوكت نا بجي طيطختلا ةيلمع  تافارخلا ىلع سيلو ثدحي نأ نكمي ام ىلع زكترت ،"عقاولا
ع ةليوط ةرتف ذنم تطقسأ يتلا ةئطاخلا ميهافملاوثراوكلا لاجم يف ثوحبلا قيرط ن. 
 
Unambiguous roles and responsibilities should be determined within disaster 
planning structures. 
ثراوكلا ةهجاومل طيطختلا لكايه لخاد اهيف سبل لا تايلوؤسملاو راودلأا ديدحت يغبني. 
 
Specialist 
Staff 
 لمعلا قيرف
صصختملا 
To increase the number of specialised technical staff with competence and 
experience, together with academic qualifications. 
ةيميداكلأا تلاهؤملا عم بنج ىلإ ابنج ،ةربخلاو ةءافكلا يوذ نم نيصصختملا نيينفلا نيفظوملا ددع ةدايز. 
 
Employees' 
Rights 
 
نيفظوملا قوقح 
To employ motivated, competent and experienced staff in disaster response 
management. 
نيفظوم فيظوت نيسمحتم يوذ ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا ةرادإ يف ةربخو ةءافك. 
 
To return to the previous system of daily working hours for civil defence centres 
- 24 hours on and 48 hours off. 
 يندملا عافدلا زكارمل ةيمويلا لمعلا تاعاس نم قباسلا ماظنلا ىلإ ةدوعلا- 24  لمع ةعاس48 .ةحار ةعاس 
 
To improve the approval process to enable staff to complete their education and 
to have their vacation outside Iraq. 
تاقفاوملا ىلع لوصحلا ةيلمع نيسحت  مهتازاجا ىلع لوصحلاو مهميلعت لامكتسا نم نيفظوملا نيكمتل
قارعلا جراخ. 
 
To provide health insurance for staff. 
نيفظوملل يحصلا نيمأتلا ريفوت. 
 
To conduct periodic medical examinations. 
.ةيرودلا ةيبطلا صوحفلا ءارجإ 
 
To replace employees who are unfit to work, by transferring them to the Social 
Welfare organisation or to the morning shift as administrators in civil defence 
centres. These staff could be replaced through the recruitment of new staff. 
لاخ نم ،لمعلل نيلهؤم ريغلا ايبط نيفنصملا نيفظوملا لادبتسايعامتجلاا ةياعرلا ةمظنم ىلإ مهليوحت ل ة
 نم نيفظوملا ءلاؤه نع ةضاعتسلاا نكميو .يندملا عافدلا زكارم يف نييرادإك ةيحابصلا ةبوانملا ىلإ وأ
ددج نيفظوم نييعت للاخ. 
 
Financial 
Resources 
 
ةيلاملا دراوملا 
To allocate budgets based on appropriate estimations. 
 صيصختةبسانم تاريدقت ساسأ ىلع تاينازيملا. 
 
To improve the mechanism to mobilize funds to the necessary departments on 
time. 
بسانملا تقولا يف ةمزلالا تارادلإا ىلإ لاوملأا كيرحتب ةصاخلا ةيللآا نيسحت. 
 
To make the availability of funds flexible depending on each emergency 
requirement. 
ئراوطلا تابلطتم ىلع ادامتعا نرم لاوملأا رفوت لعج. 
 
To make funding authorization process more flexible through the removal of ‘red 
tape’. 
نيتورلا" ةلازإ للاخ نم ةنورم رثكأ ليومتلا صيخرت ةيلمع لعج". 
 
To reduce the number of committees in the budget approval and authorization 
process. 
صيخرتلاو ةينازيملا ىلع ةقفاوملا ةيلمعب ةصاخلا ناجللا ددع صيلقت. 
 
To ensure the availability of regional, national and local financial reserves and 
apply precautionary mechanisms that are known to all concerned parties. 
 فارطلأا عيمجل ةفورعم ةيئاقو تايلآ قيبطتو ةيلحملاو ةينطولاو ةيميلقلإا ةيلاملا تايطايتحلاا رفاوت نامض
ةينعملا. 
 
To analyse the existing and emerging financial mechanisms for disaster risk 
reduction. 
انلاو ةمئاقلا ةيلاملا تايللآا ليلحتثراوكلا رطاخم نم دحلل ةئش. 
 
To increase the contingency reserve appropriations to 10% of the federal budget. 
Unused allocations may be rolled over to subsequent years in order to build up a 
reserve fund for response to large-scale disasters. 
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دامتعا ةدايز ىلإ ئراوطلا يطايتحا تا10٪ .ةيداحتلاا ةنزاوملا نم  ريغلا تاصصخملا عاجرإ نكمي
.قاطنلا ةعساو ثراوكلل ةباجتسلال يطايتحا قودنص ءانب لجأ نم ةقحلا ةنس نم رثكلأ ةمدختسم 
Attention for 
Obligations 
 
تامازتللال هابتنلاا 
تابجاولا وأ 
 
Attention should be given to disaster response rules and principles. 
ثراوكلل ةباجتسلاا ئدابمو دعاوقل مامتهلاا ءاطعإ بجي. 
 
To conduct daily inspection of the work requirements. 
لمعلا تابلطتمل يمويلا شيتفتلا ءارجإ. 
 
Operational groups should contribute in developing general policies and 
guidelines. 
نأ بجي ةماعلا ةيهيجوتلا ئدابملاو تاسايسلا عضو يف ةيذيفنت تاعومجم مهست. 
 
Decision-
Making 
 
رارقلا ذاختا 
To provide central leadership with flexibility in decision-making. 
تارارقلا ذاختا يف ةنورملا عم ةيزكرملا ةدايقلا ريفوت. 
 
To assess situations accurately and stop improvisational behaviour. 
يلاجترلاا كولسلا فقوو ةقدب تلااحلا مييقت. 
 
New control techniques that adapt the principle of reward more than the principle 
of punishment might be needed to raise and sustain morale. 
ا تاينقت ىلإ ةجاحلا ىلع ةظفاحملاو عفرل باقعلا أدبم نم رثكأ باوثلا أدبم عم فيكتت يتلا ةديدجلا ةرطيسل
ةيونعملا حورلا. 
 
Efficient and effective decision-making needs to be investigated and understood, 
learned, practiced, and effectively executed during the response. 
رارقلا عنص ةيلاعفو ةءافكب ةباجتسلاا للاخ لاعف ذيفنتو ،ةسرامم ،ملعت ،مهف ،ققحت ىلا جاتحي. 
 
To develop information and decision management competencies and procedures. 
تارارقلاو تامولعملا ةرادإ تاءارجإو تاءافك ريوطت. 
 
System versatility must be understood by decision makers at a high system level. 
يلاعلا ىوتسملا ىلع رارقلا عانص لبق نم ماظنلل )ةكرحلا ةقلاط( بناوجلا ةيددعت مهف بجي ظنلل.ما 
 
 
Law 
Activation 
 
نوناقلا ليعفت 
 
 
To activate all the decisions of the civil defence services under Law No. 64 of 
1978 amended by Act 44 of 2013. 
 مقر نوناقلا بجومب يندملا عافدلا تامدخل تارارقلا عيمج ليعفت64  ةنسل1978  نوناقلاب لدعملا44  ماعل
2013 
 
To improve clarity and transparency in the mechanisms of the declaration of an 
emergency. 
لا ةلاح نلاعإ تايلآ يف ةيفافشلاو حوضولا نيسحتئراوط. 
 
To produce a unified national legal framework for disaster risk reduction and 
response. 
اهل ةباجتسلااو ثراوكلا رطاخم نم دحلل دحوم ينطو ينوناق راطإ عضو. 
 
To update the structure of the ministries to reflect the laws and regulations of 
disaster management. 
ثراوكلا ةرادإ ةمظنأو نيناوق ىلع سكعنتل تارازولا لكيه ثيدحت. 
 
Risk 
Assessment 
 
رطاخملا مييقت 
To identify, assess, and monitor all types of disaster risks, the priority of these 
risks according to its geographical distribution. 
 دصرو مييقتو ديدحت اهعيزوتلل اقفو رطاخملا هذهل ةيولولاا ءاطعاو ،ثراوكلا رطاخم عاونأ عيمج
يفارغجلا. 
 
To ensure the availability of multiple risk assessments of national and local 
damage in areas including key sectors with a focus on urban centres or 
settlements. 
 رفاوت نامض لمشت تلااجم يف يلحملاو ينطولا نيديعصلا ىلع رارضلأل ةددعتملا رطاخملا مييقت
تانطوتسملا وأ ةيرضحلا زكارملا ىلع زيكرتلا عم ةيسيئرلا تاعاطقلا. 
 
To ensure the existence of necessary institutional capacity to conduct an 
assessment of damage and loss. 
 دوجو نامضرئاسخلاو رارضلأا مييقت ءارجلإ ةمزلالا ةيسسؤملا تاردقلا. 
 
To determine the scale and size of the disaster. 
ةثراكلا مجحو قاطن ديدحت. 
 
 
Thank you for your time and cooperation. For any clarification and queries regarding this study, 
you can contact the researcher or the supervisor of the researcher as set out below:  
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